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A bstract
The aim of this study is to open up a conversation on how counselling and psychotherapy can be 
positioned in relation to teaching and learning. “Is therapy a form of learning for people with a facial 
difference?” is the question that will be explored. The underpinning ethos of the study is an 
emphasis on the place of humanness in the research process.
From the researcher’s ‘interpretative lens’ a paradigm is developed to situate this study’s research 
activity. Meaning emerges in the in-between and known to those involved (ontological perspective); 
knowing is achieved through a relationship with another, it is an interactional subjective activity 
(epistemological perspective), meaning is generated through a reflexive and dialectical process 
(methodological perspective).
To guide the research process, a methodological framework is created that is cognisant with the 
research paradigm. The framework comprises of two cycles of interpretation and supports the notion 
of a multiplicity of meanings. The research method of heuristics generates data for analysis. This 
method through the second cycle of interpretation is expanded to incorporate a post-heuristic 
perspective; where there is a shift from the modernist self at the centre of the meaning making 
process, to a postmodernist de-centred self that is ‘subject to’.
Seventeen people shared their experience of either providing therapy for people with a facial 
difference, or their experience or opinions of therapy for people with a facial difference (this latter 
group included people who live with someone with a facial difference). The findings provided 
evidence of how previous learning experiences can create distortions in meaning making 
perspectives; distortions that are barriers to learning from experience, for they provide a template for 
the evaluation of experience. Therapy provides an opportunity for the uncovering and working 
through of distortions to enable a return to learning fr om experience. For the person to experience 
their experience. Facial difference pre-therapy is a label that can define a person, post-therapy there 
is recognition of how the label does not need to define the person; there is a return to learning from 
experience.
In conclusion a model is developed to enable others to open further conversations on therapy as a 
means to learning. A model premised on Levinas' ethical relationship and Buber’s T-It’ and T- 
Thou’ relationship. Therapy as a means to learning can represent a transition from an T-It’ (non- 
reflective). To an ‘I-Thou’ (reflective). To a responsibility to the other relationship (pre-reflective), 
and each transition offers the potential to return to learning from experience; to be more open to 
experience of the other.
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C hapter One
Introduction to the Study
An Exploration of counselling and psychotherapy as a form of learning, 
with particular reference to people with a facial difference
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an over view of the study. Firstly the aim and background of 
the study will be stated, followed by definitions of the terms ‘counselling and psychotherapy’, 
‘learning’ and ‘facial difference’. Next, the underpinning ethos of the study will be stated, 
followed by the key theoretical concepts and perspectives that inform the selection of a research 
paradigm to guide this study. The development of a methodological framework to be tested out in 
this investigation is discussed next, followed by a discussion of the selected research method 
heuristics. An overview of the findings that emerged will be stated followed by a discussion of the 
limitations of the study. A  summary of the thesis layout concludes this chapter.
1. Aim and background to the study
The overall aim of this study is to open up a conversation about how counselling and 
psychotherapy can be positioned as a form of learning. A  process that encompasses both teaching 
and learning, with a propensity for a return to learning from experience (Loewenthal 1999). 
Intrinsic to the development of this conversation is an exploration of how to study this 
phenomenon, to explicate a methodological framework to guide the investigation. A framework 
that emanates from the underpinning ethos of the study, notably a return to privileging humanness 
as opposed to science and technology. The framework will inform the research design and 
method, which then guides the investigation and culminates in the generation of a model. A  model 
that may assist practitioners to discern the learning activities inherent to their psychotherapeutic 
practice; there is thus the potentiality to open up further conversations about psychotherapy as an 
educational process. Prior to saying more about the study, the researcher will provide some 
background information that was influential in bringing this study to fruition.
This study evolved from previous research by the researcher (Rose 1997), that identified the lived 
experience of people with cleft lips (this study employed a heuristic approach as it allows for the 
researcher to have direct experience of the phenomenon of the study). The conclusion drawn, was 
that there was a need for counselling/psychotherapy service to be made available to this client 
group as part of the team approach to care. An area identified for further study was the need to 
explore the potential merits of such a service, for both service users and providers. This 
recommendation provided the impetus for this study, and a successful application was made to the
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Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) to fund it. The topic area can be located in the 
following ESRC research themes, Lifespan, Lifestyles and Health (Theme 8), and Social 
Inclusion and Exclusion (Theme 9, ESRC 1997). Where the intention is to gain a greater 
understanding of people’s life experiences and the implications for health, and the processes of 
how some individuals are included or excluded from society. It is hoped that through this study, 
the exploration and opening up of a conversation about counselling and psychotherapy as a form 
of learning for people with a facial difference, that a response can be made to these processes.
As the aim of the study is to open up a conversation on developing a way of looking at 
counselling and psychotherapy as a form of learning, a definition of the terms counselling and 
psychotherapy, and learning are provided next. As the focus is on people with facial difference, 
this term will also be defined.
2. Definitions of key terms
Prior to operationalising the key terms of ‘counselling and psychotherapy’, ‘learning’ and ‘facial 
difference’ there is a need to state the parameters of the study. The practice of counselling and 
psychotherapy can involve working with individuals, couples, families and groups, the focus of 
this study is on individual counselling and psychotherapy, and the client group are people with a 
facial difference.
2.1 Counselling and psychotherapy
The terms counselling and psychotherapy can be used interchangeably (Dryden and Feltham 
1992, British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy 2001), however there are others who 
like to make a distinction (Clarkson 1994, Corey 1991). The term psychotherapy or therapy will 
be adopted in this study, and the people engaged in its practice as the therapist and the client.
Psychotherapy is a process usually involving two people, one the therapist the other the client; the 
client seeks out the therapist to assist them with perceived difficulties in living and relating to 
others (Laing 1990). Therapy is about ‘alleviating emotional pain and distress’ (Greenberg and 
Saffan 1987:vii). Ryecroft (1968) defines psychotherapy as any form of talking cure; and Freud is 
identified as the instigator of the ‘talking cure’ (Breuer and Freud 1895). Dialogue is the central 
activity of psychotherapy, and as such a requirement of the therapist is ‘the ability to listen to 
another, the capacity to attend to another human being’ (Heaton 1998:42). Through this attending 
the therapeutic alliance/relationship is developed; and according to Laplanche and Pontalis (1988) 
psychotherapy is about the effective utilisation of the therapist/patient relationship. The potential 
outcome of therapy is a change in perspective, emanating from ‘learning, learning and relearning’ 
(Strupp 1979:130).
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The focus of this study will be on the ‘talking’ aspect of therapy; as opposed to which theoretical 
framework should be employed, and as such the researcher endorses the view: ‘The simple act of 
giving voice to one’s worries and concerns is itself therapeutic’ (Howe 1993:141). Psychotherapy 
is a treatment which, is not confined to any one particular group of people; in essence it is 
applicable for all of humankind. However, this study will focus on people with a facial difference, 
and how the therapy is a form of learning. Although the client group is specific, the aspect of 
learning emerging through therapy is generic.
2.2 Learning
‘Learning may be defined as the process of making new or revised inteipretation of the meaning 
of an experience which guides subsequent understanding, appreciation and action’ (Mezirow 
1990:1). As such the potentiality for education or teaching/learning experiences are infinite; when 
it is acknowledged that all experience is the ‘raw material’ of learning (Usher et al 1997). The 
term lifelong learning encompasses this concept (Williamson 1998, Barnett 1994). Human 
learning takes place in a context and is a reflexive activity (Jarvis et al 1998). The context of 
learning for this study is the practice of therapy, it is learning that is focused on personal knowing.
The theories of learning which inform this inquiry are student-centred (Rogers 1983), which 
acknowledges that adults learn best when motivated and when the subject is of interest to them, 
and their previous learning is recognised. The learner is active in the learning process, and the 
‘teacher’ is a facilitator of the learning process; in essence the learner is learning how to learn. 
Learning that emerges from this form of teaching and learning is referred to as ‘significant 
learning’. Transformative learning (Mezirow 1990) is learning that arises from the process of 
critical reflection. Through this process, previous distortions in learning can be recognised, 
challenged and transformed; new meanings can emerge. Emotional learning is gaining 
recognition, there are claims that it enhances decision making, and personal relationships 
(Weisberg 2000). There is a focus on intentional psychological change (Quigley and Barrett 
1999). Williams and Bendlow (1998) suggest that emotions within the scientific domain are 
viewed as being private and irrational and historically as being feminine. However, with the 
postmodern challenge, there has been a (re)opening of desire and reason; emotions are ‘embodied 
modes of being which involve active engagement with the world and an intimate connection with 
both self and culture’ (Williams and Bendelow 1998:xvi) [original emphasis].
It is suggested here that these three forms of learning in the context of therapy, are not mutually 
exclusive but are interdependent. Significant, transformative and emotional learning are intrinsic 
components of the teaching and learning milieu created within the therapeutic relationship. The 
term teaching is subsumed under the term learning, and is not included in the title for there is an
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unwitting connection with the term teaching and traditional education, whereby the teacher (or in 
the case of therapy the therapist) is the one who imparts knowledge to the student (the client), this 
is at odds with the concepts of learning identified here, and with the practice of therapy.
2.3 Facial difference
According to Bradbury (1996) there are three broad categories of facial disfigurement, congenital,
traumatic and disease processes. Whereas, Hughes (1991) suggests that there are two main
categories, the ‘disfigured’ that have acquired the condition since birth, and the ‘deformed’, those 
who were bora with the condition. Whether the condition has been acquired since birth or been 
present since birth, does not appear to affect significantly how a person copes with this difference 
in appearance (Robinson 1997a, Pruzinsky 1992). The purpose of this study is not to differentiate 
between the origin of the disfigurement, but to focus on the ‘psychological’ affects. The term 
facial disfigurement has been determined by some to have negative connotations, the term ‘visibly 
different’ was preferred by Lansdown et al (1997). The term facial difference (Charkins 1996, 
Elks 1990) will be used in this, because the research participant’s frequently used the word 
‘different’ to describe themselves.
3. Underpinning Ethos of the Study
The privileging of humanness over science and technology underpins this study. The concept of 
Plato’s therapeia, appears pertinent as ‘Plato perceived that education required the revolutionising 
of the entire mind. Plato’s paideusis, or educational discipline, is literally a therapeia’ (Cushman 
1957:xxi) [original emphasis], Plato recognised that central to knowledge was wisdom, which is 
not solely dependent on intelligence and the gathering of facts but also dependent on the ethical. 
Knowledge/cognition could be achieved through dialectical inquiry, whereby there was both the 
discoveiy and the acquisition of knowledge. Wisdom was also dependent on the three cardinal 
virtues of courage, temperance and justice (Cushman 1957); justice is concerned with a preference 
for the good. Therefore, knowledge without consideration of the implication of the good is not 
worthwhile, as it does not relate to the good of the state. As such, ‘the enigma of Platonic wisdom, 
both its attainment and definition, is that there is no possibility of the one (knowledge) without the 
goal of the other (virtue)’ (Cushman 1957:295). In the time since Plato, there has been a 
subordination of humanness (the ability to be in relationship with others) by science and 
technology. Descartes postulated that the mind and body are two separate entities; the Cartesian 
split. Credence was given to the mind over the body, with man’s striving to know more about the 
world and in his quest for the knowable/defmable truth to order the chaos he was thrown into. The 
science and technological explosion of the twentieth century firmly placed it as the dominant 
discourse.
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Education became focused or was built around the notion of teaching students knowable facts 
science and technology reigned supreme. Students would be judged on their ability to 
technologicalise, to learn how to do things, to accumulate facts under the remit of science; a 
knowable truth (Leicester 2000, Usher et al 1997). The learning to think ones thoughts was 
substituted, in the name of science and technology and the grand narratives: Education was in 
essence soulless. Plato recognised the importance of the dialectical; the ability to discuss with 
another, to question, to engage in conversation, to argue: ‘It has the capacity to conduct the mind 
of inquirers from erroneous opinions to the threshold of valid insight and knowledge’ (Cushman 
1957:295). Plato also alluded to how if this dialectic is written there is a deadening, it is in the 
dialogue with another that self-knowledge can flourish. Buber (1965) suggests that if the 
dialectical is written it is inscribed with a different meaning, one that takes away from the real 
relationship.
Thus it could be said that the development of wisdom is not taken from reading books, no amount 
of intelligence can equate with wisdom. For it is dependent on the dialectic, which involves ‘the 
art of learning to look’ (Faulconer and Williams 1990:21). Whereas, Goldberg (1998:215) 
suggests that it is a ‘to and fro exchange of information’. The practice of dialectic is dependent on 
a relationship, for Madison (1988) it is between mind and body, and Faulconer and Williams 
(1990:20) draw on Socrates, and the claim that result of the dialectic does not belong to either one 
(the student) or the other (teacher) rather it is a “gift”. As such it emerges in the in-between. 
Wisdom/virtue is something that is about being, about being in relation to another. And as such 
should take the primary position in education. An education that places science and technology 
first takes away from the development of wisdom. For the technical is all about structuring our 
thoughts, that there is a known reality, a reality that is the same for all, it is a fixed entity. 
Technical knowledge is about repeatability (Usher et al 1997), that if known procedures are 
followed, a set result or a predictable result ensues.
In the researcher’s view, the following questions can be posed, what of the ability to think our 
own thoughts? To put valence to our own experience? Or is our experience a taken-for-granted 
notion, that somehow we will ail experience the same, we will all arrive at the same conclusion 
(this is the technical remit), but what if we do not? What if our experience is outside the 
parameters that is currently known? How do we cope with this disjuncture? That our experience is 
not like others? Are we different? Are we the same? Primacy to the technical, is about a reduction 
to sameness; when in essence putting humanness first would be a return to a celebration of 
difference. Where to be different does not equate to being less than, but is as acceptable: To be 
different does not necessarily lead to marginialisation.
For Friedman (1989:57) therapeia is a form of ‘service or attendance’ or ‘medical or surgical 
treatment or cure’. Whereas (Geddes 1994:41) refers to therapeia as the ‘talking cure’. 
Loewenthal (1999:277) puts forward another view, that it is about ‘meeting’ and that ‘Therapeia 
is the therapy of the soul’. Herein lies the difference between science, which seeks to name and 
know, Friedman (1989:69) suggests that one aspect of technological thinking, is ‘a commitment to 
bringing into being a moment in the future, which is already known’. There is as such an element 
of predictability, whereas, a privileging of humanness is about being with, and being open to the 
possibilities, that may emerge. It’s about being in a ‘not knowing’ position. However, for some it 
would appear that this is difficult to practise, for example Roomy (1984) advocates that his 
programme based on notions of therapeia involved offering rehabilitation training in adult living, 
but he places boundaries on the outcome of the programme, that people following the programme 
will have an increased sense of self-sufficiency and be ready for discharge into the community. 
However, for it to be therapeia there would need to be as Loewenthal (1999:278) suggests that 
therapy as therapeia would be ‘awakening thought’. How can this be achieved? How can we be 
with another and remain open, and to not impose closure? These issues will form a continuing 
thread through the study.
It is argued here that therapeia is the main purpose of education, an education that places science 
and technology secondary to being human; and recognises the fundamental prerequisite to 
learning, is the ability to learn from experience. When there is an inability to learn from 
experience, there is a need for psychotherapy to enable a return to learning from experience 
(Loewenthal 1999). The therapeutic relationship represents a learning milieu; the very practice of 
psychotherapy is therefore a form of learning. The term therapeutic education could be used to 
denote this concept, however, there could be a confusion with the current use of this term, which 
implies that it is about teaching through intervention programmes (see Jacquemet et al 1998, 
Cohler and Zimmerman 1997); where there is an emphasis on ensuring repeatability, and as such 
it is in direct opposition to the central tenet of this discussion. The term therapeia would be more 
suitable; however it is recognised that this term was originally intended to represent the education 
of society. Whereas, the use here would be to that of the individual, and as such represents a 
microcosmic perspective of therapeia.
4. Key theoretical concepts and perspectives
Within the field of researching personal experience, there is a need for the researcher to identify 
their intentionality; how their experiences informs the subject that they study, and the need for 
‘keeping the researcher’s eye on matters’ (Clandinin and Connelly 1994:416). Denzin (1997) also 
appears to support this issue, for he suggests that the qualitative researcher needs to identify what 
they bring to the text and how this informs their interpretation. There is as such a need for the
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researcher to make known their interpretative lens; their previous learning experiences that inform 
their way of looking at a subject. The researcher’s previous learning experiences that inform this 
study are phenomenology and the exploration of the ‘lived experience’; hermeneutical 
interpretation as a way of knowing; psychoanalytic theory and the implications of the unconscious 
for knowing; postmodernism and the questioning of a definitive ‘truth’, rather there are ‘multiple 
truths’, meaning is created in the moment; feminism and the inclusion of the minority voice; the 
ethical relationship of responsibility to the other, based on the work of Levinas. An overview of 
each of these theories/concepts follows, and will be explored further in chapter three.
4.1 Phenomenology
Phenomenology provides a descriptive way at looking at the lived experience; the philosophy 
Husserl is accredited with developing this approach. As this inquiry is about determining whether 
counselling/psychotherapy is a form of learning, there is need to elicit the lived experience of 
those involved, the therapist and client; thus a phenomenological approach is applicable.
Phenomenology is ‘concerned with the relationship between the reality which exists outside our 
minds (objective reality) and the variety of thoughts each of us may have about reality 
(subjectivity) (Spinelli 1989:28). It is also described as the study of‘essences’; and that it is about 
describing not putting meaning to an experience (Spinelli 1989, Merleau-Ponty 1962). For 
Husserl, subjectivity and objectivity exist only in relation to one another (Kearney and Rainwater
1996). Husserl’s interest was ‘things in themselves - a rejection of science’ (Merleau-Ponty 
1962:80); hence the interest for this study.
There appears to be an element of the postmodern in both Merleau-Ponty’s and Husserl’s view of 
phenomenology; Merleau-Ponty (1962:80) states ‘to seek the essence of the perception is to 
declare that perception is, not presumed true, but defined as access to truth’. Whereas, Husserl 
(1935:8) states: ‘No line of knowledge, no single truth may be absolutized and isolated’. As such, 
there is no one definitive truth all that can be achieved is a description of it ‘as it is’ or ‘as it was’.
4.2 Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics is a method of interpretation, how we make sense of how experience, and as such 
aspects of it may be helpful in researching the question posed by this inquiry. The philosopher 
Gadamer identified hermeneutics as a distinct branch of phenomenology. For Gadamer, 
understanding must be ‘historically and linguistically mediated’ (Kearney and Rainwater 
1996:109).
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A  key element in hermeneutics is interpretation, how we make sense of our experience. 
Fundamental to knowing is pre-understanding, which is historically located, and evolves from our 
prejudices, our presuppositions about an object. Gadamer draws on the work of Heidegger, and 
states: ‘Our task is to reconnect the objective world of technology, which the sciences place at our 
disposal and discretion, with those fundamental orders of our being that neither arbitrary nor 
manipulated by us, but rather demand our respect’ (Gadamer 1976:111). He is also suspicious of 
method, seeing it as a kind of substitution for understanding. For him there is a always a tension 
between truth and method, and as such understanding is always in a state of becoming. He also 
rejects the term ‘scientific rigour’, as it is impossible to totally eliminate the subjective. He makes 
reference to the hermeneutical circle, which is ontological, it is neither subjective nor objective, 
but constantly being formed. As such the meaning that is created in the in-between cannot be 
fixed, for there is the potential for it to be in a process of emergence, the explication of the in- 
betweeness is dependent on reflection.
4.3 Psychoanalytic theory
There are according to Bateman and Holmes (1995:17) three areas of psychoanalytic study, which 
reflect the work of Freud; ‘the development of the mind and the influence of early experience on 
adult mental states; the nature and role of unconscious mental phenomena; and the theory and 
practice of psychoanalytic treatment, particularly transference and countertransference’. 
Psychoanalytic theory provides a framework for meaning making which recognises the influence 
of the unconscious, and how this impacts on relationships with others, and how we make sense of 
a situation. The recounting of meaning making is difficult to elaborate for another, for it will 
always be contaminated or enriched by the unconscious. An approach to research that embraces 
subjectivity, would acknowledge how the ‘unconscious is considered a fundamental aspect of 
human experience, without which meanings cannot be explored’ (Walsh 1996:360) and thus has 
the potential to enrich meaning making. Whereas, an objectified stance to research would be to 
see the unconscious as either not important, or at the very least a contaminating influence, to be 
negated in the name of scientific rigour (Walsh 1996).
4.4 Postmodernism
This is a concept, which is difficult to define, but a perspective that acknowledges that there is not 
one definitive meaning but multiple meanings, and the meaning generated is dependent on the 
context and the people. Meaning as such is created in the in-between; between the two 
interlocutors involved; meaning is created in the moment, and can be re-created with each 
encounter. Language is the medium for communicating meaning, however, ‘words are useful to 
use because we can use them to simplify and ‘freeze’ the chaos and complexities of our 
surroundings, blit that is all they can do’ (Robinson 1999:17). But how do we communicate our
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experience to the other if we are limited by the words/language used? And if the text is open to 
multiple interpretations, then how to represent the multiplicity of meanings generated by this 
study? A  deconstruction of the text offers a way; Parker (1999:2) draws on the work of Derrida 
and states:
‘Deconstruction is unravelling works through a kind of anti-method which resists 
definition and prescription, for it is looking at how a ‘problem’ is produced the way it 
is rather than wanting to pin it down and say this  is what it really is’ [original 
emphasis].
In a way it is about revealing hidden truths, and there is a need to be open to the process of 
critical inquiry and reflection. In relation to the focus of this inquiry, there is a need to determine 
the meaning created ‘in-between’ the client and therapist.
4.5 Feminism
Within the research community, the voice of feminism is a perspective that allows for the minority 
voice to speak (Stanley and Wise 1979, Rheinharz 1993). Feminism, is ‘the analysis of old 
knowledge and the source of new knowledge: it makes you think, ’ (Stanely 1997:1). Rheinhartz 
(1992) is keen to point out that feminism is not a research method, rather it is a perspective, and 
there is a need to use multiple research methods, and to address the reader. Whereas Lather (1991) 
suggests there is a need to invite the reader into the text, and that the text should represent multiple 
voices, relying on quotes, for the reader to determine/locate for themselves how the researcher 
develops their argument. From a postmodern feminist perspective, there is a ‘sensitivity to 
differences and plurality of interpretations of human experience’ (Nicholson 1995:83).
Feminism offers a return to emotions; and as Goldenberg (1993:13) comments in her book 
Resurrecting the Body, the mechanised society produced a ‘deadness’ due to ‘the progressive 
dissolution of the social, physical context for human emotions - from the dissolution of our human 
bodies’. The upsurge in the interest in emotional learning can be partially attributed to feminism 
(Williams and Benedelow 1999). It could be said that a return to emotions as a relevant way of 
knowing offers the potential for an awakening from this ‘deadness’.
The client group that are the focus of this inquiry, are people with facial difference, as such they 
represent a minority voice, and the inclusion of a feminist perspective acknowledges the inherent 
difficulty in re-presenting the voice of the other.
4.6 Ethics
An issue that surrounds and involves moral decisions is the domain of ethics. The philosopher 
Nietzsche is the ‘thinker who most radically challenged traditional moral thinking and placed 
human development at the centre of a value creating system of thought’ (Thompson 1994:131).
12
Whereas, Gans (1997), suggests that our ethical position stems from ‘responsible relatedness’; and 
as such it is based on the Levinasian point of view of putting the Other first. As such ethics is a 
‘regard for other others that becomes a part of our sense of ourselves’ (Levine 1999:73).
According to Kearney and Rainwater (1996:112) the philosopher Levinas focused on the ‘priority 
of ‘otherness’, a radical alterity that demands our ethical response’; also he raised the question of 
‘examining the lived experience without presuppositions’. But what are the implications of this 
for research? Can we meet with another without presuppositions? These questions are 
fundamental to this research, which focuses on the lived experience of giving and receiving 
therapy. In relation to the activity of therapy, the meeting of two people; Loewenthal (1996:380) 
states: ‘we should be concerned with justice on a case by case basis, for real justice cannot be 
appropriated or territorialized, instead, as with one’s clients, one has to be just in the moment with 
another’. A challenge for this study is the representation of this ‘moment with another’ the 
meeting of the therapist and the client, and the meeting of the researcher with the research 
participant.
All theories and perspectives appear to support the notion that meaning is not a universal given, a 
fixed entity, rather it is an ongoing process. We each create our own meaning from experience and 
are influenced by previous experiences. There is also a questioning of the privileging of science 
and technology.
5. Research Paradigm
Research is an activity that involves generating knowledge, and a research paradigm ‘represents a 
worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the “world”, the individual’s place in it, and 
the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994:107) 
[original emphasis]. Within the research community, it is generally considered that there are two 
main research paradigms, positivistic (privileging science and technology) and post-positivistic 
(privileging humanness) both of which will enable the researcher to address the questions that 
they pose. As this study is premised on a return to the primacy of humanness, the post-positivistic 
paradigm will inform this study.
Each paradigm is composed of three interdependent components ontological (what is there that 
can be known), epistemological (relationship between knower and what can be known) and 
methodological (how to find out about the assumptions made about what can be known) (Guba 
and Lincoln 1994). Following a review of the current paradigms within the overarching term of 
post-positivistic, the researcher develops a research paradigm drawing on aspects of critical theory 
and constructivism to guide this study, a paradigm that is more cognisant with her ‘world-view’.
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An overview of this research paradigm is provided, and it will be further explored in chapter 
three. The ontological perspective is relativist, meaning emerges in the in-between. The 
epistemological perspective is that knowing is subjective, that it is apprehended through 
relationships with others, as such it is an interactional subjective phenomenon. There is a blurring 
of the ontological and epistemological perspectives, for with the recognition that meaning 
emerges in the in-between, and dependent on the two interlocutors involved, there is the 
possibility of meanings being multiple. The methodological perspective is dialectical and 
reflexive; it is through this back and forth process that the multiplicity of meanings can emerge. 
Meanings are not fixed; rather there is the potential for re-presenting the interactional subjective, 
situated meanings that emerge in the in-between.
6. Developing a methodological framework to be tested out in this study
Qualitative research can be ‘an interactive and transformational process in which the researcher 
seeks to learn about interpret life experiences’ (Sword 1999:270). This activity involves a 
relationship between the researcher and the researched; and as such there is the ethical 
responsibility to this relationship and of the meaning created in the in-between (Fine 1998). 
According to Levinas (1989) an ethical relationship is centred on notions of putting the other first. 
As such it ‘disrupts knowing with a higher call, a responsibility to the other’ (Cohen 1986:5). It is 
suggested here that there is a need for the researcher to be mindful of what is happening in the in- 
between.
In the research paradigm developed for this study, the meanings generated from and through an 
interactional subjective process are co-created between the people involved, and the emerging 
meaning/knowledge belongs neither to one nor the other. Rather it is created in the in-between, 
and it is not an entity that can be rationalised, it is just there, in the moment. Therefore the 
framework, will need to support the notion of meaning created in the in-between: In-between the 
researcher and the research subject (data generation), the researcher and the data (data analysis), 
the researcher and the text (research report).
The framework (discussed more fully in chapter three) comprises nine stages: (1) Pre- 
understanding: the interpretative lens of the researcher - theories and perspectives and experience 
of the phenomena of the inquiry, these inform the research question; (2) which informs the 
research design and method; (3) which informs the data generation, which emerges in-between the 
researcher and research participant; (4) data analysis - emerges in-between the researcher and the 
data; (5) from the back and forth process between the data generated and the analysis a primary 
construction is created, which represents the researchers understanding of the phenomena of the 
inquiry; (6) this informs the pre-understanding of the next construction, the researcher revisits the
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primary construction, and identifies what might have been left out, as such there is a questioning 
of the meaning generated; there is a second cycle of interpretation, (7) a secondary construction is 
the outcome of this process, it emerges in-between the researcher and the text; (8) this creates 
further understanding of the phenomena, that provides pre-understanding for the next step (9) 
which is a critique of the research process. This framework will be tested out in the investigation 
that forms part of the exploration of therapy as a form of learning. There is a need to select a 
method to inform the research process.
7. Method
To explore the question posed ‘Is counselling and psychotherapy a form of learning for people 
with a facial difference?’ the researcher chose to elicit the ‘lived experience’ of people involved in 
the therapeutic process, therapists (with experience of working with people with a facial 
difference) and clients (with a facial difference). To elicit additional information on what may 
precipitate the need for therapy, people with a facial difference who had not had therapy, and 
those with living someone with a facial difference (who may or may not have had the experience 
of therapy), would be invited to share their views on the place of therapy for people this client 
group. The data generated analysed to identify learning processes intrinsic to the process of 
therapy, and distortions in learning that may precipitate the need for therapy.
The methodological framework will be applied to Moustakas’ (1990) heuristic research method 
(the selection of this method will be discussed in chapter four, and chapter five provides a detailed 
account of the method in process). The central tenet of this approach is the explication of the lived 
experience of the phenomena under investigation, and as such it is generally regarded to fall 
within the field of phenomenology (Moustakas 1994, Patton 1990). However, it is suggested here 
that although the central premise is on description, and the reliance on using the research 
participant’s words, there is ultimately a element of interpretation, which is hermeneutical, and 
such this method is a phenomenological hermeneutic investigation. The second cycle of 
interpretation, and the critique of the research process required by the methodological framework 
employed provides an opportunity for heuristics to be expanded to a post-heuristic approach to 
research.
8. Findings
The presentation of findings from the first cycle of interpretation is found in chapter six (the 
guidelines of the heuristic method are followed). Initially themes are presented within the two 
areas of focus of the study. The first area is the experience of giving and receiving therapy (three 
themes emerged, reasons for seeking therapy, the therapeutic experience, and the outcome of 
therapy). The second area, experiences that may precipitate the need for therapy comprised of two
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main groups, parents (two themes emerged, reactions to giving birth to a baby with a facial 
difference, and ongoing concerns); and people with a facial difference (four themes emerged, 
stories about their birth, reactions from others, reactions to others, and effects of difference).
There was evidence of significant learning, and the changes correlated with Cell (1984:vi) view, 
and were in relation to a change ‘in behaviour, in interpretation, in autonomy or creativity’. It is 
suggested here that significant learning is an overarching term for the learning that is intrinsic to 
therapy; both transformative and emotional learning are subsumed within the term. 
Transformative learning is a reflexive process, that encompasses uncovering and working through 
distortions in previous learning (Mezirow 1990); distortions are banders to learning (Williamson 
1998, Boud and Walker 1993, Claxton 1984). Previous learned responses to a situation are not 
just within the cognitive domain; there is also an affective domain, (Bouton et al 2001, Quigley 
and Barrett 1999). There is such an element of emotional learning involved in the process of 
exploring barriers to learning; feelings are articulated in language.
Following on from the description of the themes, a composite depiction that is representative of 
the phenomenon as experienced by the group of research participants is provided. An exemplary 
portrait that focuses on one person’s experience of therapy follows this. It is in these two sections 
that the conversation of therapy as a form of learning is developed further. A  creative synthesis 
concludes the findings, and this is re-presentation of the researcher’s understanding of the 
phenomenon that has emerged tlirough the process of the investigation. There was recognition of 
how previous learning experiences can influence a person’s ability to learn from experience. 
There was sense pre-therapy that facial difference defined the person, therapy challenged this 
perspective, and distortions that created this template were worked through, post-therapy the 
person was more open to the possibility of experiencing their own experience. Facial difference 
need not define the person. Through the learning processes intrinsic to psychotherapy, there was 
the potentiality to return to learning from experience; therapy can be seen to be a reparative 
discourse.
The discussion of these findings is found in chapter seven. The understanding gained in chapters 
six and seven form the pre-understanding of the next cycle of interpretation required by the 
methodological framework employed. This culminates in a secondary construction, which is 
found in chapter eight. The researcher deconstructed the two concepts that emerged from the 
creative synthesis, ‘facial difference does not need to define the person’ and ‘psychotherapy is a 
reparative discourse to return to learning from experience’. From this conversation, the concept of 
therapy as therapeia was explored, and this is premised on the ethical relationship as advocated by
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Levinas, Gans (1997:30) refers to this relationship in therapy as ‘responsible relatedness’ and this 
is the term used here.
A model is developed to enable others to open further conversations on therapy as a means to 
learning. A  model premised on the Levinasian ethical relationship and Bubers' (1965) ‘I-It’ and 
‘I-Thou’ relationship. A  relationship that may be helpful when exploring notions of responsibility 
to the other (Greenwood et al 2001). Therapy as a means of learning can represent a transition 
from an ‘I-It’ to an ‘I-Thou’ relationship, to a ‘responsible relatedness’ relationship, with each 
transition offering the potential to return to learning from experience; to be more open to 
experience of the other.
9. Limitations of the study
The empirical part of the study was limited by the parameters imposed; one-to-one therapy as 
opposed to family therapy, couples, and/or therapeutic groups. The focus is on people with a 
facial difference, this is not to say that therapy as a means to learning is only applicable to this 
client group, rather this is this study’s emphasis.
In the field of facial difference, although it is recognised that the origin of the facial difference 
does not appear to effect a person’s psychological response (Bradbury 1996, Pruzinsky 1992, 
MacGregor 1984). It should be noted that this study is limited to people who have a congenital 
form of facial difference, predominantly those with a cleft lip and/or palate, the most common 
form of congenital facial difference (Leonard et al 1991). Potential confounding variables are 
identified, however, they are not isolated, and the focus is on the lived experience. This focus
represents another limitation for there is as such a reliance on anecdotal evidence of therapy as a
form of learning, as opposed to the presentation of case study material i.e. of a therapy session.
To conclude this study, a model is developed to enable practitioners to develop further 
conversations on therapy as a meanings to learning. This model has not been tested out in 
psychotherapeutic practice, for it is presented here as work in progress.
10. Thesis layout
The thesis comprises of ten chapters, the first providing an introduction to the study. Chapter two 
focuses on the three literature reviews, counselling/psychotherapy, learning, and facial difference. 
In summary there is a discussion of how the literature reviews inform the research question, and 
culminates in the development of working definitions of the three forms of learning that are 
considered to be intrinsic to the process of therapy.
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Chapter three is on developing a methodological framework. Initially there is a discussion on 
research and the making of a case for how a research paradigm needs to be informed by the 
researcher’s interpretative lens. This paradigm informs the methodological framework developed 
to guide the research process. The discussions are premised on how with a privileging of 
humanness, there is an increasing recognition of the impact of the researcher on the study, and the 
tensions involved in re-presenting the other. Chapter four is a discussion on the selection of a 
research method to structure the generation of, and analysis of, data. Chapter five is how the 
selected method of heuristics was employed by the researcher to generate and analyse data.
Chapters six, seven and eight contain discussions on the findings of the study. Initially, chapter six 
contains the primary construction, the understanding gained through the first cycle of 
interpretation of the methodological framework. The findings are presented as per the heuristic 
method, the themes that emerged from the individual depictions, a composite depiction that 
represents the groups experience, an exemplary portrait that captures the lived experience of one 
person. A  creative synthesis concludes the presentation of findings, and is a representation of the 
researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon following the four stages of data analysis. Chapter 
seven contains a discussion of these findings (the headings of chapter six are used to structure this 
discussion) and comments are supported by the three literature reviews. Chapter eight is the 
secondary construction, the understanding gained during the second cycle of interpretation of the 
methodological framework. Two phrases from the creative synthesis were deconstructed, ‘facial 
difference need not define the person’ and ‘psychotherapy as a reparative discourse to return to 
learning from experience’. From this discussion it was determined that therapy is a means to 
learning. A  model is developed to enable further conversations to be developed on psychotherapy 
as a means to learning; a return to learning from experience.
Chapter nine is a critique of the research process and comprises of a discussion on the research 
design and method, data generation and analysis, and the primary and secondary constructions. 
Overall there was a view that the methodological framework had assisted with the privileging of 
humanness, however it is recognised that there are many tensions involved in this process. One 
way of working with these tensions is for the researcher to make transparent the choices made 
during the research process. Chapter ten provides a summary of, and implications of the 
investigation, and suggestions for further study, together with an identification of the researcher’s 
personal learning.
Conclusion
The question posed by this study is counselling/psychotherapy a form of learning for people with 
a facial difference? The key terms were defined, counselling and psychotherapy, and in this study
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either the term psychotherapy or therapy will be used. Three learning theories/perspectives that 
are premised on personal knowing inform this study, significant, transformative and emotional 
learning. Facial difference is a generic non-pejorative term, irrespective of the nature or origin of 
the facial disfigurement.
The underpinning ethos of the study is the privileging of humanness as opposed to science and 
technology. Science and technology are premised on repeatability, certainty and ‘sameness’, 
whereas, humanness is premised on unpredictability, uncertainty and ‘difference’. The 
implications for research are the need for the researcher to make known how they make sense of/ 
or interpret their world; to share their interpretative lens. The six theories/perspectives that inform 
the researcher’s interpretative lens were briefly introduced. From this it is possible to determine a 
research paradigm that correlates with this lens. A  research paradigm was developed for this 
study, and from this a methodological framework was created that will be tested out in this 
research investigation.
The method chosen for the generation and analysis of data is heuristics, however, with the second 
cycle of interpretation required by the methodological framework, the method is expanded and is 
post-heuristic. The findings of the study support that therapy can be seen to be a means to learning 
for people with a facial difference. A  model for looking at therapy as therapeia was developed to 
enable further conversations on therapy as a means to learning, to be initiated.
The next chapter, contains the three literature reviews and the implications for the research 
question.
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C hapter Two
Literature Reviews
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature pertinent to the research question: Is 
counselling/psychotherapy a form of learning for people with facial difference? Thus there are three 
reviews, counselling and psychotherapy, learning and facial difference. The first section provides a 
discussion on counselling and psychotherapy as learning, (as referred to in chapter one, the term 
psychotherapy or therapy will be used as a generic term for counselling and psychotherapy). The 
therapeutic relationship unites all therapeutic approaches, and this will be explored next. Followed 
by an overview of the research implications for assessing the efficacy of therapy, a summary of the 
discussion concludes this section.
The review on learning focuses on learning theories and perspectives that may inform therapy as a 
form of learning, firstly the concept of lifelong learning will be introduced, followed by a discussion 
of student-centred learning with an emphasis on significant learning. Transformative learning and 
emotional learning are also considered to be learning approaches that may inform the discussion as 
they too emphasise learning as a personal phenomenon; learning as a process. Potential barriers to 
learning are explored, and a discussion of how the learning approaches have the potential to inform 
the research question concludes this section. The review on facial difference focuses initially on an 
exploration of the concept of facial difference, followed by a review of the literature with reference 
to counselling and psychotherapy. A  discussion of previous research methods and designs is 
provided, and the implications for the research question concludes this section.
A discussion of how the three literatures inform the research question is provided, and in conclusion, 
it is believed that significant learning, transformative learning and emotional learning are forms of 
learning intrinsic to the practice of therapy; and the potential outcome is a return to learning from 
experience.
1. Literature review: Counselling and Psychotherapy
The review will firstly focus on counselling and psychotherapy as a form of learning, followed by a 
discussion of the therapeutic relationship. How the efficacy of psychotherapy is measured is briefly 
discussed, and a summary of the discussion concludes this section.
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1.1 Counselling and Psychotherapy as form of learning
A review on the term learning brought up a limited number of references. The terms unlearning 
(Albee 1999, Elliott 1995, Gross and Fugstein 1992, Olders 1989, Bruno 1974, van de Veer 1974) 
and relearning (Traux and Carkhuff 1965, Meerloo 1958, Walker 1957, Ennesis 1951, Mackinnon 
1950, Hunt 1948) were used in connection with learning. Whereas, Rogers (1961) and Bernstein 
(1992) focused solely on the concept of learning. The focus of the unlearning was either in relation 
to previous ‘inappropriate’ learning. (Elliott 1995, van de Veer 1974), or working through (Gross 
and Fugstein 1992), or emotions (Albee 1999). Relearning was either in relation to behavioural or 
emotional competencies for the client (Hunt 1948), and the art of listening for therapists (Drus 
2000).
It appears that relearning was the term of preference before the seventies, to then be replaced by
unlearning. The term unlearning implies that there has been some failure to learn correctly, therefore
there is a need to ‘undo’. Whereas, relearning implies that there is need for a refresher course as the
learning has become forgotten, therefore there is a need to ‘redo’. In his definition of psychotherapy,
Hunt (1948:68) favours relearning, he states:
‘The goal of psychotherapy is to make uncomfortable people more comfortable and to make 
them more self-sufficient socially and emotionally. In any successful psychotherapy there 
must be relearning of the behavioral or emotional variety’.
Whereas, there is a combining of the terms by Strupp (1979:130) for he states:
‘Psychotherapy of all varieties is made up of learning, unlearning and relearning experiences 
that can be mediated in different ways and that the task of the future is to spell out the 
conditions that promote or impede such learning’.
Rogers (1967) suggests that the whole process is a learning one, learning about oneself. Whereas, it 
can be learning in an interpersonal context (Strupp 1986); learning new skills (Brammer et al 1993); 
learning new meanings (Gergen and Kaye 1992). Gordon (1999:10) appears to be in agreement that 
therapy is a learning process, but suggests that ‘therapy is in part a learning about the language of 
emotions, not in some sense of being instructed or told’ but that it is about the ‘exploration of 
meaning’. It could be said that therapy is emotional work, for therapy is about getting in touch with 
emotions (Hazier and Barwick 2001, Goncalves and Machado 2000, Rice and Greenberg 1991, 
Greenberg and Safran 1987, Orlinsky and Howard 1986).
Therapy is also considered to be a ‘kind of work on the self (Kegan 1994:235); ‘an instrument for 
self-understanding’ (Fromm 1994:46); to be more aware of self and others (Spinelli 1994); to 
increase an individuals ‘freedom of choice and responsibility in the conduct of his life’ (Szasz 
1990:172). Whereas, Greenberg and Saffran (1987:vii) suggest that the client who enters therapy 
usually has a problem with emotions, ‘all psychotherapy deals in one way or another with 
alleviating emotional pain and distress’. They also suggest that it is through the therapeutic
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relationship that emotional restructuring can take place. The link between all therapeutic approaches 
is the therapeutic relationship (McLeod 1998), and this will be explored next.
1.2 Therapeutic relationship
This alliance or the therapeutic relationship is fundamentally about ‘two people talking together’ 
(Fromm 1994:121). There is a view that the therapeutic relationship and therapeutic process are 
intertwined. Bugental (1990:189) suggests that ‘Psychotherapy is the process of two people 
struggling with the issues of being alive in this world at this time’. Whereas, Zeig and Munnion 
(1990:14) suggest that the ‘process is idiosyncratic and determined by the interaction of the 
patient’s and therapist’s preconceived positions’ [original emphasis]. This perspective appears to 
take into consideration that each person in the therapeutic relationship has their autobiographical 
details which they bring to the encounter; the therapist their theoretical training and life experiences, 
and the client that which is troubling them.
Holmes (2000:452) appears to support this view, for he states: ‘Psychotherapy’s unique 
contribution is that it provides a language with which to talk and think about relationships’ [original 
emphasis]. It would appear that this relationship is linked with the outcome of therapy, for according 
to Parry and Richardson (1996:71) ‘Clinical effectiveness of therapy depends on the patients ability 
to engage in a therapeutic alliance and the skill of the therapist’. Margison (2001:180) supports this 
view and states: ‘The only robust predictor of outcome is the therapeutic alliance early on in the 
therapy’.
However, it is difficult to measure the outcome of therapy, as the meaning that emerges in the 
therapeutic relationship does not belong to either the client or the therapist, rather it is what emerges 
in the in-between; it is a shared understanding. Symmington (1986:17) states of this phenomena: 
‘Truth does not exist as some external idea, as Plato thought, but as a reality that exists in between: 
in between two persons seeking it, in between psychoanalysis, sociology, psychology, economics 
and religion’ [original emphasis]. He also suggests that when this ‘truth’ emerges there is a change 
in both the client and the therapist.
For Guidano (1991:62) the meaning and therefore the change that occurs in the process of therapy is 
based on emotions, and that the therapeutic relationship is crucial, for it is ‘a real, living, interaction 
that is, one in which cognitive and emotional aspects are continuously intertwined, its emotional 
aspects produce a facilitating effect for the assimilation of new data or reframing existing ones’ 
[original emphasis]. It could be said that within this definition there are elements of unlearning, 
relearning and learning. Izard (1991:281) refers to how change in the realm of emotions is more 
about ‘insight’ and ‘restructuring’; and ‘the role of emotions in psychotherapy depends in part on the
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therapist’s conception of emotions’. Saffan and Greenberg (1991:11) appear to be in agreement 
when they suggest that it is the quality of therapeutic relationship that provides a medium for ‘the 
exploration and synthesis of new emotional experience’.
Freud defined his therapy as the talking cure (Breuer and Freud 1895); and as such then central to it, 
are the narratives the clients tell in the process (Goncalves and Machado 2000, Legg 1998, 
Papadopoulos and Byng-PIall 1997, Pilgrim 1997, Gergen and Kaye 1992, Howard 1990, McLeod
1997). It is argued that narrative therapy is a component of any type of therapy (McLeod 1998, 
Papadopoulos and Byng-Hall 1997), and it is suggested here that a fundamental precept of the 
therapeutic relationship is the narrative of the client. According to McLeod (1998:159) ‘narrative 
approaches to counselling have gained a popularity over the past decade, and many counsellors are 
beginning to employ narrative techniques in their work’.
Narrative therapy, is ‘a way of working that tries not to privilege specific models, theories or taken-
for-granted assumptions about human nature, and remains curious and questioning about how
people construct their lives and tell their life stories’ (Speedy 2000:361). Therapy provides an
opportunity for the individual to tell their story and for new meaning to emerge (Speedy 2000,
McLeod 1998, Howard 1990). Holmes (2000:457) is in agreement and states:
‘psychotherapists are people who are trained to tune into different narrative styles - both 
their own and those of their patients - and to identify inauthenticity, defensiveness, 
incoherence, evasion and all the other aspects of distorted or falsified stories, and to help 
their clients to move towards a self-authorship and personal authority that has the ring of 
truth’.
Thus it would appear that when defining psychotherapy, there is an inherent supposition that the 
process involves telling one’s personal story, and through the communication of this with the 
therapist and the subsequent development of the therapeutic relationship, there is the propensity for 
the generation of new meaning. Learning is an integral part of the process. It would also, seem 
essential when considering the practice of psychotherapy, there is a need to question the efficacy of 
such a practice.
1.3 Effectiveness of therapy
A major issue regarding psychotherapy is, is it effective? A  question that has been researched since 
the 1920’s (May 1992). On the one hand, all therapeutic approaches can claim to have some success 
(Eaton 1998:422), and that this ‘depends largely on the personal qualities and skills therapists bring 
to therapy’. On the other hand, Freedheim (1992) suggests that of research undertaken to determine 
the effect of psychotherapy, there is a 50- 75% success rate. Whereas, Masson (1988:287) suggests 
that it is a myth to believe that ‘all therapy helps, regardless of the theoretical orientation of the
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therapist’ [original emphasis]. Roth and Fonagy (1996) advise caution, as the difficulty in 
researching such a complex phenomenon may impact on the ensuing results.
Researching psychotherapy is very challenging, (Parry 2000, McLeod 2000, Parry and Richardson 
1996, Garfield 1992). There is recognition of how quantifiable studies are more suited to measuring 
the outcome of psychotherapy and qualitative studies for the process of psychotherapy (Turpin 
2001, McLeod 2000); there is an increasing recognition that a combination of the two would be 
more illuminative of the effectiveness of psychotherapy (McLeod 2000, Pilgrim 1997, Parity and 
Richardson 1996). This combining of methods comes under the umbrella term of pluralism; and 
there is a need for the link between client benefit and empirical data to be made explicit (Norcross 
and Freedheim 1992). Whereas, Pilgrim (1997:22) suggests that if therapy is a form of ‘situated 
social practice’ it ‘can only be understood within a qualitative framework but equally it can only be 
justified by posing quantitative questions’ [original emphasis].
Another facet to be considered of research in psychotherapy is that, research findings mean different 
things to different people (Roth and Fonagy 1996); and there is a need to identify and state the 
nature of evidence that will be used to evaluate psychotherapy (Tantam 2001). Evidence-based 
health care is about the providers of a service, being able to demonstrate that the service provided is 
based on reasoned decisions; and as such the service is effective (Richardson 2001, Rustin 2001, 
Barkham and Mellor-Clark 2000, Parity and Robinson 1996, Roth and Fonagy 1996); and that there 
is constant review in light of further evidence (Mace and Moorey 2001). A  key issue to support 
evidence-based practice is the quality of the practitioners, and this is in part determined by the 
quality of the training provision (Mace and Moorey 2001, Tantam and van Deurzen 1999, Roth and 
Fonagy 1996). Parry and Richardson (1996:71) acknowledge that ‘the multi-disciplinary nature of 
all types of psychotherapy provision creates a complex situation for framing, qualifications and 
regulation of practice’.
The model of training that was founded on the psychoanalytic approach, has elements of didactic 
course work, supervised treatment of patients, and personal therapy (Binder 1999, Abram 1992); 
these encompass the three elements required for either registration with United Kingdom Council 
for Psychotherapist, or accreditation with the British Association for Counselling and 
Psychotherapy. Whereas, Charles-Edwards et al (1989:402) identify four components of training 
‘theory, skill practice, counselling under supervision, personal development activities, including the 
experience of being a client’. The discussion of theory and its application to practice should ideally 
be supported by research evidence (McLeod 1998), he also suggests that training is an area that is 
under represented in the field of research. Training should not be a one off exercise, but should 
continue throughout the therapist’s professional working life (Nel 1996, Clarkson 1994).
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1.4 Summary
Therapy is a multi-faceted phenomenon, people seek therapy when they are having problems with 
living and relating and fundamental to this is how they feel, emotions are at the heart o f 
psychotherapy. Through the therapeutic relationship the client explores how they make sense o f 
their experience, this exploration incorporates both behavioural and emotional components as they 
are mutually interdependent. Through the process o f therapy, the client unlearns unhelpful ways o f 
responding, and Ieams news ways o f  responding. Therapy as such is a learning process that involves 
elements o f unlearning and relearning.
The efficacy o f therapy is difficult to research for the identification o f  the element o f change is 
difficult to isolate, studies have therefore tended to focus on outcome measures that can be recorded. 
The process o f therapy is more difficult to elicit, for there are a multiplicity o f factors involved. An 
area that is o f considerable importance is the qualify o f  the therapeutic relationship, and this is 
dependent on the therapist’s ability to provide an environment where the client is able to tell their 
story, and to be open to what emerges in the in-between. The ability to do this is dependent on the 
training and supervision received, and their commitment to ongoing professional development.
2. Literature review: Learning
The aim o f this section is to review learning theories/approaches that may inform the discussion o f 
psychotherapy as a form o f learning. Initially lifelong learning will be defined as it appears a 
pertinent starting place for the exploration o f learning as appropriate to psychotherapy. The premise 
o f this study is to place humanness primary to science and technology and that psychotherapy is a 
form o f learning that enables a return to learning from experience. The exploration o f learning 
theories/perspective therefore needs to encompass learning from experience. With this caveat in 
mind, the following three theories will be discussed, student-centred learning, transformative 
learning and emotional learning. Barriers to and distortions to learning from experience will then be 
discussed, and a consideration of how these approaches to learning have the potential to inform the 
research question, concludes this section.
2.1 Lifelong Learning
There is a view that education encompasses the whole person, and the sense they make out o f their 
experience, as experience is part o f living, then so is learning a life-long process (Holford and Jarvis 
2000, Jarvis et al 1998, Barnett 1994, Cell 1984, Rogers 1961); ‘ learning is continuous, it builds on 
lived experience’ (Williamson 1998:21). Both Barnett (1994) and Williamson (1998) refer to the 
concept o f Habermas’ life-world, to describe how socialisation and learning takes place in the 
community. These processes are continuous and synonymous with life itself; it is about people’s life 
stories and how they confer meaning. Habermas (1968:102) suggests that the learning process is
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‘ initiated into the communication system o f a social life-world by means o f self-formative 
processes’ . It is communicative learning about understanding meaning, as opposed to instrumental 
learning which is about learning ‘how to do’ (Mezirow 1990). A key aspect is the need for reflective 
knowing, and Barnett (1994:112) coined the phrase ‘meta-learning’ which is ‘a willingness to 
critically examine one’ s own learning’ . Williamson (1998:173) acknowledges that for some people 
the insight required for this type o f learning ‘ is almost impossible; they require the help o f therapy’ .
The potentially for learning is infinite when it is acknowledged that all experience is the raw 
material o f learning (Usher et al 1997). Also, there is not a definitive state o f knowing to be 
achieved, rather it is about being open to experience, to not place foreclosure due to having ‘ been 
there before’ ; learning is not the arrival at a particular destination, it is an ongoing journey (Jarvis 
1997, Drew 1993).
2.2 Student-Centred Learning
Rogers (1983) wrote his seminal text on his theory o f learning: Freedom to Learn for the 80’s, his 
central premise was the concept o f self-directed (or person-centred) learning, whereby student’s take 
responsibility for his or her own learning process. The programme o f study is not all about the 
content, but it is also about learning how to learn: ‘Traditional education and person-centred 
education may be thought o f as two poles o f  a continuum’ (Rogers 1994:209). There are also two 
types o f learning, the traditional knowledge acquisition o f  the curriculum, and ‘significant learning’ 
which, he defines as:
‘ learning which makes a difference in the individuals behaviour, in the course o f action he 
chooses in the future, in his attitudes and in his personality, it is a pervasive learning which is 
not just an accretion o f knowledge, but which interpenetrates with every portion o f his 
existence’ . (Rogers 1994:209).
Rogers (1967:305) stated: ‘ I see the facilitation o f  learning as the aim o f  education, the way in 
which we might develop the learner, the way in which we can learn to live as individuals in 
process’ . He then goes on to define three qualities o f  the facilitator o f learning, (i) a realness; that 
the facilitator is genuine and not hiding behind a mask or facade; (ii) an acceptance o f the learner, 
and trusting that the student is able to learn; (iii) empathic understanding. He does acknowledge that 
these findings were first discovered in the field o f psychotherapy, but that there is evidence in the 
classroom as well.
Rogers then elaborates on the ‘ ideal’ attitudes o f the facilitator, which are most helpful in this 
learning relationship, these are, (i) a ‘puzzlement’ to know self, this implies that the facilitator is 
also struggling with their quest to know themselves; (ii) a trust in the human organism, that the 
organism has a propensity to self-actualise; (iii) the ability to live with the uncertainty o f discovery, 
that prior to the facilitative experience the facilitator does not know the outcome for the student or
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for themselves. Rogers style o f facilitation was for the occurrence o f significant learning, learning 
that made a difference to an individual.
2.3 Transformative Learning
Making sense o f learning is mediated by reflection, there is a need to be open to critically reflect on
experience and the emergent learning (Mezirow 1990). He defines critical reflection as ‘ challenging
the validity o f presuppositions in prior learning’ [original .emphasis], and states:
‘By far the most significant learning experiences in adulthood involve critical self-reflection 
-  reassessing the way we have posed problems and reassessing our own orientation to 
perceiving, knowing, believing, feeling and active’ (Mezirow 1990:12).
Like Rogers, he uses the word significant to emphasise how the importance o f this learning is 
personal to the student/individual. Mezirow in contrast to Rogers calls ‘ significant learning 
experiences’ transformative learning, and how this ‘perspective transformation may be individual, as 
in psychotherapy’ (Mezirow (1990:14). It is about gaining an ‘ empowered sense o f self and new 
connection with others’ (Christopher et al 2001:134). There is according to Randall (1996) a 
therapeutic component to transformative learning.
Mezirow (1990) refers to how we confer meaning on a situation or experience, and makes the 
distinction between meaning schemes and perspectives. Schemes involve the ‘ if then, cause and 
effect’ o f a situation, whereas, perspectives involve the assmnptions made about past experience, 
and how they impact on current interpretation o f  a situation or experience. As such meaning 
schemes can be generalised, whereas, meaning perspectives are individual, they ‘ involve criteria for 
making value judgements and belief systems’ (Mezirow 1990:2-3).
He also acknowledged how distortions in meaning can impact on the ability to learn from 
experience, and identifies three main forms o f distortion in meaning perspective, epistemic, 
sociocultural and psychic. The epistemic field focuses on the nature and use o f knowledge, and he 
highlights five points that contribute to this form o f distortion, (i) The ideal, that eveiything has a 
correct solution, and the quest is to find the right expert to help us; (ii) reification, that somehow the 
situation is beyond human control, e.g. homelessness, famine; (iii) use o f prescriptive knowledge to 
judge a situation, e.g. human development and the attainment o f milestones; (iv) taking abstraction 
as though it were an existing object, e.g. interpreting reality concretely; (v) verification o f what is 
apprehended by empirical means. All o f the five points appear to be about accepting the status quo 
rather than to question and stay with the uncertainty of not knowing, that it is preferable to fit 
everything into a predetermined category or box.
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The sociocultural distortions, focus primarily on power and social relationships; and there are two 
main issues; (i) self-fulfilling prophecy, which is ‘based on a mistaken premise in the first place, 
such a belief becomes a distorted meaning perspective’ (Mezirow 1990:16). There is the likelihood 
that what is feared happening will happen, because unconsciously the person engineers it, so that 
they can keep the distortion in place, (ii) ideology, which ‘ is a form o f prereflective consciousness, 
which does not question the validity o f existing social norms and resists critique o f presupposition’ 
(Mezirow 1990:16).
The psychic distortions, focus on ‘presuppositions generating unwarranted anxiety that impedes 
taking action’ (Mezirow 1990:16). He suggests that overcoming these psychological distortions 
require ‘ skilled adult counsellors and educators as well as by therapists’ . It is suggested here that all 
three distortions, place the individual in a fixed position, and that there is an inability to learn from 
experience, to experience their own experience.
2.4 Emotional Learning
Social and emotional learning is gaining momentum in the popular press, because emotional 
intelligence has been linked with success in life (Mayer and Cobb 2000). Whereas, Ellison (2001) 
posits that emotions have an impact on learning and that the upsurge in the interest o f ‘emotions’ is 
partly due to the feminist movement. In contrast to this Goleman (1995:xii) attributes the interest to 
the ability to scientifically measure emotional intelligence; and suggests that emotional intelligence 
includes ‘self-control, zeal and persistence, and the ability to motivate oneself. He also suggests 
that ethics and morality stem from ones ‘emotional competence’ .
Emotional learning is attributed to conditioning principles, they are a response to cognitive and 
behavioural learned responses (Bouton et al 2000); emotional learning is linked to previous 
experience (Quigley and Barrett 1999). The empirical aspect o f emotions, is emotional intelligence, 
scientists can now measure the amount o f emotional brain activity (see Goleman 1995). Whereas 
social and emotional learning appears to place primacy to humanness; Yins (2001:441) defines 
social and emotional learning as ‘ knowledge and skills that children acquire through social and 
emotional related education... that help them recognize and manage emotions, engage in responsible 
decision making, and establish positive relationships’ .
In their handbook on emotional intelligence, Bar-On and Parker (2000: xii) posit that emotional 
intelligence is not a new concept, but that it has been around for most o f the twentieth century, and 
comment on the related concepts being ‘alexithymia, levels of emotional awareness, emotional 
competence, openness to experience, practical intelligence, psychological mindedness, social 
competence and social intelligence’ . In this explication it would seem that emotional learning
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embraces what it is to be human; for it appears to focus on subjective experiences. In the literature 
on ‘emotional learning’ there are numerous articles on how emotional learning is linked with either 
behavioural and learning difficulties and that programmes have been developed to enhance 
emotional intelligence (see Ellison 2001, Montague and Rinaldi 2001, Zins 2001). Watt’ s (1996, 
2000) contributions were unique in that he acknowledged how early experiences o f  feeling insecure 
can impact on learning; he based his opinions from his work as a psychodynamic therapist working 
with adolescents with learning, emotional and behavioural problems.
The recognition o f how early learning experiences may contribute to the need for emotional learning 
implies that these experiences may act as barriers or distortions to learning, and it is suggested here 
that this aspect correlates with transformative learning.
2.5 Barriers and distortions to learning
It is acknowledged that some students will have difficulty in learning due to some form o f barrier or
distortion in learning (Williamson 1998, Boud and Walker 1993, Mezirow 1990, Claxton 1984).
Previous experience o f learning may remain as a template for all future learning experiences,
alternatively they may have a distorted image o f themselves which has been handed down by others
(Rogers 1951), Williamson (1998:23) states:
‘Many people remain trapped within ascriptive images of themselves which have been built 
up for them and which are imposed by others. Lacking the means to question this they remain 
confined with narrow assumptions o f  their lives’ [original emphasis].
It could be that this image o f the self is a barrier to learning, or that this distortion o f self-perception 
is due to ‘an emotional impairment which has occluded the learners capacity to learn anew’ (Boud 
and Walker 1993:82). Whereas, Mezirow (1990:7) identifies that when experiencing ‘ is too strange 
or threatening to the way we think and learn, we tend to block it out and resort to psychological 
defence mechanisms to provide a more compatible interpretation.’ Claxton (1984:146) shares this 
view, and identifies four beliefs (competent, consistent, control, comfortable) that can hinder 
learning, and states:
‘any learning situation that threatens to make me incompetent, inconsistent, out o f control, 
and uncomfortable appeal's to be a threat to me -  to my survival as the person I think I am or 
hope I am or ought to be. When one o f these triggers is pulled, learning is resisted, regardless 
o f what the learning is about. ’
Thus it would appear that psychological forces impinge on our ability to learn, they represent 
barriers to learning from experience. Another term that is used in relation to distortions, is that o f 
‘ dysfunctional learning’ which ‘principally stems from obstacles we encounter in our struggle to be 
a significant person’ (Cell 1984:3). He suggests that dysfunctional learning is a defence about 
anxiety, and he draws on the existential theologian Tillich and the psychotherapist Sullivan to
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support his view. He then posits that the aim of learning is to be significant and to cope with 
meaningless and powerlessness.
For learning to be optimised there is a need for the recognition of, and working with barriers (Boud 
and Walker 1993). They propose a four stage framework; (i) acknowledge the existence o f the 
barrier, (ii) identify them, (iii) how they operate -  critical reflection is important for this explication, 
(iv) work with them, which has the potential for being confrontational and transformative. Claxton 
(1984: 171) proposes another model and he poses the question ‘What are the circumstances that 
facilitate relearning to learn and encourage openness to experience?’ His answer concerns the 
provision o f ‘therapeutic contexts’ which he suggests are not just related to therapists, that educators 
can provide the necessary support to learners to confront and challenge their beliefs. Whereas, the 
other viewpoint is that if the barriers/distortions are too firmly entrenched then there is the need to 
refer to a therapist (Boud and Walker 1993, Mezirow 1990). Possibly the referral to a therapist is 
about how there is a need to explore the unconscious processes that underpin the barriers to learning 
fr om experience.
2.6 Summary
The concept o f lifelong learning embraces the notion that the potential for learning is ongoing 
throughout life; learning is a personal phenomenon and premised on experience. The focus on all the 
three forms o f learning (significant, transformative, emotional) is that the potential outcome is for 
the individual to have an increased knowledge about self and how they leam from experience; it is 
learning that is significant to the person. Learning that has a value for the person, and ‘ value like 
beauty is to be found in the experience o f the beholder -  it is always subjective and social’ (Jarvis 
1997:7).
The implications o f previous learning experiences are considered to be influential in how a person 
approaches and responds to learning opportunities. Distortions in previous learning may be barriers 
to future learning. It is suggested here that these distortions and barriers have the potential to close 
down on learning from experience, and as such impact on a person’s ability to experience their own 
experience.
3. Literature review: Facial Difference
The term ‘facial difference’ is used in preference to ‘ facial disfigurement’ , as it is considered to be 
less pejorative. Initially the concept o f facial difference will be explored, from this it is concluded 
that society is influential in determining what is acceptable appearance, and those who differ from 
the norm are defined as ‘different’ . This is followed by a review of the literature with reference to 
counselling and psychotherapy. From this it is concluded that the presence o f a facial difference
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does impact on a persons psychological well being, and that counselling/psychotherapy is 
increasingly recognised as being a component o f the treatment and rehabilitation programmes 
offered. A discussion o f  previous research methods and designs is provided, overall there has been 
a preference for quantitative studies, and there have been a limited number o f studies that report on 
the experience o f living with a facial difference and/or the experience o f therapy. A summary o f the 
review concludes this section.
3.1 The concept o f facial difference
Prior to discussing the literature reviewed, there is a need to locate the reader with the concept o f 
‘ facial disfigurement’ . According to Bradbury (1996) there are three broad categories o f  
disfigurement, congenital, traumatic, and disease process. Whereas, Hughes (1991) suggests that 
there are two main categories, the ‘disfigured’ that have acquired the condition since birth, and the 
‘ deformed’ , those who were born with the condition. Whether the condition has been acquired since 
birth or been present since birth, does not appear to affect significantly how a person copes with this 
difference in appearance (Bull and Rumsey 1988, MacGregor 1984)). The purpose of this study is 
not to differentiate between the origin o f the facial difference, but to explore the experience o f 
having a face that does not conform to the norm. A norm that is both culturally and self defined 
(Partridge 1997, Elks 1990).
To talk o f facial difference is to focus on the concept o f ‘ face’ , and Lerner (1996:303) suggests that 
‘Goffman furnished social psychology with the notion of face’ . In his view “ face” is the assessable 
public image o f the self that results from social interaction. Facial appearance is deemed to be 
important, for it is the first thing we see when we meet with another and when we communicate the 
focus is usually on the face (Bull and Rumsey 1988). According to McNeill (1998:4) ‘ It [the face] is 
the centre o f our flesh. It is also the showcase o f the self, instantly displaying our age, sex and race, 
our health and mood. It marks us as individuals’ . This notion o f individuality appears to be a 
fundamental concept when exploring the impact o f facial appearance; identity is invested in 
appearance. ‘Not only is the face judged to be extremely important by persons in making evaluative 
judgements about other person, but human beings are particularly discerning in noting and 
evaluating even slight differences from the prevailing norm or “ ideal” (Elks 1990:37).
How a person creates an image o f themselves ‘ comes not in our meeting with ourselves but with 
other persons and with the image o f the human that we acquire through such meetings’ (Friedman 
1992:6). Also that ‘ Image and beauty are marketing tools portraying a particular “supermodel” as 
the desired “ look” , diminishing the value o f individuals who deviate from the face or form o f the 
moment’ (McGrouther 1997:991). As such what is beautiful is good (Dion et al 1972) whereas, 
Webb (1987:110) states: ‘ physical beauty brings a person more o f the good things in life’ . She also
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acknowledges that beauty can not be defined in a once and for all statement; it is a subjective 
phenomenon.
Society is responsible for defining what is acceptable in the normality stakes regarding appearance 
(Solomon 1998, Partridge 1997, Rumsey 1997, Hughes 1991, Bull and Rumsey 1988). The beauty- 
is-good stereotype is a strong and general phenomena’ (Eagley et al 1991:109). Whereas, Hatfield 
and Sprecher (1986) suggest that beauty is good, but that the inference is context specific, and as 
such there is a need to challenge society’s norms. However, the notion o f  beauty equating with 
goodness and success is being challenged (Eagly et al 1991, Feingold 1992, Jackson et al 
1995:108).
But how do we define the look? How and what becomes the dominant voice? Can we ever embrace 
the postmodern phrase ‘ celebration o f difference’ ? Kearney (1988:1) states in the opening o f his 
book, In the Wake o f Imagination'. ‘Everywhere we turn today we are surrounded by images’ . He 
traces the philosophy o f imagination through the ages; and suggests that in today’s postmodern 
society, ‘ the real and imaginary have become almost impossible to distinguish’ (Kearney 1988:2). 
Like beauty, reality is in the eye o f the beholder (Woolley 1992), and, he states: ‘what better way o f  
expressing your individualism than by creating your own, individual reality? Empowered by the 
personal computer, liberated by virtual reality, the individual becomes the God o f his or her own 
universe’ (Woolley 1992:9). It is suggested here that therapy can provide a learning milieu for the 
person struggling with their ‘ difference’ ; to re-create their story by challenging their perception of 
reality. Rather than being empowered by the personal computer; interaction via the inter-face, they 
will be empowered by the ‘face-to-face’ encounter with another.
3.2 Counselling and Psychotherapy
An initial search on counselling/psychotherapy for people with facial difference revealed a limited 
number o f articles. The most frequently referred to form o f therapy was cognitive behavioural 
therapy, generally it was perceived as being goal oriented and short term (Turner et al 1998, 
Heinberg et al 1997, Bradbury 1996, Rosen et al 1995, Cash 1990). Psychoanalytic psychotherapy 
was recommended for long-term work, and provided the opportunity for the individual to explore 
their thoughts and feelings about their ‘ disfigurement’ (Miliora 1998, Niederland 1975). Whereas, 
two studies drew on more than one approach; Hughes (1991:497-8) concluded his study on The 
Social Consequences o f Facial Disfigurement, by proposing a counselling model ‘ drawing on social 
work, deviance and psychodynamic theories’ . A study by Newell (1998) Facial Disfigurement and 
Avoidance: A Cognitive Behavioural Approach developed a fear avoidant model which he combined 
with social skills training. Whereas, Bennett and Stanton (1993) suggest that it is difficult to identify
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which therapeutic approach to use without first defining the psychological implications o f having a 
facial disfigurement.
There was overall recognition that therapy was required for this group, although the reasons or area 
o f focus, for therapeutic intervention varied. Some ranged from how counselling is an intervention 
that can be helpful for people coming to terms with a facial difference (Bradbury 1996, 1997), or 
that it should be combined with social interaction skills (Kent and Keohane 2001, Turner et al 
1998). According to Heinberg et al (1997) there is a need for therapy when a person repeatedly 
requests further surgery. Both Rosen et al (1995) and Cash (1990) focus on people’s dissatisfaction 
with their body image, and how therapy can enhance both an individuals’ sense o f well being, and 
the perception o f their body.
The potential merits o f providing therapy were on the whole not stated, rather it was implied that it 
would be helpful. Whereas, the two psychoanalytic case studies by Miliora (1998), and Neiderland 
(1975), did provide more detailed information on the therapeutic alliance. Through therapy these 
patient’ s explored their thoughts and feelings about their difference, and as a result o f therapy there 
was an apparent change in their behaviour. Both comment on the subjective nature o f how the 
patient perceived their difference (both had facial birthmarks), and that the anomaly represented a 
narcissistic injury; therapy offered the client the opportunity to work through the early childhood 
traumas.
Several authors commented on who should provide the intervention, Robert et al (1997:53) suggest 
that ‘ any and all burn care professionals can be called to serve as psychotherapeutic agents’ . They 
identify how the professional listening to the patient’s story can create a therapeutic dialogue, and 
this experience serves to normalise experience. Whereas, Ye (1998) suggested that there is an 
increased need for doctors to provide emotional support. Pruzinsky (1988:2) refers to medical 
psychotherapy as being a ‘ hybrid discipline composed o f  many sub-disciplines’ and he includes 
nurses, psychologists and doctors in his list o f professional that could provide therapeutic 
interventions. It was assumed that the reader would know the nature of these ‘ therapeutic 
interventions’ , and an area that was not commented on was the training required. One person 
commented on the knowledge and skills required; Bronheim (1994) highlighted the need for the 
therapist to have a familiarity with medical treatments and body image issues. He also stated that 
there was a need for the therapist to open up a discussion on losses ‘ otherwise a form o f pseudo 
therapy with both patient and psychiatrist struggling at an impasse’ (Bronheim 1994:117) [original 
emphasis]. Whereas, Edwards (1997) suggests that counselling is not effective when the practitioner 
presents the client with their pre-fonned answers to what they presumed the problems to be.
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There was also concern expressed about the need to consider the limitations o f counselling with this 
client group. Bronheim (1994:117) suggests that psychotherapy following head and neck surgery, 
will not be effective if the person is still concerned with ‘serious physical concerns’ . Also, Edgerton 
et a l’s (1991:606) study on patients undergoing reconstrucive surgery comments on how 
‘psychiatric counselling yields minimal rehabilitation. The sense o f deformity remains’ [original 
emphasis]. They also suggest that the deformity is a disease, and suggest that patients undergoing 
aesthetic reconstructive surgery would benefit from a combination o f  psychological assessment, 
intervention and surgery. Referring to working with dermatological patients, van Moffaert (1992) 
suggests the need for an eclectic approach, one that combines medical and psychotherapeutic 
interventions.
An area that was referred to, or alluded to was, who would be the people who were more likely to 
have problems coming to terms with a newly acquired difference, or living with a facial difference, 
and who would therefore, be more likely to require therapy. One area o f  focus was whether there 
was a correlation between the size o f the ‘ difference’ and the degree o f  psychological trauma 
encountered. A common held belief was that the ‘ bigger’ the difference, the greater the trauma 
suffered. Robinson (1997a: 102) states: ‘Common-sense tells us that disfigurement will bring in its 
train a host o f psychological problems’ . However, she then goes on to say that ‘common-sense’ is an 
enemy o f truth. And she suggests that ‘ a mild disfigurement can cany a greater psychological 
burden than a more severe one’ . This view is supported by Pruzinsky’s (1997:372) study, he 
concluded that ‘ very small deformities can be associated with a very intense desire for surgery and 
an overwhelming negative psychological response’ . MacGregor (1984:91) states that there is ‘no 
proportional relationship between disfigurement and the amount o f psychic distress it engenders’ .
Another issue that was discussed was people’s perception o f their difference; both Pruzinsky and 
Bradbury share the view that there is no correlation between subjective and objective experience o f 
reality. Pruzinsky (1997) suggests that people’s subjective opinion o f their ‘disfigurement’ 
influence their psychological well being. Whereas, Bradbury (1997:366) states: ‘There is no linear 
relationship between the degree o f disfigurement and subjective feelings o f distress’ . Pruzinsky 
(1992:582) states ‘Each patient will respond to the stress of having a facial deformity in his or her 
own individual maimer’ . It is suggested here that the individuality is a key phrase when considering 
the implications o f living with a facial difference, for it is not possible to legislate how it may effect 
someone.
Overall counselling and psychotherapy was recognised as being helpful to this client group, it was 
also recognised as being an area ‘where an appropriate therapeutic response is currently 
inadequately defined, described or delivered’ (Newell 1998:311). There was however, support for
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counselling being an integral component o f care (Rose and Loewenthal 1998, Turner et al 1998, 
Partridge 1997a, Rose 1997). McGrouther (1997:991) is in agreement and suggests that as therapy 
becomes a more accepted as part o f the treatment package; ‘The challenge is now to audit and 
scientifically evaluate the various forms o f counselling and to lobby politicians to ensure that 
resources are made available’ . The next section focuses on a review o f  the research methods 
employed in the studies reviewed.
3.3 Review of research methods and designs
The majority o f the studies reviewed relating to ‘ facial difference’ relied on some form of 
standardised measurement tool to assess an individuals psychological functioning. For example, 
Klassen et al (1998:380) used the Derriford scale, which had been ‘ developed specifically for use 
with plastic surgery patients". In Kent and Keohanes’ (2001) study with dermatological patients the 
following scales were used HADS (Hospital Anxiety Depression Scale), DLQI (Dermatology Life 
Quality Index) and FNE (Brief Fear o f Negative Evaluation Scale). In Heinberg et al (1997) study, 
the following scales were used, psychosocial adjustment to illness scale, a self report scale (PAIS- 
SR) covering the following topics, relationships, social environment, sexual relationship, 
psychological distress. Also the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) which is a 21 item multiple 
choice measure, and the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory II (MCMI II) which is a 175 item 
likert scale questionnaire. A study by Robert et al (1997), used an ISC (incomplete sentences for 
children), which is a psychological assessment tool. The results were then subjected to a content 
analysis, and from this five major themes emerged on the issues that caused people concern when 
coming to terms with facial difference. These were preoccupation with health, the struggle for 
internal acceptance, reconstruction o f ones life map, changing relationships and redefining the 
world. In Edgerton et a l’s (1991:607) the one hundred participants were subjected to a ‘ formal 
battery o f  psychometric assessments’ .
From the qualitative domain, there were four studies, two psychoanalytic case studies (Miliora 1998, 
Neiderland 1975); two phenomenological studies reporting on peoples experience o f living with a 
facial difference (Rose 1997, Cavicchioli 1994). There was a difference in how the data was 
generated in the phenomenological studies, Cavicchioli (1994:64) asked participants to give their 
response to a pre-planned interview schedule, e.g. ‘what does it mean to you to be facially 
disfigured? What do you think it means to other people?’ Whereas, the participants in the heuristic 
inquiry (Rose 1997) were asked to share their experience o f living with a cleft, their responses were 
not constrained by a pre-determined questionnaire emanating from the researcher’ s frame o f  
reference. It is suggested here that these two studies represent opposing ends o f  the continuum o f 
qualitative research; in the first study the researcher is responsible for determining the categories
35
that emerged from the study, in the second, the themes emerged from the research participant’s 
responses.
Some studies combined both quantitative and qualitative elements. Both Hughes (1991) and Newell 
(1998) combined the use o f  a range o f  standardised tools (similar to those referred to above) 
together with a structured interview.
In relation to studies conducted, in the field o f facial difference, there were questions raised about 
the research methods; Solomon (1998:271) suggests that ‘ there is a lack o f systematic methodology, 
which has deterred many researcher from investigating the effects o f facial distinction’ . Robinson 
(1997a: 104) comments on the disparity o f research findings and cites ‘ small unrepresentative 
samples that are often reported and the non-standardised measures frequently used’ . Suggesting that 
larger sample sizes would provide a more accurate statistical analysis. Whereas, Rose and 
Loewenthal (1998) suggest that the emphasis on quantitative methods, has detracted from the ‘ lived 
experience’ o f the researched group. It is suggested here, that it is difficult to rely on quantitative 
data at the exclusion o f  qualitative data, as this has the potentiality o f engendering results that speak 
more fr om the researcher's frame o f  reference rather than the researched.
For example in Hughes (1991) study; seventy-one patients who had undergone disfiguring facial 
surgery for head and neck cancer, were interviewed to elicit how the surgery had impacted on then- 
social contacts. However, the ‘ interview’ comprised the interviewer eliciting comments to a 
questionnaire; in other words the respondents responses were coded as to their best fit to a pre­
determined category. It is argued here, that the use o f these forms o f collecting data, whilst 
providing an insight into how people with facial difference are coping, or have coped, and the 
responses have enabled researchers to determine the likely effect o f facial difference for the 
individual and their (re)integration into society. The findings are more dependent on the researchers 
perception o f the likely difficulties encountered, for they developed the questionnaires. What if a 
respondent’s experience did not fit with the predetermined categories? Would it be a case o f best fit? 
Or would their responses be disregarded? A research method, which allows for the voice o f the 
researched to be heard is required, but can we ever hear the story o f the other, or will it always be 
filtered through our own experience? These questions inform the discussion on developing a 
methodological fr amework to guide this study (see chapter three).
3.4 Summary
A facial difference may present itself at birth (congenital) or be acquired later in life (trauma or 
disease processes). There appears to be no correlation between the cause and the size o f the facial 
difference to the level o f  psychological distress experienced. Counselling/psychotherapy is viewed
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by some to be helpful, however, the exact nature o f what is helpful is not explicated; although, it is 
recognised that it should be an integral component o f the care package offered to people with a 
facial difference. The research studies in this field were predominantly quantitative; there was as 
such a privileging o f science and technology over humanness.
4.0 The literature reviews and the research questioh
Subjective experience lies at the heart o f the three reviews; learning is premised on the ability o f 
humans to learn (Bergevin 1967), it is thus a life long process. The learner accessing lifelong 
learning is seen to be self-directing, knowing what it is that they need to know, and that previous 
learning is acknowledged (Knowles 1984, Rogers 1983). The teacher can be seen to be a facilitator; 
facilitating the learning process (Heron 1989). As a consequence the learner is actively engaged in 
the learning process. This contrasts with the traditional style o f teaching whereby the teacher was 
seen as the expert, who imparted knowledge to the learners, there was an element o f  repeatability in 
the performance o f the teacher, and the learner was a passive recipient in the exchange o f 
information. With the change from ‘teaching’ to ‘ facilitating’ there is the potential for a return to 
placing humanness prior to science and technology. For the ‘ teacher’ is not able to state beforehand 
what it is that the learner will learn in any given learning situation. Rather there is openness to the 
possibility o f each learner, taking from the learning situation that which they need to enhance their 
understanding, and in the process learning how to learn.
The relationship between learner and facilitator is an influential factor in the learning process, a 
process that places the learning from experience as a key component, and in this activity reflection is 
a fundamental requirement (Jarvis 1997, Mezirow 1990). The learner through the reflective process 
is able to see the content o f learning from different perspectives, and in this process further learning 
may be identified. There is an openness to the experience o f learning, that learning does not 
necessarily equate with learning a once and for all ‘ answer’ rather that this ‘answer’ can be 
modified/expanded/altered in light o f further experiences which may create a change in perspective 
to the initial learning.
It is suggested here that a corollary can be drawn with therapy, for the client seeks out therapy of 
their own volition (Bond 1993), they are in a sense self-directing, acknowledging that they are 
experiencing problems in their day to day life. Problems which according to Greenberg and Safran 
(1987) can be said to be premised on some difficulty in coping with emotions. The therapeutic 
relationship provides an environment that may be conducive for the person to explore their current 
difficulties, to tell their story. The therapist has an openness to what will happen in the therapeutic 
session (see Gordon 1999, Lomas 1999, Rogers 1961). The learning that emanates through therapy
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can not be predicted, nor does it represent the attainment o f the correct answer, it is about the person 
finding a language for their emotions (Goncalves and Machado 2000, Gordon 1999).
The resolution o f difficulties to learning from experience requires the ability to reflect on previous 
learning experiences with a facilitator so that the ‘blocks’ to learning can be uncovered (Boud et al 
1993); as such it requires a form o f unlearning (Drew 1993). It is acknowledged in the field o f 
education that some distortions may be so firmly entrenched that they may require psychotherapy 
(Mezirow 1990); therefore psychotherapy may be helpful to the process o f learning. But is 
psychotherapy only a ‘ last resort’ when the educators are having difficulties with encouraging 
students to learn, or when there is a lack o f  educational achievement? Or is it that psychotherapy is a 
form o f learning within field o f  lifelong learning?
It is generally considered that all the theories o f counselling and psychotherapy are a derivative o f
Freud’s theory o f  psychoanalysis, in come cases a derivative o f the derivative, and thus appear to be
far removed from Freud. However, in tracing the origins o f a particular theory, there is a link albeit a
tenuous one. This factor is important in determining whether therapy is a form of teaching and
learning. For Freud recognised that the treatment he was offering was a form o f education:
‘The work o f overcoming resistances is the essential function o f  analytic treatment; the 
patient has to accomplish it and the doctor makes this possible for him with the help o f 
suggestion operating in an educative sense. For that reason psychoanalytic treatment has 
justly been described as a kind of after-education’ (Freud 1917:504) [original emphasis].
The term after-education implies that following the primary educational experience, there was a 
need for further education to work with the resistances that emanated from it. It is suggested here 
that resistances represent distortions in learning, and that after-education can equate with today’ s 
term o f lifelong learning. Thus Freud anticipated the concept of lifelong learning, whereby learning 
extends beyond mandatory education. That the resistances arising from early experience, can impact 
on how future experience is interpreted, for there can be an expectation that experience is a 
repeatable phenomenon. Whereas, according to the psychoanalyst Bion (1962:64) who was 
interested in learning from experience, suggests that ‘no experience exactly matches a past 
experience’ . To expect experience to be replicated exactly is representative o f an inability to learn 
from experience. Therapy provides an opportunity to relearn, or to unlearn, from this it can be said 
that therapy provides an opportunity to return to learning from experience (Loewenthal 1999).
Psychoanalytic theory has influenced the philosophers Gadamer and Habermas both suggesting that 
it has a place in the interpretation o f experience. Habermas (1963:77) viewed psychoanalysis as a 
form o f emancipation as it offers the experience o f ‘ critical insight into relationships o f power, the 
objectivity o f which has as its source solely that relationships have not been seen through’ . 
Habermas developed a theory o f communicative action; socialisation is fundamentally an interactive
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process stemming from the lifeworld, the culture in which the individual is situated, and the 
communicative networks within the lifeworld. Reflection is central to communicative action, and 
comprises o f two aspects, ‘ subjective reflection on what makes it possible for him or her to perform 
certain actions, and to a more critical insight into the distortions built into these and other processes’ 
(Outwaithe 1996:115). It is suggested here that it is these distortions that are subject to 
transformation through the process o f psychoanalysis. Mezirow is influenced by the work of 
Habermas, and refers to his theory o f reflective learning as transformative or emancipatory learning.
Gadamer (1967:41) suggests that ‘hermeneutical reflection plays a fundamental role in 
psychoanalysis’ , and he draws on the work of Habermas and how his reference to psychoanalysis, is 
that it is a form o f understanding, which is dependent on reflection and logic. Also that 
psychotherapy is about ‘ completing an interrupted process o f  education into a full history’ . He does 
not develop the theme o f  the nature o f the ‘ interruption’ to the process o f education, but it could be 
that some form of trauma has resulted in the inability to learn from experience (Loewenthal and 
Snell 1998). Gadamer refers to the influence o f Lacan and his linguistic interpretation of 
psychoanalysis, to support his view that language is fundamental to both his hermeneutical theory 
and the practice o f psychotherapy. He states ‘ in psychotherapy hermeneutics and the circle o f 
language that is closed in dialogue are central’ (Gadamer 1967:41). It is suggested here that the 
closure o f the circle is at odds with the open circle o f hermeneutics; and the completion of a process 
o f education, is not compatible with the concept o f lifelong learning.
Whereas, Loewenthal’s (1999) view is cognisant with lifelong learning, when he suggests that 
therapy can assist with an interrupted process o f  education, the potential outcome is a return to 
learning from experience. Suggesting that learning from experience is what constitutes education. 
Within the sphere o f lifelong learning, it is about learning how to learn, and as such therapy is an 
activity which enables people to learn how to learn; to experience their own experience.
It is suggested here, that the concept o f lifelong learning is a key aspect for viewing psychotherapy 
as a form of learning. The National Adult Learning Survey (1998) cited by Alridge and Lavender 
(2000:7), identified the following category under the heading o f non-taught learning: ‘Deliberately 
trying to improve one’s self-knowledge about anything or teach yourself a skill without taking part 
in a taught course’ . Therefore, counselling and psychotherapy can be included in this category, for 
people seek out therapy, when they are experiencing difficulties in day to day living, and through 
the therapeutic relationship, there is an opportunity to learn about oneself, relationships with others, 
and how sense is made out o f experience, The relationship provides an opportunity to tell ones 
personal life story, to speak of thoughts and feelings, to reflect on experience, and to make changes. 
A cycle that is complimentary to Merizows reflective learning cycle, where transformative learning
39
is the potential outcome. The exploration of feelings is an element o f emotional learning, learning 
that can inform relationships with others and enhance decision making. The change that emanates 
through the therapeutic process is personal; it is learning that makes a difference to a person, it is 
therefore significant learning. Thus counselling and psychotherapy provide an opportunity for 
learning; transformative learning, emotional learning and significant learning. Learning that has the 
propensity to return to learning from experience.
Counselling and psychotherapy are a recognised form o f health treatment, particularly in the field of 
mental well being. For a study on The Impact o f Learning on Health (Alridge and Lavender 2000) 
identified how learning can lead to an increase in mental well being. The general benefits were seen 
to encompass an increase in self-esteem and self-awareness, and the unanticipated benefits also 
included issues o f personal discovery about self and others, for some this was encompassed under 
the umbrella term o f ‘ general sense o f well being’ . The physical health benefits also related to 
feeling ‘mentally better’ .
It is suggested here that learning provides an opportunity to enhance an individuals’ health; learning 
and health are thus seen as inter-related concepts. Learning facilitates a change in the experience o f 
physical and mental well being, and this could be attributed to seeing their situation from a different 
perspective, a return to learning from experience. In the Department o f  Health’s (1998) document 
Our Healthier Nation there is reference to the need to look at how learning can influence the 
workforce’s health. As such the view put forward here supports the intention o f  how learning and 
health are increasingly being recognised as inter-related concepts.
The concept o f lifelong learning opens up the number o f activities that can be embraced under the 
‘umbrella’ o f learning; the learner is an active participant in the process, and change is the potential 
outcome. Psychotherapy is a process whereby the client is an active participant, and change is the 
potential outcome. With the widening o f the scope o f learning activities, psychotherapy can be 
aligned with the non-taught learning category o f adult learning. With learning now being recognised 
as having an impact on health, there is further opportunity for psychotherapy, which is comes under 
the umbrella term o f  health treatment, to be aligned with learning. Thus, lifelong learning and 
psychotherapy can be seen to be mutually interdependent terms.
The potential for a return to learning from experience in therapy is not restricted to people with a 
facial difference (this is the particular focus o f this study). The potential is open to any one who is 
not able to learn from experience, due to previous distortions in experiences, experiences that 
influence a person sense o f emotional well being.
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The literature review on facial difference, highlights that an area o f difficulty is in relation to how 
appearance can have implications 011 a person’s ability to cope in everyday situations. Therapy is 
seen to be an helpful in assisting people cope with their and others reactions to their facial 
difference. Therapy may also be combined with social skills training, or be separate to it. Bull and 
Rumsey (1988) comment on how social skills training is about learning how to cope. It is suggested 
here that therapy may also be a form o f learning to enable a return to learning from experience.
Conclusion
Psychotherapy can be seen as a form o f learning, within the field o f lifelong learning. There are 
commonalties in the process o f therapy and self-directed learning, the client/learner is an active 
participant, the therapist/facilitator provides an environment conducive to learning, the 
client/learners previous experience is acknowledge. Both processes involve reflection on experience, 
and the potential outcome is change, a change that can be health related, A change that is related to 
the ability to learn from experience, where learning is a personal process.
From the review o f the literature the working definitions o f the three forms o f learning that are 
considered here to be intrinsic to the process o f psychotherapy are as follows:-
(i) Significant learning is learning that makes a difference to how a person perceives their 
current situation.
(ii) Transformative learning, is a questioning o f previous learning, and through this reflexive 
process distortions in meaning making perspectives are recognised; the learning that 
emanates from this process results in a change in perspective.
(iii) Emotional learning involves an exploration o f personal emotions, developing a language to 
speak o f feelings and how these inform relationships with others.
It is suggested here that the three forms of learning are mutually interdependent and intertwined, 
each contributing to the possibility o f a return to learning from experience; for a person to 
experience their own experience.
Therapeia is the term adopted here to encompass the concept o f psychotherapy as a form o f  learning 
a concept that includes significant, transformative and emotional learning as defined above. The 
term teaching is subsumed under the term learning and is not contained in the heading, to avoid any 
confusion that the therapist takes on the role o f a traditional teacher, whereby the teacher imparts 
knowledge to the student, an activity that is at odds with the nature o f psychotherapy. Therapeia is 
learning that privileges humanness, it is learning that can not be taught, but is apprehended through 
relational processes.
41
The relational process o f psychotherapy provides an opportunity for the creation o f a learning milieu 
that may encompass significant, transformative and emotional learning; the potential outcome is for 
the client to experience their own experience -  to return to learning from experience. The client 
group chosen to demonstrate the teaching and learning aspects o f psychotherapy are people who 
have a facial difference.
The difficulty is how to research learning that emanates through the therapeutic relationship. For 
both therapy and learning are difficult concepts to grasp, how does the researcher attempt to grasp 
the ungraspable? How can the voice o f person’ s subjective experience o f the phenomena be heard? 
This difficulty is explored in the next chapter, which focuses on the development o f  a 
methodological framework to enable the opening up of a conversation, focused on the question 
posed by this study: Is counselling and psychotherapy a form o f learning for people with a facial 
difference?
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Chapter Three
Introduction
The aim o f this chapter is to discuss the process o f developing a methodological framework for 
selecting a research method to explore the research question posed: Is counselling/psychotherapy a 
form o f learning for people with a facial difference? The initial discussion provides a definition o f 
research, an activity that generates new knowledge. In this study it is the knowledge on how to look 
at psychotherapy as a form o f learning. Methodology is one component o f  a research paradigm, and 
as such it is not possible to develop a methodological framework without considering the other 
components, as they are interdependent (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Therefore a discussion o f a 
research paradigm is provided.
A paradigm ‘represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature o f  the “world” , the 
individual’s place in it, and the range o f  possible relationships to that world and its parts’ (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994:107) [original emphasis]. In this study, the research paradigm supports the privileging 
o f humanness as opposed to science and technology. There is a move away from technique and the 
detached researcher, to a recognition that the researcher influences the meaning(s) generated through 
the research process. The researcher is involved in the study, is part o f the study; subsequently there 
is a need to explicate for the reader what they bring to the study, to share their interpretative lens. 
The researcher discusses the theories and perspectives that inform her interpretative lens. These are 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalytic theory, postmodernism, feminism and ethics. Each is 
introduced, and a discussion o f how they inform research concludes this section.
The next section explores the development o f a research paradigm for this study. To choose a 
predetermined paradigm, would not correlate with the reason given for eliciting the interpretative 
lens o f  the researcher, i.e. it informs the research paradigm. Rather than use a ‘best fit’ paradigm, a 
paradigm will be developed from the current paradigms; thus supporting the notion that the 
construction of knowledge is personal. The final section outlines the methodological framework 
developed for, and to be tested out in this study.
1. Research
Research is considered by Wilson and Hutchinson (1991) to be about developing knowledge, in 
relation to this study it is knowledge on psychotherapy as form o f learning. But what is knowledge? 
The concept o f knowledge has a long history as a philosophical inquiry, and it is a term used in
Developing a Methodological Framework
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everyday speech (Berger and Luckman 1966). Philosophy is ‘a special department o f speculative 
knowledge’ (Ayer 1946:64), and the philosopher, as an analyst is concerned about the way in which 
we speak about things. According to Foucault knowledge is about ‘ reason’ and as such he asks the 
question: ‘How is it that the human subject took itself as the object o f possible knowledge’ 
(Merquoir 1991:11). This is a question that is difficult to answer, for on the one hand ‘ virtually 
everyone has the capacity to “construct” knowledge’ and on the other hand the traditional 
perspective on knowledge creation was that ‘only a few people have possessed the power to decree 
which knowledge will count for the culture and which will not’ (Kramarae and Spender 1993:4). 
Legitimacy o f  knowledge has implications ultimately for what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and once 
conferred with the term knowledge, it becomes a universal property. Polyani (1966:170) challenged 
the view o f reproducibility o f the truth claims o f  knowledge, suggesting that if this were the case 
then ‘ all the great pioneering achievements o f our history would not be knowledge’ . He appears to 
be suggesting that there is an irreducible element to knowing.
Martin (1990) draws on the work o f Polyani, to support his view that there are two kinds o f 
knowledge, explicit -  that which can be put into words, and tacit -  that which cannot. He also 
suggests that ‘what we like to call the ‘ real world’ is to some extent ‘ constructed’ by the human 
psyche’ (Martin 1990:148). Whereas, Peters (1995:33) suggests that knowing is ‘ simply a set o f 
contingent social practices, as a right, by current standards, to believe’ . This view was also put 
forward by Berger and Luckman (1966:15) when they stated 'the sociology o f knowledge is 
concerned with the analysis o f the social construction o f reality’ [original emphasis]. As such 
knowledge is ‘the outcome or consequence o f human activity, knowledge is a human construction, 
never certifiable as ultimately true but problematic and ever changing’ (Guba 1990:26) [original 
emphasis].
There are, according to Lyotard (1984) two functions o f knowledge, research and the transmission 
o f  learning. If research is about the development o f knowledge, it raises the question o f  ‘what is 
knowledge?’ Knowledge is not a ‘thing’ it is a construction, a concept, objective knowledge as a 
given is therefore an illusion. For there is always a link with the person whose awareness it was, and 
this was Kant’ s contribution to knowledge, that you can not separate knowledge from the knower 
(Applebaum 1995). If research is a function o f knowledge, and knowledge the outcome o f research 
it appears to be a ‘ chicken and egg’ situation -  for which comes first? This could also be said about 
the second function o f knowledge -  the transmission o f learning. For learning is associated with the 
transmission o f knowledge (Jarvis 1997), as such the terms learning and knowledge could be said to 
be synonymous. Cohen (1986:9) posits that all knowledge is self-knowledge and that outside o f it 
‘there is an abyss chaos -  for there is no truth -  that is the myth which knowledge is founded on’ .
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This definition appears to encompass the inherent difficulty in defining knowledge and as such 
knowledge is an enigma, as is research.
The move from modernism to postmodernism opened up a conversation about how knowledge can 
be located or situated within a context (Lyotard 1984). The implications for research is that there is 
no ‘ fixed’ reality rather it is constructed in the moment. But how can this ‘moment’ be captured and 
shared with others? How can the learning experiences o f therapy be explored so that this situated 
knowledge becomes knowledge available for others? It could be that the knowledge generated 
through this investigation, could be represented as a model, offering a way o f looking at therapy as a 
form of learning. A model that may enable therapists and clients to begin to open up further 
conversations about how their experience o f therapy may be seen to be a form o f learning; learning 
that offers the potential to return to learning from experience. A starting point to this exploration is 
to situate the study within a research paradigm.
1.1 Research paradigm
A paradigm is considered by Guba and Lincoln (1994) to be composed o f three interdependent 
elements: epistemology (the relationship between what can be known and the knower), ontology 
(what is the form and nature o f reality), and methodology (how we gain knowledge). The discussion 
will initially be in relation to research in general, followed by the implications for this study.
‘Paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer we maintain, ought to go about the business o f inquiry 
without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides his or her approach’ (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994: 116). This view is also supported by Schwandt (1994:118) who suggests that there is 
a need to be conversant with the notions o f being and knowing which guide a study, to enable the 
researcher to construct an account o f the phenomena o f a study which is more o f a ‘ construction o f 
the constructions o f the actors one studies’ . To focus exclusively on the methods is to focus on the 
techniques for gathering and analysing data (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2000), and as such this can 
mask the relationship between the method and the inquiry process. It is suggested here that the 
emphasis on method is to give primacy to science and technology. Whereby, there is a primacy to 
the technical prowess o f the researcher, rather than the human element o f that which they bring to 
the study, e.g. the sense they make out o f the data, the guiding principles that underpin and inform 
the sense they make out the data. It is suggested here, that making known the underpinning 
ontological and epistemological foundations, which inform(s) the methodology and ultimately the 
methods o f an inquiry, bring the researcher’s impact on the study more to the foreground, and as 
such make visible the human element in the meaning making process.
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Within the research community, it is generally considered that there are two main research 
paradigms, quantitative and qualitative or the positivistic and post-positivistic both o f which will 
enable the researcher to address the questions that they pose. A commonality between the two is that 
both are founded on the concept o f a knowing subject (Prior 1997). Descartes has been 
acknowledged as the founder o f the quantitative domain, and Kant the source o f the qualitative 
domain (Hamilton 1998). The positivistic paradigm was the only one for some four hundred years, 
the essential principle is that there is a known reality,,which can be accessed through scientific 
inquiry. Through procedures o f validity, reliability and objectivity, the researcher can get close to 
the ‘ truth’ . A researcher can increase the validity o f a study by selecting instruments, which 
measure what they are designed for (Davis 1995, Black 1993, Bryman 1988); and how the selected 
tests can be carried out with some degree o f  sameness is related to the reliability o f a study (Bryman 
1988). As such the quantitative studies o f the positivistic paradigm are recognised as providing 
‘hard’ evidence, due to the reliance on scales and measures (Guba and Lincoln 1994, Reinharz
1993). The influence o f  the researcher on the study is negated due to objective nature o f scientific 
rigour, therefore the relationship between the researcher and researched, is not acknowledged.
The post-positivists viewpoint challenged the notion of a knowable reality, recognising that reality 
could not be fully known, but that methods could be developed to ensure ‘objectivity’ , reality could 
then be apprehended under certain conditions, as such an objectified ‘truth’ could be elicited. 
Research conducted under this paradigm is known as qualitative, and it can be ‘ an interactive and 
transformation process in which the researcher seeks to learn about, and to interpret life experiences’ 
(Sword 1999:270). Whereas, Letoumeau and Allen (1999:623) define post-positivistic as ‘ the search 
for ‘warranted assertability’ as opposed to ‘truth’ . They also acknowledge that there is not one 
‘ ideal’ method, they all have limitations. Qualitative research is a process, it involves ‘theory, 
method, and analysis, and ontology, epistemology and methodology’ (Denzin and Lincoln 1998:23). 
According to McLeod (1994:79): ‘The fundamental o f a qualitative investigation is to uncover and 
illuminate what things mean to people’ . As such there is a reliance on ‘verbal data to build upon 
descriptions or explanations o f a particular phenomenon’ (Lynch 1996:114). Unlike quantitative 
studies it does not involve ‘measurement or statistical technique’ (McLeod 1994:76).
The concept o f validity is challenged within this paradigm for there is a shift from objective 
knowing to subjective knowing; that meaning is created through the relationship with the researcher 
and the phenomenon o f  the study, the self o f  the researcher is recognised in the process (Heron 
1981, Reason 1981). An apparent conundrum is presented by Reason (1981:245) who suggests that 
to gain understanding o f what is going on for an individual in an identified situation, requires the 
researcher to ‘get into the ‘world-taken-for-granted’ perspective o f those involved; yet at the same 
time as ‘getting into’ the experience the researcher needs to be able to maintain a perspective on it’ .
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As such the researcher obtains/creates an objectified subjective view on a situation, and it is 
suggested here that the knowledge claims o f the positivistic views exert an influence on what 
constitutes knowing, in the post-positivistic paradigm.
As further developments have taken place within the post-positivistic paradigm, the issue o f  the 
objectified subjective stance o f the researcher is challenged, and new terms have emerged, to 
challenge and/or replace the positivistic term o f validity;, verisimilitude (the ability to reproduce the 
real) (Denzin and Lincoln 1994); credibility (consistency between data collection and analysis) 
(Thorne 1997). Also the explication o f the researchers experience o f the phenomenon o f the study is 
said to further increase the credibility o f  a study (McLeod 1994, Reason and Rowan 1981). 
Kincheloe and McLaren (1994:152) include credibility as one aspect o f ‘trustworthiness’ the other 
aspect is ‘anticipatory accommodation’ which draws on the work o f Piaget and the ability ‘to 
reshape cognitive structures to accommodate unique aspects o f what they perceive in new concepts’ . 
Whereas, Sword (1999) suggests the location o f the researchers self in the study increases the 
legitimacy o f findings. Lather (1991) identifies five forms o f validity which she considers are more 
applicable to research o f a more qualitative genre: reflexive (challenging the text for its own 
validity); ironic (deconstruction o f the reproductions and simulations that structure the real); 
neopragmatic (challenge the power o f the researcher as the one who knows); rhizomatic 
(presentation in the text o f multiple voices) and situated (the text as a representation o f the minority 
voice). It is suggested here that these developments have arisen in response to the main criticism of 
research conducted in this paradigm that it is ‘ subjective and unscientific’ (Morse 1994:24), or ‘soft’ 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, Reinharz 1993).
Although quantitative and qualitative research have been presented here as separate entities, studies
can draw on both paradigms, usually by cross checking findings from qualitative studies with
quantitative methods (Bourner 1996, Patton 1990), as such this is a form of triangulation (Deacon et
al 1998). The preference for one paradigm over the other is based on the researchers underpinning
theoretical orientation; and there usually is a tendency to prefer one to the other. The following
quote by Stevens (1995:85-6) appears to encapsulate this phenomenon:
‘The trouble is that researchers become so attached to their own orientation, and so hostile to 
those who adopt another, that they forget they are all partially sighted observers examining 
different aspects o f the same elephant in the dark, each believing that the particular bit o f 
trunk, foot or tail they are grasping represents the whole beast’ .
It is suggested here, that quantitative research has given primacy to science and technology and that 
qualitative research begins to address the gulf between science and technology on the one hand, and 
humanness on the other hand. Therefore qualitative research will be explored further, as it is 
cognisant with the underpinning ethos o f this study.
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Denzin and Lincoln (1998, 1994) outline five ‘moments’ within qualitative research, and how the 
role o f  the researcher has changed within each epoch, and it is suggested here, that each epoch 
represents a movement away from the purely scientific towards humanness. The first moment the 
‘ traditional period’ was from the 1900’ s to 1939, validity, reliability and objectivity were supreme 
components, and the other was seen as being ‘strange’ or ‘ foreign’ . In this epoch, ethnography was 
the predominant method o f study. The next moment ‘ the modernist phase’ (1945 -  1970), there was 
a formalising o f qualitative methods; and the recognition, o f the researcher as a participant observer, 
the interpretative theories o f ethnomethodology, phenomenology, critical theory and feminism 
flourished.
The third moment ‘ blurred genres’ (1970 -  1986) there was a blurring of how best to interpret the 
phenomenon o f a study, and an increasing recognition o f the authors’ presence in the text. Also 
there was broad range o f methods and strategies to conduct a qualitative inquiry, e.g. symbolic 
interactionism, construed visim, naturalistic inquiry, semiotics, structuralism, feminism, 
deconstruction, poststructrualism. The fourth moment ‘ the crisis o f representation’ (1986-1993), 
there was recognition o f  the minimal difference between writing and fieldwork. Reflexivity called 
into question issues such as gender, class, race and how best to represent the voice o f the other. The 
next moment, the present, is a ‘double crisis’ o f both representation and legitimisation. The lived 
experience is ‘ created in the social text written by the researcher, this is the representation crisis’ 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1994:11). The legitimisation crisis focuses on issues o f validity, 
generalisability and reliability.
In relation to this study, one way of looking at psychotherapy, as a form of learning is to speak with 
people who have experienced therapy and elicit the learning that has taken place. From this a model 
may be developed to assist others to look at psychotherapy as a form o f  learning. The crisis o f 
representation is how to create a text that is mindful o f the many tensions inherent when 
representing the voice o f the other. In accepting the premise that knowledge is socially constructed, 
and linked with personal awareness, it Is difficult to write a text that is representative o f those who 
shared their experience o f learning emanating from therapy. Also, can generalisations be made? For 
in the creation o f a model there is a form o f generalising; with different people the context changes 
and with it the meaning changes.
In accepting the premise that knowledge is a personal construction, then the construction o f  the 
phenomenon of learning experiences in therapy undergoes numerous re-constructions. For example, 
the meaning o f the phenomenon [learning experiences in therapy] is situated within the therapeutic 
environment, the meeting o f a therapist and a client. This meaning is then situated within the 
research meeting, a researcher with a research participant. From this meeting the researcher creates a
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report (research text) that is representative o f her or his understanding o f the phenomenon and from 
this creates/generates a model to provide others with a way for opening up conversations on, 
psychotherapy as a form of learning. This text is then available to unknown readers who will make 
their own construction o f the phenomenon. There is thus a transformation o f the original 
construction of the meaning generated during a study, and through this process the contextual 
knowledge developed between the therapist and the client has the potential to become available for 
others.
The crisis o f legitimatisation focuses on the acceptance o f this piece o f research by the academic 
community. Does it meet with current standards for research? Can the standards be flexible to allow 
for creativity? There is the potentiality for creativity to be stifled by the demands o f stakeholders 
and intended readership (Street 1998). Can it be different and acceptable? Can the postmodern ethos 
o f multiple meanings be presented in such a way that is as acceptable as producing a piece o f 
research from the modernist perspective? Can a report that is structured from a modernist stance, 
with chapters following a linear trajectory, to meet with the current acceptable standards o f a 
research report, encompass a postmodern stance? A postmodern presentation would not follow a 
predictable linear trajectory, chapters or ‘episodes’ would emerge as the study progressed, and the 
style would be more conversational. Would this style be as acceptable?
In accepting the premise that the researcher is involved in the research process, not separate to, the 
theories and perspectives, which inform the researcher’s way o f knowing should be made explicit; 
as such there is a need for the researcher to share their interpretative lens. For this lens, informs the 
selection o f an appropriate paradigm one that is cognisant with the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological beliefs, which ultimately inform(s) the question(s) posed and the research design to 
enable the answering o f the question(s) posed.
2. Interpretative lens
A key factor in the elicitation o f the interpretative lens, is the recognition o f  previous learning 
experiences. For the researcher, it was the undertaking o f masters level studies and in the process 
being introduced to phenomenology and the exploration of the ‘ lived experience’ ; hermeneutic 
interpretation as a way of knowing, (the focus in both areas was on twentieth century philosophers); 
psychoanalytic theory and the role o f the unconscious; postmodernism and the questioning o f a 
definitive ‘truth’ , rather there are ‘multiple truths’ , meaning is created in the moment; feminism and 
the challenge o f representing the minority voice; and the implication o f the ethical relationship as 
posed by Levinas was also explored.
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The researcher’s knowledge o f these theories and perspectives has been further developed during the 
course o f this study; each theory and perspective will be explored, phenomenology, hermeneutics, 
psychoanalytic theory, postmodernism, feminism and ethics, followed by a discussion o f there inter­
relatedness and how they inform the ontological, epistemological and methodological components 
o f  a research paradigm.
2.1 Phenomenology
Freidman (1964) credits Dilthey for suggesting that phenomenology is a distinct method o f 
knowing; and Husserl for raising it from an approach to a philosophy and his motto was ‘to things 
themselves’ , whereas, Heidegger (1967) acknowledges Husserl as being the instigator o f 
phenomenology. A definition which encompasses both of these views is provided by Merleau-Ponty 
(1962:79) ‘Phenomenology can be practised and identified as a manner or style o f thinking, that it 
existed as a movement before arriving at complete awareness o f itself as a philosophy’ [original 
emphasis]. He also credits Hegel, Kirkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud as being influenced by 
phenomenology.
Husserl (1929:15) defines phenomenology as ‘ a new kind o f descriptive method’ . He suggests that 
there are two main strands to phenomenological reduction, firstly the ability to ‘bracket’ or provide 
‘epoche’ to the describers own ‘psychic sphere’, and secondly the ability to describe the multiple 
appearances available to us. There is intentionally to our experience, and the act o f 
phenomenological description is to identify the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ o f  any given experience. 
Husserl sees objectivity and subjectivity in relation to one another, and shares the view o f Gadamer 
that it is not possible to separate them. Even though the scientist may claim to be able to be 
objective about the world, a view which stems for the Enlightenment project, this is, however not 
achievable as it is not possible to get away from humanness; the subjective element. ‘Since Socrates, 
man has become a theme in his specifically human qualities, as a person, many within the spiritual 
life o f the community’ (Husserl 1935:9). He also postulates ‘It is my conviction that intentional 
phenomenology has made o f the spirit qua spirit for the first time a field o f  systematic experience 
and science and thus brought about the total reorientation o f the task o f  knowledge’ (Husserl 
1935:13) [original emphasis]. It would thus appear that he is suggesting that science is not the only 
way o f knowing, of increasing knowledge o f the world; o f existence.
According to Heidegger (1967:46) ‘the meaning o f phenomenological description as a method lies 
in interpretation’ [original emphasis]. He also makes the claim for ontology to be situated within 
phenomenology. For Heidegger, the central tenet o f his philosophy is Daesin or Being: ‘ the persons 
‘being there’ in the world, thrown into a situation apart from which neither subject nor 
consciousness have any meaning’ (Friedman 1964:70). As such: ‘The task o f  ontology is to explain
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Being itself and to make the Being o f entities standout in ftill relief (Heidegger 1967:42). However, 
it is difficult to isolate the elements which contribute to this phenomena, for on the one hand, ‘the 
meaning o f Being must already be available to us in some way (Heidegger 1967:27), and on the 
other hand, ‘no line o f knowledge, no single truth may be absolutized and isolated’ (Husserl 
1935:8). Which incorporates the notion o f  meaningless, or that meaning is created in the moment, 
and dependent on the perception o f  the perceiver; ‘ I alone bring into being myself (and therefore 
into being in the only sense that the word can have for me)’ (Merleau-Ponty 1962:80).
The element o f ‘truth’ as being in the moment is referred to by Merleau-Ponty (1962:80) as: ‘To 
seek the essence o f perception is to declare that perception is, not presumed true, but defined as 
access to the truth’ . Whereas, Husserl (1935:8) suggests: ‘No line o f  knowledge, no single truth may 
be absolutized and isolated’ . It would seem that our perception, or our understanding o f  ‘ life is only 
a constant approximation; that life reveals quite different sides to us according to the point o f  view 
from which we consider its course in time, is due to the nature o f both understanding and life’ 
(Dilthey 1962:73). Thus it would appeal* difficult to define a particular way of being that is 
universal, rather it is context specific; and dependent on another: ‘Psychic life is accessible to us not 
only through self-experience but also through experience o f others’ (Husserl 1929:17) [original 
emphasis]. As such, this experience o f others and therefore of self, or ‘real living’ is to be ‘ found not 
in the self but in the “between” -  in “meeting” (Friedman 1964:71); and he suggests that the credit 
for this perspective lies in the work o f Buber. It would seem that there is a need for an experience to 
be situated for meaning to emerge.
As a methodological conception, phenomenology ‘ is all about things in themselves, and the need to 
get away from ‘technical devices’ (Heideggerl967:43). It is about rejection o f  things being inscribed 
a recognised formula for the creation o f a definitive meaning, and the acceptance o f meaning being 
created in the moment. A central issue for this meaning making is reflection, for this allows us to 
grasp subjective experiences (Husserl 1929). The implications for research is about how there is a 
need for the researcher to bracket their experience o f the phenomena in order to get as close as 
possible to the experience o f the researched, and that the meaning is context specific.
2.2 Hermeneutics
A term introduced by Heidegger, and for Gadamer who is associated with this theory, it is that 
understanding is both ‘historically and linguistically mediated’ and that ‘there is always some pre­
understanding or prejudice’ surrounding knowing, and this pre-understanding is an essential 
requisite for intentionally (Kearney and Rainwater 1996:109). Pre-understanding is the basis for all 
understanding; and it is constantly in the process of becoming; it is a cyclical process, pre­
understanding is transformed into understanding, which then becomes the pre-understanding for the
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next experience. Another term Gadamer refers to in relation to pre-understanding is prejudice, which 
he suggests are ‘ biases o f our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we 
experience something -  whereby what we encounter says something to us’ (Gadamer 1976:115). 
For interpretation to take place and a transformation o f pre-understanding to understanding, there is 
a need to see through our prejudices ‘or tear away the pretences that hide reality’ (Gadamer 
1989:32).
Gadamer appears to reject the Enlightenment project deeming it to be illusory; as such it could be 
said that he incorporates a postmodern perspective. He suggests that the overall aim o f science is to 
objectify experience, and that as it ‘no longer contains any historical element’ it can therefore be 
reproduced (Gadamer 1989:346). For Gadamer, historicity is an important aspect o f understanding, 
o f meaning making; we draw on the past to recreate or make new meaning in the present. He states 
‘ experience stands in an orientation toward new experiences’ (Gadamer 1989:355). This represents 
the hermeneutical circle, a circle that can not be closed, for we are constantly having new 
experiences, which have the propensity for expanding our horizon o f knowing; an aspect o f this 
circle is reflexivity. Metaphorically, the horizon is made up o f what we know and beyond is what we 
do not know; the ability to be open to new learning emerging from and through experience, 
represents an expansion in our horizon o f knowing.
An interest in hermeneutics for Howard (1982:ix) is the continuing debate between the humanities
and the sciences, and he poses the question ‘to what extent do the purposes and intentions o f the
individual affect the experience he has, and consequently the shape of his reality he apprehends, and
consequently the knowledge he claims to acquire?’ This on the one hand appears to be a circuitous
argument, and on the other hand commonsensical. He goes on to state:
‘Somehow our aspirations, wants, desires and interests are themselves hermeneutically, 
interpretative, active in the emergence o f knowledge. Knowledge (or understanding) and 
interests (or purposes) are interwoven’ (Howard 1982:85).
Thus knowledge and interests are mutually interdependent; the potentiality for expanding our 
horizons o f knowing is present, but there are necessary prerequisites, that o f the need or the wish or 
the desire to know. In essence to be open to the new experience and the subsequent emergence o f 
meaning/knowing/learning. An inherent part of this process is reflection, the ability to critically 
reflect (Gadamer 1976). If there is no reflection on experience, then the hermeneutical circle would 
in essence be responded to with old patterns o f meaning making; previous experience would be the 
template for future experience. There would be no room for manoeuvre, metaphorically we would 
be wearing a straitjacket o f  our own making. With reflection, there is the possibility to experience 
new ways o f meaning making to discover the infiniteness o f experience.
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As such Gadamer (1967:111) suggests that:
‘ our task is to reconnect the objective world o f technology which the sciences place at our 
disposal and discretion, with those fundamental orders o f our being that are neither arbitrary 
nor manipulated by us, but rather demand our respect’ .
It is suggested here that this reconnection is cognisant with the placing o f humanness primary to 
science and technology. It is about the ability to think our own thoughts, to expand the horizons o f 
our knowing, not in a previously thought out way, but with a willingness to be open to the 
experience.
Language has an importance for Gadamer (1966:3) he states: ‘the fundamental mode o f operation o f 
our being-in-the-world and the all embracing form of the constitution o f the world’ . And that it ‘ is 
itself the game o f  interpretation that we are engaged in everyday’ (Gadamer 1989:32); also that it ‘ is 
the single word, whose virtuality opens for us the infinity o f discourse, o f  speaking with one 
another, o f the freedom o f “ expressing oneself’ and ‘ letting oneself be expressed’ (Gadamer 
1989:549). He also acknowledges dialogue as the fundamental tool for knowing, either face-to-face 
or through the text; both provide the opportunity for interpretation and meaning making. 
Opportunities are everywhere: ‘ I maintain that the heremenutical problem is universal and basic for 
all interhuman experience, both o f history and o f the present moment, precisely because meaning 
can be experienced even when it is not actually intended’ (Gadamer 1967:32).
In relation to science methodology, Gadamer (1967:39) suggests that hermeneutics may help 
indirectly by ‘making transparently clear the guiding pre-understanding in the sciences and thereby 
open up new dimensions o f questioning’ . Questioning is central to research activities and he 
suggests that central to asking questions is the imagination: ‘ imagination naturally has a 
hermeneutical function and severs the sense for what is questionable’ (Gadamer 1967:118). In 
essence we need to know what questions to ask to expand our horizon o f knowing; it is suggested 
here that a sterile imagination may lead to a foreclosure on experience, a fertile imagination a 
propensity to the openness o f experience. To encounter and embrace difference, rather than to a 
reduction to sameness in the name o f academic rigour. According to Gadamer it is not possible to 
totally eliminate the subjective, the researcher does not enter the field as an object, they bring with 
them their particular viewpoint o f culture, their prejudices, in essence their experience of the world; 
and ‘hermeneutical consciousness culminates not in methodological sureness o f itself, but in the. 
same readiness for experience that distinguishes the experienced man from the man captivated by 
dogma’ (Gadamer 1989:362).
Thus hermeneutics provides a way of looking at the creation o f  meaning, and how previous ieaming 
or understanding impacts and informs future meaning making. The expansion o f the horizon of
53
knowing requires openness to experience, and a willingness to question and reflect upon that 
experience.
2.3 Psychoanalytic theory
Freud is identified as the founder o f psychoanalysis; and he provides a theory o f personality. His 
theory has been influential to society, and as such he is considered as powerful as Darwin and Marx. 
His concepts o f  the unconscious, repression and sexual, desire are used in everyday language, as 
such his concepts are ‘ accepted wisdom’ (Frosh 1999:1); also the theory can provide meaning in 
social life (Elliott 1999). Symmington (1986:39) makes the distinction that Freud did not discover 
the unconscious, as a concept it had been around for some two hundred years, what he did do was 
the exploration o f ‘the laws and principles, which governed it’ . There are three areas o f 
psychoanalytic study; ‘the development o f the mind and the influence o f early experience on adult 
mental states; the nature and role o f unconscious mental phenomena; and the theory and practice o f 
psychoanalytic treatment, particularly transference and countertransference’ (Bateman and Holmes 
1995: 17).
Freud outlines a theory for human development and how early childhood experiences impact on the 
adult’s behaviour. Analysis is aimed at uncovering repressed material, in making unconscious 
material conscious. Symmington (1986:44) describes the personality as ‘a mass o f  bits and 
psychoanalysis is concerned with binding them together. The external world as chaos mirrors the 
inner abyss’ . As such psychoanalysis is about a search for meaning(s) which are not just confined to 
the individual, but also has implications for society in general (Elliott 1999, Frosh 1999).
To support o f his theory o f  the unconscious, Freud (1915:574) states: ‘ that at any given moment
consciousness includes only a small content, so that the greater part that we call conscious
knowledge must be in any case be for very considerable periods o f time in a state o f latency, that is
to say, o f being psychically unconscious’ . However, the unconscious material can impact on our
relationship with others, we transfer unconscious material from one experience to another. And the
receiver o f the transference can respond to the experience with his or her own transference, or
counter-transference. Freud (1915:574) stated:
‘an analysis without transference is an impossibility. It must not be supposed, however, that 
transference is merely uncovered and isolated by analysis. It is a universal phenomena o f the 
human mind, it decides the success o f all medical influence, and in fact dominates the whole 
o f each person’s relations to his human environment’ .
‘What is peculiar to the unconscious as a psychical system is that It violently deforms, disfigures, or 
disguises meaning into something unrecognisable’ (Elliott 1999:21), and it suggested here that 
meaning is ‘ slippery’ it is difficult to articulate the experience as it was, to get to the ‘ real’ o f an 
experience. This point is elaborated by Derrida (1998), for he makes reference to how Freud’s
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conceptualisation o f the omphalos (the navel) as a metaphor for how a dream can never be fully 
interpreted, due to the threads o f the omphalos being so closely inter-twined, that they cannot be 
separated. As such, interpretation will always be found wanting; and deconstruction as a form of 
analysis, faces the same problem, for it is not possible to get to the thing itself; it will always be an 
approximation. He also states ‘ if there is any deconstruction it takes place (which I have said too 
often, and yet once again in psyche to dare repeat it again) as experience o f the impossible’ (Derrida 
1998:55) [original emphasis].
Psychoanalytic theory provides a fr amework for meaning making which recognises the influence o f  
the unconscious, and how this impacts on relationships with others, and how we make sense o f  a 
situation. The recounting o f meaning making is difficult to elaborate for another, for it will always 
be contaminated or enriched by the unconscious. Possibly within the science and technology 
domain, the unconscious would be seen to contaminate the findings. Whereas, with a privileging o f 
humanness, the unconscious would be seen to enrich the findings. It is suggested here that in the 
case o f  the report (research text), the interpretation made by the unknown reader, will also be subject 
to unconscious influences. Therefore getting to the ‘ real’ will always be an approximation.
2.4 Postmodernism
Postmodernism is a concept that is difficult to define (Loewenthal 1996, Hinkson 1995), whereas,
Potter (1996) suggests that to attempt to define it is contrary to the nature o f  it. However, it is
defined in the Dictionary o f Modern thought as:
‘ amphorous body o f developments and direction marked by eclecticism, pluriculutrualism, 
and often a post-industrical, hi-tech frame o f reference coupled with a sceptical view o f 
technical progress’ (Bullock et al 1988:672).
Toynbee coined the term in the 1960’s (Peters 1995); however, both Peters and Kearney and 
Rainwater (1996) accredit the philosopher Nietzsche as being the first postmodernist, due to his 
style o f  questioning. Scepticism, appears to be an important aspect o f postmodernism, it is about 
challenging previously held views stemming from the modernist paradigm, and the truth claims 
inherent in it. Postmodernism is noted for its questioning o f the notion o f a definitive truth and a 
known reality; it is therefore characterised by uncertainty (Pilgrim 2000, Robinson 1999, Ward 
1997, Gergen and Kaye 1992, Kvale 1992). As such there can only be a partial view o f reality 
(Cheek 1999), and therefore the meanings that emerge from within the postmodern paradigm, are 
also viewed with scepticism; for postmodernism is an ‘ongoing project to find new ways o f looking 
at new times’ (Ward 1997:5).
Technical thought according to Gergen (1992) flourished within the modernist frame, and as such 
was deemed to have superseded values, with postmodernism, such truth claims o f the ‘technical’ are
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called into question. Lyotard (1984) explored how the concept o f knowledge can be 
challenged/redefined within postmodernism. He argues that the privileged position o f scientific 
knowledge is called into question, as it does not represent the whole field, and he makes the case for 
narrative knowing, which is more personal. The grand-narrative o f knowledge is replaced, and 
knowledge becomes local (Lauzon 1998, Kvale 1992); there is an emphasis on practical knowledge 
(Kvale 1992, Shotter 1992) as such knowledge becomes context specific or situated (Gergen 1992, 
Polkinghorne 1992, Shotter 1992, Lather 1991). With modernism, scientific knowledge has been 
privileged, and the other ways o f  knowing marginalised; with postmodernism there is an opportunity 
for the marginalised terms to be privileged.
The French philosopher Derrida introduced the term deconstruction, and he questions the ‘meaning 
o f meaning5 (Ward 1997:95). One aspect, is the focus on binary opposites, ‘how they are related, 
how one is central, natural and privileged the other repressed, and marginalised’ (Powell 1997:30). 
Derrida’s concept o f deconstruction is about the constant interplay between the dominant and 
minority voice, for deconstruction temporarily privileges the minority voice. As such the minority 
voice then becomes the dominant one, and in the next cycle o f deconstruction, it is relegated to the 
margins again. Meaning is not fixed, and in one respect it is not possible to eradicate binary 
opposites rather there is blurring o f the boundaries; in essence they are mutually interdependent. In 
relation to research Derrida provides researchers with ‘a means for deconstructing objective truth or 
what is referred to as “the metaphysics o f presence” (Kincheoloe and McLaren 1994:140).
A slogan associated with postmodernism is the ‘death o f the subject’ (Kvale 1992); or rather a de-
centering. Sarbin (1993 :xxi) defines the postmodern self as:
‘the self is a ‘ decentralised manyness’ o f I  positions that each have a voice and can tell their 
own stories about their respective me's. The I  moves in an imaginal landscape, from one 
position to another in such a way that dialogical relationships in a multivocal self become 
possible’ [original emphasis].
Thus the self, is not a monologicai concept, rather it is created in communion with others. Lyotard 
(1984:40) suggests that language is the medium o f narratives, and states: ‘the social bond is 
linguistic but it is not woven with a single thread’ . But language is found wanting for imagery 
cannot be fully captured in language (Myers 1969). For it appears an impossibility to translate 
thoughts, feelings, and experiences into words. According to Anderson (1996:65) ’Every language 
is its own set o f blueprints for constructing reality’ [original emphasis]. Within postmodernism there 
is recognition o f how words can ‘ fix’ an event, and as such there is a need to be playful with 
language and meaning making (Anderson 1996, Michael 1994).
The implications o f postmodernism for research is that it ‘ is not a mapping o f  some objective social 
reality; research involves co-constitution o f  the objects investigated, with a negotiation and
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interaction with the very objects studied’ (Gergen 1992:13). And that this has led to a focus on 
discursive practices as opposed to methods, because the ‘ concept o f truth and research as means to 
truth are impugned’ (Gergen 1992:25). Within this paradigm there is reliance on narrative, 
hermeneutic and deconstructivist methods o f investigation (Schuerich 1997, Kvale 1992, Lovile 
1992, Shorter 1992).
This perspective challenges the modernist claim to a- known reality, rather it recognises how 
meaning is created in the moment, and is dependent on the players involved. As such we are all 
subject to; language is the best tool we have o f explaining our experience, but it is found wanting. 
There will always be a gap between an experience and the explanation of it, we know more than we 
can tell.
2.5 Feminism
The work o f de Beauvoir (1949) The Second Sex, ‘has inspired many subsequent developments in 
feminist theory, as well as shaping the gender critique within the discipline o f  philosophy itself,’ 
(Kearney and Rainwater 1996:93). Phoca (1999:3) defines feminism as being: ‘ identified with a 
desire for gender equality in a long intrinsic struggle which advocated change through social action’ . 
A feminist stance acknowledges diversity and with this diversity comes a questioning o f the status 
quo and the emergence o f  new meanings. This questioning stance (Arpad 1993) creates and gives 
valence to plurality o f  meanings (Nicholson 1995, Kramarae and Spender 1993). Feminism as a 
perspective questions the traditional scientific views of knowledge, as such this masculine 
framework renders women invisible (Stanley 1997, Reinharz 1993). Also that within the male 
orientated approaches, there is an emphasis o f theory over experience (Stanley and Wise 1993). 
There is also a tendency to treat women as objects; the feminist aim is to challenge this by 
suggesting that women are also actors (Arpad 1993, Reinharz 1993, Stanley and Wise 1993). There 
is a need for women to move from the subservient position assigned them by society, to a position, 
which is in relation to the other sex (Irigaray 1993). A key notion here is that within the embracing 
o f diversity, is the recognition o f difference, and how the feminist movement is more about human 
difference and how this ‘translates into social script’ (Goldenberg 1990:61) . Feminists have been 
drawn to psychoanalytic theory, as a way o f explaining gender biases (see Rristeva, Irigaray, 
Goldenberg).
Postmodernism creates the potential for this minority voice to be heard. However, Nicholson (1995) 
is critical o f  the emergence o f postmodernism, and suggests it was a ploy to silence women. As 
women were beginning to question the dominant male culture, metaphorically the ‘goal posts’ as to 
what constitutes acceptable knowledge were moved, to embrace the concept o f multiple truths. It 
would seem that she wished to ‘ turn the tables’ , and create the feminine as the only voice and
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metaphorically emasculate the other; as such she suggests feminists should reject postmodernism. 
Somehow there does not appear to be room for both perspectives, feminists who acknowledge both 
prefer the term postfeminism (Phoca 1999).
Within the research community, the voice of feminism, is a perspective that allows for the minority 
voice to speak (see Kitzinger and Wilkinson 1996). Walsh (1993) suggests that feminism is sceptical 
o f all research methods, whereas, Stanley and Wise (199.3:161) acknowledge that there is a need to 
value the self o f the researcher; ‘ all research involves, as it’ s basis, an interaction, a relationship, 
between researcher and researched’ . On the other hand, Reinharz (1992) is keen to point out that 
feminism is not a research method, rather it is a perspective, and there is a need to use multiple 
research methods. There is also a need to address the reader, whereas Lather (1991) suggests there is 
a need to invite the reader into the text, and that the text should represent multiple voices; relying on 
quotes, for the reader to determine/locate for themselves how the author develops their argument. 
Within the research framework/perspective o f feminism is the recognition that there is a need for the 
person who is having the experience to be given a voice, rather than them being the stranger who is 
somehow not quite involved in the lived experience (Stanley 1997).
Feminism, is ‘the analysis o f  old knowledge and the source o f new knowledge: it makes you think, ’
(Stanley 1997:1). She goes on to talk about the ‘ borderlands’ o f this ‘ new knowledge’ :
‘Here in the borderlands difference is often experienced neither as separation nor as silence, 
but rather as an interface expressed through the babble o f voices speaking together, speaking 
past each other, in which some voices sound, resound, more than others, and in which echo 
comiotes power. This interface is a frontier that sees the coming and going o f peoples, the 
speaking and silencing o f voice’s, the casting o f gazes which look but do not necessarily see. 
Around this frontier are gathered the differences o f ‘race’ , ethnicity, sexuality, gender, class, 
age, dis/ability, and more; and it is this frontier which constitutes the cultural space in which 
‘difference’ becomes the point at which epistemological disputes surface around seismic 
linguistic and ideational shifts. The frontier provides ‘ the space between’ for debate, 
contention, disagreement.’
Thus there is a need for the researcher to be aware o f the concept o f ‘difference’ and how this is 
culturally defined, and that the exploration o f the ‘borderlands’ represent the challenge o f re­
presenting the other. Ultimately to explore the language used to describe a situation, and to 
determine which ‘ voice’ is being privileged and to question why.
2.6 Ethics
Nietzsche is the ‘thinker who most radically challenged traditional moral thinking and placed human 
development at the centre o f a value creating system of thought’ (Thompson 1994:131). Whereas, 
Levinas, viewed traditional ethics as secondary to the primacy o f  the ethical relationship; he ‘puts 
concern for the other at the centre o f ethics’ (Moran 2000:320). Levinas was influenced by 
phenomenology (Levinas and Keamey 1986, Moran 2000). As such he ‘ integrates
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phenomenological ontology into dialogical thinking’ (de Boer 1986:83). Whereas, Smith (1986:57) 
suggests that ‘ ethics is his optics’ for understanding intersubjectivity. A key aspect o f his work, was 
the relation to the other, and how it is founded on the ethical principle o f putting the other first: to be 
responsible for the other (Peperzak 1993, Bernasconi 1988). In conversation with Kearney, Levinas 
states ‘ My ethical relationship o f love for the other stems from the fact that the self cannot survive 
by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-world, with the ontology o f 
sameness’ (Levinas and Kearney 1986:24). He goes on to say: ‘Ethics redefines subjectivity as this 
heteronmous responsibility, in contrast to autonomous freedom’ (Levinas and Kearney 1986:27).
The notion o f the ‘ face’ is an important concept, and how the face o f  the other calls me, to be
responsible for him. Levinas (1982:85) states:
‘You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a 
forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way o f  encountering the Other is not 
even to notice the color o f  his eyes! When one observes the color o f the eyes one is not in 
social relationship with the Other’ .
It appears that this responsibility transcends the physical aspect o f  the Other, rather it is about being 
with another, not noticing their physical attributes; and it is suggested here that this is a tall order in 
today’s image conscious culture. But this possibly arises out o f  a rejection o f  the technical remit, 
whereby there is sameness, a reduction to the same, and it is this that Levinas questions. Rather than 
the totalising move o f reduction to sameness, there is a need to be accepting o f difference, and a 
willingness to be open to the infmiteness o f  possibility. Although the concept o f ‘ face’ is a metaphor 
for the personhood o f the other (Moran 2000), there is a tendency to think o f  the face symbolising 
the other, for Reed (1986:81) states: ‘ I am responsible not because I cannot hide my face, but 
because the other person does not hide his’ .
Another aspect is how difficult it is to ‘ capture’ this responsibility for the Other, for in the event the 
‘ saying’ o f this ethical response there is an aliveness. When recounting the event, the ‘saying’ 
becomes ‘ said’ and as such there is a deadening. According to Smith (1986:61) ‘Saying’ belongs to 
the horizon o f sociality that is incommensurable with the text o f the ‘ said’ but is its origin and 
presupposition’ . As such the issue o f the Other, is about a gap that cannot be bridged (de Boer 1986, 
Llewelyn 1988).
According to Kearney and Rainwater (1996:112) the philosopher Levinas focused on the ‘priority of 
‘otherness’ , a radical alterity that demands our ethical response’ ; also he raised the question o f 
‘ examining the lived experience without presuppositions’ . But what are the implications o f  this for 
research? Can we meet with another without presuppositions? These questions are fundamental to 
this research, which focuses on the lived experience o f giving and receiving therapy. In relation to 
the activity o f  therapy, the meeting o f  two people; Loewenthal (1996:380) states: ‘we should be
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concerned with justice on a case by case basis, for real justice cannot be appropriated or 
territorialized, instead, as with one’s clients, one has to be just in the moment with another’ . 
However, researching this activity is difficult, for ‘ the other cannot be represented by me’ (Moran 
2000:337). Whereas, Cohen (1986:2) suggests that ethics disrupts knowledge and truth as 
‘ epistemology and ethics only seem to distort one another unrecognisably’ . He also suggests that 
ethics ‘ is the essentially nonencompassable context, the nonplace, the u-topia, within which 
knowing “ takes place” (Cohen 1986:8). This represents a challenge for this study, how to elicit this 
‘moment with another’ the meeting o f  the therapist and the client, and the meeting o f the researcher 
with the research participant.
Gordon (1999) in his book Face to Face: Therapy as Ethics, makes reference to the influence o f 
Levinas, and suggests the difficulty o f the saying and the said, get in the way o f  representing what 
happens in therapy. He suggests that there is a gap created ‘between what actually happens in a 
session and any attempt to record or reconstruct it afterwards’ (Gordon 1999:60). It is suggested 
here that this gap is also found between the relationship between the researcher and the researched 
and how to re-present the event. Gordon (1999) develops his discussion further by suggesting that 
part o f the role o f therapist is ‘ responsibility to the other to allow for openness, formlessness, dis­
order’ (Gordon 1999:62). In relation to research, it is suggested here that there is a need for the 
researcher to be ‘ open’ to the experience o f  the other, rather than impose closure on the meeting by 
providing a set structure, by for example, a pre-determined questionnaire/interview schedule, but to 
be open to what emerges in the in-between.
The ethical relationship is about putting the Other first; and this is based on notions o f difference 
rather than a reduction to sameness. This relationship has implications for the relationship created 
between the researcher and the researched. A challenge is how to minimalise the inevitable ‘ gap’ 
when representing the ‘ saying’ as ‘said’ that emerges in this activity.
2. 7 How the theories and perspectives inform research
A commonality between the theories and perspectives discussed, is the search for meaning, and each 
has a particular take on how meaning is created; that meaning making is dependent on experience. 
Phenomenology emphasises the lived experience, and the need to describe the ‘what’ and the ‘ how’ 
o f the experience rather than to ascribe a fixed meaning. Hermeneutical interpretation, which has its 
roots in phenomenology, recognises how pre-understanding can provide prejudgements to 
experience and meaning making; as such there is closure to experience. The meaning derived from 
an experience is ‘ fixed’ by the previous experience, and as such the ‘horizons of knowing’ remain 
unchanged. By adopting an openness to experience, and the ability to reflect on experience, there is 
the potential for a new understanding to be generated. An understanding which is not ‘ fixed’ rather
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that it has the potential for change/modification in light o f further experience, experience that 
provides further opportunities for expanding the horizons o f knowing. Thus meaning making is 
never complete; it is always in a state o f  becoming.
Psychoanalytic theory provides a framework for meaning making/ interpretation that is dependent 
on both conscious and unconscious elements. Previous experiences are stored in the unconscious 
and have the potential to impact on future experiences. As such these transferential issues are crucial 
to the meaning making process; when we confer meaning we do so from past experience, and as 
such it can be an illusion to ‘experience the experience’ ; for there is always something prior to, 
which shapes the interpretation o f  the experience. Being aware o f how past experiences may inform 
future meanings, derived from experience, enhances the ability to experience the experience as ‘ is 
now’ , in preference to ‘as then’ .
Postmodernism challenged the modernist tradition o f  a definitive truth being elicited; rather there is 
multiplicity o f meanings. That meanings are construed in the moment and are dependent on the 
experiencer, the context, and the interaction with the other interlocutors involved. There is a 
recognition o f how the experiencer is not at the centre o f  the meaning making process, rather that 
they are subject to; when we speak we do so from a particular position. Language is the medium for 
articulating this position, however, language is found wanting, for it is impossible to provide 
descriptions that mirror the reality o f an experience. Also in the recounting o f an experience, further 
experiences will have taken place, which have the potential for contaminating the account o f the 
first experience. As such there is always a gap between the experience and recounting it to another, 
another gap is between the meaning conferred to the receiver o f the account o f  the experience, and 
the meaning the receiver makes o f the account. As such meaning is a slippery concept; it is difficult 
to grasp. And in this grasping there is a propensity to ascribe a fixed meaning.
A feminist perspective further develops the theme o f the multiplicity o f meaning by recognising that 
the language used to describe an experience is masculine, subsequently women’s experience is 
reduced to what can be spoken about in the male dominant discourse. As such there is a silencing o f 
women’s voices. By bringing in the marginalised voice, there is the opportunity for the voice o f the 
other to be heard. However, there is need to be mindful how this privileging o f one voice over the 
other, is temporary, otherwise there is the potential for creating a reverse marginalisation, and a 
closure to difference. It is not one or the other, but rather that in difference each have a place; they 
are as good as, or as valid as. The challenge is how to represent the minority voice; a voice not just 
restricted to women, but to other oppressed groups e.g. races, disability, and social classes.
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Our ethical responsibility to the other is based on not reducing all to the same, it is only in difference 
we can avoid totalising moves, and meet with the other, and subsequently to put the other first. It is 
also acknowledged that this meeting with another is in the moment, and attempts to convert the 
‘ saying’ into the ‘said’ represents an attempt to fix meaning on the meeting, that there will always 
be a gap between the meeting and attempts to represent it. It is difficult to represent the meaning 
making that emerges in the in-between.
All o f  the theories and perspectives support the view that ‘meaning making’ emanating from an 
experience is a continuous ongoing project, that there is not a definitive meaning or ‘truth’ , rather 
‘ truth’ is in the moment. The elicitation o f this meaning is dependent ‘ on the struggle over the 
interpretation and definition o f the experience’ (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994:44).
This representation of experience is fundamental to the research process; ‘Experience is the only 
evidence’ (Laing 1967:16) [original emphasis]. All o f the theories and perspectives discussed have 
implications for the research process. Phenomenology is concerned with the lived experience, and 
the need for the researcher to bracket their experience o f the phenomenon, in an attempt to not 
provide foreclosure on the experience o f  the other. This is also recognised as fundamental to the 
ethical relationship posed by Levinas, who was influenced by phenomenology. There is the need for 
the researcher to come to the study without presupposition, so that in the meeting with the other, 
there is the potential for meaning to emerge in the in-between, between the researcher and the 
researched. Transferential issues as defined by psychoanalytic theory, give credence how the 
process o f research is a subjective and relational activity.
The implications o f hermeneutical interpretation for research is how interpretation is a cyclical 
process, one that is based on reflection; ‘reflection on a given pre-understanding brings before me 
something that otherwise happens behind my baclC (Gadamer 1967:38) [original emphasis]. This act 
expands the horizons o f knowing, and opens up to new knowing/meaning making, rather than 
reducing what is being experienced to what is already known. It is also about questioning, and the 
‘ability to see what is questionable’ (Gadamer 1976:13). There is a need for the researcher to be 
reflexive. Reflexivity is about being able to move ‘ beyond the level o f straightforward’ 
interpretation’ (Woolgar 1988:16). He suggests that there are many varieties o f reflexivity from 
‘radical constitutive’ at one end o f the continuum, to ‘benign introspection’ at the other. It is the 
former that is cognisant with the view that there is a not one definitive meaning, rather that meaning 
is an illusive concept, and it can only be grasped in the moment. Radical constitutive reflexivity 
involves a ‘back and forth process’ focusing on the interdependency between representation and the 
phenomenon. Inherent to this activity is the ability to question, to be open to the possibility of 
expanding the horizon o f knowing.
62
Postmodernism challenges the scientific claims o f modernism, and there is recognition o f how the 
grand-narratives o f modernism are replaced with local or situated narratives o f  postmodernism, as 
such knowledge is practical. Feminism also challenges scientific knowledge suggesting that it is a 
technique that renders women invisible, there is a need to encompass diversity over sameness. 
Experience is privileged over theory, and the research participants are involved in the research 
process not as objects but as subjects; for the lived experience is their story. Both feminist and 
postmodern perspective advocate the multiplicity o f  research methods, and the need for the text to 
represent the multiple voices, and to address the reader, inviting them into the meaning making 
process.
All the theories and perspectives discussed appear to be questioning the dominant voice o f science, 
and suggesting that there are other ways, ways which acknowledge that meaning is not a universal 
given, a fixed entity, rather it is an ongoing process. We each create our own meaning from 
experience and are influenced by previous experiences, and our ability to locate our experience in 
language. There appears to be a recognition o f the need to move away from the ‘technical’ remit o f 
science to embracing humanness.
To open up a conversation about a way o f  looking at psychotherapy as a form o f learning, there is a 
need to identify the research paradigm within which this conversation will be situated. A paradigm 
that is developed from the current paradigms, for to choose a predetermined paradigm, would not 
correlate with the reason given for eliciting the interpretative lens o f the researcher, i.e. it (in)forms 
the research paradigm. Rather than use a ‘best fit’ paradigm, a paradigm will be developed from the 
current paradigms; thus supporting the notion that the construction o f  knowledge is personal.
3. A research paradigm for this study
To illustrate how the ontological, epistemological and methodological components integrate to form 
a research paradigm, the four research paradigms of positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, and 
constructivism as defined by Guba and Lincoln (1994) will be briefly explored. They suggest that 
their definitions which are derived from the field o f social sciences, are ‘ tentative and subject to 
further revision and reformulation’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994:109). Following on from the discussion 
o f these paradigms, the ontological, epistemological and methodological components o f  the research 
paradigm developed for this study will be explored.
Positivism: The ontological perspective (what is there that can be known) is ‘ realism’ whereby there 
is a known reality, epistemologically (relationship between knower and what can be known), there is 
a ‘ dualist and objectivist’ perspective, whereby there is no relationship between the researcher and
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the object/subject researched. Methodologically (how to find out whether what is thought to be 
known can be known) there is a reliance on quantitative techniques, the testing out o f hypothesis and 
the controlling o f variables which contaminate the findings. As previously stated this paradigm is 
not cognisant with the underpinning ethos o f this study, the privileging o f humanness in preference 
to science and technology.
Post-positivism: The ontological perspective is ‘critical realism’ whereby reality can only be 
partially known, epistemologically, there is a ‘ modified dualist and objectivist’ stance, whereby 
there is recognition given to the relationship between the researcher and the researched, however it 
is objectified. Methodologically there is a reliance on ‘modified experimental and manipulate’, or 
qualitative techniques. As such positivism is the “ received view” and post-positivism responds ‘ in a 
limited way (that is, while remaining within essentially the same set o f basic beliefs) to the most 
problematic criticism o f positivism’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994:109). Post-positivism is an 
overarching term, whereby there is a privileging o f  humanness, there are however, varying degrees 
to this, in this category it is ‘ in a limited way’ ; the next two paradigms embrace humanness to a 
greater extent. They are therefore considered to be more relevant to this study. Each paradigm will 
be defined followed by a discussion o f how they inform the development o f a paradigm for this 
study.
Critical Theory: The ontological perspective is ‘historical realism’ whereby there is a virtual 
historical reality, epistemologically there is a ‘transactional and subjectivist’ stance, whereby the 
researcher and the researcher are interactively linked, and the values o f the researcher are influential. 
As such the findings are value mediated, and there is a blurring o f the ontological and 
epistemological, for ‘what can be known is inextricably intertwined with the interaction between a 
particular investigator and a particular object or group’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994:110) [original 
emphasis]. Methodologically there is reliance on ‘dialogic and dialectical’ techniques, and the 
researchers views are transformed through the process. According to Kincheloe and McLaren 
(1994:157) ‘ critical research traditions have arrived at the point where they recognize the claims to 
truth are always discursively situated and implicated in relations o f power’ ; whereas, Olesen 
(1994:158) suggests that ‘ interpretative human actions ... can be the focus o f research’ . As such, 
there is an increasing recognition o f the scope o f research, and how knowledge is local and situated.
Constructivism: The ontological perspective is ‘ relativist’ whereby ‘ realities are apprehendable in. 
the form o f multiple, intangible mental constructions’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 110). As such 
reality is ‘ local and specific’ , however, there may be some commonality with others. The 
epistemological stance is the same as critical theory ‘transactional and subjectivist’ but there is a 
difference in that the findings are created as the investigation proceeds, there is also a merging o f
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ontological and epistemological perspectives. The resulting constructions ‘are not more or less 
“ true” , in any absolute sense, but simply more or less informed and/or sophisticated’ (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994: 111). Methodologically there is a reliance on ‘hermeneutical and dialectical’ 
techniques, and that ‘ individual constructions can be elicited and refined only through interaction 
between and among investigator and respondents’ (Guba and Lincoln 1994:111) [original 
emphasis]. Constructivism is a branch o f qualitative research, and recognition is given to how 
knowledge, in a relative sense, is created through formations o f ever more constructions (Schwandt
1994). As such constructivists ''reconstruct the “world” at the only point at which it exists; in the 
minds o f the constructors. It is the mind that is to be transformed, not the “ real” world’ (Guba 
1990:27) [original emphasis].
Elements o f critical theory and constructivism inform the paradigm that will guide this study, and 
this is now explored. The ontological perspective that informs the inquiry is relativist, and like the 
contructivist paradigm there is the recognition o f how the meanings that are generated are multiple 
and intangible. However, there is a difference in that this meaning emerges in the in in-between, 
between the researcher and the research participant rather than through the process o f the inquiry. 
The epistemological perspective is interactional subjective, that is meaning is generated through the 
relationship between the researcher and the research participant in the first instance, and then 
between the researcher and the data analysis, and between the researcher and the research report. 
Acknowledgement is given to how at each stage, there is the potential for an uncovering o f the 
multiplicity o f meanings generated in the inquiry, and the final report is a re-presentation o f the 
multi-layering perspectives that inform the understanding of the phenomenon o f  the inquiry.
There is a blurring o f the ontological and epistemological perspectives, whereby the ethical 
relationship developed between the researcher and research participant is founded on the ethical 
principle of recognising the alterity o f  the other; subjectivity is found in difference. The meaning 
that emerges in the in-between is in the moment and dependent on the interlocutors, and is thus 
context specific, or situated. This contrasts with the transactional subjectivist epistemological 
perspective o f both critical theory and constructivism. There is however, a similarity in how both are 
interpreted due to the merging with the ontological perspective. Constructivism’s ontological 
perspective is relativism, and as such meaning emerges through the process o f the inquiry. Whereas, 
the ontological perspective o f critical theory is historical realism, and how truth claims are 
discursively situated and dependent on power relations. The meaning generated is therefore 
interactively linked with the researcher’ s values.
The methodological perspective o f  the paradigm for this study is reflexive and dialectical. The 
dialectical component is shared with both constructivism and critical theory, whereby what is being
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proposed is a systematic reasoning o f the phenomenon o f the inquiry. The reflexive component 
represents a generic term that incorporates the hermeneutical element o f  constructivism and the 
dialogical element o f critical theory. In hermeneutics, meaning is generated in a back and forth 
processes, during which pre-understanding, or the presuppositions which informs the interpretative 
process, are transformed into understanding. This understanding then becomes the pre­
understanding that informs the next interpretative process; there is thus the potential to expand the 
horizons o f knowing infinitely. Meanings generated in a hermeneutical inquiry are developed and 
refined between researcher and research participant. However, within the interactional subjective 
perspective o f the paradigm that informs this study, meaning emerges in the in-between, this in- 
between extends beyond between the researcher and the research participant, to the in-between the 
researcher and the data analysis, and the researcher and the research report; all three activities have 
the potential to generate a ‘ snapshot’ o f the multiplicity o f meanings o f the phenomenon, that are 
generated through the research process.
The research paradigm informs the methodological framework and provides a coherency to the 
research process in action; this will be explored next.
4. A methodological framework to be tested out in this study
The methodological framework provides a structure to guide the study. The use o f the word 
‘structure’ can be misleading, for it appears to be at odds with a study that embraces a postmodern 
perspective. However, the framework provides coherence to the development o f  a conversation on a 
way of looking at psychotherapy as a form o f learning. The framework embraces the notion o f 
multiple meanings, and is premised on the interpretative lens o f the researcher and how this informs 
paradigm choices and the selection o f the topic to be researched and the questions posed.
The topic for research in this study is to develop a way o f looking at psychotherapy as a form o f 
learning. The research question: Is therapy a form o f learning for people with a facial difference? 
This question then informs the research design and method. The research design provides clarity o f 
the purpose o f the study and the question posed (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). The question is 
contextualised or situated in a field o f experience. The method is a way o f  generating data to explore 
the question posed. The use o f the word ‘ explore’ as opposed to ‘ answer’ supports the notion o f a 
multiplicity o f meanings, meaning making is infinite. To ‘explore’ suggests a process; to ‘answer’ 
suggests a definitive outcome. This view embraces the ontological perspective o f  relativism o f the 
research paradigm of this study.
The meeting o f the research participant and the researcher generates data for analysis. Thus the data 
is generated in the in-between, between the research participant and researcher. The meaning that
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emerges is interactional subjective, for it is apprehended through dialogue, and this correlates with 
the epistemological perspective o f the research paradigm o f this study. This also correlates with the 
ontological perspective, for meaning is generated in the in-between and there is a propensity for 
multiple meanings to emerge.
The analysis o f  data involves a back and forth process, the researcher moves between the data and 
generation o f new meaning. This reflexivity is an integral component o f  the research paradigm’s 
methodological perspective, as is the questioning, dialectical stance adopted throughout the research 
process. The construction o f meaning (the findings) represents the meaning that emerges in the in- 
between, between the researcher and the data. To embrace the concept o f  multiple meanings the 
analysis o f  data does not stop with the construction. For this construction forms the pre­
understanding o f a further analysis o f the construction, an activity which culminates in the creation 
o f  a secondary construction. This is premised on a deconstruction, whereby hidden meanings in the 
text are elicited (Howells 1999, Norris 1982). This construction emerges in-between the researcher 
and the text. This cycle o f primary construction and secondaiy construction could be repeated 
infinitely. However, to meet with the aim o f this study, to develop a model to open up further 
conversations on a way o f looking at psychotherapy as a form o f learning, there is a need to reach a 
conclusion, albeit a tentative one. Thus, the meaning that emerges from the secondary construction 
is an at-the-time understanding o f  the phenomenon; it is the pre-understanding that informs a 
critique o f the research process. This critique supports the notion that meaning making is an ongoing 
process. As the critique involves each stage o f  the research process, information is generated on the 
testing out o f  the framework in practice.
To summarise, the methodological framework is process comprising o f nine stages:
1. The inteipretative lens of the researcher is made explicit.
2. The research question influences the research design, and there is a need for the researcher to 
identify the research field and the selection o f an appropriate research method to guide the 
study.
3. The research method provides a framework for the generation o f data, the meeting between the 
researcher and the research participant who has experience o f the phenomenon of the study.
4. The research method also provides a structure for the analysis o f the data.
5. The analysis o f data culminates in a primary construction o f the researchers understanding o f 
the phenomena that has emerged from the data.
6. The meaning emerging from the primary construction forms the pre-understanding that informs 
a revisiting o f the construction, to elicit the hidden meanings in the text.
7. A secondary construction o f the meaning(s) generated in the inquiry is provided and there is 
recognition to the multiplicity o f meanings inherent in the experience o f the phenomenon.
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8. This leads to an understanding o f the phenomenon.
9. Which forms the pre-understanding o f a revisiting o f each stage o f the research process: (a) 
research design and method, (b) data generation, (c) data analysis, (d) primary construction, (e) 
secondary construction, (f) understanding o f the phenomena, and culminates in a critique o f the 
research process. This supports the concept that meaning making is an ongoing process; that the 
meanings emerging from the inquiry are tentative.
Conclusion
The initial discussion provided a definition o f  research, followed by a discussion o f  research 
paradigms, and how they are comprised o f three interdependent elements, ontology, epistemology 
and methodology. The two main paradigms o f positivistic (quantitative) and post-positivistic 
(qualitative) were explored. Within the post-positivistic paradigm there has been over the past sixty 
years, a movement towards the increasing recognition o f the relationship developed between the 
researcher and the researched, and the researcher and the sense made out o f  the emerging data, and 
the written report. As such there is an increasing recognition o f the difficulties encountered when re­
presenting the other, and the need for the exploration o f these tensions within the research process. 
There is recognition o f how the positivistic paradigm gives primacy to science and technology and 
the post-positivistic paradigm a relegation o f this, a return to humanness is fostered; and this 
supports the underpinning ethos o f this study.
With the increasing recognition o f the researchers’ impact on the research process, there is a need 
for the researcher to elicit the interpretative lens they bring to the study. This informs the 
development o f  a research paradigm; the ontological perspective is relativist, the epistemological 
perspective is interactional subjective and the methodological perspective is dialectical and 
reflexive. The paradigm then informs the creation of a methodological framework that will be tested 
out in this study. The framework comprises o f  nine stages, and includes two cycles o f interpretation. 
The first cycle culminates in the creation o f a primary construction o f  the findings; this 
understanding forms the pre-understanding for the next cycle o f interpretation, which culminates in 
the creation o f a secondary construction. The understanding that emerges from this informs a 
critique o f the research process.
The research paradigm informs the selection o f a research method, a method to guide the research 
process, a process that is structured by the methodological framework. The next chapter focuses on 
the research design and the selection o f  a method to guide this study; to test out the methodological 
framework.
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Chapter Four
Research design
Introduction
The aim o f this chapter is to describe the research design and represents stage two o f the 
methodological framework (the first stage -  pre-understanding -  the theories and perspectives that 
inform the study were discussed in chapter 3, section 2). A research design ‘ involves a clear focus 
on the research question and the purpose o f the study’ (Denzin and Lincoln 1998:28). The purpose 
o f this study is to open a conversation, on a way o f  looking at psychotherapy as a form o f learning. 
From this exploration the intention is to develop a model to enable practitioners to generate 
conversations on how psychotherapy can be positioned as a form o f learning. The question for 
exploration; is counselling/psychotherapy a form o f learning for people with a facial difference?
There are potentially at least three ways o f generating data to explore this question, participants 
could be asked to share their experiences o f learning in therapy, this could be achieved either by the 
researcher asking specific questions on different types o f learning. Or they could be invited to talk 
about their learning experiences per se, without providing a framework to guide the discussion. Both 
o f these approaches to a greater or lesser extent provide a predetermined structure that will enable 
the answering o f the question posed by the researcher. There is an assumption made that the person 
will have learned through the experience o f therapy, rather than the aim being to open up a 
conversation on the experience o f  therapy. To hear o f  the experience o f  therapy without imposing a 
pre-determined structure would be to ask people to share their lived experience o f therapy. From 
this, learning experiences may be elicited; learning that emanates within the field. This third way o f 
generating data is more in keeping with the underpinning ethos o f  this study, a privileging o f 
humanness; an openness to the experience o f the other.
The design o f the study is influenced by the research question, initially there is a need to 
contextualise the question, to define the parameters o f the research field. This will firstly be 
achieved by focusing on the macro perspective which defines the general focus o f  the research 
question; the therapeutic relationship, and then secondly focusing on the micro perspective, which is 
the specific focus o f the research question; facial difference. As such the macro view is the ‘what’ 
and the micro view is the ‘who’ o f the study.
Once the research field has been defined, there is need to select an appropriate research method to 
guide the research process, a process that involves data generation, analysis and discussion, and
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culminates in the research report. Again there is a requirement that the method is cognisant with the 
underpinning ethos o f the study. The section on the selection of a research method, commences with 
a discussion on how the research paradigm informs the selection of a research method, followed by 
an exploration o f the following methods that may guide this study grounded theory, heuristics, case 
study and discourse analysis. A discussion o f why the heuristic method was chosen concludes this 
chapter.
1. The research field
The research field represents the parameters o f the question. Whereby the macro perspective is the 
general focus o f the research question, that is counselling/ psychotherapy as a form o f learning. The 
area o f  interest is the therapeutic relationship, which is dependent on the meeting of a therapist and a 
client, and that the potential outcome o f this meeting is learning. The micro perspective is the 
specific focus o f the research question; people with a facial difference. Thus the client should have a 
facial difference, and the therapist have experience o f working with someone with a facial 
difference. It is suggested here that the researcher needs to extrapolate both aspects o f  the research 
field to enable the selection o f an appropriate method, to guide the research process, which 
culminates in an exploration of the question posed.
1.1 Macro perspective
The area o f interest is the therapeutic relationship, which is dependent on the meeting o f  a therapist 
with a client. The client brings to the therapeutic relationship, their current difficulties in living and 
relating. They bring to the relationship their experience o f living with others in a family unit, and o f 
living in a community. The therapist brings with them to the therapeutic relationship, training and 
supervision experiences in providing therapy; this may also include their own experience o f  personal 
therapy. They will also have their life experiences o f living in a family unit and a community, which 
have the potential to inform the therapeutic relationship. Together, the therapist and client create a 
working alliance, a therapeutic relationship (see Horvath and Greenberg 1994).
The meeting o f the client and therapist, and the ensuing therapeutic relationship, creates a potential 
learning community. This learning milieu is a form of situated learning whereby, the situation or the 
context is the therapeutic relationship, created by the meeting of the client and the therapist. Within 
this Teaming community’ , there is the potential for recognising the barriers to learning from 
experience. Learning from experience is a fundamental requisite to learning, whereby an individual 
is able to experience their own experience. The recognition o f the barriers to learning that emanate 
from distortions in previous learning experiences may be explored and the potential outcome is a 
return to learning from experience. Although the focus within this learning community is the client, 
there is the potential for the therapist to learn from the client, this learning is usually covert, whereas
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the clients learning is usually overt and worked through in the here and now with the therapist. 
Whereas, the therapists learning may be worked through either in supervision, or in their own 
therapy, or their own reflective processing. For learning to take place within the therapeutic 
relationship there is a need for both the therapist and the client to be open to the experience o f  the 
other.
The learning community created by the meeting o f the client and the therapist is situated within the 
lifeworld. The term lifeworld (Lebenswelt) was first used by Husserl, to describe the world as is, the 
given. Accordingly he suggests that all researchers have at the basis o f any inquiry the lifeworld, ‘ it 
is always presupposed as the ground, as the field work upon which alone his questions, his methods 
o f  thoughts make sense’ (Husserl 1935:11).
Habermas developed the concept o f the lifeworld, by suggesting that a common language within the 
lifeworld enables an individual to participate, to communicate, and to interact with others. Also that 
identity is created through interactions, and as such there is the potential for the boundary o f a 
particular lifeworld to be expanded, experience affords the opportunity to expand understanding, 
and thus expand the knowable aspects o f  the lifeworld available to consciousness. Thus the 
therapeutic relationship has the potential for expanding understanding and the sense made from 
experiences that emanate from within the lifeworld. Habermas, also recognises that within the 
lifeworld, experiences and meanings are not fixed: ‘ Even collective identities dance back and forth 
in the flux o f interpretations, and are actually more suited to the image o f  a fragile network than that 
o f a stable centre of se lf reflection’ (Habermas 1985: 358). Thus supporting the notion that meaning 
is context specific and dependent on the interlocutors involved; in the context o f the therapeutic 
relationship it is the meaning that emerges in-between the meeting of the therapist and the client.
1.2 Micro perspective
The micro perspective is the specific focus o f the research question, facial difference. From the 
micro perspective the client will bring to therapy their experience o f  having a facial difference, and 
some degree o f difficulty in living with this difference that has precipitated the need for therapy. The 
therapist will have experience o f working with clients with a facial difference. Within the 
relationship, the client is able to explore their thoughts and feelings, beliefs and attitudes regarding 
their facial difference and how it impacts on their relationships with others. The number o f people 
with a facial difference who have accessed therapy is unknown, and to provide another perspective, 
the term ‘ client’ is enlarged to include people who have an opinion on therapy. Also, rather than 
limiting it to those with a facial difference, those living with a person with a facial difference are 
also included, these people may or may not have had therapy. Again the intention is to provide an
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additional perspective, to further elicit the specific context o f the lived experience o f facial 
difference and the potential need for therapy as a form of learning.
There are four different groups o f research participant, the first two groups are therapists and clients. 
The therapist will have experience o f working with people with a facial difference. The intention is 
to exclude other experiences o f providing therapy, and thereby to keep the focus on those clients 
who have a facial difference. The client will have a • facial difference, and has experienced a 
therapeutic relationship. Both o f these groups have direct experience o f the lived experience o f 
therapy. Whereas the next two groups do not, they have been included in the study to provide 
additional information that may further illuminate the question posed; to generate data on what may 
precipitate the need for therapy as a form o f learning. The first group are people with a facial 
difference who have not had therapy but have an opinion on therapy either for themselves or for 
others with a facial difference. The next group is people who live with someone with a facial 
difference. The analysis o f the data generated by the participants should enable learning experiences 
to be highlighted, together with an understanding o f the issues that may precipitate the need for 
therapy as a form of learning. From this, a model may be developed to enable others to explore 
psychotherapy as a form o f learning; to open up further conversations.
There are many aspects o f the lifeworld that may inform the research participants lived experience. 
The intention here is to not isolate these confounding variables but to acknowledge the possibility o f 
how they contribute and influence how a person perceives their experience; their take on reality.
The variables identified, are ones that the researcher is currently aware of, from the literature 
reviews and her own experience. Each will be briefly mentioned, and links made with the relevant 
literature. Age, this would appear to effect how a person perceives their situation, according to 
Bradbury (1996) a mid-life crisis may trigger concerns about appearance related issues, for the 
person with a facial difference it may awaken previously not thought tlirough aspects o f their 
difference, for example ‘why me?’ Class, according to Rurnsey (1997:94) the ability to pay for 
surgical and orthodontic treatment is expensive and with the cutting back by NHS providers on non­
functional surgery (e.g. cosmetic surgery) creates a situation whereby ‘ further discrimination 
between the rich and the poor’ for those with a facial difference. Linked with this is financial 
security, as this may effect a person’s ability to pay for surgery, or therapy. Culture, a culture 
defines beauty and acceptability, some cultures shun those with a facial difference (Rumsey 1997), 
whereas, the Asian culture perceive facial difference as ‘ fate’ or ‘Karma’ and those with the 
difference are expected to bear it stoically (Partridge 1997). Furthermore, Rumsey (1997) cites 
Strauss (1985) who highlights that the impact o f culture and societal values is an uninvestigated area 
in the field o f congenital anomalies. Education, it is recognised that for some the level o f
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educational attainment may effect their resilience when coping with facial difference (Coles-Gale 
2000, Robinson 1997a). Occupation, the presence o f a facial difference can have implications for 
work opportunities (Stevenage and Mckay 1999). Gender, there is a commonly held view that 
women worry more about appearance than men (Solomon 1998, Woolfe 1990). Race, a study by 
Solomon (1998) highlighted the lack o f literature available on black women’s experience o f  burn 
injury, and likened the experience to ‘being on an island by myself. There are potentially many 
more, but at this stage they are unknown.
2. Research methods
This section contains a discussion o f the research methods that were considered for guiding this 
study, to develop a conversation on how to look at psychotherapy as a form o f learning. Initially the 
lived experience o f therapy will be elicited and from this, learning that is intrinsic to the therapeutic 
process will be identified. This understanding then informs the development o f  a model to look at 
psychotherapy as a form o f learning, this has the potential o f opening up further conversations with 
unknown others.
The method needs to correlate with the ethos o f  the research paradigm. The methodological 
perspective is reflexive and dialectical and the ontological perspective is that meaning emerges in 
the in-between. It is created by the two interlocutors involved, and can only be apprehended by them 
in the moment, can only ever be known fully to them, as such meanings are multiple and intangible. 
The epistemological perspective is that knowing is subjective, that it is apprehended through 
communion with others as such it is an interactional subjective phenomenon. The methodological, 
ontological and epistemological perspectives are interdependent.
One the one hand, within the research paradigm developed for this study, it would seem that to 
represent what happens between the researcher and the research participant is an impossibility, 
particularly if it is only known to those involved. Yet on the other hand, the researcher can re-tell 
their perception o f the experience to an unknown other (the reader o f the research report), and that 
this re-telling can be authenticated in several ways, initially by conferring with the research 
participants that the data generated captures their experience. When creating the research report the 
researcher can reveal the inherent difficulties in re-presenting the ‘saying’ (where the saying is what 
happened between the researcher and the research participant, in the re-telling it is translated into the 
‘said’); that the report is a testament o f the meaning that emerged between the researcher and the 
research participant (an interactional subjective activity). By conducting a secondary construction 
o f  the primary construction which forms the pre-understanding o f the next cycle o f interpretation, 
the researcher demonstrates that meanings are multiple and tangible, and recognition is given to the
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fundamental concept o f reflexivity. Fundamental, for without it there would be no recognition of 
how meanings are multiple, or that the generation and interpretation o f data is a human activity.
To select a method, that is mindful o f  these factors can be difficult, for on the one hand a method is 
an anathema when there is an attempt to foster an openness to experience, the very use of the terms 
‘method’ and ‘ framework’ appear to imply a closure. However, on the other hand, the use o f  a 
method can provide coherence to data generation and analysis, thereby creating a degree o f certainty 
in the midst o f uncertainty.
From the plethora o f methods available, the focus on hermeneutical and phenomenological 
approaches is appropriate; for research is all about ascribing meaning to a phenomenon. A 
phenomenon that is already partly known to the researcher and this constitutes their pre­
understanding, through the process o f conducting the research process new understanding emerges. 
The researcher through the process o f description and interpretation re-presents their newly acquired 
understanding o f the phenomenon for others. Both o f these activities draw on the theories o f 
hermeneutics and phenomenology. These theories were explored in chapter three, section two, as 
they inform the researchers interpretative lens; the explication o f this lens is the first stage o f the 
methodological framework that guides this study.
Methods that incoiporate these theories are viewed as potential methods and another factor to be 
considered is the research design, and the need for the method to embrace the ethos of capturing the 
‘ lived experience’ . For it is believed that explication o f this will provide hitherto unknown 
information on the experience o f therapy, and from this elicitation it may be possible to discern the 
learning activities inherent within the therapeutic relationship; as such to make overt the current 
covert aspect o f therapy. From this a model may be developed to enable practitioners to open up 
conversations about their own practice; it offers a way of looking at psychotherapy as a form o f 
learning.
The researcher whilst acknowledging that there are many approaches and methods to guide the 
research process, has focused on the following; grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) is said to 
incoiporate elements o f both hermeneutics and phenomenology, so it will be explored as a possible 
method to guide this study. Heuristics is an approach that lies under the umbrella term o f 
phenomenology (Moustakas 1994); therefore it too will be explored. The case study method, can be 
representative o f  both quantitative and qualitative approaches (Yin 1994), there are descriptive 
elements, and as such it could be said that it is informed by hermeneutic and phenomenological 
thinking. Discourse analysis as a method is difficult to describe; it is concerned with meaning 
making emerging from discourse (Parker 1990, Potter 1997), where language is seen to construct
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events, rather than being seen as a transparent medium (Coyle 1995). Each method will be briefly 
defined, the key characteristics o f the approach highlighted, a discussion o f  the selection o f  one 
method to conduct this study concludes this section.
2.1 Grounded theory
Grounded theory is an approach that was introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The primary 
intention is that the theory that emerges in the process o f a study is grounded in the research process, 
a process that involves the systematic gathering and analysis o f data (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 
Glaser and Strauss 1967). It is a method that encourages ‘ latitude for ingenuity and an aid to 
creativity’ (Strauss and Corbin 1990:273). It also is used mainly when the researchers aim is to 
make generalisations from the theory that is generated in the course o f a study (Strauss and Corbin 
1997). Literature pertaining to the phenomenon is reviewed following collection and analysis o f  
data. There is a reliance on description and interpretation, and as such it draws on both hermeneutics 
and phenomenology.
The researcher by reading and re-reading the data, which is generally in the form o f transcripts o f 
interview data [primary source o f data] (Moustakas 1994, Strauss and Corbin 1994); codifies and 
groups emerging themes together (O ’Callaghan 1996). This coding assists with conveying 
credibility (Glaser and Strauss 1967).
The sample size is usually small, and increases as the emerging theory is tested out with another 
group o f people who have experience o f the phenomenon. Each testing out o f the theory has the 
potential for further aspects to be illuminated; the process o f checking out emerging theory 
continues until no new aspects o f the phenomenon emerge (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Initially 
understanding is checked out with those involved (specificity) and this then acts as a guide for 
generalising. The researcher is actively involved in the meaning making process, as they are 
required to interpret the phenomenon, and to verify the emerging concepts. As such grounded 
theory is ‘a way o f thinking about and conceptualising data’ (Strauss and Corbin 1990:274) 
[original emphasis].
The focus o f a grounded theory method is to elicit the understanding and the representation o f how 
meaning is conferred on an experience and the resultant human behaviour (Strauss and Corbin 
1990). The concern is not individual responses to a given situation; rather it is about eliciting 
patterns o f actions, the discovery o f processes which can then be presumed to be the general 
response to the given situation (Strauss and Corbin 1990).
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2.2 Heuristics
This method is rooted in the phenomenological approach (Moustakas 1994). Whereas, Churchill et 
al (1998:64) commenting on the interpretative aspects o f the phenomenological approach suggest 
that Heidegger’s notion o f foresight and Husserl’s notion o f anticipation informs this process. As 
such they suggest there are two preparatory moments o f interpretation, intuition (which is about 
familiarising self with the phenomenon or living it) and analysis in which the researcher ‘ discern the 
constituents o f the phenomenon’ . Thus it would seem that it is difficult to isolate phenomenology 
and hermeneutics, that whilst phenomenology is about describing a phenomenon, there is a tendency 
for the researcher to interpret the description.
‘ Interpretation calls for us to take a deep breath and turn inside while considering our data and the 
experiences o f collecting them to imagine, reflect, and ultimately understand what we experienced 
in our research. It is probably only partly a rational process and also partly an intuitive one’ 
(McCuctheon 1990:281). This reference o f intuition underpins the heuristic approach as defined by 
Moustakas (1990); he suggests that intuition is founded on the principle o f tacit knowing as defined 
by Polyani (1967), whereby we know more than we can tell. Whereas, Benner (1994:xvii) appears 
to be advising caution when interpreting data, and is mindful o f  the need for the researcher to be 
aware o f their own understanding o f the phenomenon o f the study, she states: ‘Good interpretation is 
guided by an ethic of understanding and responsiveness, one must not read into the text what is not 
there. Self-knowledge is required to limit the interpreters projection o f  his or her own world onto the 
text’ .
According to von Eckartsberg (1998:21) adopting a phenomenological approach to research enables 
the researcher to ‘reveal the essential general meaning structure o f  a given phenomenon in answer to 
implicit research guiding questions: what it is essentially’ . There is a reliance on description, and 
there is a need for the researcher to bracket their experience o f the phenomenon (Spinelli 1989). 
Whereas, Moustakas (1990) considered a strength of a heuristic inquiry is that the researcher is 
actively involved in the process, and that the first step is the need for the researcher to own a 
personal issue, an issue that provides the impetus for the study (Douglas and Moustakas 1985, 
Moustakas 1981). According to Patton (1990:71) a heuristic inquiry ‘brings to the fore the personal 
experience and insights o f the researcher’ .
‘A heuristic inquiry is a process that begins with a question or problem which the researcher seeks to 
illuminate’ (Moustakas 1990:15). A similarity with hermeneutics, but where the variation occurs is 
that ‘ the question is one that has been a personal challenge and puzzlement in the search to 
understand one’s self and the world in which one lives’ (Moustakas 1990:20). Reflexivity is an 
essential element in a heuristic inquiry, and there is a need for the researcher to keep a journal to
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track the meaning making process (Moustakas 1990). Keeping a journal, according to Bungay and 
Keddy (1996) is a record o f thoughts and feelings and can make the researcher’ s role explicit, they 
are therefore more active in the meaning making process. It is suggested here that a journal can also 
assist in making known the processes that informs their interpretation. Without this reflexivity there 
could be the tendency for the study to be focused too much on the self o f the researcher and their 
experience o f the phenomenon, however, by referring to their journal it could be said that that there 
is the potential for the dialectical element o f meaning making to be foregrounded.
There is also the potential for consensus collusion (Torbet 1981) whereby the researcher only hears 
the story o f the other if it resonates with theirs. As such there is a foreclosure applied to hearing the 
lived experience o f  the other. The support o f an independent person, who is involved in hearing o f 
the researchers meaning making/interpretative process, can restore an element o f openness to 
hearing the story of the other (Rose and Loewenthal 1998).
The stages o f conducting a heuristic inquiry involve collection o f material, immersion in the 
material, incubation and illumination. The final report representing the lived experience o f  the 
phenomenon as shared by the researcher and the research participant (Moustakas 1990). The process 
can be lengthy, and as such there is no time limit to the process (Storey 1995). The researcher 
continues until there is a sense that the essence o f the phenomenon is captured (Moustakas 1990). 
An example o f a heuristic inquiry in the field o f facial difference is the authors previous study (Rose 
1997) and in relation to psychotherapy (Sussman 2001, West 1998).
2.3 Case study
As a research method, case study is more about description in preference to ascribing meaning 
(Stake 1994, Yin 1994); it is a method that has been applied by many disciplines (Bergen and White 
2000). ‘Case study is not a methodological choice, but a choice o f object to be studied’ (Stake 1994: 
236). This implies that the participant in the study is an object rather than a subject who is actively 
involved in the process. Also there is a need for the researcher to be aware that they cannot tell the 
whole story, for ‘the whole story exceeds anyone’s knowing, anyone’s telling’ (Stake 1994:240). 
Thus a case study may provide an in-depth insight into a particular phenomenon, for it is about 
reporting the real life context (Yin 1994, Robson 1993), A popular misconception is that a case 
study is singular, however it can also be collective (Stake 1994, Yin 1994, Robson 1993). It can also 
draw on evidence from ‘ documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation, physical artefacts’ (Yin 1994:78). Whereas, Hamel (1993) includes field studies. It can 
contain both quantitative and qualitative elements, and the evidence can be used to explain, describe, 
illustrate and explore the phenomenon. Alternatively it can provide a meta-evaluation (Yin 1994).
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Through the process o f being involved in the case, the researchers written account represents both 
the process and product o f their learning (Stake 1994).
Examples o f case studies in the field o f facial difference are by Milioria (1998) and Niederland 
(1975); they provide an account o f the therapeutic process and draw on psychoanalytic theory to 
support their discussion. Within the field o f psychotherapy, Freud drew exclusively on case studies 
to support his newly founded psychoanalytic theory. The application o f  a case study method, is 
more about description o f the life event being studied, as such there is a need to provide verbatim 
account, to enable the reader to get a flavour of what went on (Yin 1994, Hamel 1993).
2.4 Discourse analysis
We use language to describe, to explain and to discuss the meanings conferred on experience. The 
language used is not transparent, rather it constructs events (Coyle 1995). According to Parker 
(1992:5) our discourse is ‘ a system o f statements which construct an object’ and that discourse 
analysis 1 deliberately systematises different ways o f  talking so that we can understand them better’ 
[original emphasis). As such, the analysis o f discourses ‘emphasises the way versions o f the world, 
o f society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse’ (Potter 1996:145). 
Thus it would appear that a key concern is with meaning, either the uncovering o f meaning 
(Dickerson 1996), or the dynamics o f meaning (Parker 1992), and/or the multiplicity o f meanings 
(Coyle 1995).
As a research method it is hard to describe and learn (Potter 1997); there is no rigid framework to 
employ (Coyle 1995, Potter and Wetherell 1994). For it is a ‘ craft skill’ and a process that relies on 
‘tacit knowledge’ (Potter and Wetherell 1994). There is a need for both the researcher and the 
research participant to be reflexive (Potter 1996, Parker 1992); ‘reflexivity is used to denote our 
deliberate awareness o f  our place in things and our difference from others’ (Parker 1992:79). There 
is as such no end result, rather the researcher generates hypothesis (Coyle 1995); also the reader o f 
the work may offer a different interpretation (Potter 1996). Therefore a definitive meaning will not 
emerge from a study, rather that there is a multiplicity o f meanings, and this locates the method with 
the postmodern paradigm.
Although recognising that there is no rigid framework to conduct an analysis o f discourse, Potter 
and Wetherell (1987:175) devised a ten-stage model which they state is ‘ a set o f suggestions about 
how discourse can be best studied and how others can be convinced findings are genuine’ . The ten- 
stages involve questions, sampling, collection of records and documents, interviewing, transcription, 
intermission, coding, analysis, validation, the report, and application. O f particular note is the 
reference to interviewing, and the style; where the researcher makes the interview ‘a much more
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interventionist and confrontative arena than is normal’ (Potter and Wetherell 1987:164); that the 
researcher is involved and argumentative (Potter 1997). Thus it would appear that during the 
interview, both participants are actively involved in gaining a clear a picture as possible, the 
interviewee responds to the interviewers’ question, and then the interviewer questions the response, 
checking for clarification, drawing attention to any discrepancies; together they create a discourse 
that responds to the question posed. In the final report, both the interviewers and interviewees 
discourses are provided, to enable the reader to ascertain the veracity o f the hypothesis generated.
The involvement o f the researcher in the process o f data generation has been questioned; an area o f 
concern focuses on the influence o f  the researcher and the issue o f counter transference (Potter 
1997). Consequently there as been an increase in analysing texts where the researcher has had no 
involvement, as such the material is ‘ less affected by the formulations and assumptions o f  the 
researcher’ (Potter 1997:150). It would appear that interview data is not often used when conducting 
a discourse analysis (Dickerson 1996). When it is used, there is a need for the samples to be small, 
so that varieties in discursive forms can be recognised (Coyle 1995).
3. The selection of a method to guide this study
Of the methods discussed different ones appeal for different reasons, for example, the issue o f 
providing closure appears to be stronger in grounded theory and heuristics. In grounded theory, the 
theory is tested out until no new aspects o f  it emerge and with heuristics the researcher conducts the 
interviews until no new material arises. However, how possible is this? With grounded theory there 
is an inherent supposition that all will experience the same. For when the theory is tested out with a 
new group, there is a view that a new group will eventually experience a sense o f ‘ sameness’ . Is it 
that the researcher picks a homogenous group and thus minimises the potential for difference? In 
heuristics, the telling o f an individuals’ story until there is no more to tell again implies a foreclosure 
to experience, for in the telling o f an experience more may become known. As such there is an 
implication that the ‘telling’ is the definitive truth once and for all, when in essence, the ‘truth’ is in 
the moment. It is suggested here that the comment by Stake (1994) advising caution about how 
when employing a case study method, the whole story can never be captured or told, applies to both 
grounded theory and heuristics, indeed it could be said o f  all research methods. It would seem that 
all that is possible is to record a ‘ snapshot’ ; an at the moment experience o f a phenomenon.
This could be applicable to a descriptive case study; a method that allows for an individual to 
describe their experience o f a phenomenon, thus it could be said to describe the ‘ lived experience’ . 
However, a potential stumbling block is the need to elicit the real life context. In this study it would 
be for the researcher to be a therapist (as in the studies o f Milioria (1998) and Niederland (1975))
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and to comment on their understanding of the learning components o f therapy. If the clients’ view is 
sought, this would be a retrospective account.
The interview style in discourse analysis as described by Potter and Wetherell (1987) appears to be 
rather ‘aggressive’ in comparison with the heuristic interview as described by Moustakas (1990). 
The first advocates that the researcher questions and challenges what the interviewee is expressing, 
to elicit more clearly the claim the interviewee is making;- as such the researcher is actively involved 
in the meaning making process. Whereas, the heuristic interview is unstructured and with the 
researcher usually asking one question -  to invite the research participant to tell o f their experience 
o f the phenomenon. The researcher asks further questions to seek clarification. The mediating 
effects o f the researcher is recognised in discourse analysis, so much so that preference is now given 
to texts, previously recorded accounts o f a phenomenon that are then analysed by the researcher. 
The role o f the researcher in influencing the sharing o f the story in heuristics is not acknowledged; 
however, the need for them to have personal experience o f the phenomenon is, as such the 
researchers personal experience is the impetus for a study.
There is something about the transparency o f discourse analysis and heuristics that appeals to the 
researcher, for this transparency creates the opportunity for researchers to share their meaning 
making processes. There is recognition o f the need for the researcher to be reflexive, for through this 
process the tacit dimension o f knowledge can be uncovered, knowledge that informs the 
interpretation o f data.
On balance discourse analysis appeals as it supports the ethos o f multiple meanings, and heuristics 
appeals because it is an approach which focuses on the lived experience o f therapy and this is 
cognisant with the question posed by this study (Is counselling/psychotherapy a form of learning for 
people with a facial difference?).The intention is for people to speak o f  their lived experience /or 
opinion o f therapy, and from this to discern if there are learning activities or potential learning 
needs. Discourse analysis in this instance would appear to be more suited to analysing texts o f 
peoples understanding o f the learning that took place through the process o f therapy. Therefore, 
heuristics is the method o f choice for this study.
The methodological framework used to guide this study, comprises o f two cycles o f interpretation. 
The first cycle culminates in the primary construction of meaning that emerged from the generation 
o f data. This construction becomes the pre-understanding for the next cycle o f interpretation. This 
cycle o f interpretation culminates in a secondary construction. A deconstruction of the text is the 
proposed method o f analysis, where deconstruction is a way o f looking at a text to see what has been 
privileged, what has been left out (Derrida 1998, 1996). It is as such a reading between the lines
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(Howells 1999, Norris 1982). There is no set method for a decconstructive reading o f the text (see 
Burman 1994); rather it is an exploration of the taken-for-granted assumptions embedded in a text 
(Parker 1992).
In the process o f the secondary construction, there is the potential for the heuristic method to be 
expanded and thus re-conceptualised as a post-heuristic method. For there is a shift from the 
modernist perspective o f the ‘ I’ o f the researcher being at the centre o f the meaning making process, 
to a postmodernist perspective o f  the T  being de-centred; for the T  is subject to (Sarup 1993).
Conclusion
The design o f the study emanates from the research question ‘ Is counselling/ psychotherapy a form 
o f learning for people with a facial difference?’ The macro and micro perspective o f the research 
field identified the parameters o f the study: The macro perspective is the meeting o f the client and 
therapist, where the clients seeks a therapist to explore their perceived difficulties in living/coping 
with a facial difference. The micro perspective represents the specific aspects that may influence the 
meeting o f  the client/therapist, and the creation o f a therapeutic relationship. Due to the recognition 
that this study is addressing a previously unreported area, that is the lived experience o f  therapy by 
people with a facial difference, the size o f the population sample is unknown. The researcher has 
widened the research sample, to include those who live with someone with a facial difference, and 
those with a facial difference who were willing to express an opinion on therapy. The inclusion of 
these dimensions will provide additional information on the lived experience o f the phenomenon o f 
facial difference and the implications for therapy as a form of learning. Information that maybe 
beneficial to those providing therapy to this client population, and for people wishing to access 
therapy, as they may gain an insight o f the potential outcome o f therapy, together with an awareness 
o f some o f  the issues that people may take to therapy.
The methodological framework developed in the previous chapter and to be tested out in this study, 
influenced the selection o f the research method. The following methods were considered grounded 
theory, heuristics, case study and discourse analysis. From these heuristics was selected as a method 
that would enable the extrapolation o f the lived experience of therapy or the opinion o f therapy, and 
from this either learning experiences, or potential learning needs can be elicited. The knowledge 
gained through this research process may enable the development o f a model to generate further 
conversations on how psychotherapy can be seen to be a form o f learning.
With the inclusion o f  a second cycle o f interpretation (a deconstruction o f the primary construction) 
together with a critique o f  the research process (final stages o f the methodological framework), there 
is the potential to provide information on a different way to using the heuristic approach, a post-
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heuristic approach. The next chapter focuses on the next phase o f the methodological framework the 
employment o f the method to generate data for analysis.
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Chapter Five
Method
Introduction
This chapter focuses on how the data was generated and represents stage tiiree o f the methodological 
framework that is being tested out in this study. As referred to in the previous chapter, the heuristic 
research method has been selected to guide the data generation and analysis, culminating in the 
primary construction. According to Moustakas (1990:43) ‘there is no exclusive list that would be 
appropriate for every heuristic investigation, but rather each research process unfolds in its own 
way’ . However, he does give guidelines and these form the framework to structure this 
investigation.
Firstly, there is a discussion on the ‘ owning o f a personal issue’ (Moustakas 1990:43); the researcher 
shares her learning experiences resulting from therapy. This experience also forms part o f the 
interpretative lens o f the researcher and as such completes stage one o f the methodological 
framework. Stage two o f this framework, the research design and method was discussed in chapter 
four, and this chapter focuses on the third stage, the research method, the generation o f data for 
analysis. There follows a discussion o f  the preparation undertaken prior to contacting potential 
participants, consideration is given to the nature o f the information potential participants would 
require to enable them to make an informed choice whether to participate in the study. Next is a 
discussion on how the potential participants were located. Followed by a discussion on the contract 
developed for potential participants.
The generation o f data is discussed, followed by an explication o f the profiles o f the participants 
who took part in this study. The final section o f the chapter outlines the stages involved in the data 
analysis; both the primary and secondary constructions.
1. Owning of a personal issue
The first step to a heuristic investigation is the owning o f  a personal issue; it is usually an issue that 
matters a great deal to the researcher. In this study, the first step was made several years ago, during 
the researcher’s own process o f therapy. Therapy had been commenced to meet with the mandatory 
requirements o f the counselling training course she was attending. On reflection this legitimised the 
need for therapy; the impetus was external (course requirement) rather than internal (personal need). 
However, the experience provided an opportunity to talk about living with a facial difference. To 
recognise how, on the one hand it is a visible/public phenomenon (visible to self and others) and yet
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on the other it is an invisible/private phenomenon (experience only known to self), as it was not 
talked about. Therapy thus became the place to speak the unspeakable, to challenge the unwritten 
rule that ‘ it’ was not spoken about; also there was a shift from the external need for therapy to an 
internal one.
This early experience o f  therapy raised the following questions; is my [the researcher’s] experience 
o f living with a cleft [a congenital facial difference] similar to/different from others? What are the 
commonalties in experience? How have others coped/managed? Is there a need for a 
counselling/psychotherapy service to be made more readily available to this client group? These 
questions provided the impetus for the researcher’ s first experience o f undertaking a heuristic 
investigation. Rather than stating that there was a need for counselling/psychotherapy for this client 
group, which would have been based solely from the researcher’s experience, the aim was to elicit 
peoples lived experience o f having a cleft (information that was currently unavailable in the 
literature), and from this to determine if there was a potential need for the provision o f a 
counselling/psychotherapy service.
Five themes emerged from the heuristic investigation of the lived experience o f  having a cleft; the 
cleft (how the person described their appearance); teasing (a common experience, which influenced 
interactions with others, and the view o f self); experience o f treatment (part o f the process to 
‘becoming normal’); change in perspective (view o f self changed either due to change in 
environment or a particular treatment); not talking about it (a common experience, the cleft was not 
usually talked about within the family environment). In conclusion, the provision o f a 
counselling/psychotherapy service would enable people to have a choice, to talk about their 
experience if they so wished; therefore a counsellor/therapist was considered to be an essential 
member o f the multi-disciplinary team caring for people with clefts from birth to maturity (Rose 
1997).
The findings o f the study were presented in the newsletter o f the Cleft Lip and Palate Association 
and verbally [by the researcher] at the annual general meeting in 1998. The researcher was moved 
by people’s reactions to the verbal presentation, for the findings appeared to resonate with those in 
the audience who had their own experience o f the phenomenon. As such this experience supports 
the underpinning tenet o f the heuristic approach, that as a method it captures the ‘ lived experience’ 
o f a particular phenomenon. Initially this is in relation to the participants o f the study, which as such 
represents the specific or micro perspective; and the feed back given by others, who have their own 
experience o f the phenomenon, the generic or macro perspective. It would appear that the heuristic 
approach can illuminate for others the experience o f a particular phenomenon.
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Since the researchers first study, there has been an increase in the recognition o f the need for 
psychological services, in particular counselling, to be made more available for people with a facial 
difference (CSAG 1998, Turner et al 1998, McGrouther 1997, Partridge 1997a). However, what is 
missing in the literature is the experience o f the person who has a facial difference and who has had 
counselling/psychotherapy. As previously stated in the literature review (chapter two) the researcher 
located two studies (Milioria 1998, Neiderland 1975) that comment on psychotherapy with people 
with a facial difference. The two case studies focus on the nature o f the treatment and the sense the 
therapist made o f the relationship. In the available literature, the overall tendency is to suggest that 
a person with a facial difference, requires therapy to cope with the psychological problems 
encountered (see McGrouther 1997, Partridge 1997a, Bradbury 1996, Bull and Rumsey 1988). It is 
suggested here that there is insufficient information available on what people may bring to therapy 
in the way o f presenting issues, and how therapy may facilitate a change in perspective thereby 
enhancing their ability to cope with their facial difference. The intention here is to explore whether 
these changes are a form of learning. That therapy is reparative; it enables a return to learning from 
experience. But how can this be shown? How can the factors that contribute to a change in 
perspective be identified? How can psychotherapy as a form o f learning be explicated? How can 
this knowledge be made available to others, so that they can explore their experience o f therapy, to 
open further conversations on how psychotherapy is a form o f learning? The exploration o f these 
questions provided the impetus for this study.
Through the process o f her own therapy, the researcher came to realise how an environment had 
been created within the therapeutic relationship, that enabled her to challenge misconceptions in 
beliefs and attitudes about self and others in relation to her facial difference. There was a change in 
perspective, a shifting o f previously held beliefs. Could this change be aligned to learning? Learning 
from experience? Learning that is personal and transformative? Learning that is about enhancing 
emotional well being?
An example o f a change that occurred through therapy was my (the researcher’s) perception that it 
was only people who had a facial difference who encountered problems in relating to and with 
others. A belief that stemmed from childhood, the reasons for this belief are multi-faceted and 
intertwined. Firstly, learning to speak and making myself understood by others was an arduous task. 
Involving twice-weekly speech therapy, and daily lessons at home, endlessly repeating the same 
sound over and over again, until it was deemed to be satisfactory. Memories o f asking for something 
in a shop pre-school age, and being told to repeat what I wanted because they did not know what it 
was that I was asking for. My mother then accusing the shopkeeper o f focusing on how I looked, 
rather than hearing what I said, and being forced to repeat for the umpteenth time what it was that I 
wanted. Experiences that put me off from speaking to unknown others.
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Secondly, were the comments from unknown others about my appearance. These were most 
confusing, as the only mirrors in the house were out o f my reach; I did not know what I looked like. 
Rather the reactions o f others to my appearance became a ‘mirror’ ; a mirror that implied that I was 
not the same. The name calling, staring, and shunning by others that seemed to be an everyday 
occurrence during pre-school and infant school years, also helped to create the view that I was less 
than others. Going to hospital for surgery to improve ‘ my looks’ prior to going to school, and again 
pre-primary school, further supported this view; and creating the ‘mind set’ that all difficulties to 
relating with others was blamed on ‘my face’ . I became wary o f meeting new people, anticipating 
the reactions from them to my face, expecting rejection. In a way my wariness sometimes 
engineered what was most feared. My fantasy was that if I had a ‘normal’ face then everything 
would be fine, this became translated to, people who have a ‘normal’ face don’t have problems 
relating with/to others. This view/belief was not challenged, and meeting new people always had the 
potential for resurrecting the fear; re-creating the scenario leamt in the playground.
The challenging o f this view started during personal development group experiences during initial 
counselling training in the mid-eighties; people were sharing their difficulties o f living and relating 
with others. And continued when working with clients, hearing o f their difficulties, the things that 
made them vulnerable. Also there was a common reference to how they felt ‘different’ to others. It 
is with a sense o f incredulity that I write this, for how had I got it so wrong? Further challenging 
took place when I facilitated workshops on body image for health professionals working with people 
with facial difference; one o f the exercises was on body ideal. A constant feedback was that people 
(without a facial difference) were not happy with their body image, they all had an ideal that they 
aspired too, as such they too were chasing an illusive body ideal. Gradually I had become aware that 
my beliefs surrounding non-facial difference were erroneous and had no foundation other than my 
fantasy. Also that my views on facial difference were skewed in favour o f  sameness; that all would 
encounter similar experiences.
Working as a therapist, provided experience o f  working with a range o f people who identified 
themselves as different and who through the process o f therapy, this perspective was challenged, 
and as a result there was a change in outlook. For example there was ‘Anne’ who had recently been 
divorced and as a result she felt different to other women; ‘ Jim’ had always felt different because he 
had been adopted; ‘ Susan’ had always felt that her appearance marked her out as different; Tan’ 
thought he was different because he felt so alone. A range o f differences, that somehow marked the 
person out from others in a negative way, that somehow they were not as good as their 
contemporaries. Through the process o f therapy and the therapeutic relationship they came to see 
their situation from a different perspective. There was a freeing from previous held beliefs, perhaps 
this is a form o f transformative learning? The change was specific to the person, the change was
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recognised by the person, perhaps this is a form of significant learning? The change was usually 
accompanied by an increased sense of self-worth, of confidence; perhaps this is a form of emotional 
learning?
Thus the personal issue that guides this study, is that therapy creates an environment that brings 
about change, a change that may be a form of learning. The aim of this heuristic investigation is to 
explicate the lived experience of therapy for people with a facial difference, from the perspective of 
the client and the therapist. As previously stated an added dimension to this lived experience is to 
include the perspective of those with a facial difference who have not had therapy but who would 
like to share their opinion o f it, and those who live with someone with a facial difference. The 
inclusion of these views has the potential to inform the context within which people with a facial 
difference decide to access therapy.
The researcher acknowledges that the possibility of learning experiences in therapy may not just 
happen in a one-to-one situation, there is the potential for this to occur in all forms of therapy (e.g. 
couples, groups, family therapy); and that the possibility of learning opportunities in therapy are not 
restricted to those with a facial difference; rather that these are the parameters to this investigation.
2. Preparing to make contact with potential participants
Prior to making contact with potential participants there is a need for the researcher (author) to be 
clear o f what it is they would be required to do. Moustakas (1990:45) suggests that this stage of the 
inquiry involves '‘developing a set o f  instructions that will inform potential co-researchers of the 
nature of the research design, its purpose and process, and what is expected of them’ [original 
emphasis]. Moustakas referred to the participants sometimes as co-researchers in deference to their 
prominent role in data generation and the checking of findings, for consistency the term participants 
will be used in this study.
Each of the points raised by Moustakas will be discussed in relation to this study:
(i) The nature of the research design - potential participants would need to know that it is a 
heuristic inquiry, and that this approach, focuses on the research participants experience of 
the phenomenon of the study. In this study it is their experience of either giving or 
receiving therapy, or their opinion of therapy. The client group are people with a facial 
difference.
(ii) The purpose - from the researcher’s perspective this is to determine if therapy is a form of 
learning. However, to inform potential participants of this may skew the results. The 
concern in relation to this study would be that by stating the link with learning, this might 
detract from the participants ‘lived experience’. For in the re-telling of their experience,
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they may try to fit it in around learning. That somehow the experience will be refracted 
through what they think the researcher wants to know. As such there is a potential for 
closing down, or placing a structure/format to the re-telling of their experience. To state the 
purpose to explicate the lived experience of therapy, or the opinion of therapy for people 
with a facial difference will place the participant in a freer position to speak about that 
which is important to them. From the data generated, it may then be possible to discern 
factors that contribute to the learning experiences intrinsic to psychotherapeutic practice. 
This knowledge could then be made available to others, so that they can have a way of
looking at therapy as a form of learning, to open up further conversations.
(iii) The process - participants would share their experience of the phenomena either in writing,
or by face-to-face or telephone interview. Following this, participants would be invited to 
comment on the veracity of the information shared, to decide if they wished to make any 
changes, to exclude, some, all or none of it from the study. Following analysis, participants 
would then be invited if they so wished, to comment on the findings of the study, to
determine if it captured their experience of the phenomenon.
(iv) What is expected of them - to give of their time, to share their experience of either having 
therapy or their views of therapy for people either having facial difference, or living with 
someone with a facial difference, or providing therapy for people with a facial difference.
It is suggested here the four elements identified by Moustakas can be encompassed under the term 
of informed consent; where there is a need to consider what information potential participants 
require to enable them to make an informed decision on whether to participate or not. Information to 
be imparted includes the purpose of the study, what they would be required to do, and the likelihood 
of any negative effects of participating (Barrett 1995, McLeod 1994, Merara and Schmidt 1991). 
Informed consent also concerns the issue of anonymity or right to privacy, and the need to protect 
the identity o f the research participant (Fontana and Frey 1994, Black 1993). This involves more 
than just changing names, but to also avoid inadvertent clues, such as giving the location, and 
background information that may lead to identification (Paddison 1995).
Another aspect of informed consent (which Moustakas does not make reference too) is the 
protection from harm, whether it is physical or emotional (Fontana and Frey 1994). In relation to 
this study, the concern would be of an emotional nature, as there is the likelihood of causing 
psychological distress when dealing with sensitive issues (Hart and Crawford-Wright 1999). 
Whereas, Homan (1991) suggests that when participants belong to vulnerable groups researchers 
need to identify how they will be supported. It is suggested here, the need for support should also 
extend to the raising of sensitive issues. In relation to this study, there was the potential for 
participants to touch inadvertently on material that has not been worked through, in an attempt to
minimise this risk, the researcher needs to be mindful that this is a research interview and not a 
therapy interview. Potential participants need to be informed of this potential risk, and that should 
this happen, support would be available in the first instance by the researcher, and if required further 
support could be called upon, from a colleague.
Although Moustakas (1990) guidelines focuses more on the participants, it is suggested here, there 
is also the need for the researcher to determine their responsibility in data generation, prior to 
making contact with potential participants. The main method of data a generation in this 
investigation will be interviews, either face-to-face, or via the telephone. Interviewing is widely 
used in qualitative research to elicit the personal knowledge of the research participants view on a 
particular subject (Baker 1997, Holstein and Gubrium 1997, Silverman 1997); as such ‘both 
participants create and construct narrative versions of the social world’ (Miller and Glassner 
1997:99).
From a technical point of view, there is a need to keep the interview focused on what the researcher 
wants to know; ask the right questions and you will generate the right information (Baker 1997). 
This is more likely to happen in the structured interview, whereby the researcher asks the participant 
to respond to a specific set of questions. Whereas, Silverman (1997:248) suggests that the interview 
can be aligned to ‘the technology of the confessional’, whereby the interviewee tells all. This is 
more likely with semi-structured interviews where the researcher may ask a limited number of 
questions and unstructured interviews when the topic may be introduced and the participant gives 
their opinion or experience of the topic. The later approach was to be the style of interviewing for 
this study, participants would be asked to share their lived experience o f the phenomenon, and the 
researcher would ask questions to clarify, and check understanding.
From an ethical standpoint, Hart and Crawford-Wright (1999) suggest that interviews of the nature 
proposed can make an interviewee vulnerable, and the researcher has a responsibility to protect the 
interviewee. As such there is a need to be sensitive to the ways research participants may be effected 
(Patton 1990). However, learning how to interview is not easily taught, for it is dependent on 
experience (Rennie 1996), and there is the need for the researcher to be aware that it does not lead 
into a therapy session (Campbell 1997, Hutchinson and Wilson 1994, Gale 1992). On the one hand 
the research interview may parallel the therapeutic process (Kvale 1999, Patton 1990, Lipson 1984), 
and on the other hand, ‘the therapeutic relationship and the research interview appear on the surface 
to have something in common’ (Hart and Crawford-Wright 1999: 205). They suggest that the 
difference is in whom is helping whom, in the research interview the interviewee is helping the 
researcher, and in the therapy interview the therapist is helping the client. Etherington (1996) 
suggest that there is the potential for the therapist as a researcher to experience some role conflict.
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As such there is a need for this researcher to be mindful that the interviews conducted in the process 
of data generation in this study, are research interviews, and that she has a responsibility to the 
participants that they have adequate information, on which to make an informed choice to 
participate or not, and that this choice extends during the research interview, and beyond. At any 
stage, the participant may terminate the interview, or withdraw from the study.
The following three areas were identified for inclusion in the information to be given to potential 
participants: -
(a) Process: potential participants would need to know the nature of the interview, that it would 
involve them sharing their experience of the phenomenon, that the researcher was more 
interested in hearing their story, than eliciting responses to a ready prepared schedule of 
questions. The researcher would ask questions to clarify and/or check out what had been said. 
At the end of the interview they would be asked if they would like any, or all o f the information 
disclosed excluded from the study (this could mean all, some or none of it).
(b) Confidentiality: that there anonymity would be ensured.
(c) Potential risks: When asking people to share their experiences there is always the potential for 
this to raise unexpected issues and emotions, which may cause concern. Therefore, the 
researcher would inform potential participants of the possibility of this happening, and that the 
responsibility for disclosing information was theirs. Also, at the end of the interview, if 
unexpected emotions and issues had surfaced, that they would like to explore at a later date, 
they could do so with either the researcher or a colleague.
In this study participants would either be sharing their lived experience by interview (either face-to- 
face or by telephone) or by written correspondence. In relation to written correspondence, people 
would share their experience either on paper, or send it by electronic mail. The issue of the 
researcher influencing the data is reduced with written correspondence (Potter and Wetherell 1987), 
for the participant remains in control of what information to share. This lack o f involvement of the 
researcher can be seen either as disadvantage for clarification can not be sought regarding the 
meaning of the content. Or as advantageous, as the account would not be contaminated by the 
influence of the researcher, it would be the experience of the phenomenon as perceived by the 
participant.
3. Locating the research participants
The next step according to Moustakas (1990:46) is 1Locating and acquiring the research 
participants, developing a set of criteria for selection of participants’ [original emphasis]. As 
identified in the previous chapter, the criterion for the research participant was that they were either 
a therapist providing therapy for people with a facial difference, or a person with a facial difference
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who either had experience of therapy, or had an opinion on therapy, or were living with someone 
who had a facial difference, who either had experience of therapy, or an opinion on therapy.
The criterion that potential participants (male/female) must meet were either a -  c, or d:
(a) To either have a facial difference or to be living with someone with a facial difference. The 
inclusion of the second category stemmed from the findings of the study on the ‘lived 
experience of having a cleft’ (Rose 1997); the views of parents or significant others was 
identified as an area which merited exploration.
(b) To be over eighteen years of age. This age limit was set after consideration of issues of 
informed consent, with children there was a concern if someone gave consent in loco parentis, 
would the needs of the adult take precedent over the child’s willingness to take part? Also 
would a child be able to speak of their experience with only minimal prompts from the 
researcher? If the researcher needed to ask more questions to elicit a response, the data could 
become contaminated by the views of the researcher. In light of the above thoughts, a lower age 
range of eighteen years was set, with no upper age limit.
(c) To either have had experience of counselling/psychotherapy or to share their views/opinions on 
counselling/psychotherapy for people with a facial difference. The number of people who have 
had counselling stemming from issues around facial difference is an unknown phenomenon. 
Therefore, it was decided not to limit this study to those who had, rather by opening it up there 
was the potential to not only explicate the views of those who had; but to also identify the 
opinions of others in the field who may or may not think it has a place. This provides another 
dimension to the phenomenon, and may provide additional information on the need for 
psychotherapy as a form of learning.
(d) To be a therapist providing therapy for people with a facial difference.
To access people who meet with criteria a-c; it was decided to advertise in newsletters of support 
group(s) for people with a facial difference. Initial contact was made with Cleft Lip and Palate 
Association, who had shown an interest in the first project, and was supportive of the aims of the 
current study; an advert was placed in their nation-wide newsletter. The heading of the advert read 
‘What can counselling/psychotherapy offer people who either have, or are living with someone with 
a facial difference?’ Brief details of the study and what participants would be required to do was 
given, interested participants were invited to contact the researcher for further information to assist 
with their decision to participate or not. This advert had the potential to recruit either people with a 
facial a difference and people living with someone with a facial difference.
To recruit therapists (criteria d), who had experience of working with people with facial difference, 
contact was made with two organisations that provide one-to-one counselling for this client group.
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The Cleft Lip and Palate Association does not provide one-to-one counselling, however, people who 
contact the organisation requesting this are informed of ‘Changing Faces’ a charitable organisation 
that also provides information, support, training and counselling for people with facia! difference. 
This organisation [which is known to the researcher, she has conducted several Changing Faces 
training workshops for health professionals working in the field of facial difference] was willing for 
their counsellors/psychologists to be involved with the study. Another organisation ‘Face the Future’ 
in the Northeast of England, located via an Internet search was contacted and they agreed to 
participate in this study.
The other routes of gaining access to potential participants was through meeting people at the 
annua! conference of the Cleft Lip and Palate Association, speaking at conferences in Belfast, 
Dorset and training workshops. All those who expressed an interest in taking part in the study were 
invited to contact the researcher for further information.
4. Developing a contract
Moustakas (1990:46) defines the next stage as ‘developing a contract’ which involves making 
contact with potential participants, discussing issues to enable potential participants to make an 
informed choice about participation, and permission regarding the use of information disclosed. 
Once contact was made either via letter, e-mail, telephone, a standard for responding was 
determined. The framework developed in the previous section (on process, confidentiality and 
potential risks) was used to guide the discussion, the purpose of which was to enable the person to 
decide if they wished to proceed. There was also the opportunity for them to ask questions. At the 
end of the conversation, participants were invited to consider the additional information and a 
mutually convenient date and time was organised, for the researcher to contact them to determine if 
they still wished to be involved in the study.
Twenty-one people expressed an interest in taking part in the study; fourteen responses from the 
advert, three from direct contact, and four from workshops and conferences. After being provided 
with more information, four people decided not to proceed. According to Moustakas (1990) 
heuristic research focuses more on the quality of response than quantity, and as such advocates 
small participant numbers, in his study o f loneliness (Moustakas 1972) fifteen people shared their 
experience. The response from people interested in this study therefore would seem to be adequate; 
purely on a ‘numbers bases’ the decision not to recruit further participants however, was mainly 
influenced by the richness of the data generated by the seventeen participants who shared their 
experience. The implication of limiting the recruitment to the one advert, was to restrict the 
experience to those who had a congenital form of facial difference, however, the current view is that 
the cause of the difference does not affect how a person copes (Robinson 1997, MacGregor 1990,
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Rumsey and Bull 1988), and therefore this factor would appear not to be significant when 
considering the research sample.
5. Data generation
5.1 Method
The main route for data generation was through interviewing participants either face-to-face (four 
interviews) or by telephone (twelve interviews). Interviews lasted from thirty minutes to ninety 
minutes; the variation was due to the length of time people needed to answer the open-ended 
question posed. The preference for telephone interviews was due to distance and arose from the 
request for participants appearing in a nation-wide newsletter.
Once contact and had been made with potential participants, and after they had agreed to be 
interviewed for the study, a set procedure was followed. Permission was gained prior to starting the 
interview for the material to be used in this project or any subsequent publication, and for the 
interview to be either recorded or notes made. Once this was established the person shared their 
experience of either receiving or providing therapy, or expressing an opinion of it. At the end of the 
interviews, the researcher sought permission once more for the material to be included, either in its 
entirety, or with some amendments. Participants were invited to make comments on the transcription 
of the interview, or a summary of the notes made; three people wished for some of their comments 
to be rephrased so that it further captured their experience.
The participants were eager to share their experience, and provided very detailed accounts with 
minimal input from the researcher. Prior to conducting the interviews some people were concerned 
that because they would not be asked questions on specific issues, they may not provide the correct 
information. However, once it had been explained that the researcher wished to hear of their 
experience, of that which was important to them, this led to telling of their experience in their own 
way.
One person chose to communicate via e-mail (for two others this was the first contact, followed by 
telephone contact), once the person was aware of the purpose of the project, they sent a copy of a 
paper that they had written in response to a request from a support group to hear of peoples 
experiences of living with a facial difference. There followed three e-mail conversations when 
further details of their experience were shared, with a particular emphasis on their experience of 
therapy. Another person submitted a course assignment that focused on their experience of having a 
facial difference (this was sent prior to a telephone interview, to provide the researcher with 
‘background information’). The next section provides information on the number of people who 
contributed to the study.
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5.2 Participant profiles
The total number of people who took part in the study was seventeen, however due to some o f the 
participants belonging to two groups, they were able to comment on both perspectives. There were 
three groups of participant responses, therapists (three people), person with a facial difference 
(twelve people, [two were also therapists]), living with someone with a facial difference (six people, 
[two also had a facial difference]), altogether representing twenty-one responses.
Three therapists took part in the study, all were female, and two had a facial difference, and had had 
therapy. All were working in the field of facial difference, affiliated to an organisation providing 
one-to-one counselling. All had had training for their role, either as a counsellor (two people) or as a 
psychologist (one person). All received either clinical supervision and/or peer support.
Twelve people with a facial difference either shared their experience o f therapy (eight people) or 
opinions of it (four people). Four of the group were therapists, two of whom worked in the field of 
facial difference. Three of the group were male (two of whom had experienced therapy) nine o f the 
group were female (six had the experience of therapy). For all, the presence of the facial difference 
had been present since birth, one person had the hereditary skin condition neurofibromatosis, and 
eleven people had a cleft lip. One had a parent with the same congenital facial difference. Three 
people had no siblings, and of the nine people who had siblings, two had siblings with the same 
congenital facial difference (their parents did not). Five people were single, and seven were either 
married 01* living with a partner. O f the four people who had children, two had a child with the same 
congenital facial difference.
The six people, who were living with someone with a facial difference, were all parents (mothers) 
who had given birth to a child with a facial difference. All mothers shared their opinion of therapy 
(two people had the same facial difference as their child -  one of the two had had therapy [for 
coming to terms with their own facial difference] many years prior to the birth of her child). Three 
had no family background of facial difference, of these one is now a grandmother to a child with a 
facial difference (none of her other family members took part in this study). O f the three people who 
had a family background of facial difference, two had their own facial difference, and one had a 
great-uncle with a facial difference. All six people had no further children following the birth of the 
child with a facial difference, two had one child, three had two children and one had three children.
The information contained within each group was not requested it emerged in the sharing of their 
experience, and is representative of the many variables that contribute to a persons experience. It 
forms part of the micro perspective of the research field as identified in the research design (chapter 
four, section 1.2).
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6. Data analysis
This is a lengthy process (Patton 1990, Douglas and Moustakas 1985, Moustakas 1981) and requires
the researcher to become familiar with the data generated; Moustakas’ (1990) eight-point guide was
followed:
1. Collection of material: this comprised of interview transcripts and notes, written 
correspondence and journal entries. The investigation involving seventeen people generated 
data in the form of sixteen interview transcripts and notes, five written accounts (two 
papers/articles and three e-mail correspondence). Plus the researcher’s journal, Moustakas 
(1990) advocates the researcher keeps a reflexive journal, charting their thoughts and feelings as 
the study progresses. This may provide additional information to support the final stage of the 
analysis, the creative synthesis.
2. Immersion: ‘the researcher enters into the material in timeless immersion until it is understood. 
Knowledge of the individual participant’s experience as a whole and its detail is 
comprehensively apprehended by the researcher’ (Moustakas 1990:51). This process required 
the researcher to read and re-read each participant’s ‘lived experience’ time and time again, the 
aim was to ‘hear’ his or her words rather than what the researcher thought should be there.
3. Incubation: the need to leave the data alone for a period of time, with the intention that on 
return to it, with renewed energy, new perspectives may emerge. The researcher found that this 
was a difficult stage, and it required her to trust the process that in so doing new perspectives 
may emerge. It was helpfiil to be reminded of the analogy of when trying to remember 
someone’s name, one that eludes recall, when focusing on something else; the name may be 
recalled. By taking a complete break from this study and focusing on leisure pursuits, returning 
to the data did provide fresh insight on the learning experiences of therapy.
4. Individual depiction: The researcher returns to the original data from which the individual
depiction was created to ensure that there is consistency. Also these can be shared with the
participants to ascertain accuracy, to check that the experience has been captured.
5. Steps one to four are repeated for each participant. There then follows a further period of
incubation, during which ‘illumination’ may occur; this is when the researcher gains a new
awareness of the phenomenon. Moustakas (1990:27) suggests that this phase is spontaneous, 
and is linked with tacit knowing; and it is the incubation phase that allows for the ‘inner tacit 
dimension to reach its full potential’. The process of immersion, and incubation prepares the 
researcher for the next phase of explication, the individual depictions are reviewed and 
commonalties are grouped together under themes. In this study the responses of. the
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participant’s were grouped into two areas, the experience of providing and receiving therapy, 
and experiences that may precipitate the need for therapy, themes emerged within each of them, 
initially the focus was on the lived experience as shared, and from this the identification of 
learning processes and learning needs inherent in their lived experience.
6. Composite depiction: The individual depictions are reviewed as a group, and further immersion 
takes place, from which a composite depiction is developed. Moustakas (1990:52) states: ‘The 
composite depiction (a group depiction reflecting the experience of individual participants) 
includes exemplary narrative, descriptive accounts, conversations, illustrations, and verbatim 
excerpts that accentuate the flow, spirit, and life inherent in the experience’. In this study, the 
composite depiction develops the conversation started in the elaboration of the themes, here the 
learning processes inherent in the experiences shared are further explored.
7. Exemplary portrait: This step involves the presentation of individual portrait(s), which 
exemplify the experience. A portrait of John (pseudonym) is provided, and his ‘lived 
experience’ reflects the experience of people with a facial difference that had experienced 
therapy. John’s experience includes comments from his parents about his birth, which correlates 
with and is representative of the parents who spoke of their experience of giving birth to a child 
with a facial difference. This information had been provided as part of their [parent’s] opinion 
on the place of therapy for people with a facial difference from the perspective of a person 
living with someone with a facial difference.
8. Creative synthesis: This final phase requires the researcher to draw upon the knowledge gained 
and to elucidate for others their understanding of the phenomenon. To create new understanding 
and meaning for others to read, this may be in the form o f ‘a narrative, story, poem, work o f art, 
metaphor, analogy, or tale’ (Moustakas 1990:52). Underlying this phase is tacit knowing. By 
drawing on the analysis of data up to this stage, and reflecting on her journal entries, the 
researcher required a further two periods of incubation interspersed by a final period of 
immersion, for the new understanding of the phenomenon of learning experiences in therapy to 
be stated. This was necessary partly due to the content of the material being explored; it was at 
times a veiy moving and emotionally draining experience, and partly to ensure that the 
synthesis emanated from the data.
The methodological framework guiding this study, advocates a second cycle of interpretation, and 
the creative synthesis as it is representative of the understanding of the phenomenon arising thus far 
from the investigation will be deconstructed, a process that involves questioning the meaning of a 
text (Derrida 1996, 1972); to open up a conversation of what may be missing in the text, for
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example which voice was represented and which voice silenced. There is thus an opening up to the 
possibility of multiple meaning. In this study, two concepts that emerged from the creative synthesis 
were explored. From this discussion, a model is developed to enable practitioners to begin to open 
up further conversations on psychotherapy as a form o f learning.
A dilemma posed was how to present the data in a such a way that it brings the reader alongside the 
process the researcher went through in analysing the data; for there are two interconnected strands to 
the analysis. Firstly there is the story as told by the research participants, a story that covers three 
different aspects o f peoples experience of therapy. There are the people who provide the therapy 
(therapists working in the field of facial difference), there are the people who have a facial 
difference who have either had therapy or expressed an opinion on therapy for people with a facial 
difference, and there are the people who live with someone who have a facial difference, who shared 
their opinion of therapy for people with a facial difference. From the participants ‘lived experience’; 
the researcher could then identify elements of learning, an approach that Colazzi (1973) advocated 
as a way of eliciting people’s learning processes. This identification represents the second strand of 
the analysis.
The learning can be seen to be either significant learning, learning that makes a difference in how a 
person perceives there situation. Or transformative learning that involves the identification and 
working through of distortions in previous learning. Or emotional learning, a learning that involves 
developing a language to speak about feelings and through this to affect a change in how a person 
feels about their situation, which then informs relationships with others, and may enhance decision 
making and problem solving. Or it could be that the learning that emanates in therapy is a 
combination of all three, for they are not mutually exclusive terms.
The dilemma is how to present this two layers of analysis, the voice of the research participant and 
the voice of the researcher as she interprets the data from the perspective of learning. A paradoxical 
situation, for in the privileging of humanness and an openness to experience, the research 
participants were asked to share their experience or opinion of therapy, to have asked them to share 
their learning experiences of therapy, or the place of therapy as a form of learning, would on the one 
hand made the analysis o f data not such a complex activity, and on the other provided a foreclosure 
to hearing their ‘lived experience’ it would have been filtered through the lens of what they thought 
the researcher wanted to hear. In the primary construction the experiences of the research 
participants are shown, and where appropriate the researcher identifies the learning inherent in the 
experiences shared.
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Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to discuss the method used to generate the data to enable the exploration 
of the question posed by this study. The framework provided by Moustakas (1990) was utilised. 
Firstly the owning of a personal issue which underpins a heuristic investigation was explored. The 
researcher shared her experiences of changes that have emerged from her own therapy and from 
working with clients, and she questioned whether these changes are forms o f learning.
Prior to generating data to explore the question posed, there was a discussion on the information that 
would need to be imparted to potential participants to enable them to make an informed choice 
whether to participate. This information included the nature of the research design, the purpose of 
the study and the process, together with what was expected of them. The researcher’s aim was to 
recruit people who would share their experience of either providing or receiving therapy, or their 
opinion of therapy. Three categories of experiences were defined, from the perspective of therapists 
working in the field of facial difference, from people with a facial difference and from people who 
lived with someone with a facial difference. Potential participants gained information about the 
study either through the advert (this recruited people for the latter two groups), or by direct contact 
(this recruited people for the first two groups).
Before participating in the study, potential participants were given the information of what they 
would be required to do, their right to withdraw from the study at any stage, and that their 
anonymity was assured. The data was generated through either face-to-face interviews, telephone 
interviews, or written correspondence. Participants had the opportunity to screen what they wished 
to omit or leave in. Participant profiles were provided to give an insight to the multifaceted nature of 
the variables found within the research sample.
The data was analysed following Moustakas (1990) guidelines and forms the primary construction. 
An individual depiction for each participant was created, which was checked for accuracy. These 
were then reviewed and commonalties were grouped together under themes. Within these themes 
learning experiences were identified. A composite depiction was developed which is representative 
of the group experience. An exemplary portrait that exemplifies the experience was also generated. 
A creative synthesis that captures the experience of therapy as a form of learning for people with a 
facial difference concludes the first cycle of data analysis. A deconstruction of the two main 
concepts that emerged from the creative synthesis completes the second cycle of interpretation and 
culminates in the secondary construction.
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The primary construction that emerged from the first cycle of analysis o f the data is provided in the 
next chapter (chapter six), a discussion of these findings is provided (chapter seven) followed by the 
secondary construction (chapter eight).
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Introduction
This chapter represents stages four and five of the methodological framework (as discussed in 
chapter three). Stage four is a cyclical process, whereby the researcher moves back and forth 
between the data generated and the emerging construction (stage five). The construction 
presented here is structured as per the heuristic method (as discussed in the previous chapter).
Initially, the two areas that were explored as part of this study are discussed; these are the 
therapist and client experience of therapy for people with a facial difference, and experiences 
that can precipitate the need for therapy for people with a facial difference. Within each o f these 
areas, themes emerged from the analysis of the data generated (details of this process were 
provided in chapter five). As previously stated, the use of the term learning was omitted from 
the question posed, to enable the participants to talk about their experience without boundaries 
imposed by the researcher.
Presenting the findings represented a dilemma for there are two layers to this activity. There is 
the experience as shared by the participants and the identification of experiences that are 
indicative of either the learning experiences of therapy, or the barriers to learning, that may 
precipitate the need for therapy as a form of learning. Thus in the presentation of the findings 
(particularly in the themes), the researcher makes explicit for the reader, the learning or barriers 
to learning implicit in the experiences shared (these will be located in the literature in the 
discussion of findings in the next chapter). The working definition of the three learning 
theories/concepts (significant, transformative, emotional) as identified in the literature review on 
learning (chapter two) informs the presentation of findings. This reference to learning begins the 
conversation on how therapy can be seen to be a form of learning, and will be further developed 
in the discussion of the findings in the next chapter (chapter seven).
The presentation of themes is followed by the composite depiction, which represents the 
experience of the group, and it is divided into the two areas of the study, an exemplary portrait 
follows this. The portrait of ‘John’ was selected as his experience exemplifies experiences that 
can precipitate the need for therapy, and also illustrates the learning intrinsic to the experience 
of therapy. The presentation of themes, composite depiction and exemplary portrait are 
supported with examples of the research participants words, these are in Italics, and the 
participants involved in providing therapy are referred to as therapists. A creative synthesis 
concludes the primary construction; a synthesis that represents the researcher’s understanding
Chapter Six
Primary Construction
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emerging from the exploration of the research question: Is counselling/psychotherapy a form of 
learning for people with facial difference?
1. Areas that were explored as part o f this study
To begin the process of opening up a conversation, on a way of looking at psychotherapy as a 
form of learning, the people who took part in this study were invited to share what for them was 
important when responding to the question posed by the researcher. People with a facial 
difference were asked to share their experience of either having therapy or their opinion of 
therapy, therapists were asked to share their experience of working with people with a facial 
difference, people who live with someone with a facial difference were asked to share their 
opinion of therapy for this client group.
The data generated was initially divided into the following categories, providing therapy 
(analysis o f therapists’ transcripts); experience/opinion of therapy (analysis of the following 
transcripts (a) people with a facial difference both those who had had therapy and those who 
expressed an opinion of it; (b) those living with someone with a facial difference i.e. parents, 
none of whom had had therapy following the birth of a baby with a facial difference); and 
experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy (analysis of all transcripts).
Within each category, commonalties in experience were grouped together and there were 
correlations with the therapists and the clients experience of therapy and these were merged 
together, thus there are two broad areas that emerged from the data analysis; therapist and client 
experience of therapy, and experiences that may precipitate the need for therapy. Within each 
area themes emerged from the consistency from which an issue was spoken about. Three themes 
were generated in the therapist and client experience of therapy area; reasons for seeking 
therapy, therapeutic experience, and the outcome of therapy. The experiences that can 
precipitate the need for therapy, were sub-divided into two categories, ‘parents’ and ‘person 
with a facial difference’. Two themes emerged in the parents’ category, reactions to giving birth 
to a baby with a facial difference, and ongoing concerns. Four themes emerged in the second 
category, stories about their birth, reactions from others, reactions to others, effects of 
difference.
2. Themes that emerged from the analysis o f the individual depictions
2.1 Therapist and client experiences o f therapy
There were commonalties in the responses from clients and therapists (none of the therapists 
and clients had worked together), however, there was a difference in the area of focus, the 
therapist spoke more on what they thought were the clients reasons for seeking therapy and less 
on the outcome. Whereas, the clients spoke more about how the experience had changed them 
and less on the reason for seeking therapy.
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2.1.1 Reasons for seeking therapy
Three therapists working for two charitable organisations, solely involved in work with people 
with a facial difference, commented on the service they provide for their clients. Both 
organisations provide a range of literature on facial disfigurement related issues, run workshops 
for people having difficulties in living with a facial disfigurement/difference, and provide one- 
to-one support either face-to-face, by correspondence or by telephone. All clients, who contact 
the organisations, self refer.
From their perspective, the clients reasons for seeking therapy are related to meeting unknown 
others. For example, one therapist said, 'some people [clients] comment on how it is so difficult 
some days to go outside, they fee l that everyone is looking at them. They only need someone to 
comment and this reinforces to them that they should stay indoors, away from the prying eyes 
o f the public'. Another said, ‘o f  all the people [clients] I  have seen over the past three years, all 
make comment on how difficult it is to socialise. They see their appearance, as setting 
themselves apart from society '.
It is as if previous negative experience(s) have created anxieties about the next encounter of 
meeting strangers/members of the general public. From a learning perspective, if a particular 
situation creates anxiety, then further encounters of being in a similar situation, can create a re- 
experiencing of the anxiety; anxiety that creates a barrier to learning from experience. For the 
outcome of the as yet to be experienced experience is already predicted based on the previous 
experience; there is a closure to experiencing the new, as such there is an inability to learn from 
experience.
Another general theme to emerge from the conversations with the therapist’s was that through 
the experience of working with a range of clients, there was a sense that if the person did not 
have the ‘disfigurement’ then all would be well, for then they would not have to cope with the 
reactions of the general public. For example, one therapist said ‘they want to be perfect, and that 
would be the end o f  their problems ', another said, 'there is a tendency to blame all their 
problems on the disfigurement. So the disfigurement is sometimes blown out o f  proportion
There was also a sense that the person with a facial difference had no responsibility, no role in 
social interactions, for it appeared that interactions with others just happened, without their 
involvement; they happened in a predictable way. For example, one therapist said, ‘what they 
[the client] do not seem to realise is that their own behaviour is also a contributory factor'. 
Another said, fo r  some [clients], rather than face the situation, they blame it all on the 
disfigurement
The therapist’s commented that some of their clients believed that if they had more plastic 
surgery, this would hold the key to their future happiness, that further surgery would make them
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more acceptable to society. For example, one therapist said, ‘plastic surgery is the convenient 
key to make everything all right', and another said, ‘some see it as the answer to their problems; 
they would rather have surgery than learn to live with it
For some of their clients the desired surgery did not have the anticipated result. For example, 
one therapist said, ‘several people [clients] found that the longed fo r  operation, the one that 
would make it all better, did not live up to expectations, One person in particular talked o f  how 
the difference in his appearance was hardly noticeable, and he was veiy angiy with the surgical 
team, fo r  building up his hopes'. Another said, 7 worked with someone who found that the 
operation, the one that marked the end o f  her treatment, did not make a difference in how 
people responded to her. She was still having difficulty in fitting in with people... she still fe lt on 
the outside...the edge o f  society ’.
The therapist’s commented that for some clients, if surgery did not have the answer then the 
counsellor/therapist would. For example one therapist said, fo r  some it [plastic surgery] is a 
magic wand, and i f  i t ’s not then maybe the counsellor will have the magic wand. I t ’s really 
about them not conforming to society’s desire fo r  perfect beauty, and i f  they don’t have it, then 
they are not acceptable ’.
Overall, the therapist’s response seemed to be indicating that there was a sense that the 
‘problem’ [the facial difference] was seen as if it were external to them [clients], a dissociation 
between body and mind. As such there appeared no sense of self separate from the 
‘disfigurement’, that the label o f ‘disfigurement’ defined them. There appeared an inability to 
experience their experience, for there was a degree of predictability to how they perceived other 
people’s response to them.
Eight people shared their experience of therapy, this was either via their primary health care 
team (two people) [referral by general practitioner], a voluntary service (one person) [self 
initiated], or funded privately (five people) [self-referral, or at the suggestion of another person]. 
Two people commented that it was through training to be a therapist that they accessed therapy, 
for example one person said, 7 changed my name ...and then I started training, my therapy was 
about getting qualifications’. The others had sought out therapy due to appearance related 
difficulties in living and relating with others. For example one person said, ‘I ’d reached a point 
in my life where there was so much that I  was unhappy with ...I ’d  just come out o f a long term 
relationship ...I didn't fee l good about myself ...I was referred to counselling by my general 
practitioner Another said, ‘on an in-house training programme at work, the facilitator said to 
me that I  seemed to keep people at a distance, and perhaps counselling may be beneficial ’.
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2.1.2 Therapeutic experience
All three therapist had different theoretical backgrounds (cognitive behavioural, psychodynamic 
and person-centred), and all described their role as being premised on the need for the client to 
take responsibility for their actions. One therapist said that her role was about 'facilitating 
peoples own effectiveness’ another said, 'with a bit o f  support they can turn their lives around’. 
Another therapist said it was about enabling the client to realise that they are ‘not at the mercy 
o f  other people that there are things they can learn to do, to be in a more powerful position ’.
From the clients perspective, the therapist was perceived to be ‘supportive \  for example, one 
person said, 'my counsellor was an independent ear; 1 did not have to w ony about upsetting 
someone', another person said, ‘my therapist was there for m e '. Overall, it appeared difficult to 
say what it was that was helpful, a word frequently used was ‘feedback’ for example one person 
said, ’the feedback I got from the therapist was a turning p o in t... it was about not being so hard 
on myself’.
Two people, commented on how they had not had a good experience of therapy. For example, 
one person said 'my own therapy was a struggle to be heard, that somehow the therapist had 
preconceived ideas about how I  should fee l with my disfigurement ’. Another said 7  tried a non- 
disfigured counsellor, and she could not understand how I  fe lt about my face, all she kept saying 
was that I looked OK, and fo r  me that was not what /  wanted to hear. I  wanted my concerns 
about my face taken seriously’. For both people it appeared to them that they had not been 
listened to, and the inference either implicit or explicit was that, had the therapist had a facial 
difference then this would have been more helpful. One client who had had a positive 
experience of therapy, believed that what had been most beneficial was ‘her [the therapist] 
having a disfigurement helped, she could understand me ’.
The therapists also commented on the issue of whether or not the therapist should have a facial 
difference. From their perspective the presence of a facial difference could place them in the 
position of being a good role model, (two therapists had a facial difference). One therapist 
commented on how she thought clients perceived her own facial difference, Hf she's done it 
then so can 1. People see I  am some way down the line; I ’m living my life profitably’. The other 
said, '90% are pleased that I  have a disfigurement, as I  am on the same wavelength. It may give 
them that bit o f  comfort, that 'I’m not alone'. Whereas, the therapist who did not have a facial 
difference said, ‘people do ask on the phone -  do you have a disfigurement. I  do actually 
challenge that. You know I  don’t think you see a heart specialist because he has a heart defect. 1 
think that what they really want to know is do you understand the issues that I  am asking fo r  
help with. But 1 do recognise that there are some people who see my colleague who has a 
disfigurement and that this alone is remarkably helpful. 1 can understand that ’.
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On the one hand it can be perceived as helpful for the therapist to have a facial difference, and 
yet on the other it is about whether the client feels the therapist can understand them. Perhaps if 
both client and therapist can be open to the experience of the other then the issue of their 
respective appearance may not rate so highly in the conversation. There appears to be a 
preference for sameness rather than difference, where sameness equates with a closure to 
learning from experience, for experience is the same and predictable. New experiences will be 
evaluated, as per previous experience; there is as such a sense of certainty. Whereas, a 
preference for difference w ould. equate with openness to learning from experience, each 
experience has the potential to be different and there is an element of uncertainty.
The perspective of those who commented on what they thought a service should provide them 
gave an indication of a person’s willingness to be open to the experience of therapy. For some 
people they wanted the service to provide answers for and to their experience. For example, one 
person said 7  need to know i f  I  am doing the right things.... is this the norm? ’ Another person 
said ‘I 'd  like to speak to someone who can say this is what it will be like in five  years ...so that 
I ’d  know what to expect’. It would appear that both people wanted some certainty to their 
experience. Whereas, others wanted the therapist to listen to them, and to help them understand 
what was going on for them, for example, one person said, 'how to make sense o f i t ’, another 
said 'to try and come to terms with it, to know that I  am not a l o n e and another said 7 want the 
chance to share the downside, with someone who will listen and not judge me. I  want to tty and 
understand what it all meant and means ’. As such there appears to be more of an openness to 
the process of therapy of not knowing where the exploration will take them; for the answer is 
not known in advance of the encounter. There is thus an openness to experience, and the 
potential to learn from experience.
2.1.3 Outcome of therapy
The three therapists commented on how they perceived the outcome of therapy, this information 
was gained either at the final session, or from comments made by the clients during sessions 
about how they were feeling ‘different’ about their situation. Overall there was a sense that 
therapy had enabled the client to effect a change in their lives, for example, one therapist said 
'to fee l more comfortable with life and experience -  to do things they had not previously been 
able to ’. Another said, fo r  them to fin d  and have their own experience o f  what works fo r  them ’, 
and another said 'to be more accepting o f  their situation, and that’s up to them how they cope 
with the publics interest in them ’.
The clients (six) who had stated positive affects from therapy referred to how the experienced 
had changed them, how their self-perception had altered. How they felt in 'a different place ’ or
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la better p lace’. Part o f this process was the recognition of previous distortions in learning, for 
example: -
'Learning to be normal despite cleft ...I learnt such a lot ...who I  am. That I  am good  
enough. I  came to realise that a lot o f  my thinking was distorted, due to my early 
childhood experiences
‘In therapy my disfigurement was not the focus, it was more about how I  was making 
sense o f  things, and how this thinking was distorted. After therapy I fe lt more positive 
about myself.
‘Counselling gave me a lot o f  confidence in m yself . . .I ’m not six fee t tall, I'm  not miss 
world... but I  have got on with it and I  am getting on with it ’.
'Through counselling, finding a voice, and not to bottle up feelings. Also that peoples 
perceptions are different ’.
‘Increase in self-esteem, and facing my greatest fear ...talking about having a different 
face., and what it meant and means to me ’.
7 came realise that I  expected people to treat me just like others before had, I did not 
give them a chance to be different ’.
There appeared to be an increased awareness of how they felt about their facial difference, and a 
realisation of the uniqueness of experience. That all people do not respond in the same way, 
people’s perception can be different; their perception can be different. For there is the potential 
for another way of responding to others; it is this shift in perspective that is indicative of 
learning from experience.
Learning through the process of therapy is not just in the domain of the client. All the therapists 
made reference to how through the process of either supervision or peer support, they had been 
able to reflect and acknowledge their own learning, emanating from the therapeutic relationship. 
For example: -
‘Being with clients is a learning curve fo r  me. Its made me think much more about things 
that perhaps I  had been dismissive o f  earlier on and hadn’t picked up through reading 
the literature. Learning from the client ... the sort o f  lag between the difference between 
what people look like objectively and what they feel subjectively '.
‘Need for me to change my view o f  counselling that I  was not there to solve it fo r  them. It 
is a two way process ... I  think they have to participate and they don't need to look to me 
as the fa iiy  godmother to make everything right; that they ha\>e responsibility’.
‘One client was desperate fo r  surgery... but you know to me she looked so attractive. And  
I  came to recognise that there is not a scale o f  beauty to ugly ... a universal scale...that 
each person has their own perception o f  what is beautiful and where they f i t  on this 
imaginary scale ’.
It would appear that the therapists too, through working with clients were learning how to 
experience their own experience.
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2.2 Experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy
The themes that emerged in this section were from the interviews with people who shared their 
opinion of the need for therapy for people with a facial difference, their perspective was either 
as a person with a facial difference, or living with someone with a facial difference. The themes 
are grouped into two categories, parents and people with a facial difference.
2.2.1 Parents
There are two themes in this section, reactions to giving birth to a child with a facial difference, 
and ongoing concerns.
2.2.1.1 Reactions to giving birth to a child with a facial difference
The parents (six mothers) identified how difficult it was to have given birth to a baby with a
cleft (congenital facial difference), an experience that was associated with a mixture of negative
emotions, for example: -
'My family said it was not on our side o f  the family... it must be on his. But me...I just fe lt  
so guilty ...Imean this wasn't supposed to happen ...I must have done something’.
7 found it terrible ...Ifeel terrible guilt... obviously in time it disappears'.
'At the birth I  was shocked ...somehow I  managed to switch into caring mode... but it was 
difficult ...she was not what I  had expected ...I mean I ’d never seen anything like it 
before...such a shock... The worst bit has been that as a mother 1 can’t remedy i t ... I just 
take one day at a time ’.
‘As a mother I  was churning on the inside, but on the outside it was business as usual.
But then I would see other mothers with their perfect babies, and I  wanted to leave him 
... to hand him over to someone who would want him...really want him...then I 'd  fee l 
guilty at having such feelings ... its like being on a rollercoaster’.
Two of the mothers had the same facial difference as their child, for them there was a sense of 
history repeating itself. A concern was that their child might experience what they had. For 
example one mother said, 7 was devastated at the birth.... It was my fau lt...I had passed it 
on... I  feel so guilty... and I  don’t want him to go through what I  have’. There is the potential 
here for a closure to experience, for there is an expectation that the child will experience what 
they had. Which may create a situation where the responses to the child are premised on their 
own experience. Responses that can be seen as representative of an inability to learn from 
experience. There appeared to be the potential for this to be an intergenerational process. For 
example, one mother said 'my father did not want to see her, my mother went to pieces...we 
were not to tell people...not to let them know.... it had happened again’.
For those whose parents had not had the experience of giving birth to a child with a facial 
difference there were comments made given of differing negative responses to the birth of their 
grandchild. For example one person said, 'my mother said it was not on our side o f  the family it 
must be his .. I  should never have married him. Such shame had been brought on the family', 
another said ‘my family said to me just ignore it and it will be O K’, and another said 'my parents
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did not want to see him until he'd had his first operation As such the parents appeared to have 
to contend with their own feelings surrounding the birth, plus the reactions of the extended 
family.
There was evidence of their need for support, however, asking for help appeared to be difficult, 
for example one person said ‘as a parent, I  needed a lot o f  support and education. 1 would have 
appreciated help -  what to say, what not to say to others. But I  fe lt I  couldn’t ask, I fe lt as i f  I 
should know how to cope'. Also, accepting help appeared to be difficult. One parent commented 
on how when her son was eighteen months old, a referral to a psychologist was suggested. The 
offer was turned down 7  did not want to be seen as someone who couldn't cope...he wot my 
baby and it was up to me to get on with it...I was not ill...I didn't need to see that sort o f  
person ’. On reflection she wondered if it would have been helpful to explore her feelings of 
‘guilt at having produced baby Frankenstein ...I fee l better towards him now...but I  do worry 
about what the future holds ...I mean the scars are becoming more obvious now ’.
It could be that the difficulties in asking for and accepting help left the mothers with a missed 
opportunity o f putting thoughts and feelings into words. There was a sense of being left to cope 
on their own, of not knowing what to say to others, perhaps because they did not know 
themselves. A mother, who had had therapy to come to terms with her own cleft, appeared to 
have more of a sense of knowing how to respond to others. For she said, 'when people comment 
on my baby, I  ju st said to my other child, never mind them, this is our baby and i f  they can‘t 
cope ... tough. Sometimes when people comment, 1 say don't be so bloody ignorant...others just 
say sh e ‘s got such a sweet face. My husband too has stood up fo r  her. People were commenting 
when we were on the train... look at that baby’s face ...h e  said excuse me that's my daughter’. 
In this example, there is a sense of the parents being able to see beyond the facial difference, to 
be open to the person behind the label. It could be that without the opportunity of exploring the 
difficult feelings engendered by giving birth to a baby with a facial difference there is the 
potential to not see beyond the difference. An emotional learning experience could provide the 
potential for an exploration of feelings, for the development of a language to talk about 
emotions. The potential outcome of such learning is for improved relationships with others; here 
it would be between mother and her baby with a facial difference.
2.2.1.2 Ongoing concerns
All the parents commented on how their concerns for their child continued due to 
developmental changes and the need for ongoing medical and surgical treatment. For example 
one person said, ‘you know I fe lt so helpless each time I  handed her over to the medical team. 
Each operation was painful fo r  me too. You know it’s not just a one o ff repair, when she was 
little, I thought two operations and that would be it. And although the repair is brilliant, she still 
looks different, and then they suggest another operation, and they know best, so you say yes. 1
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always found the hospital a safe place, away from the teasing and bullying, everyone wo? equal, 
no matter how they looked'.
Another concern was that having a child with a facial difference affected the whole family. For 
example one person said, 'cleft palate and harelip have given my family and me much pain. It 
was seen as a tragedy’, and another said ‘having a child needing hospital treatment, and one, 
who looks different to others, has put a strain on my marriage
Also there was the difficulty in coping with teasing, starring from others. For example one 
person said, ‘starting playgroup was difficult ...having to face a lot o f  new people, the children 
were OK towards her, but the other mothers were curious. Primary school was all right; she
spoke to the class about her surgery. Secondary school, well she’s on her own ...she doesn’t
want me to interfere ...but 1 worry about her ...I mean they are so appearance focused at that 
age ... and boyfriends ...how do I tell her that she does not have a chance? No one prepares you  
fo r  this'.
It would appear that each age range brought further challenges; challenges possibly that kept the 
facial difference ‘always present’. For example one person commenting on her daughter who 
was in her thirties said ‘people say she is ‘normal’ it has not blighted her life. But you know 
when I  look at her; all I  see is the cleft ’. And another person commenting on her son in his 
twenties, ‘"ifyou look at a photograph o f  him, you know he looks almost perfect. But then i f  you  
look closely you can see it, the lopsided nose ... the surgeon did a good job, but h e ’s never- 
going to look normal'. There is a sense of an ongoing trauma, that the trauma of the birth that 
was not talked through becomes a barrier to seeing the person; the label defines them, creating 
the potential to see their ‘child5 primarily through the lens of facial difference, there appears to 
be a closure to experiencing it any other way.
2.2.2 People with a facial difference
There were four themes that emerged in this category, stories about their birth, reactions from 
others, reactions to others, and effects of difference. Although the reactions from and to others 
are represented as two categories they are mutually interdependent, and inform the ‘effects of 
difference5 category.
2.2.2.1 Stories about their birth
During either childhood or adulthood, people commented that their parents shared recollections 
about their birth. For example: -
‘Dad said to me last year, I had to persuade your mum to look at you ’.
1 My parents did not want anything to do with me. I was left in the hospital until I  had had 
my operations...about three months. When I had counselling, as a teenager, they came 
along fo r  one session, and they made it clear they did not want me. I f  it had been left to 
my mother she woxdd have had me adopted’.
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'My mothers ’ mother refused to acknowledge my existence to her friends fo r  the first six 
weeks o f my life
Another person commented ‘my mother had a nervous breakdown, when I  was in my teens and 
the psychiatrist said it w o t  ot a result o f  delayed guilt at having borne me ’.
Others shared their memories of how their parents appeared to have difficulty in accepting the 
presence of the cleft. One person recalled how when she was at secondary school, they were 
doing a project and needed to take in a baby photograph, her mother’s response was ‘you were 
too ugly we had none t a k e n The first photograph she has of herself was taken at junior school. 
Another person told of how when she was little her father, ‘would hide her from visitors to the 
fam ily home’. And her stepfather, has advised her in her adult years, ‘you should not have 
children... its not right to bring children into the world... like you
These stories and memories have the potential to create and sustain the mindset that having a 
facial difference is a term that is associated with being ‘less than’. A perspective that can be 
traced back to their birth. Left unchallenged this view can become a barrier to learning from 
experience. There is a foreclosure to it being any other way; there is such an inability to learn 
from experience.
It was generally acknowledged by the people with a facial difference that ‘parents had a lot to 
shoulder’, and they recommended that all parents of the new-born baby with a facial difference 
should have the opportunity to talk about the experience of the birth; the coming to terms with 
not having a ‘perfect baby’. Perhaps this is indicative of how they believe that some of their 
difficulties of living and relating with others stem from their own childhood experiences.
2.1.2.2 Reactions from others
The main concern was about staring and teasing. That somehow they felt they stood out in the 
crowd in a negative way. They felt part of a minority group. A typical response was, ‘i t ’s the 
staring and teasing, people can be cruel. The teenage years were the worst years... it was so 
difficult..teased many times ..sometimes it seemed all the time...the laughing..the staring. You 
know children are quite cruel to children... ’
All seemed to have a recollection of how people had singled them out for being different. One 
person recalled, when she was about 8-9 years old, she was invited to a birthday party, she had 
not met the family before, when she knocked at the door she was told ‘sorry you are not 
wanted, here is some cake, you must go now. The door was shut, I  did not go to the party, and 1 
w o t  left with the present in my hand'. Another person, remembered a time at school when the 
teacher selected her to play a part in a play, 7  was so pleased, it was the first time I had been 
chosen, but a so called friend, said to the teacher, oh don’t pick her, we can't understand what 
she says... so someone else was chosen instead o f  m e '.
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Previous experience can create and sustain a sense that others perceive them in a predominantly 
negative way. Previous experiences can form a ‘blueprint’ for experiencing, a template against 
which future experiences are anticipated and evaluated. Without challenge, previous experience 
creates distortions in perception, for there is an inability to be open to experiencing the new, an 
inability to learn from experience. These templates inform their response to others.
2.2.2.3 Reactions to others
All commented on how they respond to others, particularly unknown others, for example: - 
7 instinctively expect people to reject me
7 always hid my nose/mouth behind my hand, until someone said that this drew attention 
to i t ’.
'When I speak to people, I  wonder what they wall think o f me. I f  I  stay away from people I  
w on‘t get hurt ’.
'Feeling isolated with lack o f  confidence. I  ju st know I  go into myself, when I  meet people 
-  I  don’t want to get hurt
'Before I  meet people, I  rehearse what I  want to say. I  don't like being unprepared’.
There is a sense that there is a repetitious predictable cycle of how others will respond and how 
they respond to others. This cycle is premised on previous experience, where distortions in 
previous learning form barriers to learning from experience.
2.2.2.4 Effects o f difference
All the people with a facial difference, commented on their reactions to their appearance and 
how it has effected them. There was a sense that their facial difference is always present, that it 
does not go away, and as such they all had their own way of describing their appearance. For 
example:-
'My upper lip is narrow, and my nose is a bit wonb>> and I  sound different. In a way I ’m 
bottom o f  the tree in every way ’.
7 have phases when I  am not happy with the way I  am, I would say that I am never 100% 
happy, with the way I  look ’.
'I’ve always thought I  was ugly. Others see a funny nose, and I think 1 ’snarl’ due to cleft 
lip'.
'Being incomplete and inferior, those were the terms I used and that was the sort o f  
difference I  applied to myself. 1 wasn't good enough ’.
All commented on how their appearance has affected their lives, how as a result they 'lack 
confidence’ and their self esteem is 'low ' or 'poor’. For example one person said, 'i f  you are 
different eveiybody has the right to treat you differently. They don’t think yo u ’ve got feelings, 
they think you don’t look right, mentally impaired, and then when you don’t speak right they 
don’t want to know '. Another person said, 7  think that no one with a cleft palate speafcs without
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thinking are people going to understand... either overtly or secretly. Me, I am always waiting to 
be ridiculed. Speech - that fo r  me is the root o f  all my inferiority\
The overall view was that having a face that was different to others was difficult, and that it 
resulted in a low self-esteem and lack of confidence. There was also a sense of the past being 
replayed in the present, the past created a way of interpreting experience in a fixed way, a 
predictable way. There appeared a certain inevitability in what they spoke about, a sense that 
they had ‘been there’ and ‘done that’. There was a sense of it not being possible for it to be any 
other way, for there was no questioning, no awakening to the possibility that it could be 
different. It was as if the future had already happened; there was an inability to learn from 
experience.
3. Composite depiction
The composite depiction develops the conversation further, and was created from the themes 
that emerged from the individual depictions, as such the views of the group are presented in two 
sections; the therapist and client experiences of therapy, and experiences which can precipitate 
the need for therapy.
3.1 Therapist and client experiences of therapy
All the therapists were committed to providing therapy for people with facial difference; they 
had worked in the field for an average of five years. During this time they had worked with a 
variety of people who had accessed the service because they were having difficulty in living 
with a face which was visibly different to self and others. A central issue for the therapist was 
about empowerment, to help the client to learn new skills, new ways of interacting with others, 
and in so doing to see their situation from a different perspective. It was believed that the 
presence of a facial difference should not be a barrier to leading, a 'normal life '. And those who 
accessed the service did so due ‘to problems o f  coping with the reactions o f  the general public ’. 
It was also recognised that 'the issues they present with are facial, but then very quickly there 
are a whole lot o f  other things. I  think so often they are so caught up in there own conditions o f  
worth, which have been imposed by parents, teachers, friends, non-friends.. Jo  be able to put 
that on the side and say I value me because I  am alive ’.
The potential outcome of therapy was for them To fee l comfortable with life and experiences, to 
take part in things they have previously not been able to. Firstly to acknowledge why ‘ am V  
stuck, and then how can they move forward, but without me telling them how to do it’. Also that 
it is about the need for the person to recognise themselves; ‘I'm not whatever it is, that I am not 
someone with what ever it is...I am not a label, I  am m e’. It was also acknowledged that 
Therapy is a two-way thing...I think they have to participate and they don't need to look to me 
as the fa iry godmother to make everything right. They have got a responsibility and they need to 
decide that the time has now come fo r  m e’ to take action to improve 'my life'. During the
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process of therapy they begin to 'recognise where they have been stopping themselves, or 
putting their lives on hold'. Also, ‘there is a dawning realisation that they cannot blame it all on 
their face, because part o f  it is how they react to other people, that they are reactive instead o f  
proactive
Therapy was about enabling a person to talk through their experience of living with a facial 
difference and through this process they were able to challenge previously held beliefs and 
attitudes about how they perceive themselves and other people’s reactions towards them. It was 
a change process, and one that encompassed learning through exploring their current situation 
and looking at alternatives; 'to think about things.... examining alternative ways you can think 
about an issue...and being able to choose from  those alternative explanations, one that helps 
you fee l more confident about how you fee l in that situation’. Also, that ‘with a bit o f  support, 
they can turn their lives round’.
The three therapists recognised that ‘being with clients is a learning cui've \ for some it is the 
realisation that the effect of the difference is more profound than stated in the literature. Or that 
their previously held beliefs about difference were challenged and called into question. The 
issue of training was also raised, and it was acknowledged that it is ‘important to know how you  
think about the world before you embark on any form  o f training, because it actually should 
help you decide what sort o f counselling training you do and what you offer to other people.’. 
Another issue that was raised centred on whether the therapist should or should not have a facial 
difference when working with this client group. For some, it can be deemed helpful; 7  think 
sometimes they will think about it along the lines o f  i f  she’s done it then so can I, or they may 
say, that their difference is not so major, or minor. But I  think i t ’s more about them realising 
that they don't need to accept this negative view o f  self... and I suppose in a way, i f  I  can be seen 
as a positive role model then so be it’. Whereas, it was also felt that ‘having a disfigurement wot 
not the real issue ’, as what clients ‘really want to know is, do you understand the issues that I 
am bringing; asking fo r  help with ’.
From the clients perspective, therapy had been self initiated, usually an event or a series of 
events had culminated in the need to talk about things; ‘there were situations at work, my 
fathers demise, the 'bubble burst ’ and I fe lt so alone, isolated and lacking in confidence, I  saw a 
counsellor fo r  twelve months’. Some had experienced one, two or more therapeutic 
relationships; the experiences lasting from a few weeks to several years.
Overall it was considered helpful to talk to someone who was neutral; who did not know the 
family, 'who would not be upset by what I  said’. It was difficult to be specific about what it was 
that made therapy helpful, ‘I ’m not sure what she did that was helpful that made me realise that 
my views about my face were ones that I  had learnt from others, I ’d  never really explored what 
it means to me. I think maybe it w o t  being with someone who w o t  there fo r  me, who was really
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trying to understand me...when she did not understand she asked me to say more about it, or 
explain what I  meant...that was really helpful; it made me think about what I  was saying. It 
made me realise that a lot o f  my thinking was distorted’. There were elements of being listened 
to and that their story was worthy o f being told and heard by another; 'my therapist listened to 
me in a non-judging way. She did not criticise me; my feelings about myself, my face, were 
heard fo r  the first time ever. It was not just about her hearing but I  could hear myself I  was1 
able to articulate how I  fe lt  andfeel; and that was good’.
For some the process was 'frustrating at times, because there were no straight answers, it was 
not a conversation with a friend. There were times when my views were challenged, and this 
made me think about what I  had said, and I gradually came to realise that a lot o f  my thinking 
about myself was not right. I  still held on to the hurt from the playground taunts ... I  created an 
invisible barrier around myself to protect me, to keep people away ... I  expected them to 
respond to me as others had ...I did not give them a chance to be different’. For some the 
frustration could not be worked through, for it was too difficult -  7  could not remember what it 
used to fee l like, fo r  example when I  was ignored at school. Possibly too, my memory is 
selective, and blocks unpleasant things to protect me ‘ -  and therapy was discontinued.
For those who stayed with the process, there was generally a feeling that a change had taken 
place, 7  now realise, through therapy that it's up to me how I  deal with it. I t ’s no good being a 
shrinking violet... i t ’s about pushing selfforward...to meet with people and feel positive about 
myself. Alternatively, ‘therapy made me aware that I can’t change how I  look, but I can change 
how I  think and feel and about m yself I always thought I  was ugly, but in therapy I  began to 
look at the qualities I  had, and then to explore what it is that I  like about myself My thoughts 
not what the family said, or people at school; you know you ha\>e to like se lf first. And that gave 
me a lot o f  confidence in m yself. As such therapy had provided the opportunity to explore 
thoughts and feelings around their facial difference, and through the process to leam about how 
they felt about themselves; how they make sense of their experience, it was learning that was 
significant to them, a transforming of previously held beliefs and attitudes. Therapy offered an 
opportunity to return to learning from experience.
3.2 Experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy
Parental concerns can start pre-birth, either as a worry that a familial congenital anomaly may 
represent itself, or the presence of the anomaly was picked up at routine pre-natal scanning. On 
discovering that she had passed on her congenital anomaly to her son at a routine pre-natal scan: 
7  went to pieces, and I  wanted to have him terminated. Even though I knew there was a risk 
because o f  the family histoiy, and I had been fo r genetic counselling... I  ju s t thought it would not 
happen again. After 1 got over the shock, 1 mean I know its not life threatening, my main worries 
were that he is not going to go through what I  went through. I  did not accept him, could not 
push him into the world, so I  had a caesarean. It was a real struggle to fe ed  him; we were in
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and out o f  hospital The sta ff just thought I  would know how to handle it, because o f  my own 
experience, but 1 didn't, they just said I could cope. He's due to start school soon, and 1 expect 
he will come home and say that children have been calling him names ...it's ju st history 
repeating itself.
For others the condition presented itself at the birth. At birth the issues focused on telling others 
the news, coping with their own feelings of guilt and rejection, and coping with feeding 
difficulties and surgery some time during the next three months. ‘ When I  gave birth to her I did 
not know what it was, a complete malfunction. I  did think that she would die -  solve all the 
problems -  best thing fo r  everybody. She was my second child, i f  she had been my first then I ’d  
never had had anymore. She was a one o ff ...its hereditary but I  suppose it had to start 
somewhere. People on the whole were not sympathetic, my father would not see her and my 
mother went to pieces. My husband was OK, but he was not as loving to her as our first child. 
He also did not want me to tell people, not to let them know about her face. I  found  it terrible - 1 
feel terrible guilt. Obviously in time it disappears. You put your child through eleven or twelve 
operations. But you know that whenever I  look at her, I  see someone whose face is not perfect. It 
does effect the whole family and puts a strain on your marriage. It has affected her too, she has 
‘black moods'; i t ’s a legacy. When she was small and we would pass the butchers shop she 
would scream when she saw his white coat, it reminded her o f the hospital. When she was in 
hospital it was the best place to cope, because everyone was in the same boat. At school she was 
teased a lot; school was difficult she was always moaning that people were staring and 
laughing. You know it was heart wrenching to hear about it, as a mother I  could not make it 
better. Although, things did get better when she was a teenager, well as long as nobody made a 
spectacle o f  her. 1 used to try to pre-empt reactions, and as she got older I  needed to be more 
vigilant, I  ju st took one day at a time Overall, there was a view that parents need both support 
and education as their child relies on them to help them cope with having a face, which is 
visibly different.
When they were older, usually late adolescence or early adulthood, some parents were able to 
talk about their reactions to the birth. The memories of this were then available for re-telling.
‘ When I  was born at 2.45 am, the midwife told my mother that I had a cleft. Mum had read an 
article about this, and thought its OK, because there is surgery for this. Meanwhile, I was thrust 
into my fa thers' arms. He left the hospital about 5 a.m., went straight to his mothers and wept in 
her arms. My mothers' mother refused to acknowledge my existence to her friends fo r  about the 
first six weeks o f  my life. At the age o f  ten, my mother developed some kind o f  neurosis. I  later- 
learned from my father that the psychiatrist blamed it on her reaction to bearing me. Having a 
cleft was seen as a tragedy: It need not have been. It has made me a very sensitive individual, 
but also a very vulnerable one, easily stressed and depressed’.
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'My dad said to me last year, I  had to persuade your mother to look at you and to hold you. She 
didn’t want to accept me because o f  my cleft, and was anxious to know which side o f the family  
did it come from...each side were blaming the other. It does have a major effect, always 
knowing that I was treated differently in the family. My parents would not talk about it when I  
was younger. I  think how you feel about yourself in the beginning can have problems in later 
life. For me, I ’ve always held back, never really fe lt good enough ’.
For those with a facial difference, a commonly held view was that other people would comment 
negatively about their appearance, and that this had been a learned response from childhood.
‘ When I  speak to people I  wonder what they will think o f  me. I  tend to stay away from  
people...then I  w on’t get hurt...I learnt that at a young age...I can still hear the names they 
called me. I became timid and shy and a loner at school. You know there are two choices, either 
blend into the background or become aggressive. But I  am what I  am, and I ’d like to be able to 
say that...to say this is me...this is the package... like it or lump it. But I  fin d  it hard to stand up 
fo r  me...I go red, I  blush and then I  walk away There is a tendency to withdraw; ‘when I  am 
with other people, I  go into myself I  instinctively expect people to reject me, and am surprised i f  
they don’t ’.
As a result o f the reactions from other people, a picture of himself or herself is formed as 
someone who is ‘different’: ‘I f  you are different everybody has the right to treat you differently, 
they don’t think you have got feelings. They think because you don’t look right then you are 
mentally impaired and then when you can’t speak right they don’t want to know. Jobs... as soon 
as they look at you, you are discriminated about...for example a job on the telephone -  need 
someone to speak in a clear and concise manner. I f  involved -with members o f the public, the 
image they want is blond haired instead o f  someone with a lopsided face. But you know a cleft is 
not a major disability. However, there is a stigma attached to being different. And it is others 
who make you feel different, especially at school, made the butt o f  eveiybody ’s jokes ’.
The reactions from others can subsequently effect how they interact with others. ‘At school, I  
wot lonely because it seemed that virtually no one would speak to me. The girl who had to sit 
next to me in class w o t  spiteful to me. I  w o t  very shy and inhibited in my teens. I  used to walk 
about on my own during school break times, assuming that the gang would not want my 
company. Today, /  lack confidence in my ability to socialise, and as a result I  fee l rather 
isolated. Also I ’m not able to form  a lasting relationship with a partner’. Early negative 
experiences act as a template against which current reactions are measured. Positive comments 
are disregarded, ‘I ’m told how people often don 7 notice fo r a while but I  don’t believe them. My 
partner says its not noticeable, so why do I make such a fuss whenever I  meet new people; he 
doesn’t understand’. Early childhood experiences impact on how they perceive themselves and 
how they respond to others; and there is a persistent view of 'still standing out'. Previous 
learning experiences can create a template for anticipating and evaluating future experiences,
116
meaning making is distorted for it is premised on previous learning, these distortions create 
barriers to learning from experience.
4. Exemplary portrait
When John was five, he asked his mother about his appearance, she replied 'you are a 
punishment fo r  something I  have done’. John recalled that as an adult his father told him ‘you  
were such a shock to your mother, she had problems fo r  many years with her nerves ’. When he 
was sixteen John was going to ask a girl out, and he told his mother of his plans, she said 'the 
girl might laugh at you -  so don't do i t’. I  took this to mean that girls wouldn 't want to go out 
with me, and it would be better not to ask. This early experience did not do a lot for my 
confidence, and this comment by my mother virtually emasculated me, and I  regarded women as 
being ‘out o f  bounds'. It was my wife who asked me out, she was a friend o f  the fam ily’. In later 
life, his father used to say to him ‘you were such a shock to your mother; this too did not do 
much goodfor my self-esteem '.
He also recalled, how although he was academically bright, wining a prize at primary school, 
when he went to sit a scholarship 'the maths paper covered subjects I had not done, I did not 
have the confidence to say this, so I  just got up and walked out o f  the examination. My parents 
constantly reminded me o f my inability to complete anything'.
John entered therapy when he was in his fifties, his marriage was over, and he was having 
difficulty in socialising. He was in therapy for five years, during which time he also commenced 
training to be a therapist. He commented ‘therapy was a maivellous experience, and it has made 
such a difference. For me my relationship wnth women was a central issue -  I  can trace it back 
to my early experiences. I  began to explore my views around my appearance and speech, fo r  me 
my speech has been my major difficulty. For example, I  would rehearse fo r  ages before asking 
fo r  cinema or theatre tickets, and i f  I  were not understood I would walk away. Now I  know that 
people can understand me, and i f  they don't I  will repeat, its no big deal. I  have even started to 
initiate conversations with people. Pre-therapy this was something I  would not have 
contemplated - 1 feared rejection. My self-confidence has increased many folds.
Through therapy I have confronted many issues, my therapist would challenge my views about 
myself and would often sci)> that I was good enough. Gradually I  ha\>e come to see that maybe I  
am good enough. My therapist was a mirror. It was good to say what I  wanted and to be 
accepted fo r  who I am. It is a struggle to accept normality, to know that I  don't sound OK and 
to not give a damn. Learning to be normal despite cleft -  it works some o f the time'. 
Commenting on the outcome of therapy: 7  have improved self-esteem...due to facing my 
greatest fe a r ...I’m sure that looking at things correctly ...a lot o f  the time my thinking was 
distorted. I  realise now how important our early experiences are. Also through therapy, I  have 
come to realise that we socially and emotionally set ourselves apart'.
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5. Creative synthesis
Therapy provides an opportunity for a person to talk through their experiences of living with a 
facial difference. Through the therapeutic relationship and process the person is able to explore 
how they make sense of their experience. To explore how facial difference can define the 
person. This exploration has the potential to uncover distortions in how they perceive the world. 
These distortions usually emanate from early learning experiences, and have the capacity to act 
as a standard for all future experience. For example, experiences of being treated negatively by 
others may create the mindset of being less than others, not quite the same, not quite good 
enough. When meeting new people there is an expectation of being received as per previous 
experience, and this negates experiencing the new. Previous experiences are thus the template 
for evaluating future experiences. As such there is an inability to learn from experience; where 
there is trauma there is an interruption in learning from experience.
In recognising how early socialisation processes have the preponderance to generate distortions 
in learning, there is a need for parents to explore their experience of having a child with a facial 
difference. For example they may experience guilt at having produced a baby that was not 
anticipated; they need to mourn the loss of the baby they did not have. They need to explore 
their experience of witnessing their child being responded to negatively by others. As such there 
is the potential for it to be an intergenerational process; both child and parent experiencing 
feelings of being less than; with the potential for this to impact on relating to others and each 
other. Where there is trauma there are interruptions to learning from experience.
Therapy provides an opportunity for re-learning; it is a reparative discourse where the potential 
is for the person to return to learning from experience. To experience his or her own experience; 
facial difference does not need to define the person.
Conclusion
The heuristic method of analysing data informed the findings presented; there were two areas 
that were explored in relation to facial difference, the therapist and client experience of therapy 
and experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy. As the participants were not asked to 
speak of learning experiences (so as not to influence the experiences shared) there were two 
layers to the presentation of findings. There was the participant’s experience and the 
researcher’s identification of learning through therapy and the barriers to learning that may 
precipitate the need for therapy as a form of learning. The research participant’s words were in 
Italics, alongside, where appropriate the researcher identified either barriers to learning and/or 
learning (these were not at this stage located in the literature) drawing on the three working 
definitions of significant, transformative and emotional learning (as developed in chapter two, 
and restated in chapter five).
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Initially the themes that emerged from the data were stated, there were three themes within the 
area of therapist and client experiences of therapy (reasons for seeking therapy, therapeutic 
experience, and the outcome of therapy) there was evidence that therapy provided the person 
with an opportunity to explore their difficulties in living and relating with a facial difference. 
Through the process distortions in meaning making were uncovered and worked through, 
therapy provided an opportunity to return to learning from experience. The six themes that 
emerged in the area of experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy, were subdivided 
into two categories, parents (reactions to giving birth to a baby with a facial difference, and 
ongoing concerns) and experiences of people with a facial difference (reactions to stories of 
their birth, reactions from others, reactions to others and effects o f difference). Giving birth to a 
child with a facial difference appeared to be an emotionally traumatic experience. There was 
evidence of the trauma being ongoing, and the need for a place to explore their feelings around 
giving birth to a child that was not expected. Living with a facial difference can create 
difficulties, difficulties that can be premised on distortions in meaning making perspectives. 
Where previous experience becomes the template for evaluating future experience. Templates 
that are barriers to learning from experience.
The next stage of analysis was the presentation of a composite depiction, which represents the 
groups experience of the phenomenon. An exemplary portrait of one person was provided that 
captures the flavour of the lived experience. Both of these stages further develop the exploration 
of therapy as a form of learning for people with a facial difference, and draw on the participant’s 
words. The final stage of data analysis, the creative synthesis represents the researcher’s 
understanding of the phenomenon that emanates from conducting this heuristic inquiry. Early 
experiences can create a negative view of the s e lf ; that facial difference defines the person. An 
inability to learn from experience can sustain this negative view. A view that may be passed 
down from the parents, an intergenerational transmission of a template for the evaluation of 
future experience; facial difference becomes a term that can define the person. Therapy can 
provide a reparative discourse to enable a return to learning from experience.
The next chapter is a discussion of the primary construction presented here, and completes the 
first cycle of interpretation of the methodological framework being tested out in this study.
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Chapter Seven
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to develop a conversation on how therapy can be seen as a form of 
learning and builds on the presentation of findings (the primary construction) in the previous 
chapter. The particular emphasis is on people with a facial difference, and therefore the conversation 
is developed in relation to how people with a facial difference may require therapy as a form of 
learning. The three literature reviews (discussed in chapter two) on psychotherapy, learning and 
facial difference inform the exploration. The discussion of findings is structured as per the headings 
of the previous chapter, initially there is a discussion on the themes that emerged from the individual 
depictions, followed by the composite depiction and exemplary portrait. Next is the discussion on 
the creative synthesis, that is representative of the researcher’s understanding of how therapy can be 
seen as a form of learning. In conclusion a review of the discussion is provided, and the two phrases 
from the creative synthesis that will be deconstructed in the next interpretative cycle identified.
1. Analysis of themes that emerged from the individual depictions
Initially the three themes that emerged in the category of ‘therapist and client experience of 
therapy’; reasons for seeking therapy, therapeutic experience, and the outcome of therapy, will be 
discussed. Followed by a discussion of the six themes that emerged in the category of ‘experiences 
that may precipitate the need for therapy’.
1.1 Therapist and client experience of therapy
1.1.1 Reasons for seeking therapy
The therapists in this study were working for two charitable organisations that provide a range of 
services for people with a facial difference. The organisations provide information, support and 
befriending, one-to-one counselling and training workshops for social skills training. Hughes (1991) 
makes reference to, the plethora of self-help groups, which have sprung up to meet with consumer 
demand for more information and support with particular conditions. It is acknowledged that the 
support and information provided by someone who has gone through a similar experience can be 
helpful to some people (Partridge and Nash 1997, Robert et al 1997, Brammer et al 1993). Whereas, 
others benefit from ‘befriending’ on a one-to-one basis; a ‘befriender’ is not only someone who has 
been through a particular experience, but has been ‘trained’ in the skills of offering support to others 
(Clarke 1999a). Social skills training is recognised as a method of providing coping strategies for 
handling social interaction, and as a result may enhance self-confidence and reduce anxiety
Discussion o f the Primary Construction
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(Robinson 1997a, Robinson et al 1996, Partridge et al 1994, Bull and Rumsey 1988, Rumsey et al
1986). The combination of counselling with social skills training is recognised as being helpful in 
supporting an individual coming to terms with a facial difference ( Kent and Keohane 2001, Newell 
1998, Clarke 1999a,Turner et al 1998). Thus it would appear that the two organisations provide a 
range of activities to meet with the educational and psycho-social needs of people with facial 
difference.
The therapists commented on why people sought out therapy, this was because they were 
experiencing some difficulty in coping with their appearance and the response they got from the 
general public, this is supported in the literature (Moss 1997, Bradbury 1996, Robinson et al 1996, 
Partridge 1994, MacGregor 1990). There is a similarity in the effects of facial difference irrespective 
of the type or the cause of the difference (Solomon 1998, Moss 1997, Robinson 1997a). Contrary to 
popular belief there is no correlation between the size of the ‘disfigurement’ and the extent of 
psychosocial difficulties encountered (Robinson 1997a, Elks 1990); minor facial anomalies are 
considered to be more difficult to cope with (MacGregor 1990). Within the literature reviewed, it 
was Pertschuk and Whittaker (1982) who commented on why this may be so, and suggest that the 
defence mechanism of repression may create and sustain this situation, whereby the person with a 
larger defect may rely on repression as a coping mechanism. Therefore on observation they may 
give the impression that there are minimal psychological problems associated with their appearance. 
The therapists in this study did not make the distinction between the types/forms of facial difference, 
they focused on the issues that were considered important for the person to seek therapy.
Another general theme was that if the person did not have the facial difference then all would be 
well, and as such this links in with their appearance and how it does not measure up to the perceived 
norm. The ‘beauty myth’ contributes to the desire to be ‘perfect’ for the myth compounds the view 
that success and happiness come to those with the perfect/ideal image (Coutinho 2001, Robinson et 
al 1996, Jackson et al 1995, Woolfe 1990). In her book The Beauty Myth Woolfe (1990:16) 
suggests that ‘the modern arsenal of the myth is a dissemination of millions o f images of the current 
ideal’. The media as such fuels the myth (Coutinho 2001, Woolfe 1990, Bull and Rumsey 1988). 
The key to this myth is the notion that physical attractiveness equates with goodness, and that 
badness is associated with physical unattractiveness (Dion et al 1972); therefore, those who have a 
facial difference are considered to have a less than acceptable form of appearance, (Bronheim 1994, 
Feingold 1992, Eagly et al 1991, Hatfield and Sprecher 1986). This can be representative of a 
sociocultural distortion in meaning perspective, Merzirow (1990); whereby the stereotypical 
viewpoint creates a closure to experience, for there is an anticipation of how the person should be, 
based either on previous experience or from opinions of others.
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Another related aspect of not measuring up to the perceived ‘perfect image’, is that it has the 
potential to impact on social interaction, and for some they believe that reconstructive surgery 
(plastic surgery) will be able to restore their appearance. Or rather that surgery is designed to make 
those with an atypical appearance more acceptable to society (Glover 1988); and make them feel 
attractive (Bronheim 1994, Thomas 1990). Both of these perspectives appear to be incorporated in 
the following quote by McNeil (1998:327) who comments in his book The Face ‘some people 
blame their problems on facial flaws and see plastic surgery as a royal road to happiness’. However, 
in relation to people with a facial difference, the view that surgery can solve all problems is another 
myth (Partridge and Cooper 1996), and as such ‘surgery is a magic wand that will remove my 
disfigurement and solve my problem’ (Coutinho 2001:8) [original emphasis]. This myth is 
representative o f an epistemic distortion in meaning perspective (Mezirow 1990), here the 
knowledge of plastic surgery is incorrect, for there is the belief that it can restore a normal 
appearance.
Reconstructive surgery is helpful to a certain degree, in repairing damage due to illness or trauma, or 
correcting congenital anomalies (Pruzinsky 1997, Cash 1990, Thomas 1990). The focus on 
reconstructive surgery is to see the problem purely as a medical one (Robinson 1997) and there is a 
need for a shift in emphasis from surgical outcomes to emotional outcomes (Cochrane and Slade 
1998). Shaw (1981) also mooted this perspective when he suggested that now surgical techniques 
have reached a plateau there is a need to look for alternatives in helping people to adjust to facial 
disfigurement.
It is recognised that people who are not happy with their appearance, both those with a recognised 
form of facial difference, and those who are labelled as having body dysmorphobia (those who have 
no physical imperfection but believe in their mind that they are grossly deformed) (Cash 1994); have 
high expectations of reconstructive surgery (Pruzinsky 1988). The collaboration of plastic surgeons 
and medical psychotherapists is advocated for this client group, as it can both increase awareness of 
the expectations of surgery, and lessen the repeated requests for surgery (van Moffaert 1992, 
Edgerton et al 1991).
One therapist in this study commented, 7  think for some they are so fixed  on the surgery providing 
the answers, that I  explore with them where this thought comes from, how realistic is it'. This seems 
to encapsulate the idea of beginning to explore and challenge the misconceptions that surgical 
techniques can provide all the answers; for it is recognised that some people may benefit from 
psychotherapy as opposed to surgery (Webb 1987). It is suggested here that the emphasis on surgery 
is the technical remit, whereby there is a focus on the outer presentation, the quest for outer 
perfection to meet with the current perceived media generated ideal image. Whereas, psychotherapy
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can provide an opportunity for an individual to explore their thoughts and feelings about their 
appearance, and to challenge faulty perceptions. It is about valuing humanness. There is also the 
potential to transform previously held beliefs and attitudes.
From the client’s perspective there appeared to be two referral routes; either a referral was suggested 
by others (e.g. general practitioner, colleagues, counselling training requirements) or self-initiated. 
This was generally linked to a crisis related to their appearance, either they were not happy with 
their appearance and/or the reactions o f the general public, the outcome of which created difficulties 
when meeting new people.
There was a correlation between the presenting issues identified by both therapists and clients. The 
difference being in the language used, clients referred to a specific crisis in their lives, for example 
one person said * it suddenly all got too much fo r  me ...I had just finished a relationship and I  
blamed it all on my face.... But I  realise the feelings about my face were there before the 
relationship and that the two were not connected. He did not finish with me because o f  my face... it 
ju st gave me the excuse to enter therapy ...I should have done it years ago '. Whereas the therapist’s 
commented more on the generic need for therapy and this was appearance related. This study 
provides previously unreported information on the clients’ experience of what initiated therapy.
Within the literature on facial difference, there were two direct references to why a client accessed 
therapy, and these were from comments filtered through the therapist. 7  have a portwine stain on 
my face. I got laser treatments for it last winter and realised I have a lot of feeling about it that I 
have never dealt with’ (Milioria 1998:386). Whereas, Niederland (1975:450) said that the client was 
referred to him as she suffered from ‘frequent anxiety attacks ... and recurrent episodes of 
depression’. These were attributed to her facial disfigurement and her difficulties in socialising. 
Bradbury (1996) in her book Counselling People with Disfigurements, makes reference to how a 
crisis in life may trigger unresolved conflicts about an individuals disfigurement, and the crisis may 
as such not be related to their appearance. It would thus appear that the findings of this study 
correlate with Milioria (1998), Niederland (1975) and Bradbury's (1996) comments.
There was a sense of the person with a facial difference not owning their difference, rather the 
‘problem’ was externalised, for if they had a perfect image then this would solve their problems. 
Previous experiences have informed their self image, an image that may have been formed by the 
negative responses of others to their appearance, it is as such a distorted image, and this can create a 
barrier to learning (Williamson 1998, Rogers 1967). Williamson (1998:174) goes on to state ‘many 
people remain trapped within aseriptive images of themselves which have been built up for them 
and which are opposed by others. Lacking the means to question this they remain confined with
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narrow assumptions of their lives’. This appears to be representative of the experience shared in this 
study, for those with a facial difference can be ‘trapped’, and it is suggested here that therapy offers 
an opportunity to question their ‘ascriptive image’.
1.1.2 Therapeutic experience
The therapists in this study preferred mode of working stemmed from the training they had received. 
One of the therapists relied on cognitive behavioural therapy techniques, and this approach is the 
one that is most widely referred to in the literature for being effective with people with facial 
difference ( Newell 1998, Bradbury 1997, Rosen et al 1995, Bronheim 1994, Bradbury 1993, Cash 
1990). Although in agreement, Heinberg et al (1997) make the distinction o f how this is particularly 
so in cases of visible scarring, e.g. hands and face. Whereas, Kent and Keohane (2001) suggest that 
the combination of cognitive behavioural therapy with social skills is the most effective form of 
treatment. The other two therapists relied on person-centred and psychodynamic approaches. As 
such, the range of underpinning theoretical orientation of the therapists in this study, is 
representative of the three main approaches to therapy (McLeod 1998, Stewart 1992, Mahrer 
1989). The link between them is the therapeutic relationship (McLeod 1998); as one therapist 
commented 7  think it is more about seeing each person as an individual and the relationship we 
develop '. It was this aspect that the therapists commented on, their experience of the working 
alliance. How it is fundamental to empowering the individual ‘that there are things they can learn, 
to be in a more powerful position’.
The therapist’s were describing how they are facilitators of learning (Heron 1989, Knowles 1984, 
Rogers 1967), whereby they encourage the clients to discover their own solutions, and this embraces 
the notion of self-directed learning. The learner is active in the learning process, and previous 
experience is acknowledged. The relationship between teacher and learner is a necessary requisite 
for this form of learning (Rosenow 1998, Jarvis 1997). The use of the term ‘teacher’ can be 
misleading, for the traditional view o f the teacher is the one who imparts knowledge to the students, 
Laudrillard (1993:29) suggests ‘that teaching is a rhetorical activity: it is mediated learning, 
allowing students to acquire knowledge of someone else’s way of experiencing the world’. This is at 
odds with the role of the facilitator, which encompasses the notion of facilitation, learning how to 
leam (Knowles 1984, Rogers 1983). In relation to therapy, it is the relationship between the 
therapist and client that is fundamental to learning, where the therapist is a facilitator o f learning.
From the client perspective, of those who had a positive experience of therapy, it was the therapists’ 
ability to listen to them and for them to feel listened to that was most important, and this correlates 
with the views of the other client’s experience of therapy (Stracker and Becker 1997, Howe 1993). 
There were also comments that the therapist was ‘an independent ear, could understand me, and
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visas' interested in m e’. As such these support Orlinsky’s (1989:427) view, ‘the human qualities o f the 
relationship have more consistent impact on patients than do technical aspects of therapy’.
Those who found the experience to be less than satisfactory commented on the apparent lack of 
understanding of the therapist concerning how the person with the facial difference felt about their 
appearance, for example one person said, ‘a// she [therapist] kept saying was that I looked OK, and 
fo r  me that was not what I wanted to hear. I wanted my concerns about my face taken seriously’. It 
could be argued that the therapist was challenging the person’s perception of her appearance, and 
that this is what the client needed, to explore their distortions in previous learning. However, the 
timing of the interpretation is questionable, for the client was unable to work with this, and 
subsequently terminated therapy. It could be that prior to challenging previously held beliefs, there 
is a need for the therapeutic relationship to be established. For the client, to feel safe and accepted 
prior to exploring and challenging previously held beliefs, as such the therapist needs to provide a 
secure base (see Holmes 2001, Bowlby 1988).
Another possible interpretation could be transferential issues, the client projecting a previous 
experience onto the therapist (see Freud 1915). Or countertransferential issues, Bronheim (1984) 
makes reference to this in the field of working with people who have had radical head and neck 
surgery, and the need for the therapist to be aware of their thoughts and feelings surrounding facial 
difference so as not to project these onto the client. He also suggests that the therapist needs to have 
knowledge of available treatments, (particularly when working with clients in the immediate post­
operative phase) otherwise a form of psuedotherapy can take place.
In relation to the therapist being aware of their thoughts and feelings of facial difference, is the 
concept of stereotypes. Bull and Rumsey (1988) reviewed eight papers on the unattractive client, 
and how the therapists perception conclusively demonstrated that therapists prefer to work with 
attractive clients as they think they are more honest, and likely to be more committed to the 
relationship. As such, ‘a clients level of physical attractiveness may affect the therapeutic process in 
some way’ (Bull and Rumsey 1988:250).
It is suggested here that if a therapist has not worked with someone with a facial difference before, 
and who also has not had the opportunity to explore their views on the subject, they may 
inadvertently seek to reassure a client that their face is ‘OK’ to them, and this has the potential of 
being heard as not understanding the difficulties that the client is trying to articulate. It is potentially 
a veritable mine field; for we will never know what the other thinks of us, it is left to fantasy. 
However, if the therapist is able to mirror the willingness to be open to the client’s experience, and
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not to impose closure then there is the propensity for the therapist to be a role model, for facilitating 
a return to learning from experience.
The views of therapy as either ‘being helpful’ or ‘not being helpful’, represent opposing ends of a 
continuum. Into the equation is the skill/quality of the therapeutic relationship, which is dependent 
on the meeting of the client and the therapist. The ability of the therapist to hear the story of the 
other without imposing closure, for example one person said, ‘all she [the therapist] kept saying 
was that I  looked OK ...I wanted my concerns about my face taken seriously... ’ could be placed 
along an imaginary continuum representing therapist responses; o f judgmental to non-judgemental. 
This response would be at the judgmental end, and the willingness to accept the client and their 
perception of reality at the opposing end.
An area both the therapist’s and client’s commented on was in relation to the whether or not there is 
a need for the therapist to have a facial difference to work with this client group. Of the three 
therapists interviewed, two had a congenital facial difference, and this may have contributed to this 
being an area that was identified as being of relevance when discussing the service offered. The 
opinions expressed suggest that it could be perceived as being helpful. The comment by the therapist 
without a facial difference, is illuminating, for she raised the issue of would you only see a heart 
specialist if he had a heart defect; rather it is the skills o f the person that are important.
Bull and Rumsey (1988) comment on four papers they reviewed regarding the physical attributes of 
a therapist, and conclude that a therapist who is unattractive is perceived as being less credible and 
helpful. They suggest ‘that unattractiveness in the counsellor may enhance the perceived similarity 
between the facially disadvantaged client and the counsellor, thus increasing the interpersonal 
interaction of the two, and facilitating the counselling process’ (Bull and Rumsey 1988:248). It is 
suggested here that this could be part o f the reason why people wish to see someone with a facial 
difference. Or it could be that as the potential client approached an organisation working within the 
field of facial difference, there was an expectation that the counsellor would have a facial difference.
The therapist can be seen to be role model (Corey 1996, Fromm 1994) and this correlates with the 
views expressed by the therapists in this study regarding whether or not the therapist should have a 
facial difference, for they have been through a similar experience. However, it could be that their 
experience of the phenomenon could provide a foreclosure to the client being able to experience 
their own experience, as there is the potential for the therapist’s frame of reference to be imparted to 
the client. There is a need for the therapist (with a facial difference) to be mindful that therapy with 
a client who also has a facial difference does not become a form o f vicarious therapy. Schapira
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(2000) makes this case when the therapist does not have personal therapy, and the therapy they 
provide for others, is doing for others what they can not do for themselves.
Requesting to see someone with a facial difference is rather like requesting to see someone from the 
same ethnic background, gender, or sexual orientation. According to Spinelli (1994:65) ‘only 
therapists from the same culture as their client can understand and deal with particular issues 
brought to them’. This would seem to be the case for some people with facial difference and 
possibly underpin their request to see a therapist with a facial difference. Although it is recognised 
that the perceived similarity between the therapist and the client (not just physical attributes) can 
enhance the therapeutic relationship (Vera et al 1999); it appears that the client with a facial 
difference focuses on the physical attributes, i.e. appearance to gauge similarities. It could be that 
this focus is representative of their own experience, that other people’s focus is on their appearance. 
However, it is suggested here that this focus has the potential to impose closure to meeting the other; 
for acceptance is dependent on similarity; rather than a willingness to be open to difference, to meet 
with another and for meaning to emerge in the in-between.
Of the views expressed of what people want from the therapist, there were three differing 
perspectives, there were those who wanted to know ‘is this how it should be?’ and those who 
wanted to know ‘what I might expect’ and there were others who, wanted to ‘make sense o f it’. The 
first two views appear to be expressing a need/desire for certainty, there is the potential for the 
answers given to be perceived as the correct way, or the only way of being; in essence to create 
sameness. Whereas, the third view appears to embrace the notion of a willingness to be open to 
experience, to explore what it means for the individual. It is suggested here those whose 
expectations fall within the third perspective are more likely to perceive the therapist as someone 
who will not provide answers, but someone who will facilitate exploration of the sense they are 
making from their experience.
At the heart o f transformative learning is critical reflection (Mezirow 1990). It is suggested here that 
this process contain elements of critical thinking (see Brookfield 1987) and reflective learning (see 
Jarvis 1987). The outcome of critical reflection is ‘identifying and challenging distorted meaning 
perspectives’ (Mezirow 1991:87). There is as such a questioning of personal knowing, an 
exploration of commonly held beliefs and attitudes. Distortions are barriers to learning (Williamson 
1998, Boud and Walker 1993, Claxton 1984). Mezirow (1990) is in agreement and defines three 
forms of distortions, epistemic (about the nature of knowledge), sociocultural (accepted cultural 
norms) and psychic (psychological anxiety), fundamental to these distortions are previous learning 
experiences.
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Examples of these three types of distortion can be found in this section. For example, epistemic, the 
assumption is that others will know the answer, for example expecting the therapist or surgeon to 
have a ‘magic wand’ to make everything better, or needing to know what to expect in five years 
time. This assumption is founded on providing some certainty, to remove the uncertainty inherent in 
experiencing experience, and learning from experience. An example of a sociocultural distortion, is 
accepting the ‘beauty myth’ (the cultural prevailing norm of what is acceptable in the beauty stakes), 
can create a stereotypical view, that good looks equates with all the good things in life. An example 
of a psychic distortion is how previous experience can create anxiety, an anxiety that can be evoked 
by the thought of encountering a similar situation. It is suggested here that the three distortions are 
not mutually exclusive. It would seem for the person with a facial difference there is the potential 
for all three to be present.
The person with a facial difference may have difficulty in social interactions, and this has the 
potential to create and sustain distortions in meaning making perspectives. One way of interpreting 
this is, that firstly within the sociocultural domain the acceptance of the ‘beauty myth’ can create a 
sense of being less than, there is an anxiety that others may perceive them to be less than. This belief 
informs a psychic distortion, the result o f which may be an avoidance of situations that may evoke 
anxiety. There can be a withdrawal from social interactions, and a search for either a surgical or 
medical solution to the problem (an epistemic distortion); the problem is blamed on their 
appearance. The difficulties in working through the barriers to learning emanating from these 
distortions in meaning perspective may require the assistance of therapy (Mezirow 1990). This need 
for therapy is also acknowledged when there is a need to work through barriers to learning (Cell 
1984, Boud et al 1993, Moore 1974).
It is suggested here that distortions in meaning making perspectives can create a way o f seeing the 
world, of providing foreclosure to experience; distortions are barriers to learning from experience. 
For there is as such a reduction to sameness, experience ‘happens’ in a predictable way without an 
exploration of the ‘why’ it is this way. An exploration of the ‘why’ is fundamental for fostering 
openness to experience; for transforming previous ways of experiencing; and a return to learning 
from experience.
1.1.3 Outcome of therapy
Both the therapist’s and client’s commented on how therapy is about a change in perspective. The 
therapist’s commented that their role was about empowering the individual; and subsequently 
decreasing anxiety and social avoidance. In essence following therapy the clients appeared to view 
their situation differently, and were subsequently more able to cope in their day to day activities. As 
such it was about being more positive about self and capabilities; therapy thus has the potential for
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facilitating change. Personal change is a consequence of learning (Alridge and Lavender 2000, 
Williamson 1998, Rogers 1961). According to Williamson (1998:65) ‘learning is a psychological 
process which takes place in particular settings of social interaction’, and it is suggested here that the 
therapeutic relationship is a ‘particular setting’. The term situated learning can be used (Lave and 
Wenger 1991), a learning that can be implicit or tacit.
A commonly expressed view by those who had had therapy (ranging from six months to several 
years), was that therapy had changed the person; and this correlates with the therapists perception of 
the outcome of therapy for this client group. Both therapist’s and client’s referred to therapy as a 
change process and one that incorporated learning, for example 'I learned so much about m yself.
From the client perspective, it could be said that those who had experienced therapy and reported 
that it had changed the way they felt about themselves, had experienced ‘interpersonal learning’ 
(Strupp 1986). For example one person said, 'increased confidence in myself increase in se lf esteem 
and feeling more positive about m yself. Several participants referred to how tlirough therapy they 
had learnt things about themselves and how they relate to other people: 7 learnt such a lot ...who I  
am and that I  am good enough. I  realise now that I expected people to reject me, without even giving 
them a chance to get to know me ’. It is suggested here that these comments are encompassed in the 
statement of Orlinsky (1989:414): ‘Therapy as a form of education focused on the cognitive and 
social skills required for effective interpersonal and self-management of behaviour’.
Another frequently stated outcome of therapy was how the person now perceived their situation 
differently. Through the exploration of thoughts and feelings, and the reflection on previous 
experiences they came to realise that their previous thinking was distorted. The comment of 
‘learning to be normal in spite o f  cleft... my thinking was distorted’ appears to encompass the view 
of Orlinsky (1989:416) who suggests that during childhood patterns of behaviour are learned in 
response to life situations. If the behaviour is maladaptive, then therapy is required as ‘a remedial 
emotional education’. As such psychotherapy is an ‘educational or learning process’. Whereas 
Laplanche and Pontalis (1988:373) suggest that psychotherapy is ‘a benign learning experience’ and 
a ‘psychological re-education’.
The use of the term ‘benign learning’ appears to encompass the experience of the research 
participants, for although they shared their experience of therapy, and the researcher specifically did 
not refer to learning so as not to skew the discussion, it would appear that learning was inherent in 
their discussions. Some specifically referred to the term, whereas others spoke of the changes that 
had emanated from therapy. Changes that were representative of learning. As such they had all 
experienced therapy, as a form of learning, learning that was either covert or benign.
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The concept o f change emanating from therapy is well documented (see Ferrara 1994, Sanford 
1990, Zeig and Munnion 1990, Holmes and Lindley 1989). It could be said that therapy enables the 
person to reconfigure their problems (Eaton 1998), or that they come to realise that they have 
choices (Hoeller 1990); post therapy they realise that they have ‘freedom of choice and 
responsibility in the conduct of his life’ (Szasz 1990:172). Whereas, Spinelli (1989) makes the 
distinction that therapy itself does not produce change, rather it creates awareness that change is 
possible. It is suggested here, that the experience of therapy can provide the person with the 
opportunity to explore their current difficulties and to begin to recognise that there are choices in 
how to respond to a particular situation. That they do not have to rely on previous responses, for this 
in essence is to place a foreclosure on and to experience; or they can as Casement (1985:27) 
suggests be ‘Blinkered by past thinking that often functions too much like a set o f rules’. Rather, 
with the growing awareness that change is possible, there is the possibility of being more open to 
experience. Without choice, there is closure; there is a re-experiencing of a similar experience. 
Therapy provides the opportunity for a return to learning from experience.
In defining the learning processes inherent in psychotherapy, the terms ‘relearning’ and ‘unlearning’ 
were used. It is suggested here that these terms encompass the notion of a return to learning. For 
example, relearning in therapy can be related to behavioural or emotional competencies (Hunt 
1948). Whereas, the term unlearning can either be in relation to previous ‘inappropriate’ learning 
(Elliott 1995, van de Veer 1974), or that it is working through (Gross and Fugstein 1992), and that 
this process involves emotions (Albee 1999). Both these terms indicate that previous learning was 
incorrect, or as Mezirow (1990) suggests previous learning can create distortions in meaning making 
perspectives. It is suggested here that there is a need for ‘corrective’ or ‘reparative’ learning 
experiences, to enable the reassessment of the foundation to the distortions, a process that involves 
exploration of personal meaning schemes. Through this process there is the potential for the 
emergence of learning that is significant to the individual, the experience can transform previously 
held beliefs and attitudes, and there is a reconnection with the feeling domain of experience. There 
is thus an increase in emotional well-being, as there is a ‘reowning and reassimilating’ of personal 
emotional schemes (Greenberg and Paivio 1997:95).
The person who commented that in therapy ‘my disfigurement wot not the focus ’ correlates with the 
views expressed by Milioria (1998) and Niederland (1975), as the disfigurement was not talked 
about outside therapy, the same is likely to be repeated within the therapeutic relationship. As such 
the therapist should not expect it to be openly spoken about in the first instance. Rather there is a 
need for the development of the therapeutic relationship prior to the person being able to speak the 
unspeakable, to put words to the feelings surrounding the experience of having a facial difference. 
As Bowlby (1988:140) suggests there is a need for the therapist to provide a secure base (attachment
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theory) or a holding (Winnicott) or a containing (Bion) environment, ‘to enable exploration’ of 
thoughts and feelings.
There was recognition of how previous thinking was distorted; some were able to locate the 
distortion in ‘early childhood experiences’. It is recognised that early childhood experiences are 
important in shaping the personality (see Rogers 1951, Freud 1915). Distortions in learning can be 
transformed by reflecting on the experience, recognising the distortions and for the end result to be 
re-learning. Mezirow’s theory can be an overarching framework for looking at how learning can 
bring about change (Brown-Shaw et al 1999).
An issue discussed by some authors is how early experiences may distort how an individual 
perceives their reality and how there is preponderance to have certainty. Mezirow (1990:5) suggests 
that ‘when experience is too strange or threatening to the way we think or learn, we tend to block it 
out or resort to psychological defence mechanisms to provide more comfortable interpretation’. It 
would appear that the individual is in a fixed position, and as such unable to learn from experience. 
Another term that is used is ‘dysfunctional learning’ which ‘principally stems from obstacles we 
encounter in our struggle to be a significant person’ (Cell 1984:3). He suggests that dysfunctional 
learning is a defence about anxiety, and posits that the aim of learning is to be significant and to 
cope with meaningless and powerlessness.
Emotions are fundamental to being human, they shape our perception of reality; they are ‘at the 
very core of psychotherapy’ (Greenberg and Saffran 1987:vii). If during childhood misleading 
messages are experienced about self image, perceptions may be skewed, and therapy provides an 
opportunity for an individual to explore these distortions; Bowlby (1988:139) suggests that this 
exploration enables a person ‘to cease being a slave to old and unconscious stereotypes and to feel, 
to think, and to act in new ways’. It is suggested here that therapy provides an opportunity for 
emotional learning, learning that brings about a transformation in how a person views their situation, 
their self and their relations with others.
This form of personal learning that may emerge through the process of therapy, is not prescriptive, 
for it is not possible to say what an individual may learn through the process of therapy, rather each 
will experience learning that is significant to them. Rogers (1951) refers to how significant learning, 
is individual, learning that matters a great deal to the person, and it would appear that this 
encompasses the views expressed by the participant’s who share their lived experience of therapy 
with the researcher. They were commenting on that which was significant to them. Their feelings 
about themselves had changed, ‘emotion is the basis of both experience and personal meaning’ 
(Greenberg and Paivio 1997:viii). They also suggest that therapy is about transforming feelings, and
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advocate a three stage model for working with emotions in therapy, there is a need for bonding, 
evoking and exploring emotions, and through the process there is both an emotional experience and 
an emotional restructuring.
Within the literature reviewed on facial difference, there was a limited reference to how therapy may 
be helpful, it was generally assumed that it would enable the person to cope better (Partridge 1997a, 
Ambler et al 1997, Caviccholi 1994, Hughes 1991, Bradbury 1993, Bull and Rumsey 1988). 
Whereas Bradbury (1997:367) commenting on the place of counselling for children, stated that it 
would enable ‘them to develop strategies for coping with teasing, with their feelings o f difference 
and with their emotional reactions to their cleft’. And Nash (1995) suggests that counselling for 
parents o f babies with a cleft may help them to express how they are feeling.
The two psychotherapy case studies by Milioria (1998) and Niederland (1975) were unique in that 
they reported working with someone with a facial difference. Both female patients had a congenital 
form of facial difference, and the authors commented on the perceived benefits o f therapy. 
Niederland (1975:457) suggested that therapy provided the opportunity to work through ‘the 
feelings of ugliness and monstrosity, the feeling that she was a member of another species’ and how 
these were changed during the therapeutic process. Whereas, Milioria (1998:392) suggested that it 
was a form o f ‘emotional work’ ‘transmitting internalization, to change her sense of herself from a 
freak -  flawed and defective -  to an attractive talented woman’. The concept of change connects 
both Miloria and Niederland views, also there is a correlation to the findings of this study that a 
potential outcome of therapy is change; a change in perspective.
An area that all three therapists commented on was the personal learning achieved through working 
with this client group. Of particular note was that although they were aware of the literature in the 
field of facial difference; how a persons subjective perception of their appearance does not 
necessarily equate with the objective appraisal by others (MacGregor 1984, Pruzinslcy 1992). Also 
fia t there is no correlation between the size of the disfigurement and the degree of psychological 
discomfort experienced (Solomon 1998, Moss 1997, Robinson 1997a). However, they were 
surprised to experience this in practice, some clients appeared to them to have ‘a minor problem’ but 
in hearing the clients story they became aware of how much time and energy was spent in avoiding 
situations that were perceived as difficult, or perceived by them to accentuate their sense of 
difference. In essence their experience echoes Partridges’ (1997:4) sentiment, that the facial 
difference ‘may actually be quite minor but they feel it is significant’ [original emphasis].
Thus working with clients was a learning experience, 'it made me think more about things’, ‘change 
my view o f  counselling that I  was not there to solve it fo r them’, ' I  came to r e c o g n is e statements
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that incorporate a change in perspective in the therapists, that mirrors the potential outcome of 
therapy for the client. It would appear that supervision, talking with colleagues and the process of 
personal reflection was helpful in recognising their change in perspective; the impetus for change 
occurring in the therapeutic relationship. Casement in his two books, Learning from the patient 
(1985), and Further Learning from the patient (1990), identifies that the meeting of the therapist and 
client, presents an opportunity for learning. Whereas, Symmington (1986) makes the distinction that 
in the process of therapy, there is the potential for both client and therapist to be changed. Thus there 
is an assumption that learning is the potential outcome.
Both Milioria (1998) and Nierderland (1975) also described their respective client’s, as being 
attractive, although the patient thought their ‘disfigurement’ was unattractive. As such it could be 
said that satisfaction with facial appearance is an individual phenomenon (Thomas et al 1997, 
Lansdown et al 1991). However, the comments of Milioria and Niederland were not explored 
further, and it is suggested here that a potential learning opportunity was missed. For can the 
therapist allow for the difference in perception? How can this be used therapeutically to assist with 
the uncovering of distortions in perception? How to challenge the prevailing norm of the ideal 
image? Can the therapist as a facilitator o f learning be open to their experience? Can the therapist be 
able to respond to Lauzon's view of the need ‘to live with paradox, ambiguity and uncertainty’ this 
is he suggests is ‘the key to human survival. These capacities can only be developed through the 
soul’ (Lauzon 1998: 325)? He recognises the shift in education from the imparting of knowledge, to 
the embracing of uncertainty and personal knowing. He advocates that there is a need to engage in 
peoples biographies of learning, and from this distortions in learning can be revealed. There is as 
such an embracing of humanness and the ability to experience our own experience. It is suggested 
here that therapy provides a ‘situated learning’ experience, where there is the potential for relearning 
to learn from experience.
1.2 Experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy
Two groups are identified in this section, firstly, those who are living with someone with a facial 
difference. All who participated in the study were parents (mothers) who talked of their experience 
of having a child with a facial difference and why they thought there was a need for therapy to be 
made more readily available. Secondly there were the experiences of people with a facial difference 
some had had therapy and some expressed their views on the need for therapy. It would seem 
pertinent to include people’s opinion of therapy as this provides information on how people perceive 
their situation prior to having therapy, how people construe their reality. Williamson (1998:27) 
suggests a precursor for learning, is ‘to know how people have come to learn the ways in which they 
frame their experience and perception of the thresholds they inhabit’.
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Initially the two themes that emerged from the ‘parents’ group will be discussed; reactions to giving 
birth to a baby with a facial difference, and ongoing concerns. Followed by the four themes of the 
‘experiences of people with a facial difference’ group; reactions to stories of their birth, reactions 
from others, reactions to others and effects of difference.
1.2.1 Parents
1.2.1.1 Reactions to giving birth to a baby with a facial difference
The mothers, who shared their opinion of the need for therapy, shared their reactions to giving birth 
to a baby with a facial difference; and it appears that it was a traumatic time. There was evidence 
that it took time to come to terms with, and to adjust, to having produced a baby that was not 
anticipated. It would appear that as well as coping with their own reactions, 7  must have done 
something, I  feel so guilty ’ they had to cope with the responses of their extended family (my parents 
did not want to see him These views are represented in the literature.
The sense of the mother having ‘done something’ is acknowledged as being a common response 
(Hearst and Middleton 1997, Bull and Rumsey 1988); it is suggested that this stems from folklore 
surrounding difference (Rumsey 1997). Also the feelings of wanting to blame someone, can impact 
on how the mother responds to the baby (Bradbury 1997, Hearst and Middleton 1997). Niederland 
(1965:532) is in agreement and suggests that parents reactions to the birth of a child with an 
anomaly are “recognition shock” and states ‘from the time of recognition of the defectiveness 
(“recognition shock”) there is a marked disequilibrium in the relations between mother and child -  a 
disequilibrium which hardly ever subsides’. He says that as a result of this faulty mother-child 
interaction, there is trauma.
It has been acknowledged that it is more stressful to bring up a child with a cranio-facial anomaly 
(Speltz et al 1990); and that this may be due to witnessing negative reactions of both families and 
strangers to the child. As such there is a need for a period of time to adjust to the birth, and the 
feelings of guilt engendered in not producing a ‘perfect’ baby (Bradbury 1997, Walters 1997, 
Bronheim 1994, Speltz et al 1990). However, the period of time of adjustment is not stipulated, 
rather there is an expectation that ultimately they will adjust. Whereas, Niederland (1965:323) 
appears to suggest that the trauma of giving birth may be ongoing, ‘some mothers go into prolonged 
postpartum depression, which may be later followed by renewed depressions or anxiety states’.
Some parents appear more able to cope than others do, and ‘some do remain acutely distressed and 
transmit feelings of guilt and shame to the child’ (Bradbury 1997:366). This may result in 
difficulties with the emotional bond between mother and child (Hearst and Middleton 1997, Barden
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et al 1989). Walters (1997:114) reviewed six studies on attachment and concluded that the child 
with a facial difference experienced ‘less sensitive, less responsive and less nuturant parenting from 
their mothers than do infants of normal appearance and that this impaired interaction is of a kind 
that may prejudice the development of secure attachment’. She also refers to how this may impact 
on ‘future well-being and interpersonal functioning’.
Whereas, a study by Speltz et al (1997) although recognising that there is an increased likelihood of 
psychosocial problems for people with a cleft, the origins remain unclear. They considered that this 
might be due to early attachments, emanating either from feeding problems or the baby’s facial 
appearance, both of which could effect the relationship between the infant and their family. Their 
study focused on maternal attachment; the hypothesis was that children with a cleft would have an 
increased risk of insecure attachment. However, this was not supported by their findings (they 
focused on attachment during the first year of life), and conclude ‘Contrary to social-psychological 
formulation, the facial appearance of infants with CLP [cleft lip and/or palate] had no adverse effect 
on the quality of maternal attachment’ (Speltz et al 1997:12). Yet they acknowledged in an earlier 
study, that by the time a child with a cleft starts school they are three to four times more likely than 
the control group to have psychological disturbances resulting in behavioural problems (Speltz et al 
1993). It would appear that it remains difficult to isolate the cause of the emotional problems, and it 
is suggested here that this difficulty may emanate partly from the research methods employed. There 
has been a preponderance to rely on quantitative research methods; to objectify a subjective 
experience. That in privileging science and technology over humanness, the experience of the 
human phenomenon is impersonalised, and thus may become unrecognisable from the experience of 
the experiencer.
A key emotion expressed by the mothers was guilt. This corresponds with a study by Dolger-Hafner 
et al (1997) who suggest that this is a common emotion, and may lead to depression if the mother is 
not provided with emotional support and information. According to Hearst and Middleton (1997) 
the guilt may stem from anger around the unanswerable question of ‘why me?’ To address parental 
guilt there is a need to provide programmes that will help individuals and the families (Coles-Gale 
2000). As such these programmes are about enabling parents for a ‘letting go of their hopes for a 
perfect child’ (Bradbury 1997:366). However, the nature of these programmes remains elusive, 
Bradbury (1997) does make reference to how counselling may be beneficial. It is also recognised 
that there is a need to listen to parents and family experiences of living and coping with facial 
difference to determine the level of support required (Coulter et al 1999); to assess the needs of 
parents and children, and to refer for psychological support if there are difficulties in coming to 
terms with a facial difference (Hearst and Middleton 1997).
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There is a sense that the trauma of giving birth to a child with a facial difference may if not worked 
through becomes a source of intergenerational trauma; a term that has been referred to survivors of 
sexual abuse and the holocaust (Gardner 1999, Walker 1999). According to Greenberg and Paivio 
1997:186) ‘with trauma, the fundamental sense of self-coherence and assumptions about reality are 
shattered or broken, and the self is deeply wounded. Psychic wounds cannot heal, and the person is 
vulnerable to these wounds being continually reopened’. An individual may protect themselves from 
this trauma by creating distortions in their meaning making perspectives, distortions that can create 
an inability to learn from experience, for to do so there is the risk of the ‘wound’ being opened. 
Therapy could provide an environment for the working through of emotions surrounding the 
‘trauma’ and in so doing there can be a change in meaning making perspectives; there may be a 
return to learning from experience. Therapy provides the potential for unlearning and relearning, for 
a transformation in perspective, a transformation that is significant to the person and encompasses 
both cognitive and affective domains of learning. Greenberg and Paivio (1997:32) suggest that ‘the 
inability to regulate anxiety is at the core of much dysfunction. Ultimately therapeutic change 
involves addressing dysfunctional emotion regulating strategies and redeveloping more adaptive 
ones’.
1.2.1.2 Ongoing concerns
It would appear from the comments made that the difficulties in coping were not limited to adjusting 
to the birth, but also extended to adjusting to the need for surgery. Pruzinsky (1992) comments on 
the need to discuss the surgical reality with parents who have a child with a craniofacial anomaly. 
He does suggest that some parents have difficulty in hearing this, due in part either to denial (that 
this has happened), or hope (it will be all right), or resort to magical thinking (the surgery will make 
my baby as he/she should have been). It would appear that some of the comments from the mothers 
in this study, support Pruzinsky’s view; for despite their children now being adults one said ‘all I  see 
is her cleft’ and another said ‘he [the surgeon] did a good job  but she is never going to look normal'. 
Thus suggesting that accepting the surgical reality was difficult, that perhaps there was a hope that 
somehow surgery would restore that what was taken away by the congenital anomaly -  the perfect 
image. This is an example of an epistemic distortion in meaning making perspective, for there is the 
belief that someone with the knowledge can provide some certainty to his or her experience. Or 
there is a hope that the situation is only temporary, it can be made better if the right ‘expert’ is 
found, to restore the equilibrium.
The mothers also, talked of how the difficulties were ongoing, that each age range presented new 
situations that needed to be overcome, for example starting school, changing school, further surgery, 
adolescence, and finding a partner. They not only had to cope with their own feelings, but to be 
there to support their child. Coping with the reactions of others to their child, at times was also
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difficult; according to Pertschuck and Whittaker (1992) there is a tendency for people to presume 
that the child is unintelligent and unfriendly, and therefore treats them more formally than others. 
They also felt that having a child with a facial difference effects the whole family, and this is 
supported in the literature (Amber et al 1997, Bradbury 1997, Hearst and Middleton 1997, Walters 
1997). One mother commented on how the birth of her child had effected her marriage, and this 
view correlates with Speltz et al (1990).
The mothers commented on how helpful the Cleft Lip and Palate Association, as a support group 
had been in normalising their experience, to realise that they were not the only ones to have a child 
with a facial difference. These comments support the opinion of the place of support groups 
(Partridge and Nash 1997). Overall, they felt that therapy was something that their child could 
benefit from, to help them come to terms with the reactions of others to their appearance. But it 
would appear that the parents, also have a need for information on how to respond to others 7  would 
like to know what to say to others ...how to respond '; but what is not acknowledged is the need for 
them to talk about their feelings and emotions. This would appear to be necessary particularly as 
there is the potential for the mothers reactions to the child to impact on the mother-child interaction, 
which has implications for the child’s emotional development.
According to Bowlby (1988) there is a need for parents to provide a secure base for their child’s 
emotional development. Thus, therapy could provide an opportunity for the mothers to explore their 
thoughts and feelings about facial difference, to enable them to provide a secure base for their 
child’s emotional development. Having a baby with a facial difference is traumatic (Ambler et al 
1997, Bradbury 1997, Walters 1997), and as previously acknowledged when there is trauma there is 
an inability to learn from experience (Loewenthal and Snell 1998). There is as such an inability to 
experience experience. Whereas, Greenberg and Paivio (1997:71) suggest that the inability to 
express emotions impacts on ‘peoples inability to accept their own experience’. Reactions to having 
a baby with a facial difference are individual, and therapy can offer the potential to explore feelings 
of either not having what was expected/anticipated (a child without a facial difference) or coming to 
terms with the fact that '‘history had repeated itse lf. There is the potential if  the parents are not able 
to talk about what is going on for them for ‘it’ to be either unconsciously or consciously transmitted 
to the child (Bradbury 1996, Nash 1995).
1,2.2 People with a facial difference
1.2.2.1 Stories about their birth
All participants made reference to the stories they had heard about their birth, and there is a 
correlation with the stories told by the mothers (participants were not related); having a child with a 
facial difference was difficult. There was evidence of how some parents experienced ongoing
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emotional problems, which is something that Niederland (1965) alluded to. One person commented 
on how she was left in the hospital for three months until after she had had the cleft repaired. It 
would appear that her mother had difficulty in forming an emotional bond. It is acknowledged that 
some parents are unable to form a strong emotional bond with their child, therefore ‘children with 
facial anomalies are more likely than those of normal appearance to be fostered, adopted or placed 
on a child protection register’ (Walters 1997:114).
It would appear that there was a translation of feelings of guilt and shame onto the child (Bradbury 
1997) for one person reported how they had to hide away when visitors came. This was also an 
experience shared by the patient in the case study presented by Niederland (1975). Other examples 
of responding negatively to the child were comments made about appearance, or saying that the 
person should not have children in case they 'look like y o u ’. One possible explanation could be the 
defence mechanism of projection, according to Bateman and Holmes (1995:81) ‘We commonly 
attribute our more difficult and unacceptable feelings to others -  for example, blaming those that are 
close to us for our own shortcomings’. It is suggested here, that if the parents have unresolved 
feelings around the birth of the child, a child that was usually not expected, then they can be 
unconsciously projected onto the child. For example saying to the child not to have children because 
they may look like you could be a projection of the parents feelings of being unable to accept that 
they have produced a child that is not perfect. The reverse of projection is introjection, here the 
person takes on board the projected feelings of the other and owns them as if they belong to his or 
her self.
Overall it was recognised that having a child with a facial difference was difficult for parents, and 
that therapy should be available to them as part of the overall package of care. This sentiment 
appears to echo the mothers’ view, that the child should have the opportunity of therapy; both 
groups advocating that the other should have therapy, perhaps this is a further example of projection. 
However, people with a facial difference also acknowledged the need for therapy for themselves 
(those who had had therapy), while those who had not were divided, some saying that they would 
have liked the opportunity, and others saying that it should have been available when they were 
growing up.
Again there is the notion of how previous experience can impact on a person’s ability to experience 
their own experience, rather there are set ways of perceiving a situation, and this set way is an 
attempt to reduce the anxiety that may be evoked, or put another way if emotions are not 
acknowledged, where there is as such no language for emotions there is the potential for there to be 
a rationalised way of perceiving the situation. Symmington (1986:289) suggests that ‘we have 
cognitive templates so that we ‘actively’ shape the environment that we see’. Therapy could
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provide an opportunity to question meaning making perspectives, to make known the cognitive 
templates that inform a person’s perception of a particular experience.
1.2.2.2 Reactions from others
The experience of being treated differently by others correlates with the findings in the literature. 
Overall the reaction is negative, comprising of staring, teasing and comments (Bradbury 1997, 
Partridge and Cooper 1996, Houston and Bull 1994, Bull 1990, MacGregor 1990, Bull and Rumsey 
1988, Rumsey and Bull 1986), together with feelings of avoidance/rejection or being perceived as 
deviant (Newell 1998, Robinson 1997, MacGregor 1990). These experiences are a form o f social 
discrimination (Bradbury 1997, McGrouther 1997). This sense of being treated differently is not just 
paranoia on the part o f the person with a facial difference (Robinson 1997a, Bull and Rumsey 1988). 
Whereas, Bronheim (1994) suggest that they (those with a facial difference) are sensitive to the 
reactions of others.
Both of these viewpoints are further supported by research studies into the response of others to 
those with a facial difference. Studies have been conducted, whereby people have an engineered 
cosmetic facial difference, and are sent out into community to observe and record reactions from 
others (Houston and Bull 1994, Strenta and Kleck 1985, Rumsey et al 1982). The conclusions 
drawn support the view that people did respond negatively to them; they tended to avoid eye 
contact, stand further away or stand on the unaffected side.
The study by Strenta and Kleck (1985) was unique in that although the research participant’s 
thought they were having a facial difference cosmetically applied, however, this was not the case. 
They went outside to meet with the general public thinking that they did have a facial difference, 
and on feedback of their experience, they too reported a difference in response from others to them. 
This suggests that they were more sensitive to the reactions of others, and thus support Bronheim's 
(1994) view; as such they were anticipating being treated differently, and they were. Or it could be 
that their behaviour towards others was different, that somehow the presence of the ‘facial 
difference’ made them behave in a different maimer, so much so that others were drawn to their 
behaviour rather than the facial difference.
A further study by (Rumsey et al 1986) combined effective and/or ineffective social interaction 
skills with a facial difference and/or a non-facial difference, (as before the facial difference was 
cosmetically applied). The conclusions drawn were that effective social interaction skills can 
mediate the effect of the presence of a facial difference. This view supports the belief that training in 
effective social skills training can enable the person with a facial difference to cope better with the 
reactions of the general public (Turner et al 1998, Robinson et al 1996, Partridge et al 1994, Bull
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and Rumsey 1988), Part o f the social skills training involves education on how ‘everyone who has 
an unusual appearance, whatever the cause has to cope with curiosity from the rest of the world’ 
(Clarke and Cooper 1997:10); as such it is a natural response. This view appears to correlate with 
Goffman (1956:21) who suggests that when we meet with another person ‘he will want to discover 
the facts of the situation’. This discovery however, is not just restricted to their physical appearance, 
but for the person with a facial difference this is their focus of their difficulties, of people’s 
perceived response to them.
There have been several theories put forward as to why this may be so, on the one hand there is the 
sense that the myths and folklore that surround facial difference are responsible (Jackson et al 1995, 
Bull and Rumsey 1988); and on the other, that the person with a facial difference challenges the 
assumption of a just world (Newell 1998). Or alternatively drawing on Levinas, that prejudice is 
representative of a learned pre-judgement, and a ‘refusal to find humanity in the face of the Other’ 
(Davis 1995a: 72). It would appear that whatever the foundation, the presence of a facial anomaly 
can alter other peoples opinions (McNeill 1998).
The most common stereotype surrounding facia! appearance is that good looks equate with success.
‘People who are seen to be physically attractive are also seen to be more socially desirable, 
likely to secure more prestigious jobs, have happier marriages, be better parents and more 
competent spouses, more likely to find an acceptable spouse, and marry earlier’ (Elks 
1990:36).
Subsequently those who have a facial appearance that is deemed to be unattractive are seen to be 
less competent, i.e. the reverse of the above description (Jackson et al 1995). These views are 
formed on meeting the person, and as such there is discrimination without getting to know the 
person (Bronheim 1994, Bull and Rumsey 1988). This appears to encompass the experience of the 
people who took part in this study.
Stereotypes appear to be formed early in childhood, a study by Sigelman et al (1986:18) concludes 
that ‘all signs point to pre-school years as the period when children first display negative reactions 
to individuals who are physically different in some way’. Of particular note that this ‘some way’ 
could be the wearing of spectacles, being in a wheelchair, or a facial difference. There appears to be 
segregation into ‘same’ and ‘different’, where difference equates with a sense o f being less than. 
Within schools and organisations ‘attractiveness bias may operate unconsciously to benefit attractive 
children and adults’ this has implications for the less attractive (Jackson et al 1995:18), Stereotypes 
influence person’s perceptions; as such they are not open to experience, they expect the person to be 
as per their stereotypical image. Some people are of the opinion that people with a facial difference 
do not experience social discrimination that is appearance related; this could be due to the difficulty 
in owning for self and others that we treat others differently (Bull 1990, Bull and Rumsey 1988).
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These views represent further evidence of distortions in meaning making perspectives, for example, 
epistemic (people that have a facial difference are different to us), sociocultural (stereotypes 
surrounding facial difference) and psychic (anxiety, avoidance). These distortions in meaning 
perspectives can be barriers to learning from experience.
1.2.2.3 Reactions to others
Overall there was a sense of keeping others at distance; that previous experiences of being rejected 
influenced how they were when meeting new people. These views are supported in the literature, for 
social interaction represents a major problem (Robinson 1997a), and there is a sense of putting a 
greater distance between self and others (Bull and Rumsey 1988); resulting in avoidance of 
situations to protect the self from potential rejection (Kent and Keohane 2001, Newell 1998, 
Robinson 1997a).
It would appear that others represent a ‘social mirror whose reflections are interpreted by the 
anomalous person’ (Bull and Rumsey 1988:187). Thus if the person experiences negative responses 
from others, they learn to avoid the perceived threat (Robinson 1997). The comment by Chappie 
(1997:19) speaking of his experience of living with a facial difference appears to support this, ‘I had 
grown so used to my face being rejected that I couldn’t imagine anyone being interested’. As such 
there is a reversal o f the social discrimination experienced by those with a facial difference; this 
time they are doing the discrimination.
The findings of this study also support the view that the reaction to others is shaped by previous 
experiences, and as such there is a closure to experiencing new situations differently, as such 
previous learned behaviour is the template for future experience. The inability to see their situation 
from a different perspective is indicative of non-reflective learning. Where experience is not open to 
questioning, to exploring ‘why’ it may be that way as opposed to this way. To critically reflect on 
experience is fundamental to personal knowing (Mezirow 1990, Jarvis 1987, Schon 1987, Rogers 
1967).
Claxton (1984) defines four beliefs that can create barriers to learning, competent (personal worth 
depends on actions); consistent (the need in any situation for predictable behaviour and responses); 
control (the need to know what is going to happen); comfortable (the need to not feel guilty or 
anxious). He states:
‘any learning situation that threatens to make me incompetent, inconsistent, out of control, 
and uncomfortable appears to be a threat to me -  to my survival as the person I think I am or 
hope I am or ought to be. When one of these triggers is pulled, learning is resisted regardless 
of what learning is about’ (Claxton 1984:145) [original emphasis].
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Within this sphere of interpretation there is a closure to experiencing the new, for there to be 
learning from experience.
1.2.2.4 Effects of having a facial difference
All described how they perceived their difference, and there was a sense of how other peoples’ 
opinions shaped their sense o f inferiority. As such they have introjected the views of others as if 
they were their own experience, another example of an inability to experience their own experience. 
Within the literature reviewed there were very few comments on how a person perceived their 
difference, due mainly to the lack of written accounts from people with facial difference.
The following three quotes appear to encompass how the three components of reactions from others, 
reactions to others and effects of difference, are not mutually exclusive, rather they are intertwined; 
they also are representative of the views expressed by the people who shared their experience of 
living with a facial difference.
‘Distortion of the face is to put at risk the individuals full participation in life’ (Hughes 
1991:505).
‘Disfigured people are constantly under the scrutiny of others, and are restricted across the 
broad range of social situations. They are acutely aware of the responses of others and the 
generally negative attitude these reveal’ (Newell 1998:68).
‘Social anxiety, lowered self confidence, negative self-image, depression and lowered self­
esteem all of which can have a cumulative effect on future interaction’ (Robinson et al 
1996:103).
It is suggested here that this ‘cumulative effect’ is representative of the need for therapy, to enable 
the individual to explore their thoughts and feelings around their facial difference, to recognise 
projections and introjections and how these impact on their ability to respond to others in the here 
and now. Therapy offers an opportunity to break the cumulative cycle, and offers the opportunity of 
a return to learning from experience.
Of the impact of facial difference on life, there were two differing views expressed, there were those 
who appeared to have no sense of the other, and as such were self-focused, and were unaware that 
others might be having problems in responding to them (Bull and Rumsey 1988). As such others 
were blamed for all the problems, for example ‘when yon don’t speak right they don't want to 
know’. Whereas, others were aware of others, and of their own role in how they set themselves 
apart, for example, ‘we socially and emotionally set ourselves apart’. Those who had had therapy 
were more likely to recognise how their attitude can contribute to their sense of difference.
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From the findings on peoples’ experience of living with a facial difference, there appears to be 
issues that have their foundations in early childhood and how these have been influential in creating 
their inability to learn from experience. The key one appears to be around issues of early emotional 
attachment, that as a group they are more prone to experience a more negative attachment than those 
without a facial difference (Hearst and Middleton 1997, Walters 1997, Barden et al 1989), this has 
the potential of creating difficulties with emotional development and subsequent interactions with 
others (see Bowlby 1988). It is suggested here that therapy may provide an opportunity for a return 
to learning from experience. Learning that is significant to the person whose experience it is, 
learning that transforms beliefs and attitudes and results in a change in perspective, learning that 
enhances emotional well-being.
2. Analysis o f composite depiction
Firstly the discussion is on the ‘therapist and client experience of therapy’, followed by ‘experiences 
that may precipitate the need for therapy.
2.1 Therapist and client experience of therapy
The therapists in this study commented on how the process of therapy involves 1 empowerment' 
which encompasses the notion of people taking responsibility for their actions, a concept that is 
cognisant with self-directed learning (Knowles 1984, Rogers 1983). The therapists described a 
process of therapy that focused on the need for clients to acknowledge ‘why am I stuck', this appears 
to be indicative of focusing on their current situation. There is an exploration of thoughts and 
feelings, and through this process there is a reflection on previous experience and the identification 
of distortions in previous learning. When working with emotions in therapy, Greenberg and Paivio 
(1997) have identified the need to evoke emotions, and it suggested here that perhaps in the 
speaking about ‘why I  am stuck' emotions can be verbalised.
Once the client gains a sense of why they are stuck, the therapists suggest that the client ‘cart move 
forward'. This moving forward is indicative of action, emanating from a change in perspective. It 
could be said that this change is representative of re-learning (Elliott 1995, Hunt 1948) or re­
structuring (Greenberg and Paivio 1997). Part o f the learning process is the exploration of what the 
label facial difference means the for client. There is thus a questioning o f socio-cultural, epistemic 
and psychic distortions in meaning making perspectives (Mezirow 1990). It could be said that the 
therapeutic process provides opportunities to question current meaning making perspectives, and 
that the learning that emerges encompasses elements of significant, transformative and emotional 
learning.
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The therapists also commented that the process of therapy may enable the client to 'learn new skills; 
new ways o f  interacting with others’. It is recognised that if a person has good interaction skills, or 
social skills, then this can lessen the impact of the facial difference when meeting new people 
(Turner et al 1998, Robinson et al 1996, Partridge et al 1994, Rumsey et al 1986). Social skills 
training is recognised as a way of helping people with a facial difference (Clarke 1999, King 1997, 
Bull and Rumsey 1988). This view is cognisant with Woolfe (1992) who suggests that there is a 
need to educate people about difference rather than pretend that it is not there. Education of the 
general public is also important (Clarke 1999a, Partridge 1997a).
A study by Robinson et al (1996:282) reviewed whether the perceived benefits o f attending a social 
skills training workshop for people with a facial difference, was still evident six-months later. The 
focus of the training was on the need for participants to ‘discover more about social interaction 
process and how they can influence the reception they get from others’. Each social encounter is 
viewed as a potential learning opportunity for the development of effective social interaction skills. 
At a six-month review of the course, sixty per cent of the participants reported that the effects of the 
workshop had been sustainable.
However, what if the person is not able to learn from experience? Could it be that the minority, who 
were unable to sustain the positive effects of the workshop had an inability to learn from 
experience? Their previous distortions to learning from experience acting as barriers to learning 
(Boud et al 1993). Is there a need for people to be able to learn from experience prior to attending 
social skills workshops? There is recognition of how combining social skills framing and cognitive 
behaviour therapy is helpful (Kent and Keohane 2001, Newell 1998, Turner et al 1998). Where the 
process of cognitive behavioural therapy is seen to be re-educative (Blackburn and Twaddle 1996, 
Mahrer 1989). As such it would appear that when working with people with a facial difference, the 
educative role of the therapist could be seen to incorporate social skills training.
It is suggested here that social skill training is to favour the technical over humanness. Where 
humanness, would be to acknowledge that the response to facial difference is multifaceted and 
individual (Robinson 1997a, Partridge 1994, MacGregor 1990, Bull and Rumsey 1988), Therapy in 
contrast to social skills training may enable a person to be more open to their experience, by 
acknowledging that previously learned behaviour can provide a template for evaluating future 
experience; as such there is a closure to experience. It could be that following therapy, some may 
not need social skill training, whereas, for others it may enable them to engage with the social skills 
programme, to see each opportunity of social interaction as a potential for learning from experience.
144
From the clients perspective, therapy was self initiated, usually at a time of transition or crisis 
(McLeod 1998); and it would appear that for the development of an effective therapeutic 
relationship, there is a need for the client to enter therapy of their own volition. Therapy is a place to 
explore ‘what it means to be me’ where it can be whatever the person chooses. Not the therapist, for 
if this is the case, the client metaphorically can replace one set of parents or significant others (who 
know what’s best for them) with another. One client said that speaking to the therapist was different 
because of their neutrality, someone ‘who would not be upset by what I  sa id’. It would appear that 
speaking about feelings surrounding their facial difference could not be openly spoken about. 
Perhaps unconscious ‘guilt’ from the parents creates and sustains a stance of not being able to speak 
about it. Not being able to speak about it embraces the notion of ‘it was as if there was an unwritten 
rule that they could not talk about it: ignore it and it will be OK’ (Rose and Loewenthal 1998:110),
It was difficult for people to be specific about that which was the most helpful aspect of therapy, and 
this correlates with current research findings (Stracker and Becker 1997, Howe 1993). The 
elicitation of the process of therapy remains elusive partly because of the nature of therapy and the 
difficulties in selecting an appropriate methodology (McLeod 2000, Parry 2000, Parry and 
Richardson 1996, Garfield 1992). A scientific approach is more geared to quantification of outcome 
measures (Patton and Meara 1992), and qualitative studies the process (Turpin 2001, McLeod 
2000). It is suggested here that another difficulty is the representation of what happened in the 
‘saying’ of therapy; for re-presentation renders it ‘said’, the aliveness of the encounter is evaded 
when trying to recreate what happened in the moment. Language can create a barrier in not being 
able to articulate the feelings engendered in the therapeutic session (Gordon 1999), also that since 
the event further experiences will have occurred and these have the potential for further learning 
(Boud et al 1993, Cell 1984), so when recounting the experience of therapy, the time lapse can 
distort what happened in the session. Alternatively the significance of what happened in the session, 
may only be revealed, or become apparent some time later (Straker and Becker 1997).
In his book On Being a Client (Howe 1993:15) suggests that clients prefer therapists ‘who attend to 
their feelings and help them to think about themselves’. Bateman and Holmes (1995:248) appear to 
be in agreement when they state that it is the ‘personal qualities of their therapist rather than 
technical procedures’ that clients comment on when speaking of the therapeutic relationship. This 
view seems to correlate with the findings of this study, for the therapists were perceived to be 
‘trying to understand m e ’; ‘listening’. No specific reference was made to technique apart from 
‘when she did not understand me she asked me to say more about i t ’. There is the possibility of this 
being seen on the one hand as a technique, but on the other hand, it can be perceived to be an 
encouragement or an invitation to continue exploring.
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According to Howe (1993:12) what the therapist provides as experienced by the client is; ‘accept 
me, understand me, talk with me’. Acceptance seemed to be important to the clients with a facial 
difference, as this is perceived to be the root of their problems. A perceived example of non- 
acceptance by the therapist is how they 'd id  not take my concerns about my face seriously', it would 
appear that the therapist did not invite an exploration of the client’s concerns; rather the therapist’s 
view was that the clients’ face was 'satisfactory', this however became a barrier, a closure to 
meaning emerging in the in-between. In this instance the therapist took up the position of previous 
others, for example Tny partner say>s that I  look OK'. But what was missed was the client’s feelings, 
it could be hoped that through the process of exploration a return to learning from experience could 
be fostered. But for this to be achievable there is a need for, and willingness from, the client to 
explore and uncover previous distortions in learning, in the safety of the therapeutic relationship. 
Bowlby (1988) suggests that therapists provide a secure base to enable the person to explore their 
attitudes, values and beliefs that underpin their behaviour. Greenberg and Paivio (1997) in their 
three phase model for working through emotions in therapy, suggest that there is a need for bonding; 
that the client feels a bond with the therapist and this facilitates the evoking and restructuring of 
emotions.
If the opinions of the therapist take precedent to the feelings of the client; for example ‘she [the 
therapist] thought that I  looked OK, she did not take my concerns seriously5 there is a foreclosure 
to experiencing it any other way. Rather than staying with the uncertainty of not knowing, which in 
essence is what ‘exploration’ is about. When the therapist embraces encompassing ‘exploration’ 
there are no guarantees of what may happen; certainty as such is imposed by the boundaries of the 
meeting, for example time, place, and cost. The ‘therapeutic technique has something in common 
with a code for manners’ (Lomas 1999:66). What happens in the in-between in the therapeutic hour 
is unknown, unpredictable. To put the other first, encompassing the Levinasian notion of ethics, it is 
not to do violence in the face of the other, by reducing knowing in the moment to what is previously 
known. To do so is to provide foreclosure to the meeting of the other, rather than being open to the 
unknown.
The person who said that through therapy they realised they had 1 learnt views from others’ 
correlates with the views that behaviour is learned from others. Freud (1924:20) states ‘the 
impressions of that early period of life, though they were for the most part buried in amnesia, left 
ineradicable traces upon the individuals’ growth and in particular laid down the disposition to any 
nervous disorder that was to follow’. The nervous disorders are referred to as neuroses, and it is 
considered that during childhood the child becomes fixated at one developmental stage and it is this 
that ‘determines the choice o f  neurosis' (Freud 1924:22) [original emphasis]. It would seem that the 
standards for behaving to others are laid down, these then inform future interactions, through the
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process of transference which is ‘a universal phenomenon of the human mind .... and in fact 
dominates the whole of each person’s relations to his human environment’ (Freud 1924:26).
Early distortions in learning are responsible for future behaviour, and as each experience has the 
potential to further strengthen the early distortion; an early analysis is advocated to undo this early 
learning (Klein 1923). However, childhood analysis appears to only take place if a child showed 
gross maladaptive behaviour (see Axline 1964). For the,majority the distortions go unnoticed and 
unchallenged, in fact it is generally perceived by people that as early childhood memories can not be 
readily recalled, there is a sense that it is an unimportant period in life (Lemma-Wright 1995). 
Where in fact the reverse is the case, through the process of repression, memories are rendered to the 
unconscious and exert an unconscious influence on behaviour. As such the past can be replayed in 
the present; therapy is a reparative discourse, where the unconscious material is made conscious, 
and there is then the potential to exert a change, in essence to return to learning from experience.
It is suggested here that once the early foundation is laid down, there can be an inability to learn 
from experience; as such there is a passivity to experience, and the prevailing norms o f the culture 
and family values are accepted ‘as is’, rather than questioning; the status quo is accepted. This can 
create a sense of ' I ’d never really explored what it means to be m e’. But where does one go to 
explore? Therapy offers this potential; the use of the word potential does not provide foreclosure, for 
to say that exploration will happen is to predict; to favour certainty rather than uncertainty. The use 
of words like probabilities, possibilities, potentialities, maintains and fosters an openness to 
experience. To accept certainty is to assume a taken-for-grantedness, there is however, a need to be 
open to exploration, to challenge this taken-for-grantedness perspective. To reject this certainity is to 
acknowledge the juxtapositions; to explore the ‘maybe’, the ‘perhaps’ in preference to ‘it is’.
An outcome of therapy is a ‘change in how I  think and fee l about m yself, this impacts on behaviour 
as there is an increase in confidence and self-esteem (Turner et al 1998, Grealy 1994). This 
correlates with Rogers (1951: 280-1) view, that ‘therapy produces learning’s or changes’, he 
identifies five conditions for this learning. Firstly the client needs to face the problem, secondly in 
meeting with the therapist; he/she is met with congruence, unconditional positive regard and 
empathic understanding, all of which need to be communicated to the client. His belief was that if 
the client experienced these they would change:
‘The person conies to see himself differently.
He becomes more self-confident and self-directing.
He becomes more the person he would like to be.
He becomes more flexible, less rigid, in his perceptions.
He adopts more realistic goals for himself.
He behaves in a more mature fashion.
He changes his maladjustive behaviors, even such a long-established one as chronic
alcoholism.
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He becomes more acceptant of others.
He becomes more open to the evidence, both to what is going on outside of himself, and to 
what is going on inside of himself.
He changes in his basic personality characteristics, in constructive ways.
I think perhaps this is sufficient to indicate that these are learning’s which are significant, 
which do make a difference’.
It is suggested here that Rogers concluding comment of learning being significant and making a 
difference, is to encompass the notion that it is the individual who defines what is ‘significant’ and 
the individual who experiences ‘the difference’. Also that the individual ‘becomes more flexible, 
less rigid in his perceptions’; is to embrace an openness to experience. It is suggested here that at the 
heart o f this significant learning is how the person feels about his/her self, and through the process 
of therapy the person is able to develop a language to speak about emotions (Greenberg and Saffan
1987).
The outcome of therapy for one client was the realisation that ‘my feelings about myself my face  
were heardfor the first time ever. It was not just her [the therapist] hearing but I  could hear m yself. 
This is an example of exploring, of questioning, of the client ‘hearing’ their story rather than it 
being a repetitive discourse. The outcome of this exploration was not known in advance, for to do so 
would be to ascribe a meaning to the client’s experience, a meaning that does not belong to the 
client. There is a need for the client to be engaged in the process of therapy, 7  could hear m yself 
and this is an essential prerequisite for the client to take responsibility for the learning experience 
intrinsic to therapy. Another example of the client taking responsibility, is the person who said, 'it’s 
up to me how I deal with i f ,  this is representative of a shift, a change in perspective, the ‘problem’ is 
owned, rather than externalised. Another person said, therapy was about a *change in how I think 
and fe e l ' there is a sense here of a change in perspective, 01* that there was a transformation in how 
they perceived their situation. The use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ is indicative that the learning was 
personal, learning was significant to them, not the therapist or others; but for him/her self.
Another example of exploring, questioning and a transformation in perspective is provided by the 
client who said 7  always thought I wot ugly, but in therapy I began to look at qualities I had, and 
then to explore what it is J like about myself My thoughts not what the fam ily said, or people at 
school; you know you have to like selffirst. And that gave me a lot o f  confidence in myself, I'm  not 
six foo t tall, I ’m not Miss World, but I  can get over it and I  can get on with i t ’. Here there is 
evidence of the learning being personal, for it was not what others thought, thus the learning is 
significant, also there is a change in perspective 7  always thought’ and a recognition of the need to 
‘like se lf f ir s t’, examples of transforming previous beliefs, therapy as a form of transformative 
learning. A transformation that includes both cognitive and affective elements.
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Through the process o f transformation there is a challenging o f previous meaning making 
perspectives, for example one person said 'my views were challenged, and this made me think about, 
what I  said, and I gradually came to realise that a lot o f my thinking about myself was not right, /  
still held on to the hurt from playground taunts ...I created an invisible barrier around myself, to 
protect me, to keep people away...I expected them to respond to me as others had...I did not give 
them a chance to be different’. There is a sense o f  this change process being gradual, and it is 
suggested here that there is a need to. go at the clients pace, that it is difficult to set a time limit for 
this transformation. For prior to the change in perspective there is the need for the client to recognise 
current distortions in meaning making perspectives, 7  still held on to the hurt from playground 
haunts’, a sense o f how this traumatic event has the potential to be replayed in the present 
(Greenberg and Paivio 1997). Then for the person to recognise how the distortion in meaning 
perspective can inform current experiencing, 7  created an invisible barrier around myself, to 
protect me...to keep others away'. This recognition can lead to the identification of the reason for 
the distortion, 7  expected them to respond to me as others had ' there is a sense here o f a repetition 
o f  experience, for 7  did not give them a chance to be different'. Now that the distortion in 
perspective can be named and the reason behind it, there is the potential to effect a change. For there 
to be an openness to experience.
The process o f exploring distortions in meaning making perspective can be challenging, particularly 
if the person is not open to exploring. For example the person who commented 7  couldn't remember 
what it used to feel like, for example when I was ignored at school'. There is a sense that perhaps the 
therapist was inviting an exploration o f  what it was like to have a facial difference, what it felt like. 
It could be that the person identified that they had been ignored at school, in a way that was 
dissociated from the self o f the experience!* (Laing 1967), there was as such no connection with the 
feeling behind this experience. As the person went on to say, ‘possibly too, my memory is selective, 
and blocks unpleasant things to protect m e\ there is a recognition o f repressing painful material, 
but also an unreadiness to explore the affective domain. The process o f therapy is about ‘witnessing 
and waiting’ (Gordon 1999), the need to go at a pace that is governed by the client, for if it is too 
uncomfortable this itself can be a bairier to learning (Claxton 1984). If it becomes too 
uncomfortable there is the likelihood o f  the client discontinuing therapy, for the working through o f 
the material is too difficult.
This represents a paradoxical situation, on the one hand therapy represents the opportunity for 
exploring distortions in meaning making perspectives with the potential outcome a return to learning 
from experience, and on the other hand, the very working through can re-evoke the previous trauma, 
(trauma that resulted in the creation o f the distortion being worked tlirough) and this has the 
potential to sustain the distortion in meaning making perspective. Mezirow (1990:3-4) suggests that
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‘ the more intense the emotional context o f learning and the more it is reinforced, the more deeply 
embedded and intractable to change are the habits o f expectation that constitute our meaning 
perspective’ .
One o f the determinants o f  efficacy in psychotherapy is the standard o f training (Mace and Moorey 
2001, Tantam and van Deurzen 1999, Roth and Fongagy 1996). In this study two o f the therapists 
had undertaken personal therapy as part o f the requirements o f their respective training courses. The 
other requisites are that the training course provides the opportunity for discussion o f the 
underpinning theory, integration o f this theory to practice, personal development work, discussion o f 
cases (Binder 1999, Charles-Edward et al 1989). The need for personal therapy for trainee therapists 
is a contentious one, for some decree that it is not necessary (Macaskill 1999), some suggest that 
until its efficacy is proven by research then it is difficult to draw a conclusion (Macran et al 1999). 
Whereas, others suggest that it is one o f the essential prerequisite for the provision o f therapy 
(Sinason 1999, Williams et al 1999). Personal therapy provides the opportunity to leam about 
therapy, to address issues arising from training, and enables the person to deal with personal issues 
(Macran et al 1999, Williams et al 1999).
Without therapy there is the potential to offer vicarious therapy (Schapira 2000), whereas, Glickauf- 
Hughes and Mehlman (1995:213) suggest that ‘many therapists were as children, raised by 
narcissistic parents, and these children learned to respond to parental needs at the expense o f their 
own development’ and how therapy is a ‘corrective interpersonal experience’ . Personal therapy 
provides the opportunity for the therapist to attend to their own emotional needs (Norcross 1990); 
and to experience the helpful conditions o f therapy (Macran et al 1999).
The researcher concurs with the need for therapy, for the neophyte therapist to have experienced the 
therapeutic relationship, to have explored how they make sense o f their own experience. However, 
she suggests the quality o f the therapy offered is an area that merits further exploration. For example 
has the therapist had his or her own therapy? Are they an accredited therapist? Have they 
experienced their own experience, where therapy enabled them to return to learning from 
experience? Or have they had a therapy that was technique focused? In technique focused therapy, 
the skills o f the therapist take precedence over the meeting with another. Can the therapist lay aside 
technique and be open to the experience o f the other? Inherent in this is that therapy is not a set o f 
skills that can be utilised in response to what a client says. There is not a manual o f how to respond, 
for it is a craft rather than a technology (Legg 1998). There is a need for the therapist to suspend 
theory for ‘ only then can we be truly open to what is before us’ (Gordon 1999:72).
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The therapist is not the expert in the relationship, rather they are an ‘ interested inquirer’ (Gergen and 
Kaye 1992:182). Through the process o f  therapy, and the connection between therapist and client 
(dialogue as opposed to monologue); and through offering a ‘spectrum o f  therapeutic interaction, 
support, affirmation, reassurance, empathy, encouragement, elaboration, clarification, confrontation, 
interpretation’ (Bateman and Holmes 1995:168), the client is enabled to take responsibility; to 
change; to learn. In this study, through the process o f therapy, the person with a facial difference 
was able to recognise that ‘I'm not whatever it is ... that I  am not a label ... I  am m e’. As such 
there is an unlearning (I’m not whatever it is) and a relearning (I am me).
The use o f a label to define a person is paradoxical, for on the one hand it is to mark out the person
as different, and on the other hand it is a reduction to the same. With the privileging o f  humanness
over the technical remit difference is deemed to be more favourable than a reduction to sameness.
The use o f a label is to not privilege humanness, or the alterity o f the other (see Levinas 1947). The
ethical relationship in therapy is to privilege the alterity o f the other. Gordon (1999:47) drawing on
the work o f Levinas, comments that therapy as ethics:
‘ requires that we abandon a great many preconceptions and assumptions about otherness and 
about our relations with others, that we have to develop an attitude or position o f radical 
openness towards the other in all his strangeness which avoids reducing the other to what is 
already known to us’ .
The therapist who had not undergone training in counselling, was a psychologist, and had been 
trained in cognitive behaviour techniques. However, is there an increased potential for her to 
technologise the interaction? Does an individual need training in how to be alongside another, to put 
the other first? One could argue that the being alongside another can not be taught, rather it is an 
attitude towards the other. According to Lomas (1999:6) what happens in the consulting room is 
unpredictable and ‘ there is no technique for behaving well towards another person’ . Rather, there is 
a need for ‘a particular quality o f attention and to take responsibility for what we are doing’ (Heaton 
2000:12).
Supervision is a forum for the therapist to explore how they are working with their clients (see 
Gilbert and Evans 2000); it is suggested here that it provides a forum for learning how to be with 
another person. However, the question o f the quality o f supervision needs to be explored, for is the 
supervisor able to learn from their own experience? Have they had therapy that enabled them to 
experience their experience? Have they had supervision from someone who enabled them to learn 
how to be with another? Can they foster an openness to the other, to provide an ethical relationship? 
Gordon (1999:62) refers to the therapists responsibility to client and states: ‘ It is part o f  our 
responsibility to the other to allow for openness, formlessness, dis-order’ . It is suggested here that 
this is also applicable to supervision, for supervision can parallel the therapeutic process (Doehrman 
1976 cited by Gilbert and Evans 2000).
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The therapist’s in this study identified how offering therapy was a learning process for them too; as 
such it is about ‘being’ with the client rather than ‘doing’ . It is suggested here that privileging 
humanness is to ‘be’ with another, to be open to not knowing what will emerge in the in-between, in 
the dialogue created by the therapist and the client. Whereas, to privilege technique is to be ‘doing’ , 
and the technique favours certainty, to get it right. The creativity o f the in-between is stifled by the 
application o f technical skills.
2.2 Experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy
If the parent has a cleft and passes it on to the next generation, there is a sense o f disbelief 7  just 
thought it would not happen again'. This is similar to how Pruzinsky (1992) comments on parents 
reaction to the child needing surgery, how some parents resort to magical thinking, that it will be 
alright. There was also a sense o f the child ‘not having to go through what I went through It is as if 
there is intergenerational transmission o f trauma (Gardner 1999, Walker 1999). Freud and later 
Frenczi first referred to this phenomenon (Gardner 1999:298), she states ‘The concept o f trauma is 
seen as the connection between a series o f external events in the life o f the person and the psychic 
consequences o f such events’ . Also when trauma is not spoken about there is preponderance for the 
phenomenon occurring. Although both Walker and Gardner draw on the experience o f childhood 
abuse and survivors o f the holocaust to illustrate the concept o f how trauma may effect subsequent 
generations, it is suggested here there is a similarity with those with a congenital difference in that if 
the trauma is not talked about then it may be worked through in the next generation.
It is suggested here that if a person with a facial difference has not had the opportunity o f finding a 
language to speak o f  their emotions, then their unconscious thoughts and feelings about their own 
difference may be ‘passed on’ to their offspring, in one o f two ways, either by silent 
transgenerational trauma, or by projection o f concerns onto the child, which the child then takes on 
board, through the process o f introjection. Either way the child is coping with material that does not 
belong to them (whether or not the child has a facial difference). If the child does have a facial 
difference, then the groundwork is laid down for ‘history repeating itself, for it seems difficult for 
them [the parents] to imagine it any other way; their experience becomes the template for 
living/coping with a facial difference.
Once a child is bom with a congenital facial difference the comment ‘never had anymore children’ 
correlates with Walters (1997) view, that on the whole the child will be either the only or the 
youngest child in a family. The parents also had to cope with the reactions o f others to their baby. It 
could be that prior to having a child with a facial difference, the parent had negative stereotypes 
surrounding difference, they may even have responded negatively to people with a facial difference. 
In essence the ‘tables have been turned’ . These emotions need to be worked through and may
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contribute to the fact that some parents adjust more readily than others (Bradbury 1997, Walters 
1997, Bronheim 1994, Speltz et al 1990). These negative stereotypes are examples o f sociocultural 
distortions in meaning making perspectives and the potential is there that without the opportunity of 
exploring their distortions, for the person to see it any other way.
How a parent adjusts and copes will impact on the attachment they have with the child (Ambler et al 
1997, Hearst and Middleton 1997, Niederland 1965). Making emotional bonds with an other is 
fundamental for psychological wellbeing (Greenberg and Saffran 1987:164), and they credit the 
theories o f Bowlby (attachment) and Fairbairn (object relations) as being ‘ general explanatory 
theories that help us to understand the functioning o f the emotional system in human beings’ . 
According to Bowlby (1988) the person with whom one forms an attachment is said to create a 
secure base, and the relationship can survive separation; connection is maintained.
If a parent does not provide a secure base for a child, in the form o f consistent positive care, then 
this can effect subsequent emotional development and ultimately influence relations with others. 
Bowlby comments that when a baby is disabled then there is a need to monitor how the mother 
bonds with the child. The parents in this study commented on their feelings o f  guilt at having 
produced a child with a facial difference, these feelings may subsequently affect the attachment 
between the mother and child. The child develops a concept o f self based on this early care. 
According to Greenberg and Saffran (1987:164) ‘ if  these schemata carry hostile and negative 
representations o f significant caregivers, they will serve as the source o f continuing psychological 
trauma into adulthood’ [original emphasis].
The child with a cleft (the congenital facial difference that was spoken about in this study) requires 
surgery to correct the anomaly, therefore there will be periods o f hospitalisation in the first three 
months, and subsequent years. The periods of hospitalisation can represent times o f separation that 
may also impact on the relationship between mother and child (Bowlby 1988). This then can effect 
subsequent relationships through the process o f transference. The therapeutic relationship can 
provide an opportunity o f  working through attachment issues; ‘ It is the emotional communication 
between a patient and his therapist that play a crucial part’ also that ‘ the therapist hopes to enable his 
patient to cease being a slave to old and unconscious stereotypes and to feel, to think, and to act in 
new ways’ (Bowlby 1988:139).
It would appear that a cycle o f  no-change is created when early experiences provide a template for 
future experience, in this situation, others will be rejecting and this will highlight difference, and as 
a result the person with a facial difference is left ‘still standing out’. As such there appears to be a 
cycle o f repetition, for the person with a facial difference may anticipate negative responses from
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others to their appearance, for example 'when I speak to people I wonder what they will think o f me. 
I tend to stay away> from people...then I won’t get hurt’. This anticipation stems from previous 
experience 7 learnt that at a young age....I can still hear the names they called m e’. There is an 
anticipation o f re-experiencing o f  the trauma in the present (Greenberg and Pavio 1997), and this 
anticipation creates anxiety, an anxiety that can impact on how the person responds to unknown 
others. For example ‘when I am with other people, 1 go into to myself I  instinctively expect people to 
reject me, and am surprised when they don’t '. There is a closure to experiencing the new, for there 
is an anticipation/expectation o f a repeat o f previous experience, the other is feared; and there is a 
tendency to either physically or emotionally withdraw from experiences that may evoke the original 
anxiety. The above example is a form o f emotional withdrawal, whereas, an example o f a physical 
withdrawal is provided by the person who said, 7 used to walk about on my own during school 
break times, assuming that the gang would not want my company’ .
Templates are created from these experiences that inform future experiencing, there is a tendency to 
ignore comments that do not meet with the template, for example, Tm  told how people often don’t 
notice for a while...but I don’t believe them'. There is a sense that experiences that fall outside this 
template, may not be acknowledged for the template is the ‘ real’ and current experiencing ignored in 
preference to the ‘ real’ that is founded on distortions in perception. Without questioning and 
exploring the foundations to templates, there is a potential to remain closed to the new. To learn 
from experience, there is the need to reflect on experience (Mezirow 1990, Boud et al 1993). For 
through the process o f  reflection there is a re-looking at experience, a questioning o f experience, and 
there is a willingness to be open to the new.
The cycle o f no change is founded on previous experience, and revolves around how the person 
forms an image o f themselves created by previous experience o f others to them. This image and 
experiences o f how people respond to them, informs how they respond to others. This response to 
others has the potential to inform the response from others, which has the potential to maintain the 
equilibrium; an equilibrium founded on distortions in meaning making perspectives. Therapy offers 
the potential to explore this repetitious cycle, and for it to be possible for experience to be different; 
to return to learning from experience.
Those who spoke o f what they wanted from therapy were on the whole looking for certainty, 'to 
know what to expect’, 'what to say to others’. There is a need to find a way of imparting this 
information without it being stated as the only way, failure do so would be to take away the 
experience o f the person requesting the information. For it has been identified that parents need to 
be educated on how to speak to their child with a facial difference (Kish and Lansdown 2000, 
Charkins 1996). One way o f introducing this from an early age is to use children’s storybooks that
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focus on the story o f difference, for example Show Time by Clarke (1999b). In this book during 
show and tell sessions at primary school, Emma spoke about her ‘ burnt’ arm and nose, and the 
scarring resulting from skin grafts. Without the opportunity to name and talk about difference, the 
child with a facial difference learns that certain aspects of experience are ‘unspeakable’ , thoughts 
surrounding difference are thus not given a language and therefore not part o f an individuals’ 
personal language. Thus this information can be essential in enabling the child to talk about their 
difference, but what about the parents? How can they explore their thoughts and feelings around 
having to talk about difference to their child? Therapy offers the potential for this, however, there is 
a need for a willingness to embark on the process.
It would appear that there are a myriad o f experiences, and a multiplicity o f  issues that contribute to 
the emotional world of a person with a facial difference, all have the potential to impact on how the 
person perceives their self. Early experiences can become a template for future experience, 
templates that inhibit a person to experience their experience.
3. Analysis o f exemplary portrait
The portrait o f John embraces the main themes discussed. His mothers’ reference to how his cleft 
was a ‘punishment for something she had d o n e contributes to the feeling o f guilt mothers can feel 
on the birth o f her child with a facial difference (Walters 1997). Rumsey (1997) traces the cultural 
perception o f facial difference and how in the early 1700’s the King o f  Denmark, decreed that no 
person with a facial deformity should show their face to a pregnant women in case they passed it on. 
Rumsey makes the case that in some African countries this view is still held. In 2000, a mother who 
gave birth to con-joined twins blamed herself for this because she had looked at a book containing 
photographs o f deformed children (Barton 2001). If the community also believes in this concept, 
then there is the likelihood that the family will be shunned. The difficulties o f having a child with a 
facial difference may manifest itself in depression, which may be present soon after the birth, or 
may not become apparent until many years later (Niederland 1965). This appeared to be the 
situation for Johns’ mother.
John also retold how his mother responded when he wanted to ask a girl out, The girl might laugh at 
you -  so don't do it'; from this he formed the opinion that no one would want to go out with him. 
This situation can be viewed from different perspectives. It could be that the mothers’ inability to 
accept John’s appearance was projected onto ‘ the girl’ that perhaps as she [the mother] found him 
unattractive, therefore other women would feel the same. Another possibility is that John was 
uncertain whether he would be acceptable, and in checking it out with is mother, he has 
confirmation of that which was difficult for him to own. He subsequently does not go out with the 
girl, projecting the decision onto his mother, saving himself from possible/anticipated rejection by
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the girl. Or it could be that the response was not related to his appearance, rather that the mother 
thought he was too young to go out with girls; or maybe she knew the girl in question and did not 
think her suitable for John.
There are various ways that the ‘event’ can be interpreted and meaning conferred, meaning that is 
context specific and dependent on the people involved and the interplay o f their emotional schemata. 
According to Safran and Greenberg (1991) an individual, encodes an emotional schemata as a result 
o f experience. They also suggest that the original emotional response may be appropriate in a 
particular context, then become inappropriate/maladaptive in a new context. It is suggested here that 
if an individual is unable to experience their experience, then they will continue to use outmoded 
emotional responses. In the above example, Johns’ emotional response to his mother saying not to 
ask the girl out was to become a template for all future interactions with girls. He continued to have 
a lack o f confidence around girls/women and subsequently his self-esteem was low.
Mrulc (1999) suggests that there are three developmental stages to self-esteem, the first stage is pre­
esteem which takes place during early childhood, prior to the child being able to construct the 
concept o f self-awareness. He suggests that this phase is influenced by how significant others react 
to the person. The first source o f self-esteem is being valued by others. This valuing can be based on 
preconceived ideas the significant others bring to the infant. For example, in relation to gender and 
how this ‘ announces a whole range o f categories, values, expectations that others bring to the infant, 
who can only respond to them’ (Mruk 1999:172). The second stage is middle childhood when there 
is a growing recognition o f  the concept o f self-esteem by the child. The third phase is in adulthood, 
when the person becomes aware o f situations that can have an impact on their sense o f self-esteem, 
and as such they have some control over the outcome.
Worthiness and competence are benchmarks for self-esteem; worthiness initially emanates from the 
quality o f  parenting. If there is unsupportive parenting then there is the likelihood o f a decreased 
sense o f worthiness, which can subsequently impact on competence which is determined in middle 
childhood, and the evaluations made in the realm o f ‘motor, social, intellectual, personality, and 
behaviour characteristics’ (Mruk 1999:173). It is suggested here that low self-esteem may emanate 
from distortions arising in the pre-esteem stage, which if unchallenged will continue to exert an 
influence into adulthood. It would appear for John, that therapy enabled him to challenge the 
previous distortions that created and contributed to his sense o f having a low self-esteem.
Through the process o f therapy he was able to explore his views on his appearance and speech. The 
important o f speech and identity is acknowledged; ‘speech is not only a part o f  the total body image 
but also has a special role in establishing personal identity through the expansion of inner thoughts
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and feelings’ (Bronheim 1994:115). Thus Johns perceived difficulty in speaking also impacted on 
his sense o f self; he talked o f how he had to rehearse many times what he wanted to say before 
speaking to someone unknown to him. There is a sense that he was not present in the encounter, 
spontaneity was absent, and it was only post-therapy that he could initiate conversation -  7  have 
even started to initiate conversations with people’. Pre-therapy there was a fear o f  rejection based on 
his difficulty in communicating and his appearance, according to Kent and Keohane (2001) this fear 
o f rejection can be both actual and.anticipated. The anticipation acting as a barrier to interaction 
with others and this creates avoidant behaviour (Newell 1998).
The changes identified by Cell (1984:vi) as being an indication o f significant learning are changes 
‘ in behaviour, in interpretation, in autonomy or in creativity’ . There are examples o f these found in 
John’s experience o f therapy, 7 have even initiated conversations with people. Pre-therapy this was 
something I would not have contemplated’ (an example o f a change in behaviour and creativity); 7 
have come to realise that we socially and emotionally set ourselves apart’ (an example o f a change 
in interpretation); ' my self-confidence has increased many fo lds’ and 'gradually I  have come to see 
that I am good enough ' (two examples o f  a change in autonomy). These examples o f  significant 
learning, also encompass the element o f  a transformation ‘Pre-therapy this was something I would 
not have contem pla tedand emotional restructuring with an increase in self confidence; how he 
feels about himself, and the recognition o f emotionally setting himself apart from others. The 
learning implicit in Johns’ comments on his therapy includes significant, transformative, and 
emotional learning. It is difficult to separate the forms o f learning inherent to the process o f therapy, 
rather the three elements are interdependent and intertwined. Therapy provides the opportunity for 
learning that can be either significant, transformative or emotional, and the potential outcome is a 
return to learning from experience.
Milioria (1998) suggest that people with a congenital facial difference have an avoidant personality 
and comments on her work with a person with a facial difference. She suggests there was a ‘hide 
and seek fantasy’ aspect to her clients behaviour; on the one hand she wanted to be seen, to have 
contact with others, however, this carried with it the risk o f being seen, and in this seeing she would 
be seen as ‘ flawed’ , there was therefore a need to hide. She suggests that early losses and self-object 
failures contribute to the sense o f being ‘ flawed’ ; ‘the disfigurement predisposed the patient to 
narcissistic vulnerabilities and avoidant behaviour’ (Milioria 1998:378). This view is supported by 
Niederland (1965) who suggests the presence o f a congenital facial anomaly is a narcissistic injury; 
an injury that impacts on the ability to interact with others. For John, his sense o f  being ‘ flawed’ was 
due primarily to his speech and appearance; he felt unable to be understood by others, he wanted 
contact, but feared rejection because he could not always make himself understood. Through the 
process o f therapy, he was able to acknowledge that if he was not understood, he could repeat and it
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would be 'no big deal’. Pre-therapy Johns’ (in)ability to communicate was a barrier to him engaging 
with others.
Therapy is a form o f ‘emotional work’ that provides ‘ self-object functions including mirroring and 
idealizing as well as differentiation within containment’ (Milioria 1998:392). This appears to have 
been Johns’ experience, for his therapist 7ms a mirror'. However, it is suggested here that she was 
able to give something a mirror cannot, ‘the experience o f another human being alongside her [him] 
at the level o f her [him] internal feeling and experiencing’ (Kegan 1994:245).
The mirror is a metaphor that is used both in life and in therapy (Shipton 1999:183): ‘Looking in the 
mirror is the first step in a pact between a subject and object, tenuously connecting the me ‘ over 
here’ and the me ‘over there’ in the mirror. In looking we project and introject our present and future 
selves and secure a kind o f continuity’ . The commonly held view is that the mirror reflects a 
persons’ image, so that the person gains a sense o f how they ‘ look’ ; however this look is an illusion 
and a delusion. For the mirror cannot reflect the self that others see, for this ‘ look’ is mediated by 
the perception o f the perceiver. Thus a person can be deluded by the illusion in the mirror. The 
mirror is not real, it is a ‘ no place’ , Shipton (1999) uses the term ‘heterotopia’ to encompass how the 
mirror is an ‘ analogous place’ a ‘contrasting place’ . It is neither objective nor subjective.
In relation to psychoanalytic theory, Winnicott (1967) refers to how the mothers gaze is important as 
through this the infant can gain a sense o f self and o f  being valued. The gaze confers a template for 
how the child perceives ‘ self and as such their place in the world. Lacan’s (1977) view o f the mirror 
is fundamentally different to Winnicott in that he acknowledges the illusion o f  the image. Also he 
recognises that the mirror stage (six to eighteen months) is not just about forming an image o f  self, it 
is from this stage that ‘ I’ is articulated, the self is created in and through language. The child 
identifies with an image outside self, with the ‘real’ mirror image; and is bound to the image by 
language. The words o f the parents are important in assuming an identity: ‘The identity o f the child 
will depend on how he or she assumes the words o f the parents’ (Leader 1995:43). Language 
enables the child to symbolise and represent their self to others (Sarup 1993).
The ‘ mirror stage’ is permanently being worked through, for it involves ‘accepting the reality o f  its 
unreality’ (Bowie 1991:23). According to Hill (1997) the mirror stage represents an alienation o f  the 
self from the real, where the real is the impossible to say. It is through language that the subject is 
constituted (Sarup 1993); however, language is found wanting, for we cannot always symbolise our 
experience. Hill (1997:49) is in agreement, and suggests that ‘ language is a universal trauma or 
wound, taking a unique place for every subject’ . He suggests that a trauma is an experience that 
belongs to the Lacanian category o f the real: ‘ it refers to an experience in a person’s life that he has
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not been able to put into language’ (Hill 1997:79). Therapy provides an opportunity to redress this 
trauma. For John it seemed important to him that 'it was good to say what I wanted and to be 
accepted for who I am '. Part o f this accepting was for his view o f  himself, as not being good 
enough, being challenged; initially being told he was good enough, and for him to realise this for 
himself. Being accepted for himself was a previously denied experience.
It would appeal* that ‘ language constitutes us a subject’ (Sarup 1993:8). However, what if the 
language has a negative connotation? Did Johns’ sense o f not being ‘good enough’ emanate from his 
early experiences with his parents? Was this compounded by further experiences? Does this initial 
response create and sustain a sense o f marginalisation? It would appear so if we accept Sarup’s 
(1993:7) premise that ‘we cannot separate a person’s psychology from his or her personal history’ .
Therapy can provide a reparative discourse for the exploration o f the place a person takes up in the 
world, a place that is originally consigned due to early experiences and then taken up as the only 
place if there is an inability to learn from experience. Post-therapy John commented that he realised 
how people with a facial difference ‘socially and emotionally set ourselves apart'. It would appear 
that he came to realise that the self is created through relationships with others and he had a 
responsibility in how others responded to him.
4. Analysis o f creative synthesis
The creative synthesis represents the researcher’s understanding o f how therapy can be seen as a 
form o f learning. This understanding emerged through the process o f conducting this study, and 
reflecting on the understanding gained during the initial analysis o f data, the presentation of findings 
and the location o f findings in the literature on psychotherapy, learning and facial difference.
The learning that is intrinsic to the process o f therapy draws on the theories and concepts o f 
significant learning, transformative learning and emotional learning; it is learning that is personal to 
the individual. In keeping with the underpinning ethos o f this study, whereby there is a privileging 
o f humanness over science and technology, it is not possible to describe the specific nature o f this 
learning, rather there is a recognition that the learning, that is intrinsic to the process of therapy, can 
enhance a return to learning fr om experience; where experience is an individual phenomenon known 
only to the person whose experience it is (Laing 1967).
The inability to learn from experience is dependent on previous learning experiences; for previous 
learning can create barriers to learning (Mezirow 1990, Boud et al 1993, Cell 1984, Claxton 1984, 
Rogers 1967). These barriers can inform how a person approaches learning, and the sense they make 
out o f the potential learning experience. There is the potential to re-experience experience, based on
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previous learning, as the previous learning can create a template or a standard, for evaluating further 
experience (Bowlby 1988, Symmington 1986, Casement 1985). There is a closure to experiencing 
experience; there is an inability to learn from experience.
This study focused on developing a conversation on therapy as a form of learning for people with a 
facial difference, and it has been possible to identify issues that can create barriers to learning from 
experience, and to acknowledge that therapy provides an opportunity for a person to explore and 
work through previous distortions in learning, to effect a change in perspective. A change that is 
cognisant with a return to learning from experience.
There is a sense that the label ‘ facial difference’ can define the person, that it is difficult pre-therapy 
to separate the person from the label, experience is filtered through the lens o f  facial difference. 
Also, there is a sense that the facial difference is the cause o f their difficulties in living, in relating; 
for it becomes the template for evaluating experience. Previous experiences, emanating in childhood 
sow the seed for the creation of a Tens’ to make sense o f  their experience, a Tens’ that is appearance 
focused, rather than person focused. There is a sense that this can be an intergenerational process, 
the Tens’ being handed down from significant others, who have difficulty in responding to the child 
with a facial difference, for they too may have an inability to learn from experience.
Therapy provides an opportunity to redress this imbalance, by providing an environment that is 
conducive to the exploration o f thoughts and feelings surrounding their appearance and how they 
make sense o f their world. Therapy can provide an opportunity to return to learning from 
experience: Facial difference does not need to define the person and therapy is a reparative discourse 
to enable a return to learning from experience.
Conclusion
The findings o f the study were located in the appropriate literature; initially the themes that emerged 
from the data were explored. It was recognised that within the literature available there was a 
preponderance to theoretical concepts rather than people’s direct experience. This study addressees 
this apparent imbalance by focusing on people’s experience. The researcher identified the learning 
that was intrinsic to these experiences, and the discussion was informed by transformative, 
significant, and emotional learning approaches. It appears that significant learning could be an 
overarching term for the learning that can emanate through the therapeutic process; it is learning that 
is significant to the person. Intrinsic to this there is a transforming o f beliefs and attitudes 
(transformative learning) underpinned by a recognition o f feelings and how they inform behaviour 
(emotional learning).
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Initially the themes that emerged from the data were discussed. There was evidence from therapist 
and client experiences o f therapy that the reason for seeking therapy was usually related to their 
appearance together with their perceived difficulties in handling the reactions o f the general public. 
The therapeutic relationship developed between therapist and client was deemed to be helpful in 
enabling a person to speak about their ‘ difference’ , to explore their distortions in meaning making 
perspectives, and through the process o f therapy there was a change in perspective, therapy was a 
form o f learning. There was evidence o f significant learning, that the changes emanating through 
therapy were pertinent to the individual; transformative learning, for there was a freeing o f  
previously held beliefs, and emotional learning for they were able to speak o f thoughts and feelings 
about their difference and this had the potential to impact on their sense o f  self-worth. Therapy 
enabled them to return to learning from experience.
Of the experiences that can precipitate the need for therapy, from the parent’s perspective there was 
evidence o f how giving birth to a child with a facial difference was a traumatic emotional 
experience. Feelings o f guilt underpinned their reactions; there was a sense o f how this may be 
transmitted to the child if not spoken about. Also there were ongoing concerns, related to 
developmental changes and surgical/medical intervention. For people with a facial difference there 
was evidence o f a correlation in the stories they told about their birth, and the parent’ s experiences. 
There was an indication o f  an intergenerational transmission o f trauma, a sense o f  learning someone 
else’ s way of experiencing; the parents ‘ template’ for evaluating experiences becoming their way o f  
evaluating their facial difference. Early socialisation experiences also have the potential to reinforce 
the view that facial difference defines the person, and further creates and sustains distortions in 
meaning making perspectives. These distortions have the potential to become barriers to learning 
from experience. Therapy could provide an opportunity to work through the distortions, and to 
return to learning from experience.
The composite depiction and exemplary portrait further developed the discussion on therapy as a 
form o f learning, or the need for therapy as a form o f learning. Therapy appeared to be about a shift 
from an external view o f the problem, to an internal one, and in this process there was recognition o f 
how the person with a facial difference has a role in maintaining the distortions in their meaning 
making perspectives. Distortions that have their foundations in childhood, templates are created that 
continue to inform how a person anticipates and evaluates experience. There is an inability to 
experience their experience, there is as such a repetitive cycle to experiencing. Therapy can provide 
an opportunity to break into this cycle and offer the possibility o f a return to learning from 
experience.
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The creative synthesis highlighted how facial difference need not define the person, and that therapy 
is a reparative discourse for a return to learning from experience. In the second cycle o f 
interpretation required by the methodological framework that guides this study, these two phrases 
will be deconstructed; this secondary construction is provided in the next chapter.
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Chapter Eight
Secondary Construction
Introduction
The aim o f  this chapter is to complete the second cycle of interpretation o f the methodological 
framework developed for and being tested out in this study, and represents stages six and seven o f  
the framework. This second cycle o f interpretation culminates in a secondary construction, and is a 
deconstruction o f the creative synthesis o f the primary construction, and is representative o f the 
researcher’s understanding o f  the question being explored by this study, is therapy a form of 
learning for people with a facial difference? Deconstruction is a term that is accredited to Derrida, 
and it is an exploration o f  hidden meanings embedded in the text. Derrida (1998) suggests that there 
is nothing new to be found, for there is always a building on o f something else. As such previous 
knowing is the springboard for further knowing. Bennington (1994:4) suggests that a text is always 
historical, and includes ‘ repression’ s, exclusions and misreadings o f all sorts’ . Whereas, Howells 
(1999:3) suggests that ‘Deconstruction may set out to ‘read between the lines’ or even ‘ read against 
the grain’ , but it always attempts to read, and understand’ .
The researcher is aware that she could deconstruct the whole project, from the title to the method 
chosen to guide this study, however, the intention is to demonstrate, or to provide an illustration of 
the multiplicity o f  meanings inherent in the findings that can emerge in a study. That the 
presentation o f  findings is but one interpretation, the second cycle o f interpretation provides an 
opportunity for this demonstration o f multiple meanings.
The following two issues that emerged in the creative synthesis will be deconstructed. Initially, 
‘ facial difference does not need to define the person’ will be explored, as this appears to be at the 
heart o f the ability for a person to relate to, and with others. What does the label o f facial difference 
signify for others? Where is this difference to be located, in the mind, or the body, or both? This is 
followed by an exploration o f ‘therapy is a reparative discourse to enable a return to learning from 
experience’ . What is reparative about the discourse o f therapy? How can it be brought about? What 
are the implications for return to learning from experience?
The next section explores how therapy as therapeia (premised on the ethical relationship o f 
responsibility to the other) can be developed as a model that promotes therapy as a means to 
learning. To conclude this section, there is a discussion o f the overall findings o f the research 
investigation.
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1. Facial difference does not need to define the person
What is facial difference? The researcher selected this word, as this was the word that participants 
used when speaking o f  themselves that they were ‘ different’ . Why not stay with facial 
disfigurement? It would appear that there is difficulty in selecting another term, for in the literature 
review a range o f  words were used by the authors to ascribe meaning to those with a facial 
difference: only one author Solomon (1998:269) clarified why she preferred the term ‘ facial 
distinction’ , as it is a ‘ non-pejorative descriptor’ . Three .other authors appeared to be acknowledging 
the need to use a word which was ‘neutral’ , ‘visible difference’ (Lansdown et al 1997), ‘ facial 
difference’ (Charkins 1996, Elks 1990). This contrasts with the remainder who used terms that 
inferred that the person with a facial difference was ‘ less than’ the norm; ‘ visible damage’ (Glover 
1988), ‘ impaired appearance’ (Hill-Beuf 1990), ‘ facially deformed’ (Pruzinsky 1992) ‘ facially 
marred’ ‘ facially crippled’ (MacGregor 1984), ‘visibly handicapped’ , ‘visibly stigmatised’ (Bull 
1990).
In the book Facial Appearance (Bull and Rumsey 1988) used several terms e.g. ‘atypical 
appearance’ (page 185), ‘unattractive or disfigured end o f the physical appearance continuum (page 
217), ‘ people who are considered by others to be ugly, or those who are disfigured or deformed’ 
(page 179). Hughes (1991) also used several terms; ‘not quite whole, not quite normal, or not quite 
acceptable’ , ‘ facially impaired’ (page 1), ‘ distortion o f appearance’ (page 505). It would seem that 
the authors were having difficulty in defining the other.
Language was first described as a social phenomenon by de Saussure, he stated that language 
comprised o f  two components langue, the pre-given, ‘ rule governed abstract system’ , and parole 
which is individual speech (Rainwater and Kearney 1998:290). Lacan develops this schema and 
advocates that the unconscious is structured like a language and is representative o f langue, and 
consciousness is parole. Using this concept Lacan re-read Freud’s work and creates a topographical 
model which is premised on language. Lacan (1977) identifies the mirror stage as being when the 
infant leaves the imaginary (maternal) order and enters language and the (paternal) symbolic order. 
The third mode, is the real, the impossible to ‘ say’ or ‘ imagine’ .
Feminists have contested Lacan’s paternal emphasis on the dominance o f language, arguing that it in 
effect silences women’s voices. For example, Irigaray offers a feminist critique on discourses that 
privilege sameness over difference, and the inherent difficulties in representing and imaging 
femininity. She states:
‘Women’ s social inferiority is reinforced and complicated by the fact that woman does not 
have access to language, except through recourse to ‘masculine’ systems of representation 
which dissappropriate her from her relation to herself and to other women. The ‘ feminine’ is 
never to be identified except by and for the masculine, the reciprocal proposition not being 
‘ true’ (Irigaray (1985:423-4).
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For Irigaray it appears difficult for women to find a place from which to speak within the current 
system, for women will always be defined by a language that is masculine. A situation that could be 
seen to correlate with facial difference. For the same question posed by Irigaray o f representing the 
feminine, can be used for representing facial difference ‘ If it were different what would it look like?’ 
For it to be any other way seems ‘unimaginable’ for we are always subject to language. The 
language for facial difference is rooted in the dominant description o f  ‘ normality’ , any deviation 
from the norm is an inversion o f the normal. The creation o f binary opposites, where one term is 
privileged over the other, where one is subjugated over the other. However, do we need to be 
restrained within language? Can we come to a different understanding o f self and situation? Can we 
find parity for self?
Possibly, Kristeva offers another way, for she had developed the concept o f a ‘ subject in process’ , 
neither object nor subject but in between, the semiotic represents the in between, the tension 
between the paternal symbolic and the maternal imaginary; semanalysis is the recognition o f the 
speaking subject (Kristeva 1986, 1980). Smith (1998:59) commenting on the work o f Kristeva in 
her book Speaking the Unspeakable, states ‘ speaking the unspeakable, representing the 
unrepresentable are the premises o f the work o f psychoanalysts, o f interpreting texts and of writing 
poetic fiction’ . Where the text, is the discourse o f the client and in the process o f therapy beginning 
to explore the unspeakable, to find a language for the repressed material in the unconscious. The 
therapeutic relationship offers the opportunity for an exploration o f subjectivity, for embodiment, 
‘ language becomes embodied when it resonates with desires, hopes and fears for past and present’ 
(Goldenberg 1993:3). Embodiment dissolves the mind/body split, the language o f  emotions uniting 
mind and body.
A further possibility about the use o f  different words to describe the phenomenon o f ‘ facial 
disfigurement’ , is the representational system of de Saussure, where the signifier represents the 
object, the image, or the sound o f the word, and the signified is the concept or meaning that is being 
named (Sarup 1993). The taken-for granted given is that the signified and signifier together create a 
naming o f the real; but this is a myth, representation is founded on a myth, the myth o f language 
(Barthes 1957). There is a difference between signifier and signified, there is a slippage and 
meaning is difficult to grasp (Derrida 1996). Meaning is open to multiple interpretations as language 
is open to multiple interpretations, at best it is an approximation to that which we ascribe meaning.
This approximation is evident in the attempt to ascribe meaning to the phenomenon o f facial 
difference; ‘There is one feature that is both necessary and sufficient in defining facial 
disfigurement, namely the strength o f negative reaction by the possessor and others, to a particular 
facial feature, or set o f features’ (Elks 1990:37). He also suggests that without the negative reaction
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it would be a ‘ facial difference’ . Thus implying that the difference exists in the minds o f  those who 
see it as something negative, and worthy o f commenting on. As such it is society that defines the 
person with a facial difference, for the prevailing culture defines what it is acceptable in the ‘ beauty 
stakes’ and therefore what are acceptable and non-acceptable forms o f appearance. It is suggested 
here that a corollary can be drawn with the term ‘women’ , for as de Beauvoir (1949) suggests that 
one is not born a woman, it is an inscribed state conferred by society.
A person born with a facial difference is not aware that they are ‘ different’ they will be ascribed a 
‘ label’ by society, firstly a medical label for a congenital anomaly (for example cleft lip) and a 
colloquial label by culture (for example hare lip). The label takes away from the person, the subject 
replaced by the object; a dehumanisation. The person takes on the label and owns it. An inverse o f 
the designer label that the young must have, the label o f facial difference becomes the must not have 
item. How can it be different? Are people with a visible difference the only ones who have an 
appearance that does not measure up to the culturally defined norm? What about the people who 
have been given the body dysmorphobia label? People whom although they do not have a visible 
form of difference, but to them their invisible difference is real (see Rosen et al 1995, Cash 1990).
Those with a difference that is visible to others can be defined by others (both medically and 
socially), and this somehow legitimises it; the difference can be named. Whereas, those with an 
invisible difference have a difference that can only be defined medically, within the social domain 
the difference does not exist, it is not legitimised. Yet to the person the difference in the mind is very 
real. There is a self-imposed label o f difference. Whether the label is initially ascribed by others, 
then accepted by the person as a ‘ real’ concept, or imposed by self, both labels have by implication, 
a taken-for-granted assumption, the person is less than.
Appearance related difference could then be said to be either in the body or in the mind. Thus 
difference is not the sole domain of those with a visible difference, for ‘disfigurement’ can be in the 
mind or the body, and the ‘disfigurement’ is in relation to emotional well being; how a person feels 
about their self image. The ‘disfigurement’ can become a block to social interaction, the other is 
feared, for they may see the ‘disfigurement’ and reject the person; respond negatively. There is a 
propensity to judge all ‘ others’ as the same. There can be a zero tolerance to it being any other way, 
to embrace difference, and not to reduce all to what is known. Difference has a negative inference. 
This emotional template o f being ‘different’ acts as both a barrier to, and a distortion to, being open 
to experience; to be open to their own experience. Metaphorically they become a slave to their 
template. There is an inability to learn from experience.
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The mind body dualism is representative o f a primacy to reason and facts, the scientific domain, a 
masculine way o f knowing and the body represents unreason and feelings, the unscientific domain, a 
feminine way o f knowing (Mies 1991). By deduction this implies that embodiment would represent 
Kristeva’ s ‘ subject in process’ . There would be a return to feelings, and emotions as legitimate 
knowing paradigms. Romanyshyn (1990:240) suggests that phenomenology and psychoanalysis 
reject the mind body split, and accredits psychoanalysis as having ‘ cautioned us to never assume the 
who or what o f experiences’ . He also suggests that ‘human experience is as such a given to be 
made’ (Romanyshyn 1990:244). However, this given may not be recognised; and therefore not 
made. For the person may be trapped in a cycle o f repetition based on previous experience being the 
template for future experience.
They metaphorically get trapped in the ‘here is the one I made earlier’ culture. This phrase 
stemming from the children’s television show Blue Peter where on live television, the presenter 
rather than struggle and show all the stages in making an intricate model from recycled material, 
would get to a particular point (usually when they reached a tricky stage) and stop, utter the phrase 
‘here’ s one I made earlier’ and produce another model at the same stage o f  making, but with the 
‘ difficulties’ overcome, and begin working on the next stage, this would be repeated until the 
complete model was shown. The ‘difficulties’ were not shown. The illusion is created that you too 
can make this model if you follow the steps as demonstrated by the presenter. But the steps have 
been sanitised, the messy difficult bits, have been avoided, for example the trial and error attempts 
before getting it right; instead the perfect image/model is shown. How can this relate to experiencing 
our own experience? It may create and sustain ‘what you see is what you get culture’ , the outer 
image, is all there is. Also life follows a predictable passage, that if you ‘ do’ what is expected then 
the individual will move effortlessly along the predicted trajectory. Difficulties are not anticipated, 
and when they are it can be seen as a tragedy, for example producing a child with a facial difference.
The illusion o f  the perfect image, a surface with no depth, is as such a paradoxical situation, for 
postmodernism is about favouring surfaces rather than depth, and yet this surface, this image is not 
the real (Baudriilard 1984). Postmodernism is also about celebrating difference yet the term facial 
difference appears one difference too far. What does it mean to privilege the sur-face rather than 
depth? The preference to faces that are the same rather than different? If all we have are ever-mobile 
signifiers, then anything goes; but how does the individual mediate between the ‘ real’ and the 
‘ imagined’ ?
‘Difference legitimises acts o f inclusion and exclusion’ (Clarke 1999:23). He cites Freud’s book 
Civilisation and Discontents and how the capacity for love and harmony is dependent on their being 
a group that holds the aggression. As such there is a projection onto others what can not be owned
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for the self. ‘The product o f  paranoid projection is the stereotype, the transference o f socially 
unpalatable thoughts from subject to object1 (Clarke 1999:24). Klein’ s notion o f splitting into the 
good introjected object and bad projected object is used by Clarke to demonstrate how projective 
identification creates a ‘ construction o f the ‘other’ as a defence. The other is then responsible for the 
theft o f our enjoyment, something we have imagined in phantasy and never possessed’ (Clarke 
1999:28). The ‘other’ may pick up the thoughts and feelings o f the projection, and own them as if 
they originate in their self.
For the person with a facial difference, this could create an inverse form o f prejudice, for the 
prejudice that they attribute to others can emanate from within, thus projecting out onto others that 
which they can own for themselves. How is the other construed if all negativity is projected onto 
them? And, what o f the parents experience o f producing a child with a facial difference? There is 
reference to how they need time to adjust, to mourn the baby they did not have (Ambler et al 1997, 
Hearst and Middleton 1997, Walters 1997, Bradbury 1993). Can the mother own for herself her 
feelings and thoughts surrounding the birth? Or does she project them onto others? For both mother 
and child there are a host o f  implications associated with conferring the erroneous label o f facial 
difference on the child. An erroneous label, for as the above discussion infers there is no ‘ truth’ in 
the term. But how to speak the unspeakable and think the unthinkable for the person to arrive at their 
own truth?
2. Therapy is a reparative discourse to return to learning from experience
This statement raises several questions, what does it mean to say that psychotherapy is a reparative 
discourse? What is learning? What is experience? What does a return to learning mean? An 
exploration o f these questions is difficult, for there is a merging between the concepts, and as such 
there is a sense o f which comes first, learning or experience, and where does therapy fit in? Is it that 
therapy is a form o f learning? But then what is learning? What is experience?
Experience is only possible in the presence o f an experiencer (Laing 1969), the experiencer recounts 
the experience via language and thought (Nicholson 1995); and this activity as such provides a 
structure and coherence to that which was experienced (Kegan 1994). Experience is as such a 
personal phenomenon, known only fully to the person whose has the experience (Laing 1969). In 
accepting this premise that experience is personal, there is recognition o f  how ‘we ourselves actively 
give shape and coherence to our experience’ (Kegan 1994:199). Subsequently people are considered 
by him to be ‘the author o f his experiencing, he writes the play the way he does’ (Kegan 1994:254). 
This view could be seen to endorse the perspective o f the modernist self, a self that is master o f what 
it surveys, a self that is knowable and definable in a definitive manner. The self is thus at the centre
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o f the meaning derived from an experience. In contradiction to this is the postmodern self, the self 
created in communion with others; a de-centred self (Sarup 1993).
According to Sarbin (1993:xxi) this perspective, ‘ opens a possibility to study ‘meaning’ and 
‘meaning making’ in particular, as a ‘movement’ between dialogical positions’ . He also posits that 
the ‘ self is a ‘decentralised manyness o f I  positions that each have a voice and can tell their own 
stories about their respective me's’ [original emphasis]. There is thus the opening up to the 
possibility o f multiple selves (see Rowan and Cooper 1999). If the self is created in communion 
with others, each meeting then has the potential for a different self to emerge. The self, is as such 
not a once and for all known entity, rather it is an elusive concept, and the ‘ centre’ o f the self shifts 
from being within the person, to being located in the in-between, in-between the meeting with 
others. The self emerges in ‘ the gap’ between the meeting o f two people; a gap that is irreducible 
and thus the self as a known construct is beyond reach; for the self is in a process o f  becoming. All 
that can be known is a sense o f the self as created through these meetings, however, in the recalling 
o f  the ‘who’ and ‘what’ this self is, there are limits imposed, for who is included in this telling? For 
the potential is there for the image o f the self to shift depending on who is present in the telling.
It could be said that, there is a similarity with experience, for experience ‘ contains many 
ambiguities, it acts sometimes as a noun, at others a verb, and it is almost impossible to establish a 
definitive view with which to work’ (Boud et al 1993:6). A view that could be seen to be cognisant 
with encompassing a postmodern perspective. Another, aspect that further confounds attempts at 
defining experience, is that in the re-telling o f experience, there is as yet another experience. 
Therefore, experience can be said to be ‘multifaceted, multilayered, and so inextricably connected 
with other experiences, that it is impossible to locate temporally or spatially. It almost defies 
analysis as the act o f analysis inevitably alters the experience and the learning that flows from it’ 
(Boud et al 1993:7). It would appear that Derrida (1996:83) reaches a similar conclusion, for he 
states; ‘Human experience is inseparably entangled with our description o f it’ .
It is suggested here that the description is further confounded by the limits imposed by language, for 
language is an imposed given, we are socialised into the language o f the prevailing culture; and 
enter the signifying chain as defined by Lacan (Sarup 1993). There is thus the further difficulty in 
the re-telling o f an experience, because o f the gap between the signifier and the signified. Another 
difficulty in re-telling an experience is that the self o f the experience (the experiencer o f the 
experience) also informs or has implications for, how the re-telling is spoken about, for the self has 
the potential, to be re-created in the experience o f the re-telling o f the initial experience. There is 
thus a gap between the experience o f an experience and our ability to re-teil this experience to an 
other.
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It can be seen that attempting to define experience is difficult when a postmodern perspective 
informs the discussion. O f postmodernism, Ainley (1998) suggests that within this ever changing 
landscape, the only constant is the ability to learn. But is this necessarily the case? What does this 
ability to leam mean/imply/infer?
Bergevin (1967) posits that the most important thing that we have ever learnt, is the fact that humans 
can learn. Learning as defined by Jarvis (1997:90) is ‘the process o f  transforming experience, o f 
one kind or another into knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, senses, emotions, and so forth’ . But 
how can this ‘ transforming experience’ be determined, elicited? Especially when it is acknowledged 
that experience is an elusive concept, it is beyond reach, for there is an irreducible gap between the 
experience and the recounting o f the experience. Is it that learning like experience is an individual 
phenomenon, and any attempt at defining it is an attempt to create a graspable entity? For it could be 
said, that ‘ learning’ this ‘transforming experience’ may not be appropriated, it can only be 
apprehended in the moment.
However, within the scientific paradigm o f  modernism, it is possible to legislate for the outcome o f
this transforming o f experience into learning. For there is the awarding o f certificates for the
attainment of specific standards o f knowledge (e.g. general certificates of education, diplomas,
degrees), as conferred by the educational institutions. Within the modernist paradigm, the grand
narratives o f knowledge create a definitive stance on what constitutes knowledge as the outcome o f
learning (Lyotard 1984). He suggests that within the postmodern paradigm, local narratives replace
these grand narratives, knowledge then becomes personal and context specific. There is thus, a
renouncing of primacy to science and technology, and a privileging o f humanness. Jarivs (1997:64)
appears to be mindful o f  the human element in learning when he acknowledges how Heidegger’s
concept o f Being, underpins learning and states:
Tiuman-ness remain a potentiality within human existence until it emerges from the mind 
and, eventually, as a self or identity. This initially occurs as a result o f  the learning processes 
-  mostly non-reflective learning during the course o f what sociologists regard as primary 
socialisation; later it occurs through a combination of non-reflective and reflective learning’ .
This distinction between non-reflective and reflective learning is important in developing the 
concept o f  learning from experience, where learning is seen to be a process o f ‘transforming 
experience’ . Non-reflective learning could be seen to be the accretion of facts and figures, or 
alternatively it could be seen to be indicative o f a repeatability in experience.
For as Cell (1984) comments, citing Zellner as saying that one can either have twenty-five years o f 
experience, comprising of one year repeated twenty five times, or comprising o f twenty five years o f 
unique experience. In the first instance the person has not been open to the experience, rather
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closure has been imposed, for the understanding gained the first time round has remained the 
‘blueprint’ for all future encounters with the ‘ same’ or ‘ similar’ situations/experience; there is a 
sense o f predictability, repeatability, certainty to an experience. Whereas, the second instance is 
about being open to experience, where each experience has the potential for providing new 
understanding; there is a sense o f  unpredictability, non-repeatability, uncertainty; and the potential is 
there for learning from experience.
Building on from Zellners’ notion o f there either being a ‘ sameness’ to experience, or an element of 
‘difference’ , the question that can be posed is why restrict the measurement o f  ‘experience’ to units 
o f  years, why not months, or days, or hours? Why impose a time frame at all? When the notion o f 
difference is encompassed, the potential is there for experience to be a moment by moment 
phenomenon. It could be that by introducing time-scales there is an attempt to reduce this 
‘ transforming experience’ and the learning that emanates from this process into a pre-determined 
known entity. To impose some order, some certainty to the uncertainty that is created when learning 
from experience; for the learning cannot be appropriated beforehand, the learning that may emerge 
from experience is an unknowable entity.
Reflection on learning enables the learner to see the content o f learning from a different perspective 
(Mezirow 1990, Colazzi 1973). von Eckartsberg (1998:98) is in agreement but also acknowledges 
how ‘each insight into something is accompanied by new areas o f opacity’ . It is suggested here to 
embrace the notion o f opacity, is to give credence to how learning is an ongoing process, for 
experience is a precursor for learning, and experience is synonymous with life. Learning from 
experience can not be anticipated in advance. If learning is anticipated or there is an expectation o f 
the outcome o f an experience, then there is a foreclosure to the experience. This foreclosure to 
experience can be representative o f a barrier to learning. The ensuing ‘ learning’ can then be said to 
be non-reflective, where there is an element o f repeatability to the experience, the learner is a 
passive recipient o f the experience.
Jarvis refers to how early socialisation is a non-reflective process, implying that the learner is a 
passive recipient o f experience; there is as such an imparting o f  knowledge from parents/significant 
others who could be said to take up the position of the ‘ teacher’ . When the teacher is seen to impart 
knowledge to ‘ students’ , a situation is created whereby the student learns someone else’s experience 
o f the subject being taught (Laudrillard 1993). It is suggested here that another way o f looking at 
this, is that it is the interpretative lens o f the teacher that is passed on to the learner. There is the 
potential here for the lens, to incorporate the distortions in meaning making perspectives o f the 
owner o f the lens; perspectives that shape how a person construes/makes sense o f  their experience, 
experience that has the potential to be transformed into learning. It could be then, that a situation is
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created whereby the ‘student’ learns the distortions in meaning making o f the ‘teacher’ , and assumes 
that this is the way for them to interpret similar situations.
In the case o f  the parent/child interaction, there can be an intergenerational transmission o f 
distortions in meaning making perspectives. Prior to learning through socialisation, the child 
experienced its own experience, there was no language for this activity, for language according to 
Lacan introduces the child to the symbolic order (Sarup 1993). It could be said that this is 
representative o f  pre-reflective knowing, where there is a coming to experience without prior pre­
supposition (Heidegger 1967). With the transition from the imaginary (pre-language) into the 
symbolic, experience becomes something that can be named, brought into conscious awareness. 
Through the socialisation process, the child learns the language o f the parents, ‘things’ are ascribed 
a particular meaning, also an image o f the self is created in response to this entry into the symbolic.
Lacan, in developing his theory o f psychoanalysis and the importance o f language, drew on the 
work o f Freud, or rather he re-worked Freud’s theory o f psychoanalysis; a theory that was based on 
the discovery o f  how the unconscious informs human behaviour. In Lacan’s deconstruction o f 
Freud, he proposed that the unconscious be structured like language. That in learning a language 
needs can be expressed, but that the underpinning desire gets lost into the unconscious, due to the 
limitations o f language (see Lacan 1988). Freud’s theory o f how ‘material’ was relegated to the 
unconscious was focused on the tensions between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. 
Where the pleasure principle is representative o f the persons desires, and the reality principle the 
cultural norms, when impulses and desires are in conflict with the cultural norms, they are stored in 
the unconscious, where they remain active and influence behaviour (see Freud 1915). Thus, as 
learning from experience is influenced by previous experience, there is the potential that some 
experiences may have been repressed (due to the tensions between the pleasure and reality principle) 
and although these experiences can be unconscious to the experiencer, they continue to exert an 
influence on the interpretation o f current experiencing. The unconscious can therefore be 
representative o f a barrier to learning from experience.
It was acknowledged in the primary construction (analysis o f findings in the previous chapter) that 
barriers to learning, i.e. distortions in meaning making perspectives, can impinge on the person’s 
ability to learn from experience, and that therapy may be required to work through these barriers 
(Boud et al 1993, Mezirow 1990). However, with the recognition o f the importance o f the 
unconscious and how previous experiences may continue to exert an influence on behaviour (for 
there is a tendency for a repetition compulsion, we repeat what we do not understand; a return of the 
repressed [see Freud 1915]); it is suggested here that some educators have overlooked this potential. 
It could be that with the predominance o f science and technology, where the teacher was seen as the
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one who knows, and imparts their knowledge to the students (see Knowles 1984), and the students 
passive recipients o f knowledge, their unconscious processes and how it informs their ability to 
learn from experience were not recognised.
Whereas, with the shift to student centred learning, and the role o f the teacher being changed to a 
facilitator o f learning (see Rogers 1983), the student becomes active in the learning process, and the 
facilitator is there to facilitate learning how to learn. The place o f previous learning experiences are 
recognised, there is then the potential, at least, o f  recognising unconscious processes. The difference 
between the two approaches to learning can be found in the old Chinese proverb, you can give a 
hungry man a fish, and you feed him for a day, or you can teach him how to fish, and you feed him 
for life.
Conscious processes do not purely influence transforming experience to learning; rather there is an 
intermingling of conscious and unconscious processes. For there to be a return to learning from 
experience, there is a need to recognise how unconscious processes inform current experience; how 
these processes may provide a template to interpreting experience. It is about working through the 
barriers to learning from experience, and how in this process, the previously identified learning 
theories/perspectives that inform therapy as form o f learning, can be seen in a different light when 
the unconscious is recognised as exerting a hitherto unnamed component o f significant, 
transformative and emotional learning. Perhaps the suggestion o f  the need to refer a learner to a 
therapist if the barriers to learning are firmly entrenched (Boud et al 1993, Mezirow 1990); is a 
recognition o f how the barriers may reside in the unconscious.
In commenting on learning in therapy Felman (1987: 76) comments that it does not proceed:
‘through linear progression but through break throughs, leaps and discontinuities, 
regressions, and deferred action, the analytic learning process puts in question traditional 
pedagogical belief in intellectual perfectibility, the progressist view o f learning as a simple 
one-way road from ignorance to knowledge’ .
The implications are that it can be difficult to isolate the forms of learning that are present in 
therapy, for there is not a linear progression. Also with the recognition o f how the learning 
theories/perspectives o f significant, transformative and emotional are seen in a different light when 
unconscious processes are recognised. It could be said that to ascribe a particular form o f learning to 
therapy is a modernist stance, an attempt to provide closure to an experience by naming/prescribing 
the forms o f learning. Whereas, to adopt a postmodern stance, would be to see therapy as a means to 
learning. Here there is openness to the learning that may emerge through the therapeutic process. 
What then is reparative by the discourse o f psychotherapy? Therapy is a process whereby 
unconscious material is made conscious (see Bateman and Holmes 1995, Symington 1986). 
Whereas, Gergen and Kaye (1993:257) suggest that ‘ It is a process during which the meaning o f
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experience is transformed via a fusion o f the horizons o f the participants, alternative ways of 
punctuating experience are developed, and a new stance toward experience evolves’ .
Therapy as deconstruction is about a shift from focusing on the problem, to questioning how that 
particular story came to be told, as opposed to another one, it is about a ‘ reflection on the way the 
therapeutic encounter is storied into being’ (Parker 1999:1). It is about identifying the transition 
from meaning and power in the. relationship to reflexivity and responsibility. Kaye (1999:34) 
appears to be in agreement when he suggests that there are two dominant discourses in therapy, the 
‘ techno-rational repertoire’ and the ‘ethical discursive form’ . Where the ‘ethical discursive’ is about 
the therapist taking up a stance o f ‘not knowing’ (Kaye 1999), or ‘not knowing knowing’ (Lamer 
1999:44). For Romanyshyn (1990:245) the stories in the life-world are ‘ symptoms o f the soul’ and 
‘when psychology attends to the life-world as cultural therapeutic, when it attends to the shadows 
and symptoms o f culture, it performs the work of deconstruction’ (Romanyshyn 1990:250).
O f the deconstuctionist approach to therapy Kaye (1999:34) suggests that it is about examining ‘the 
socially constructed discursive complexities and practices by which people are positioned or social 
conditions in which they find themselves’ . There is as such an emphasis on how the self is socially 
constructed and how the self may differ dependent on the context. It appears that in this discussion 
we have come full circle; back to how the self, as the experiencer o f the experience is influenced by 
previous learning, and how the telling o f  experience is shaped by the people present, together with 
the limits imposed by language.
The researcher is aware that the use o f the term ‘circle’ implies a closure; however, it is a circle that 
cannot be closed if we are to remain open to experience, like the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer 
1967). If we remain open to experience, there is the sense that the understanding gained from 
previous experience may be available as pre-understanding when we next encounter a similar 
situation, and through reflection, the previous experience informs the next experience. Gadamer 
(1967:41) also posits that ‘ hermeneutical reflection plays a fundamental role’ in psychoanalysis. For 
it is here a link is made with how the ‘the unconscious motive does not represent a clear and fully 
articulable boundary for hermeneutical theory’ . He goes on to say that ‘ psychotherapy could be 
described as the work o f “ completing an interrupted process o f education into a full history (a story 
that can be articulated in language)’’ , so in psychotherapy hermeneutics and the circle o f language 
that is closed in dialogue are central’ . He also made reference to how his reading o f Lacan, had been 
influential in shaping his views that therapy and education are inextricably linked.
Loewenthal and Snell (1998:334) are interested in therapy as a form o f teaching and learning and 
state: ‘where there is trauma in our lives and there is restriction we cannot learn. In trauma the world
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does not make sense to us. There is a war between ourselves and others rather than rapport’ . It is 
suggested here that trauma is an inevitable outcome of early socialisation, for there is, drawing on 
the work o f Freud, a denial o f the pleasure principle, and drawing on the work of Lacan, the mirror 
stage represents a break into language, the symbolic, there is rupture between what the child desires 
and what can be spoken about. There is through this socialisation process an abnegation of self; 
there is as such an interruption into the process o f learning from experience. Therapy can provide a 
reparative discourse to enable the repression(s) that emanated from early non-reflective learning to 
be made known, a knowing that has the potential to enable a return to learning from experience.
It could be that through the process o f  therapy, the patient is introduced to him or her self
(Symmington 1986). Reaching a similar conclusion, Holmes (2001:89) states:
‘Therapy provides an opportunity for the patient to begin to see himself from the .outside; to 
forgive parents as well as to blame them; to see and own his contributions to circumstances, 
rather than to view himself as the helpless victim; and to recognise that there are occasions in 
which fate deals us cards over which we have no control’ .
Within this quote, there is recognition o f  the need for the client to make a shift from seeing things in 
either black or white, ‘ to forgive parents as well as to blame them’ , in a sense to embrace the binary 
opposites, for a blurring o f perspectives, to be more open to multiple meanings. It is neither one 
thing nor the other, but a combination o f a multiplicity o f  factors. There is also a recognition o f how 
the client assumes some responsibility in maintaining the status quo; to own the distortions in 
meaning making perspectives, that informs their way o f  knowing. There is also a sense, o f  accepting 
the things that cannot be changed.
How can the therapist provide an environment that is conducive to creating a learning milieu that 
has the potential to enable a return to learning from experience? An environment that is ‘ethical 
discursive’ as opposed to ‘ techno-rational’ (Kaye 1999). Lamer (1999:44) suggests that an ethical 
relationship is a ‘ tolerance difference’ ; perhaps this is one way o f  viewing therapy as a reparative 
discourse for a return to learning from experience. Lowe (1999) suggests that in ethical therapy 
there is a sense o f ‘ not yet’ for there is a sense o f staying outside the binary opposites, there is as 
such an embracing o f  the notion o f multiplicity o f meanings and I positions. He states, there is ‘an 
openness to the contents o f discursive binary forms in which subject positions are constituted’ 
(Lowe 1999:97).
Levinas (1947) in an attempt to explain this ethical relationship o f responsibility for the other 
critiques Buber’s I-It, and I-Thou relationship. The I-It relationship represents a relationship 
between a subject and a passive object. Others are therefore objectified, it is as such a narcissistic 
relationship, a relationship with one self; notions o f the other are not recognised. To move away 
from this place there is a need for ‘ self-forgetfulness as the first abnegation’ (Levinas 1947:39).
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In preference to this I-It relationship is the I-Thou relationship and there is a sense o f mutuality 
between two subjects. Levinas suggests that in this relationship there can a sense o f social 
communion, a dialogue. However, there is the tendency for the other to be reduced to what is 
known. To ascribe a meaning in advance to the meeting, to posit that the other can be known is to 
already provide a foreclosure to the other. What Levinas is advocating is a relationship that is 
asymmetrical, where the I has responsibility to the other, but the Thou has no responsibility to the I. 
For the I to take up a responsibility for the Thou would be to make the relationship symmetrical, and 
it is this that Levinas questions. It is as such a difficult relationship to conceptualise, for in essence it 
is found in the unconscious, for it is pre-reflective knowing.
Levinas, does acknowledge for there to be a meeting between people, there needs to be an element 
o f ‘sameness’ for it is this that facilitates a dialogue, however there is a need for the concept o f 
‘difference’ to be privileged. It is in this difference, that the asymmetrical relationship can emerge. 
Emerge, for to suggest that it will is to already subscribe some element o f knowing in the meeting 
with the other.
A relationship based on reciprocity has the potential to totalise, to reduce the other to what is known, 
to ascribe a meaning for and to the other; to define the other; to know the other prior to the face-to- 
face meeting. Whereas, he suggests that the asymmetrical relationship that he prefers, is for there to 
be an openness to the infmiteness o f the meeting. He implies that in Buber’s I-Thou relationship, the 
I is subjective, and is a knowing self. Whereas, Levinas refutes this because for him it is about 
being. A being founded in mystery, like the mystery o f death. Death is unknowable, and the ethical 
relation with an other is unknowable for ‘ the relationship with the other is a relationship with a 
mystery’ (Levinas 1947:43). We can never grasp the other, it is not a possibility, for the ‘Other is in 
the future’ like death (Levinas 1947:44). Accordingly he suggests that it is difficult to conceptualise 
this meeting with the other, for any attempts at conceptualising is an attempt to provide foreclosure 
to experience. Can we meet in the face-to-face and be open to the experience?
Critchley (1992:4) drawing on the work o f Levinas suggests ‘The domain o f the Same maintains a 
relation with otherness but reduces distance between the Same and the Other’ . There is thus an 
attempt to close the ‘gap’ , a ‘ gap’ that cannot be closed if we maintain a responsibility to the other. 
A closure o f the gap is to create a symmetrical relationship, founded more on the principle o f 
Buber’ s, I-Thou rather than Levinas’s face-to-face. Gans (1997) used the phrase ‘ responsible 
relatedness’ to refer to this asymmetrical relationship.
176
The ethical subject according to Critchley (1999:186) is not a conscious subject, ‘ for consciousness 
is the effect o f an affect and this effect is trauma’ [original emphasis]. Thus through trauma we 
become a conscious subject, and yet this veiy act o f becoming conscious imposes a boundary on 
learning from experience. There is relegation to unconsciousness o f the elements that are too painftil 
for the nascent ego to comprehend, to admit to awareness. We are thus caught in yet another ‘gap’ 
the ‘gap’ between consciousness and unconsciousness; to return to learning from experience there is 
a need to ‘ bridge the gap’ , to be open to experience. But how can this bridging take place?
How can the therapist provide a therapeutic relationship that is premised on ‘ responsible 
relatedness’ ? This is the focus o f  the next section, where notions o f good practice will be suggested 
for providing therapy as a form o f therapeia, premised on the concept o f ‘ responsible relatedness’ in 
the face-to-face encounter with another.
3. Therapy as therapeia
The deconstruction o f therapy as a reparative discourse to enable a return to learning from 
experience highlighted the inherent difficulties when the postmodern paradigm informs knowing, 
for there is a shift to multiple meanings. That experience, and the learning emanating from it emerge 
in the in-between, between the therapist and the client (Felman 1987, Symmington 1986). There are 
limitations imposed on the re-telling o f the experience due to the boundaries imposed by language. 
To speak of a return to learning is to embrace the notion o f an interruption in learning from 
experience, due to trauma. The initial trauma being the transition to a conscious subject, other 
experiences may then build upon this trauma, for experiences that are too traumatic for the 
conscious self to acknowledge or to ‘know’ are repressed. The repressed material in the unconscious 
continues to exert an influence on behaviour. The repressed material may form a barrier to learning 
from experience, for it can inform how future experience is anticipated and evaluated. Thus previous 
experience informs current experience; there is an inability to learn from experience.
One way for therapy to be seen as a reparative discourse is to enable unconscious material to 
become conscious, there is a sense o f redressing the original trauma. As an adult, there are choices; 
there comes a recognition o f the many juxtapositions involved when binary opposites are reworked, 
and there is a blurring o f boundaries between the ‘either’ and the ‘or’ . Or as Derrida (1998) suggests 
it is about speaking from a non-place; to metaphorically be on the outside looking in, another 
position from which to speak.
Therapy becomes a place to speak the unspeakable, and think the unthinkable, there is a sense o f  the 
process enabling an ‘awakening to thought’ (Heaton 2000). For this to occur there is a need for the 
therapist to be open to the experience o f the other, to not provide foreclosure to the meeting by
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reducing all to that which is already known in an attempt to favour sameness in opposition to 
difference. There is a need for the therapist to create an environment that is mindful o f  the face-to- 
face meeting.
Building on from the work o f Levinas (1947) and his critique o f Buber’s I-It and I-Thou 
relationship, it can be possible to identify how these relationships may take place in therapy. 
According to Williams and Gantt (1998) there is the .potential for all relationships to be seen as 
‘ therapeutic’ as the meaning o f the word refers to ‘ service’ or ‘attendance’ . Drawing on the findings 
that emerged in this study, the researcher proposes a model for opening up further conversations as 
to how therapy is a means to learning.
The givens to the therapeutic relationship in therapeia constitute the setting, the contract agreed 
between therapist and client, the timing of sessions, payment and confidentiality, etc., aspects that 
Feasey (1999) considers under the heading o f ‘good practice’ . There is an assumption made that the 
therapist will be qualified, and to have had a training experience that prepared them to take on the 
role o f a therapist. In providing an environment that is premised on the Levinasian notion o f 
responsibility to the other in the face-to-face, there is a need for the therapist to acknowledge the 
theory and techniques o f  therapy, but to lay this aside, for there to be an opening up to difference 
(Lamer 1999). He also poses the question ‘ can we as therapists deconstruct ourselves so as to allow 
others to speak?’ (Larner 1999:46).
Perhaps there is a need for the therapist to have had had the experience o f being a client, to have 
experienced therapy as therapeia. Perhaps there is also the need to have supervision from a therapist 
who has also experienced therapy as therapeia. Perhaps these experiences may facilitate an opening 
up to difference.
With the aforementioned in mind, the givens o f therapeia, are the environmental/contractual issues, 
and the training, therapy and supervision experiences o f the therapist. The intention o f stating these 
givens is to set the scene for therapeia, for what happens in therapeia cannot be appropriated 
beforehand, for to do so is an attempt to provide a foreclosure. And afterwards, any attempts to 
translate the ‘saying’ in the moment, becomes the ‘said’ and a reduction to the same. The ‘moment’ 
emerges in the in-between, in-between the therapist and the client, an unconscious in-betweenness.
According to Larner (1999:47) ‘the therapist in ethical relation to the other creates an abode or space
for encounter and conversation’ . Whereas, Gordon speaking o f therapy as ethics, suggests,
‘ It involves an ability to be truly open to the other, not to try and fit him into any 
preconceived model or theory. It requires an ability too to learn from experience, not in the 
sense that one knows more facts but rather that one’s conception of and thoughts about the
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world have broadened... It is a position which does not tolerate unknowing or uncertainty, 
for that implies a passing phase, something to go through or got over, but which welcomes 
such unknowing and uncertainty as the ground from which something worthwhile might 
emerge.’ (Gordon 1999:160) [original emphasis].
There is, as Gordon, acknowledges a need for the therapist to learn from experience and his use o f  
the word ‘ too’ implies that there is an intention that through the process the client may learn to learn 
through experience. This factor is also acknowledged by Loewenthal and Snell (2001:30) ‘As 
psychotherapists we can be ethical only if we see the other as someone we can serve and leam from. 
This is ethics as practice’ . The use o f the term serve is cognisant with Freidman’s (1989) definition 
o f therapeia, as one that encompasses service to the other. Thus therapeia is ethical practice; a 
practice premised on learning. For Levinas, teaching is the ethical relation to the other, ‘the other 
that precedes me is my teacher: the law o f the other is that I must learn “ my” past which is given to 
me through another’ (Beardsworth 1998:75). But how may this learning be recognised? How may 
the practitioner be mindful that learning from experience is taking place?
It is suggested here, that there can be an imaginary continuum to represent different forms o f 
therapeutic relationships, at one end there is the ‘ I-It’ relationship whereby there is no recognition o f 
the other, the other is objectified, the self too may be objectified, the self may be referred to by an 
impersonal pronoun. The next relationship is the ‘ I-Thou’ relationship, here there is a recognition o f 
the other, and the relationship is symmetrical. The relationship with the other is founded on a 
mutuality. At the other end o f the continuum is ‘ responsible relatedness’ , an asymmetrical 
relationship premised on the responsibility o f the therapist for and to the client. A responsibility that 
is apprehended in the moment.
Examples o f statements from the client, that could be seen to be indicative o f non-reflective 
learning, in the ‘ I-It’ relationship, it is always that way...you know it will be that way because. An 
example from the data that emerged in this study ‘you just know that people are going to reject you 
Whereas, in the ‘ I-Thou’ relationship there may be signs o f reflective learning, willingness to 
question, to explore, it may be this way, or it maybe that way, or I feel that at times I have prejudged 
situations. An example from the data 7  realise that I did not give people a chance to be different’ . 
Here there is a sense o f being able to reflect, to recognise their role in maintaining the status quo. It 
may be possible in the ‘ I-Thou’ relationship to determine significant, transformative and emotional 
learning. In ‘responsible relatedness’ it is a pre-reflective state, it is as such a felt sense, an 
unconscious knowing; therapy as a means to learning.
It is not possible to legislate for the type o f learning that may take place in therapeia rather it is 
about welcoming uncertainty and not knowing, as the underpinning ethos to the practice o f 
‘ responsible relatedness’ . It may be possible through reflective processing, for the therapist, to
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identity the types o f therapeutic relationship formed. But it is not possible to enunciate the ethical 
relationship; this being in the moment with the other, for it is not graspable, it is beyond reach.
Conclusion
Through the process o f initially deconstructing ‘ facial difference need not define the person’ there 
was recognition o f how the term ‘ facial difference’ is erroneous. It is a term conferred by society. 
This ‘ difference’ may be in the mind or in the body; the effects on the person are for them to be 
perceived as ‘ less than’ . There is a sense o f marginalisation. The suggestion that therapy may be a 
reparative discourse to enable a return to learning from experience, highlighted the difficulty in 
defining experience and learning within the postmodern paradigm. There are limits imposed by 
language and unconscious processes. To ascribe therapy as a form of learning, creates the possibility 
o f identifying learning theories/perspectives that may inform the ‘ lens’ for looking at therapy as a 
form o f learning. But in recognising the role o f the unconscious in the first trauma (entity into 
language) that interrupts the process o f learning from experience, it is not possible to define the form 
of the learning; rather therapy becomes a means to learning.
With this recognition, therapy as therapeia was explored; a concept that embraces the ethical 
relationship o f responsibility for the other and is premised on pre-reflective knowing. It is therefore 
a phenomenon that happens in the moment, it cannot be appropriated. A model was proposed, to 
enable practitioners to open up further conversations, on therapy as a means to learning. It is 
acknowledged that the very use o f the term model, may imply/infer a step by step process for 
therapy as therapeia, however, the term is used here in its loosest sense, and is mindful o f  the need 
to encompass difference in preference to sameness. Levinas acknowledged that the ethical 
relationship is premised initially on an element o f sameness to enable a dialogue to commence, and 
it is in this vein that the model is provided, as an element o f sameness to open up a dialogue, how 
the dialogue develops is premised on difference, a difference that cannot be apprehended, for it is in 
the moment.
The next chapter concludes the final stage o f  the methodological framework developed and tested 
out in this study; a critique o f the research process.
180
Chapter Nine
Introduction
The aim o f  this chapter is to complete the final stage o f the methodological framework, to critique 
the research process, and is representative o f stages eight and nine o f the framework. The aim o f  the 
study was to develop a methodology for exploring psychotherapy as a form o f learning. A research 
paradigm was created following a review of other paradigms. The intention was to provide a 
paradigm that was informed by the researcher’s interpretative lens, and would be mindful o f the 
tensions inherent when re-presenting the other, where subjectivity (humanness) was privileged over 
objectivity (technical). Knowing is achieved through communion with an other; it is an interactional 
subjective activity (epistemological perspective). The meaning emerges in the in-between, created in 
the moment and known to the interlocutors involved (ontological perspective). The possibility o f 
meaning is generated through a reflexive and dialectical process (methodological perspective).
The methodological framework that guided this study will now be critiqued to elicit whether it does 
privilege humanness over science and technology. There are six phases to the critique; (1) research 
design and method; (2) data generation; (3) data analysis; (4) primary construction; (5) secondary 
construction; (6) review o f the research process; each will be discussed.
1. Research design and method
The design emanated from the purpose o f the study, an exploration o f  therapy as a form o f learning 
with particular reference to people with a facial difference. The question posed by the study ‘ Is 
counselling/psychotherapy a form of learning for people with a facial difference?’ The first step 
was for the researcher to operationalise the meanings o f the terms in the question, literature reviews 
were conducted on counselling/psychotherapy, learning and facial difference. A review o f the 
literature allows for ‘ a historical perspective on the topic as well as a source for further 
interpretations o f the data’ (Garman 1996:21). Whereas, Fink (1998) suggests that a review may 
inform a researcher o f previous studies and assist with developing the research question. In this 
study the reviews on counselling/psychotherapy and facial difference enabled the researcher to be 
clearer on what previous research had been carried out and the methods employed; and the review 
on learning clarified the domain of learning that correlates with therapeutic practice.
An area o f opacity found in the research reviewed was that the decisions that informed the selection 
o f the research method(s) was on the whole omitted. Consequently, the reader is left to make an 
assumption as to how the method correlated with the chosen research paradigm. Overall there was
Critique o f  the Research Process
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an absence o f the humanness o f the researcher; there was an emphasis on the ‘doing’ o f  the study. 
The method as such is viewed as a ‘ set o f  instructions’ and if correctly applied/followed then an 
assumption is made that sound results will be produced, there is privileging of 
replication/repeatability. There is a foreclosure to humanness; for subjectivity is erased in deference 
to objectivity. The subjectivity o f the researcher becomes negated in the name o f  scientific rigour.
The sharing o f the researchers interpretative lens is- one way o f making more transparent the 
researchers’ subjectivity and it is suggested here that it is representative o f a privileging of 
humanness. The hermeneutic approach may help science methodology by ‘making transparently 
clear the guiding pre-understandings in the sciences thereby open up new dimensions o f 
questioning’ (Habermas 1962:39). This seems to be an invitation for the researcher to share their 
interpretative lens, however, can we make something transparently clear? To whom? Possibly the 
researcher, but for unknown readers it is an impossibility for there is a presupposition that the 
reader will reach the same point o f clarity. None the less this should not deter the researcher from 
explicating how they make sense o f the research process. By defining the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological perspectives that inform the research process, the researcher 
makes known to the reader o f the research text (report) how a particular meaning(s) emerges from a 
particular study. It as such adds to the credibility o f  a study (Sword 1999, Thorne 1997).
In this study, the sharing o f the researcher’s interpretative lens included the theories and 
perspectives that inform her knowing, it would be naive to suggest that in this telling all is revealed 
to the unknown reader, for can we make it all known to ourselves? For what o f the unconscious 
processes? Perhaps all that can be said is that this is how it was at that moment in time, this was the 
then current state o f understanding. However, in light o f further experience it may be changed. This 
does not take away, or lessen the achievement at the time, rather it is to give credence to how 
meaning is not a fixed, static entity, for it is in a state o f flux; like the human state.
Is it possible to be mindful that the meaning created belongs neither to the researched or researcher; 
it lies in the in-between? Can we re-present for the other this in-betweeness? Can we capture the 
‘ saying’ , or will there always be something that is not graspable? This difficulty is acknowledged 
when trying to capture the ‘ saying’ in the therapeutic relationship (Gordon 1999). From a 
Levinasian perspective, the ‘ saying’ is in the moment and there is the potential for an openness to 
the other. Any representation of the ‘ saying’ becomes the ‘said’ and there is a closure to the 
meaning that emerged with the other. Meaning is reduced to something that is other than what 
occurred in the moment. How does the researcher account for this without doing violence to the 
other? Should we conduct research, if research becomes a totalising move, an attempt to reduce to 
all that is known? What are the alternatives? Perhaps what can be shared is the struggle with the
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inherent tensions o f embracing an approach that privileges humanness in preference to science. This 
very ‘sharing’ demonstrating the difficulties in not reducing all to what we already know, and to be 
mindful that the meaning generated is a situated meaning. Batchelor and Briggs (1994) suggest that 
this sharing enhances an awareness o f potential ethical dilemmas.
The selection o f the research method was influenced by the researcher’s intention for the research to 
focus on people’s the lived experience, to hear the participant’s story; thus the heuristic method was 
chosen to guide this inquiry primarily as it is a phenomenological research method and the focus is 
on ‘ lived experience’ . The relationship o f the researcher and the research participant is 
acknowledged, and the researcher needs to have experience o f the phenomenon (Moustakas 1990, 
Patton 1990). There appears to be a privileging o f humanness; there is the intention to conduct the 
study with participants or co-researchers as opposed to on them (Scheurich 1997, Lather 1991). Also 
the method correlates with the ontological (relativist), epistemological (interactional subjectivist) 
and methodological (reflexive and dialectical) perspectives o f the research paradigm that informs 
this study.
The selection of one method appears to contradict the recommendation, for multiple methods to 
guide research that encompasses postmodernism (Scheurich 1997, Reinharz 1992, Lather 1991). 
The researcher believes that heuristics can be seen as an eclectic method, for the four stages o f 
representing the findings encompass elements o f  grounded theory (the content analysis o f the 
individual depictions); case study method (exemplary portrait) and discourse analysis (analysis o f 
transcripts. It could be said that multiple methods have been employed. Another possible way of 
looking at this piece o f  research is to acknowledge the multiple stories told; the stories o f the 
participants, the story the researcher made from the analysis o f transcripts which drew on the words 
o f the participants, the story the researcher made o f her understanding o f the phenomenon following 
conducting the inquiry (the creative synthesis). The research report is yet another story; and as 
Scheurich (1997) suggests there are only partial stories; we never arrive at a full story, for in the 
telling o f one story, one story or one voice is privileged.
The humanist stance o f heuristics where the self (of the researcher) is at the centre o f the meaning 
making process is in opposition with the decentred postmodern self, where the self as a phenomenon 
exists in relationship with others. We are all subject to (Sarup 1993). The methodological 
framework that guided this study, incorporated a second cycle o f  interpretation and offered the 
potential o f reviewing heuristics from a post-phenomenological perspective; and to consider the 
implications o f being subject to, and an opening up to the possibility o f  multiple meanings. (This 
will be explored further in the review of the research process that concludes this chapter).
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2. Data generation
The telling o f  the lived experience was shared either through face to face interviews or telephone 
interviews, or via e-mail and written documents. Apart from the written documentation, all 
participants were concerned that the information given was what the researcher wanted to hear. This 
correlates with the view that people like structure in an interview so that they know that they are 
giving the right response (Acker et al 1991). But is this necessarily so? Or is it a cover story on 
behalf o f the researcher to maintain control o f the situation, thereby ensuring that they ‘get’ the right 
data to answer the question they pose? Already there is a closure implied to the meeting with the 
other and hearing their lived experience. Both West (1998) and Sussman (2001) when conducting 
heuristic inquiries used a pre-determined set o f questions to guide the generation o f data. The 
questions selected by West became the headings o f the themes that allegedly emerged from the data. 
Whereas, Sussman (2001:93) states ‘while dialogue cannot be planned, some areas o f  inquiry must 
be outlined in advance’ [researcher’ s emphasis]; she does not however elaborate why. But must we? 
Is the must more about a structure to ensure that the researcher ‘ collects’ data to answer the 
research question the way in which the researcher has decreed beforehand?
Somehow by using a structure there is an element o f certainty created to temper the uncertainty 
created when meeting with an other. Can we meet with an other when conducting research and be 
open to the experience? To not reduce the story told to that which we already know, or presume to 
know? Hence the questions to check out the presumption. Do we only hear the story if it resonates 
with our own story, our take on reality? Gerrish (2000:920) recognises how the ‘ researchers own 
values also impact upon collection and interpretation o f ethnic data’ for as such we interpret from 
our own culture. But it would seem that this sentiment is pertinent to all research, why single out 
ethnic data? If all researchers were more transparent about their personal interest in a study, and the 
methodological, epistemological and ontological aspects were also shared, would there be a need to 
raise this as issue?
An experience that occurred in the process o f this study has reinforced the researcher’s belief in 
letting people tell their own story in their own way. Nearing the end of the data analysis, another 
potential participant made contact, wishing to join in with the study. The initial thought was that it 
would be good because the emerging themes could be checked out, who was imposing a structure 
now! The second thought on including another participant stemmed from the fact that the person 
was interested in being involved, had experience o f living with a facial difference, was a therapist 
and had experience o f personal therapy. The challenge would be to not structure the interview as per 
the emerging themes.
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However, at interview, the person was not happy with the researcher asking only one question; *you 
say what you want and I will respond\ This posed a dilemma; to respond to the research 
participant’s needs appears more in keeping with the underpinning ethos o f this study. However, to 
respond in the way asked would be to skew the storytelling, under the scientific remit the interview 
could be seen to be ‘null and void’ for there would not be parity with the rest o f the data collection. 
There is a tendency for research conducted guided by the ethos o f subjectivity, to be evaluated by 
objective methods (Koch and Harrington 1998, Thorne 1997, Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 
McCutcheon 1990) therefore there is a need for new ways of evaluating the validity and credibility 
o f the findings. One way is for the researcher to share their struggle when re-presenting the other 
(see Kitzinger and Wilkinson 1996).
With this in mind the interview proceeded, the themes that had emerged from the data thus far, 
guided the open-ended questions posed, for example, ‘what was the most helpful aspect o f therapy?’ 
‘what is your experience o f meeting new people?’ The content o f the responses was similar to what 
others had shared. However, the process was different, there was a ‘deadness’ to the story, it was a 
more o f a ‘matter o f  fact’ answer, a story told that followed a linear trajectory. Which contrasted 
with, the spiralling trajectory o f the response that emerged through the process o f  participants telling 
o f their experience. It is possible that the person needs the questions as a framework to ensure that 
they would be heard? For ‘The subject in the act of speaking constructs an interpretation o f  
experience which is consonant with what the researcher wants to hear or risk not being heard’ 
(Crowe 1998:342).
The generation o f  data represents a paradoxical situation for on the one hand the focus o f  the study 
was on the face-to-face encounter (the exploration o f the therapeutic process), and on the other hand 
the main route for data generation was face-less (either telephone conversations or written 
correspondence). This paradox could have been avoided had the researcher focused on the 
experience o f  therapy from the perspective o f the therapist. For instance, she could have used an 
approach similar to Granfanki and McLeod (1999) who recruited people to their study on the helpful 
and hindering aspects o f experiential psychotherapy, by offering twelve free sessions o f therapy to 
people, on the understanding that they were participating in a research project. Thus data would 
have been generated in the face-to-face, and transcripts from actual therapy sessions could have 
been analysed; and the learning intrinsic to this elicited. However, what would have been missing 
would have been the uncovering of people’s stories o f their experience o f  therapy and peoples 
opinion o f therapy. Stories that enabled a picture to be developed o f the issues that may precipitate 
the need for therapy as a means to learning, and reflections on the outcome o f therapy that illustrated 
the effects o f the learning that had emanated through therapy. A multi-dimensional story could be 
told, where there was an exploration o f more than one perspective.
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For the researcher, the face-to-face encounters raised issues o f meeting others with a facial 
difference, o f somehow belonging to the same “club” , in essence there was the potential for a 
reduction to sameness. Belonging to the same group as the research participants can provide an 
access to minority groups, however there is a need to be mindful o f  the ‘ seduction o f sameness’ 
(Hurd and McIntyre 1996: 78). They suggest that sameness can diminish critical reflexivity, and that 
one voice may be privileged over another. But is this not the case with all research? Rather there is a 
need for researchers to be aware o f this inherent tendency, perhaps the inclusion o f a deconstruction 
o f findings is one way o f demonstrating the privileging o f one voice, one view over the other. A 
deconstruction is a way o f  blurring the boundaries between the either or stance; and this could be 
representative o f the messy texts o f  research that Lincoln and Denzin (1994) refer to.
The place o f the researcher in the study needs to be acknowledged (Bola 1996), she suggests that the 
researcher should identify whether or not they belong to the same group as the participants, and to 
explore the implications o f either stance. In this study the three different modes o f data collection 
facilitates this exploration. In the face-to-face encounters there were visible cues o f belonging to the 
same group, and one person contributed to the study because it gave them the opportunity to meet 
with another person with the same facial difference. In telling o f their story, there was a sense o f 
isolation, a sense o f the difference being accentuated because o f  not having had the opportunity o f 
talking with someone else with a facial difference.
In the telephone interviews, there was no face to scrutinise, just the sound of a voice to determine 
sameness or difference. For some people, they would have preferred to have met, but geographical 
location prevented this, and for some the fact that the interview would be via the telephone was a 
contributory factor in taking part in the study, for they would not have to meet with an unknown 
other, a situation which was extremely difficult for them. On the one hand this method o f data 
generation appears impersonal, and yet on the other it enabled the telling o f  the story to an unknown 
and unseen other, like a confessional. Skinner (1998) comments on this when speaking about 
unstructured interviews, and it would seem that with telephone interviews, there is a need for the 
researcher to be mindful that in not being seen this could have the potential to open the floodgates 
for telling one’s story. Getting it o ff one’s chest without having to worry about the impact on the 
other person. As Levinas (1947) suggests it is more difficult to do violence to the other when 
looking into the face o f an other.
One way o f handling this potential situation is to keep the focus on the research question, to bring 
the person back to the puipose o f the interview. In essence to place boundaries to the story telling, 
without this there could be the potential for the interview to become more like a therapy interview 
(Hart and Crawford-Wright 1999, Etherington 1996); the research interview unlike the therapy
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interview does not take place within an ongoing relationship. There is thus the need for the 
researcher to be aware o f the need for support, (Barnitt and Partridge 1999) suggest that follow up 
interviews may be necessary when covering sensitive issues. In this study, none o f the participant’ s 
requested support, this could have been due to the researcher staying within the boundaries imposed. 
An example o f needing to impose the boundary was when there was one instance o f the person 
wanting to off load her views on how awful people were to her, by intervening and restating the aim 
o f the interview was to hear o f her experience o f therapy, the o ff loading stopped. On the one hand 
there is the invitation for people to share their lived experience, and 011 the other hand there are 
boundaries imposed; boundaries that are premised on ethical considerations (Punch 1994).
The e-mail correspondence, was another face-less method o f  data generation, this time there was 110 
voice to determine sameness or difference. Kralik et al (2000) suggest with pen-pal correspondence 
there is a need for the researcher to be thoughtful o f how they respond to the stories shared, for the 
written word can be re-read, and the potential is there for it to be miss-read. However, this can also 
the case with face-to-face encounters. The dilemma is how to respond to this miss-communication, 
with the written word there is no personal contact. In this study, it was for this reason that the person 
participated, and shared how it was much easier to write of her experience than to speak it with 
another person. My responses to her, followed the same as in the other interviews, to respond to 
questions posed, and to seek clarification, for example she had said that therapy had not been 
helpful, and in response to the invitation to say more, the unhelpful part was that she had been 
disappointed at the slow progress, and that she could not express her feelings in the way that she 
thought the therapist wanted her to. Most people did not ask questions, but those that did (three 
people), these were in relation to my own experience o f having a cleft (e.g. had I been teased), these 
responses were in the vein o f yes, 1 had had a similar experience, and then to focus back on the 
research participants lived experience.
The choice o f data generation, either face-to-face, telephone or written correspondence, provided 
people with a choice (for some, geographical location, reduced the choice to either telephone or 
written modes o f data generation). For some this choice was instrumental in their decision to take 
part, perhaps there is a need for researchers to consider different methods o f generating data, rather 
than relying on one method, as this may limit the number o f stories told.
3. Analysis of data
Once the data is collected, Moustakas (1990) advocates the researcher immerses themselves in the 
stories, so much so that it fills every waking moment. West (2001:128) suggests that this stage 
involve ‘ synchronous occurrences when opportunities arise in chance meetings with people to 
explore our research question’ . It is during this immersion that the individual depictions o f the
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research participant stories are read and re-read for the emerging themes; similarities in experiences 
are recognised and grouped together. This need for themes may be foregrounded during the 
generation o f data, and contribute to how the telling o f the story at interview may be structured by 
the researcher to ensure they get the answers they were looking for (Crowe 1998, Reinharz 1992). 
Whereas, Smagorinsky (1994:xii) appears to reach a similar conclusion, but from two differing 
perspectives, he poses the question ‘to what extent had the method itself shaped the data?’ And also 
comments on how ‘the researchers hypotheses and theoretical framework affect the interpretation 
o f the results’ (Smagorinsky 1994:xvii). As such it appears impossible for the researcher to abnegate 
from the process. Rather there is a need for the researcher to be more transparent in the research 
process, by sharing their interpretative lens and questioning their taken-for-granted assumptions 
surrounding research. Garman (1998) refers to this as questioning the stereotypes surrounding 
research, and raises the question o f the use o f personal pronouns instead o f ‘the researcher’ . This 
represents one o f the tensions inherent to this study, on the one hand wishing to use 7 ’ instead of 
‘the researcher’ , and on the other hand recognising that within academia this is not as acceptable 
(Reinharz 1993), also that this could be indicative o f the researcher positioning themselves at the 
centre o f the meaning making process, a process that is not possible without a relationship with and 
to another. Thus it becomes not just the case o f re-presenting the other, but also how to re-present 
the self o f the researcher.
To invite people to share their experience o f a phenomenon was a struggle, for on the one hand there 
was the need to make comparisons between the individual stories told, so that a collective story 
could be told, as such there was the temptation to ensure sameness by asking some questions to 
structure the stories. And on the other hand there was the dilemma o f trusting the process, to let each 
participant tell their story in their own particular way, and hope that there would be an element of 
sameness, that would enable a collective story to be told. There was another possibility, if  all the 
stories were so diverse as to not find consistent commonalties for a collective story, the story of 
diversity could have been told. Research that endorses humanness, needs to remain open to the 
experience o f conducting research, and to be open to what emerges, to tell the story as ‘ how it was’ 
rather than impose closure and tell it ‘how they thought it should be’ . If the researcher knows the 
answer before conducting an inquiry, and skews the data generation and interpretation to meet with 
this ‘ ready made answer’ , why conduct the research? Is research carried out under this guise not a 
form o f violence to the other?
Another potential violence to the other, is to not hear the others story and to generalise from own 
(Reinharz 1992). But how difficult or easy is this in practice? For is there not the potential to reduce 
all that is known to that which we already know; as such there is a closure to the experience o f  the 
other if it does not fall within our interpretative lens. Can we allow for our horizons o f knowing to
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be expanded? An inherent difficulty when conducting heuristic research is the notion that ‘ it is a 
process that encourages the researcher to make a personal connection and relationship to the topic 
which leads to depictions o f essential meanings and its significance to the researcher’ (Etherington 
2001:122). Thus the researcher’ s understanding o f the phenomenon is expanded; their own 
experience being their pre-understanding that they bring to the study, and through the connection 
with the research participants, their pre-understanding is transformed into understanding. But what 
o f the research participants understanding?
West (2001:130) compares grounded theory and heuristic research, and suggests that the 
understanding in the two approaches is significantly different; Tn grounded theory it comes from a 
study o f  the people researched and the data gathered, in heuristic inquiry it is to be found within the 
researcher and elucidated by an intuitive and tacit process o f knowing’ . However, can the 
subjectivity o f the researcher be eliminated in grounded theory? Can the researcher claim that the 
understanding comes from the researched? For is it not the researcher who codifies the transcripts, 
in much the same way as in the first stage o f heuristics. How else can the themes emerge? The self 
o f the researcher is involved; previous experiences cannot be erased in the name o f objectivity.
To illustrate this point, a study by Churchill et al (1998) gave a group o f researchers the same 
interview generated data to codify, the researchers were all involved in the study, and had attended 
the same workshop on how to codify the data. Each presented a different thematic analysis, which is 
not surprising as you cannot eliminate the subjective, each has their own way o f processing 
information and conferring meaning, their own perception, their own take on reality. So how can it 
be that the understanding gained in grounded theory differs from heuristics? Is it more that in 
heuristics the personal tacit dimension is more foregrounded? Whereas, in grounded theory there is 
an attempt to hide behind technical know how?
Another dilemma appears to be in how the data is presented, both West (1998) and Sussman (2001) 
whose heuristic inquiries in the field o f psychotherapy were published, only represented the creative 
synthesis as the findings. The stages in how they had reached this were omitted, and this researcher 
believes that these stages need to be included to demonstrate how the meaning that emerges in the 
study is co-created with the research participants. This omission places the researcher in the centre 
with the potential for the participants lived experience as surplus to requirement.
In writing we objectify (Acker et al 1991). When we sort data into themes we also objectify. Where 
does the researcher’s responsibility to the other begin and end in the research process? Whose lived 
experience is reported on? How can we maintain contact with the subjective? Is it something that is 
only achievable during the meeting with the research participant? In writing can we be mindful to
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re-present their voice in a way that does not dehumanise? It is difficult to re-present the other 
without imposing our template o f  knowing; perhaps in recognising this there is an openness to the 
possibility.
Following on from immersion, is incubation, when the researcher leaves the data alone for new 
insights to enter awareness (illumination). It is at this stage that the researcher needs to trust the 
process (Etherington 2001, West 1998a). There can as such be no time scale to this; it can not be 
forced. The researcher agrees, but also suggests that what is not emphasised is how the researcher 
may be affected by hearing the stories, perhaps further sanitisation of the research process accounts 
for this; for this can be another messy part. For if it is included does it not become more evident that 
there is yet another story inherent to the research process, a story that if untold, removes the 
humanness from the process. Re-reading the transcripts o f the research participants was at times a 
very moving and at times ‘just too much’ . There was a sense o f doing violence to the other, by 
selecting just a snippet o f  their story to include in the study. Research appeared at times seemed to 
be a violent process when drawing on the work o f Levinas; for people shared their stories and then I 
as the researcher would make some sense o f it, a sense that would fit within an established 
framework for research and the stories told being different from the encounter, the encounter that 
can never be re-told, for there is a gap a unbridgeable gap.
There was at times a rawness to the stories told, people were in pain, like the mother whose son had 
the same facial difference as she had, and who had difficulty in coping with him, that he spent four 
days a week in foster care. These experiences were painful to hear, but yet there was also a sense o f 
being privileged to hear them. On the one hand to not be moved by these stories would have been to 
take up the position o f an objectified observer, and on the other hand to be moved was to be open to 
the possibility o f meeting with the other. To not know in advance what may emerge in the 
conversation, to be open to possibility is to be subject to the unconscious. For the study to be 
enriched by unconscious processes (that cannot be appropriated beforehand) rather than 
contaminated by it (where attempts would be made to objectify the process). Breathing life into 
research process requires the researcher to become involved, to engage in the process, to be open to 
the many tensions inherent when struggling to re-present the other.
At times when conducting this inquiry the researcher felt as if she took two steps forward and six 
back, oscillating between yes this is what it is, then no, it is not so. It was difficult to grasp the 
thoughts, to create a sense from the bits o f jigsaw as they emerged. It was tempting to place the 
pieces together in a picture that resonated with ‘ me’ , a bit like when a young child is doing a jigsaw 
and they are determined that the piece in their hand will fit the gap in the picture, and they spend 
ages forcing it into place, miss-shaping the piece in the process. The involvement o f others (e.g.
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academic supervisor, colleagues) in the process o f identifying emerging themes and the subsequent 
analysis can minimise researcher bias (West 1998, Rose 1997), and make known unconscious 
processes (Rowan and Reason 1981); and enhance the study’ s credibility (Thome 1997).
A journal is advocated by Moustakas (1990) to record o f thoughts and feelings that emerge in the 
process o f conducting a heuristic inquiry. The journal maybe referred to in the data analysis (Koch 
and Harrington 1998, Bungay and-Ready 1996); and informs the discussions of the research process 
with others. The researcher’s journal recorded her struggle to stay with the participants stories and to 
not interject ‘that it does not have to be this way’ , the researcher acknowledges that this would be 
imposing her frame o f reference, rather than hearing their stories. Personal therapy became an 
important venue for exploring my need to interject, and the effect the stories were having, some 
resonating, some providing food for thought. What if a forum for these types o f discussions is not 
possible? Or what if there is no recognition o f this potential need? How then does the researcher stay 
with the struggle o f accepting the stories o f the other? Perhaps when this is difficult the researcher 
resorts to structuring the way the story is told, so as to protect themselves from the unknowing that 
may emerge in the process o f exploring the phenomenon o f a study. Perhaps the use o f  the word 
explore, should be more prevalent in research rather than questioning which implies an answer that 
may be partially known in advance, whereas exploration is an invitation to discover.
4. Primary construction
The presentation o f the findings that emerged in the study (themes, composite depiction, and 
exemplary portrait) represent the many layering o f understanding gained during the analysis o f the 
data; it was a back and forth process. What was interesting was that although the participants had 
shared their experience in response to the one question posed ‘ can you tell o f  your experience o f ... ’ 
there were commonalties in what they spoke about, all the themes were represented in some form in 
each individual depiction. There was a difference in how the stories were told, people who had had 
therapy, appeared more philosophical about their experience, recognising how they influenced 
interactions with others, how it was not all down to the other person. This contrasted with people 
who had not had therapy but were expressing their opinion o f therapy, and in so doing shared their 
experience o f either living with a facial difference or having given birth to a child with a facial 
difference. These stories focused more on how it was the other people who created the problems, it 
was the others who needed to accept them. Possibly projecting onto others what they were having 
difficulty with themselves; in consequence the other seemed hostile, not there for them.
The selection o f dialogue to represent how the themes emerged from the data, was difficult. By 
taking a section out o f context, the potential is there to change the meaning, for ‘ all language can 
always be read as saying other than intended by the speaker’ (McQuillan 2000:314).
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Even the reading o f the transcripts and notes was open to this dilemma, for the text is open to 
multiple interpretations (Howells 1999, Bennington 1994, Norris 1982). Does the researcher read 
into the text that which is not there? One way of eliminating this was to share the individual 
depictions with the participants. Another way is by being mindful o f potential contradictions in re­
presenting the other, and by sharing these with the unknown reader, it is a way of being more 
transparent, and supports the recognition that the meaning derived from the study is the best 
approximation o f  the ‘truth’ as it was for the researcher at the time of the study.
This approximation can also be extended to the generation of data, for example, interviewing 
participants on a different day, a different story may be told. Change the interviewer, and yet another 
story may be told, these possibilities become thinkable, speakable when we acknowledge that 
meaning making is difficult to grasp, for it is not a commodity, it exists in the minds o f the 
interlocutors involved. When humanness is privileged over science, it is a messy process that can 
not be packaged as a repeatable product. There is an aliveness to the process, a willingness to 
explore and engage in the process. Perhaps this is why Moustakas (1990) suggests there is a need Ra­
the researcher to be passionate about the phenomenon o f the study.
The creative synthesis is representative o f the researcher’ s understanding o f  the phenomenon, the 
sense she made from hearing the stories o f the research participants. Moustakas (1990) suggests that 
there is a need to rely on tacit knowing, intuitive knowing, and for this to emerge there is a need to 
‘switch o f f ,  he refers to this stage as incubation. There is a need for the researcher to trust the 
process (West 1998) it cannot be hurried. The sharing of the ‘ felt’ sense the researcher was making 
o f  the data generated, enabled her to recognise when she was providing closure, reducing to what 
was already known, rather than staying with the uncertainty, and questioning and exploring the 
meaning making process.
This process has the potential to be infinite, for when does a researcher stop? What if the researcher 
had stopped when she first had a sense o f a ‘this is it’ ? It is difficult to put a time-scale to this 
activity (West 1998a, Moustakas 1990). How does one know when enough is enough? Difficult 
questions, without definitive answers. Although the data has been analysed and presented, there is 
thus the supposition made that it is complete, however, this is not necessarily the case. For what o f 
the interplay o f unconscious processes, in our ability to make sense o f our world? To state that the 
definitive has been reached, is to ignore the unconscious. With further experience, there is the 
potential for a different reading to be made. By including another cycle o f  interpretation, there was 
the opportunity for the researcher to further expand the understanding o f the phenomenon by 
presenting a secondary construction.
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5. Secondary construction
This stage o f the research process was undertaken following a further period o f incubation. There is 
no method for deconstruction (Burman 1998, Derrida 1996), the researcher chose to look at two key 
phrases from the creative synthesis and to unpack them, and in so doing see the phrase in a different 
light. The process was an exploration of the taken-for-granted assumptions surrounding the phrases. 
The first phrase was ‘ facial difference need not define the person’ and the second ‘ psychotherapy is 
a reparative discourse for a return to learning from experience’ .
By focusing on language there is recognition o f how there is always a gap between the terms 
‘ signifier’ and ‘signified’ ; for they do not represent a concrete entity, rather they are abstract, and 
each person will ascribe a meaning to them. This ascribing o f meaning first occurs during the 
process o f socialisation, the child learns the language of the parents. However, this learning is 
premised on the parents learning experience o f language acquisition. The child prior to the entry into 
language can experience their experience; however, with the entry into language there is an 
interruption to this process, for experience is mediated through language.
Through socialisation the child learns someone else’s experience o f the world; there is as such an 
interruption to learning from experience. During this process there is a relegation to the unconscious 
the tensions between the reality and pleasure principle; tensions that the ego cannot tolerate. 
Consigned to the unconscious they remain unknown at a conscious level, however, these tensions 
continue to exert an influence on behaviour, there is as such an interruption to learning from 
experience. Through the process of therapy, the unconscious influences on behaviour can be made 
known, and worked through. Therapy can provide a reparative discourse to enable a return to 
learning from experience; for in the process o f therapy the person relearns their personal language, 
and the sense they make of their experience. A key issue for the person with facial difference is the 
recognition that the term is erroneous, for it exists in the minds o f people. Therapy provides people 
with the opportunity o f exploring their meaning making perspectives, and working through 
distortions in meaning making; to return to learning from experience.
As a process, deconstruction enabled the researcher to further explore the meaning generated in the 
primary construction, to identify the taken-for-granted assumptions and to gain a different 
perspective. The author concurs with Butler’s (1990:xi) view, that when exploring the meaning o f  a 
text there is ‘ no guarantee that unravelling would ever stop’ . For each exploration has the potential 
for new meaning to emerge. Through conversation with other people about this study and the 
sharing o f the sense I was attempting to make o f it, also provided opportunities for new meanings to 
emerge, sometimes there was a clarification o f  ideas, or the uncovering o f another perspective to the 
study. Research, as an activity should not take place in isolation.
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Each exploration has the potential for a different story to be told, in this study, the inclusion o f two 
cycles o f interpretation, provides the possibility o f at least three different stories being told. Firstly, 
there is the meeting o f the researcher with the research participant, secondly the primary 
construction is the story o f  the researcher’s sense o f the data, and thirdly there is the story o f the 
secondary construction. It could be said that all research is about narrative, if a narrative is taken to 
be stories about action (Bruner 1990, Polkinghorne 1988). With encompassing an interactional 
subjective perspective in the paradigm that guides this study, the view o f Botella and Herroro 
(2000:417) would seem pertinent, for narratives encompass ‘the relationships we constitute and that, 
in turn, constitute us’ . Narrative then become context specific, the research process is a narrative 
grounded in the sense the researcher makes o f conducting a research inquiry. An inquiry that has the 
potential to produce multiple narratives, for ‘stories are multiple; there is always more than one 
story’ (McQuillan 2000:3). It is to be hoped that the stories told here have not ‘ remained dependent 
upon ever the same old stories’ (Booth et al 1999:273). For do so would to not be open to 
exploration, questioning, for to embrace the notion of multiple meanings is to remain open to the 
possibility o f infinite interpretations. Rather than reach a definite conclusion, a tentative conclusion 
can be drawn; research, as a process is infinite. For the story told is a partial story (Scheurich 1997); 
it should always be work in progress; work that will never arrive at a definitive destination; just a 
temporary respite.
The next section is the review o f the research process, another story integral to this research process; 
one that builds on from, and concludes the story o f the research critique.
6. Review of the research process
The development o f a methodology to conduct this study, formed a major strand to this study, it 
could be said that without it the findings may not have come out the way they have. The question 
that the researcher now considers is why was there a need to develop a research methodology for 
this study, why not pick up a ready formulated methodology? A good question, for on the one hand 
there is a sense o f  how this could have made the study a lot easier, for the prevarication’s on which 
and what method to choose at this moment in time seems infinitely easier than what took place. So 
what did take place?
A key aspect to the study was how to represent the other, and how to be mindful o f the inevitable 
gaps that occurs in the process o f translating the ‘ saying’ to the ‘said’ . How to speak o f the tensions 
inherent in this process? How to privilege humanness over science and technology? Where 
humanness is about embodiment, and the reconciliation o f the mind body dichotomy. That 
embodiment is neither one nor the other, but a blurring o f  the boundaries. The process of 
psychotherapy is an inherently human activity, one that is premised on the relationship developed
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between the client and the therapist. How can this meeting be represented for unknown others? 
Usually it is a private activity, but with the increase o f professionalisation and evidence-based 
practice, the practitioner is called to account for their practice. This very human activity has been, at 
times, reduced to mechanisation, technologisation in the name o f scientific rigour, to determine the 
efficacy o f  such practices. Whilst the researcher can at one level acknowledge the need for some 
form o f regulation o f practice, and consideration o f how research may inform practice, the question 
explored was how to study this intrinsically human activity, without reducing it in the name of 
scientific rigour to a mechanised activity. Where mechanisation would be to focus on repeatability, 
predictability, in a sense a de-humanisation. How to breath life into the process o f research? To re- 
huinanise research, an activity that involves acknowledging intersubjectivity.
How to bring in humanness and for it not to be seen as the poor relation; that this is not ‘proper’ 
research? How to challenge the dominant voice? A theme that informs the concept o f facial 
difference, a minority group. In both cases it is the dominant group that claims the authority, that 
legitimises its position over the minority. For example, the positivistic research paradigm informs 
how research per se should be measured, or defines what constitutes research (see Guba 1990). The 
post-positivistic paradigm has flourished, is flourishing, is expanding (see Denzin and Lincoln 1998, 
1994), and yet the ground on which arguments and discussions are premised are within the language 
o f the positivists.
There is a corollary here with how the person with a facial difference, is defined, assigned a place in 
the community by comparison with/against those with non-facial difference, those without the label 
facial difference, are the standard against which the minority group is measured. In the attempt for 
sameness, for parity, the majority voice is heard, the minority voice silenced. It is those without 
facial difference who name the difference, or legitimises their position in deference to the minority. 
The practice o f psychotherapy could be seen be mirror this, for whose voice is privileged? Does the 
therapist assume the stance o f the one who knows? Their professionalisation and studying placing 
them in a powerful position. In deconstructing psychotherapy, Parker (1999) acknowledges the need 
to shift from looking at the ‘problem’ o f the client, but rather to be open to exploring why they tell 
the story they way they do, what has influenced the story being told that particular way. Larner 
(1999) talks about the issue o f power and the need for the therapist to debase themselves o f this, or 
to question the how and why o f taking up this stance o f knowing. This appears to be particularly so 
with postmodernism there is a sense o f never knowing; that knowing is the wrong question; it is 
about being open to the possibility o f  uncertainty.
How to work with these tensions between the positivists and post-positivists positions o f research? 
The view o f Stanley and Wise’s (1993) is particularly relevant here, for they suggest that there is a
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need to work with the blurring o f the boundaries o f the binary opposites, that it is neither this not 
that, but a blurring, a merging. In a sense, this merging could be seen to be what emerges when a 
different stance is taken, when there is an exploration o f the majority and minority perspectives. 
Whereas, Fine (1998) refers to the need for reworking the hyphen, in a sense there is an exploration 
o f  the in-between, the position between ‘ it5 being neither one nor the other.
In relation to research, it could be said that positivism represents the mind, and post-positivism 
represents the body, the question becomes how to embody research? Whereby there is a situation 
created where it is not one nor the other, but a blurring o f the boundaries. Or put it another way to 
not throw the baby out with the bath water, where the ‘ baby’ is the dominant voice in the research 
community, i.e. science. However, the privileging o f  the minority voice is not at the exclusion of 
the majority, for this stance perpetuates the either or stance, rather than embracing a blurring of 
boundaries. Leicester (2000) refers to the blurring o f boundaries in the field o f education as post- 
postmodemism, whereby there is a recognition o f both traditional teaching and the grand narratives, 
and o f facilitation and local narratives.
As Derrida (1998) suggests there is nothing new, something always builds on something else. There 
is a need, the researcher suggests, o f  identifying the building bricks to the new, so that the new is 
seen as a progression. For research to be seen as a process as opposed to a product; that the practice 
o f research is not premised on taken-for-granted assumption on how research should be carried out, 
rather there is a need for the process to be deconstructed, and the components, the constituents o f 
research made known. From this knowing, research is re-visioned, knowledge o f the process is 
foregrounded rather than assumed.
Prior to undertaking research, or perhaps the first step in research should be an exploration o f how 
the researcher makes sense o f their phenomenal world. For this perspective informs the research 
paradigm. A paradigm that comprises o f three interdependent elements, ontological, epistemological 
and methodological perspectives. The ontological perspective, considers issues/concepts o f reality. 
From a Heideggerian perspective this would be the nature o f Being, or Daesin, our being in the 
world. Whereas from a research perspective, the view o f Guba and Lincoln (1994) is that ontology 
is the nature o f reality, as if it is something removed from the person, that reality exists possibly 
outside o f us, that we can in essence remove ourselves from reality for we are not a part o f it; 
possibly this is the scientific take on ontology. For Levinas ethics precedes ontology, for there to be 
a question o f being, we are already ‘being’ for there is a consciousness, whereas, ethics as preceding 
ontology is an unconscious state, a pre-reflective state. It is suggested here that there is a need for 
the researcher to grapple, to struggle with this phenomenon, what is their take on reality? How do 
they perceive the relationship between the knower and what can be known; the epistemological
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perspective o f a research paradigm. Is it an objective stance (positivism) or subjective stance (post­
positivism)? It is argued here that the subject cannot be totally objectified in the name o f  scientific 
rigour, for the subject selects the research question, the research method, and writes up the findings.
Can we in essence offer a mechanised view o f what we apprehend? Descartes postulated that man 
could separate out the mind and body, where the mind became the rational discourse and the body 
the irrational, where the mind is masculine, and the body feminine, where consciousness is rational, 
and unconscious is irrational. Man in his quest to know, castrated himself from knowing in the 
feeling domain, he became a machine, there was an attempt to reduce everything to what could be 
explained, rationalised. Any questioning o f this was rejected due to the dominance o f  the scientific 
discourse. The film A.I. (artificial intelligence) currently on release, is premised on how man 
created the ultimate machine, a robot that was capable of feeling. But man created his own demise, 
the machines took over the world. Science had gone a step to far, annihilation. A stance that can be 
seen in a comment by Nietzsche (1882:36) ‘thirsty for reason, want to look at our experiences as 
fixedly in the eye as a scientific experiment, hour by hour, day after day. We ourselves want to be 
our own experiments and vivisectional animals’ . In essence we wanted it all.
How can we know what we know, is the domain of the methodological perspective. Positivists 
appear to focus more on the methods o f a study, rather than the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological perspectives, these are as such taken-for-granted assumptions. To a lesser degree it 
could be said that the post-positivists also focus on the methods; there is however, the recognition 
o f how the self o f the researcher impacts on the subject/topic studied. One way of looking at this is 
Buber’s conceptualisation o f relationships, the view of positivists is the ‘ I-It’ relationship, the 
researcher as 7 ’ objectify the other in the name of scientific rigour. The post-positivists is the ‘ I- 
Thou’ relationship, where the researcher as T  meets with another subject, and is influenced by, and 
influences the encounter. There is a tendency for it to be a symmetrical relationship based on notions 
o f modernity, the self at the centre o f the meaning making process.
The blurring o f the boundaries between positivists and post-positivists is messy, for it is suggested 
here that the relationship is premised on the postmodern de-centred self. Where the self is not a 
known entity, but rather emerges in the in-between, where there is an interplay o f  conscious and 
unconscious processes. The known self is a misnomer with postmodernism, rather there is a 
multiplicity o f selves, dependent on ‘who’ the self is interacting with.
The intention o f this study was to privilege humanness over science and technology, and that part o f 
this process was for the researcher to make known previous experiences, experiences that inform her 
interpretative lens, from this it could be made known how this lens informs the development o f  a
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research paradigm to guide the research process. A methodological framework was developed to be 
tested out in this study, a framework that is supported by the research paradigm; they are thus 
mutually inclusive.
The methodological framework in keeping with the ethos o f embracing a multiplicity o f meanings, 
includes a second cycle o f  interpretation. There is the potential for the understanding generated in 
the primary construction to be re-interpreted with the second construction. There is also the potential 
for the selected research method, to be re-interpreted from a postmodern perspective. In this study, 
the heuristic method is expanded to include a deconstruction o f the meaning generated in the 
creative synthesis. There is a shift from meaning generated by the modernist self, the self at the 
centre o f the meaning making process, to considering the de-centred self, a self that is subject to. 
Heuristics is viewed as a post-phenomenological method, and is as such post-heuristic.
With a post-heuristic method there is a move away from the researcher’s understanding as the 
central focus o f  the meaning generated to recognising how the researcher is subject to the meaning 
that evolves; the meaning/understanding emanating from/within the in-between of the researcher 
and the researched; researcher and the data; researcher and the text. In sharing their process o f 
meaning making via a critique o f the research process, a researcher can increase transparency, and 
demonstrate the tensions inherent when representing the other.
In this study, the research was undertaken with a ‘knowable product’ the heuristic method premised 
in modernism, and the researcher viewed it from a postmodern perspective; there was thus an 
element o f an unknownness to the process; there was a need to be open to what might emerge in the 
process o f exploration. But is this just another cover story? For did not the researcher find what she 
was looking for -  that therapy is a form o f learning? On the one hand the answer is yes, for it was 
evident in the lived experiences shared that therapy had changed a person’s perspective o f their 
situation, thus therapy was a form o f  learning. And on the other hand the answer is no, for therapy is 
not a form of learning rather it is a means to learning. A subtle difference, the first implies that there 
is a ‘ form’ a knowable/definable product to learning; in this study it was in the domain o f  
significant, transformative and emotional learning. Whereas, a ‘means’ is an unknowable/ 
indefinable process o f learning, what can be established are the givens to this learning, i.e. the 
therapeutic context. The unknown is the meeting of the client and therapist in the moment with each 
other.
To make a preference for either ‘ form’ or ‘means’ to learning, would be to privilege one term over 
the other, and be a replay o f  the binary opposites, either product vs. process, or process vs. product; 
whereas, a blurring o f the boundaries would be representative o f a process - product - process.
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Where the process is the saying (the in the moment experience between client and therapist) and the 
product is the said (the re-telling o f this moment; naming this moment as learning). However, the 
said is also a process when premised on the notion o f a multiplicity o f meanings, for each ‘said’ has 
the potential o f being formed/created through another form of ‘ saying’ ; thus a blurring o f 
boundaries is represented by process - product - process - ad infinitum.
A post-heuristic approach to research can represent a way o f looking at lived experience that is 
mindful o f the multiplicity o f  meaning and the need to work with the binary opposites where there is 
a temporary privileging o f one term. In re-presenting the researcher’s saying (the experience o f the 
research exploration) there is a translation to the said (the naming o f the understanding gained 
during the research exploration) there will always be a remainder, a gap that cannot be bridged. 
However, a researcher that is mindful o f this gap can work with it rather than denying it. A post­
heuristic research approach is one way o f acknowledging and working with this gap. A critique o f 
the research process is another way o f working with this gap, for in the process the researcher shares 
their struggle o f re-presenting the other.
Conclusion
This critique followed the stages o f the methodological framework developed for and tested out in 
this study. Initially the research design and method was explored, this was premised on humanness 
and the question o f how can a researcher conduct research that is mindful o f  the other, and not to 
reduce what is apprehended with what is already known. Humanness is subjectivity, but it can be 
erased in deference to objectivity, and the subjectivity o f the researcher negated in the name of 
scientific rigour. The research paradigm developed for this study is cognisant with the researcher’s 
interpretative lens; the creation o f  meaning is a dialectical and reflexive activity; it is an interactional 
subjective process and the meaning generated is context specific. This paradigm informs the 
methodological framework developed to guide the research process. A process structured on the 
heuristic method, a method that provided coherency to the data generation and analysis.
In acknowledging the multiplicity o f meanings that can emerge through the process o f research, the 
methodological framework comprised o f two cycles o f interpretation, this provided an opportunity 
for the heuristic method be explored further, and expanded to a post-heuristic method. A method 
that includes a deconstruction o f the creative synthesis (the final stage o f a heuristic analysis); to 
read between the lines, to identify which term/voice is privileged (in the text) and which is 
marginalised (relegated to the margins), There is thus a temporary privileging of one term/voice, 
temporary for it to be permanent is to maintain the status quo, a recreation o f binary opposites.
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A critique o f the research process offers a further potential to demonstrate that the meaning 
generated through the research process is open to further interpretation, further meanings. The 
research report is representative o f the researcher’s understanding o f  the phenomenon o f  a study at 
the time o f writing. There is an openness to research as being work in progress. The methodological 
framework developed and tested out in this study supports this view; and there was a privileging o f 
humanness.
A summary o f  the study as work in progress is provided in the next chapter.
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Introduction
The aim o f this chapter is to provide a summary o f the study, firstly the three main areas o f 
the study will be reviewed; research methodology, therapy as a means to learning and facial 
difference. The implications arising from the study are also included in each o f the three 
sections. Areas for further study are then identified. The researcher’s personal experience o f 
the phenomenon of the study was shared in chapter four as this was integral to the 
inteipretative lens she brought to the study; as such this was her pre-understanding that 
informed the research process. In this concluding chapter, I (the researcher) will share the 
changes to this personal knowing as a result o f conducting this research inquiry; my current 
understanding. A summary o f the study concludes this chapter.
1. Research methodology
As discussed in the previous chapter, the researcher developed a research paradigm for this 
study; one that is cognisant with the researcher’s interpretative lens. A lens that was 
premised on the theories and perspectives o f phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalytic 
theory, postmodernism, feminism and ethics. Phenomenology encompasses the concept o f 
the lived experience and description (Spinelli 1989), whereas hermeneutics includes 
interpretation. An interpretation based on how understanding is generated through a 
reflective process, whereby previous understanding is the pre-understanding that underpins 
the next cycle o f  interpretation, from which new understanding emerges. This then becomes 
the pre-understanding to the next cycle o f interpretation. There is thus the potential for 
expanding the horizons o f  knowing (Gadamer 1989).
Psychoanalytic theory can provide a way o f looking at relationships, and how relationships 
are premised on both conscious and unconscious processes (see Bateman and Holmes 1995, 
Symmington 1986). Relationships are dependent on transference (Freud 1915), we transfer 
past feelings and thoughts onto future situations; in a sense there is a questioning can we ever 
meet in the moment? Or are we destined to re-create the old, the familiar? Can we be open to 
experience? Where to be open is to welcome uncertainty and exploration, an exploration that 
may lead to a temporary answer, temporary, for when an openness to experience is embraced, 
there is the potential for this answer to be subjected to further revision/amendment in light o f 
future experience.
Chapter Ten
Summary and implications o f the study
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A postmodern perspective incorporates the notion o f a multiplicity o f meanings (Robinson 
1999). Modernism is premised on a knowable subject, whereas, postmodernism embraces the 
concept o f an unknowable subject, for we are always subject to (Sarup 1993). A feminist 
perspective challenges the male dominance o f society, how in language there is a privileging 
o f the masculine, and a silencing o f  the feminine (Reinharz 1993, Lather 1991, Stanley and 
Wise 1979).
The ethical stance o f Levinas, is premised on the responsibility to the other, an ethics that 
precedes ontology, it is a pre-reflective knowing, an unconscious knowing (Peperzak 1993, 
Bernasconi 1988). Can we meet with the other in the face-to-face encounter, and 
acknowledge our responsibility for the other? Can we be open to the other and not reduce to 
the same? Or to put it another way, to not evaluate the other against what we know, but to be 
before the other without presupposition. To not interpret, where to interpret is to reduce, to 
categorise.
All the theories and perspectives support a preference for understanding to be an in the 
moment experience, also there needs to be an openness to the experience o f the other. 
Meaning making emerges in the in-between, and known to those present. Any attempts at 
recounting this moment o f in-betweeness is an attempt to reduce to what is already known; in 
the translation o f the ‘saying’ to the ‘ said’ there is always a remainder, that which cannot be 
spoken about (Peperzak 1993, Llewelyn 1988, Blanchot 1986, Cohen 1986). The 
implications for research is that meaning making is context specific, and there is the need to 
be mindful o f meaning emerging in the in-between. There is a need for a research approach 
that privileges humanness over science and technology.
The researcher’s interpretative lens informed the research paradigm developed for this study. 
The paradigm comprised o f an ontological perspective o f relativism, whereby reality is 
context specific. The epistemological perspective was interactional subjective, meaning is 
created through a relationship, there is a relationship between the subject and knowing; 
knowing is not independent o f the person. The self o f the researcher is involved and subject 
to, the meaning making process. The researcher exerts an affect on the meaning generated. 
The methodological perspective was reflexive and dialectical, in that meaning making is 
possible through reasoning and achieved through a back and forth process. A process that 
promotes the emergence o f meaning in the in-between.
There was a blurring o f the epistemological and methodological perspectives, in that the 
meaning emerges in-between subjects. There was also a blurring o f the ontological
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perspective, for meaning is created within a context, the meeting o f the researcher and the 
researched and emerges in the in-between, through a reflexive and dialectical process. Each 
perspective is mutually interdependent, there is a multi-layering o f perspectives.
The incorporation of a double cycle o f interpretation, o f the methodological framework 
supports the notion o f the situatedness o f meaning generation; together with meaning 
emerging in the in-between, through a dialectical and reflexive process. The first cycle 
represented the meaning that emerged in-between the researcher and the research data. Prior 
to this analysis o f data, there was a relationship between the researcher and the research 
participant; meaning generated in that in-between created the generation o f ‘data’ . The data 
was analysed by the researcher and the meaning that emerged was represented in the primary 
construction. That meaning became the pre-understanding of the second cycle o f 
interpretation, which was premised on a relationship between the researcher and the text. A 
deconstruction o f the findings was undertaken, in an attempt to question the privileged voice 
(Howells 1999, Derrida 1996, Bennington 1994). The secondary construction was generated 
by a deconstruction o f the creative synthesis from the primary construction.
The deconstruction was premised on language and the impossibility o f the message sent 
being the one received, for there are ‘gaps’ in the generation o f meaning; we are subject to 
the limits o f language. The deconstruction attempted to make known some of these ‘gaps’ or 
slippage’ s in meaning. There was as such a re-working o f the binary opposites inherent in 
the text. The cycle o f interpretation could have been repeated infinitely but to bring the study 
to closure, a critique o f the research process was provided. The intention o f the critique was 
to make more transparent the researcher’s understanding gained during the process o f  
inquiry, to highlight the inherent tensions when re-presenting the other. Also it was an 
attempt to demonstrate how research can become work in progress, and how the researcher 
attempted to remain open to this exploratory process.
Heuristics was the research method chosen to generate data for analysis. An approach from 
the modernist frame, whereas, the inclusion o f a second cycle o f interpretation through a 
deconstruction o f the text, locates the approach within the postmodern frame. Subsequently, 
the method employed was post-heuristic, and the self o f the researcher is not at the centre o f  
the meaning making process, they are subject to it. A critique o f the research process is an 
integral component o f post-heuristics as this provides the opportunity for exploring and 
questioning the research process. To make known the tensions inherent in the process o f 
attempting to re-present the other.
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The development o f a research paradigm and methodological framework for this study, 
enabled an exploration o f some o f the taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin the 
research process. In making more open this process there is a sense o f an increase in 
credibility; the study speaks for itself, there is as such no need to elaborate on the issues o f 
validity, reliability, repeatability, generalisabilty. For these are the tools o f making the 
opaque transparent in a scientific way. When a study embraces humanness over science and 
technology there is a need to explore different ways o f determining ‘ trustworthiness’ 
(McLaren and Kincheloe 1994, Reinharz 1993, Lather 1991).
The implication o f postmodernism for research is that there is a need to recognise how 
knowledge is generated within a specific context . Therefore there is a need for a change in 
how a researcher approaches the research process. There is a need for researcher’s to make 
known their interpretative lens, together with an exploration o f the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological perspectives that inform the research paradigm within 
which a study is situated. To share how the research process unfolds, with the privileging o f 
humanness and subjectivity, there is also a privileging o f transparency over opacity.
2. Therapy as a means to learning
The intention of this study was to open up a conversation of therapy as a form of learning. 
One way o f establishing this was to ask people to share their experience o f  therapy and from 
this to elicit the learning experiences. To speak o f their learning experiences would have 
provided foreclosure to their experience, rather the aim was to elicit the lived experience 
(heuristic approach) and from this the researcher would identify the learning experiences. To 
assist with this identification, there was an exploration o f approaches to learning that were 
considered to be cognisant with the underpinning ethos o f the study, a privileging o f 
humanness. The three approaches to learning that the researcher considered correlated with 
the intentions o f  therapy were significant learning (Rogers 1967); learning that is relevant to 
the person, they are active in the meaning making process. Transformative learning 
(Mezirow 1990), whereby previous learning is transformed through the reflective process 
intrinsic to this form of learning, distortions in previous learning experiences can be 
uncovered and worked through. Emotional learning whereby a language for speaking of 
emotions is considered helpful for forming relationships with others, and for informing 
decision making and problem solving activities (see Bar-On and Parker 2000, Quigley and 
Barrett 1999).
It was possible to identify elements o f learning in the analysis o f the data generated. This 
identification was located within the researcher’ s frame o f reference, and on the one hand,
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this appeared to be in contradiction to the ethos o f the study, whereby meaning emerges in 
the in-between the researcher and research participant, it is their experience o f the 
phenomena not what the researcher thought happened. But on the other hand, had they been 
asked to share their learning experiences it could be that their interpretation o f  learning could 
be more situated in the modernist, traditional frame o f learning, whereby the teacher imparted 
knowledge to the students, and translating this to therapy could be how the therapist taught 
them. Also there is a view that learning is synonymous with life experience and how a 
broader picture o f learning could be established if the word was not used.
The first cycle o f interpretation demonstrated how therapy can be seen to be a form o f 
learning; where previous learning experiences can create templates for evaluating future 
experience. Distortions in meaning making perspectives were created, and these became 
barriers to learning from experience. Through the therapeutic process, there is an uncovering 
o f  barriers to learning, and a dismantling o f them, to enable a return to learning from 
experience. In this process there was evidence o f significant, transformative and emotional 
learning. Therapy offers the opportunity to return to learning from experience (Loewenthal 
1999).
The second cycle o f interpretation demonstrated how learning also encompasses conscious 
and unconscious processes; processes that cannot be appropriated by naming a particular 
theory. Therefore, therapy is not a form o f learning, rather it is a means to learning; for a 
return to learning from experience. The first interruption to learning from experience, takes 
place with the entry into language, the speaking subject (see Lacan 1988, 1977). Through 
this socialisation process the subject learns another person’s (initially the parents) way of 
experiencing the world. They learn to interpret their experience dependent on the 
experiencing o f  the other person, there is thus the potential for an intergenerational 
transmission o f  distortions in learning. The ability to think one’s own thoughts and to 
experience one’s experience is subjugated in the name o f the dominant voice. There is as 
such a marginalisation o f their own experience; and there is an interruption to learning from 
experience. Therapy enables the minority voice to be privileged and offers the potential for a 
return to learning from experience.
A model was developed to assist others to look at therapy as a means to learning. It was 
acknowledged that it was not possible to come up with a definitive view, for this was a 
contradiction to privileging humanness. However, what could be identified were the 
parameters, the givens o f the therapeutic encounter. This then allows for the potential o f a 
space being opened up, a space for meaning to emerge in the in-between, in-between the
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therapist and the client; for a return to learning from experience. The givens are the 
contractual issues pertaining to the therapeutic relationship, (e.g. time, venue, cost) and the 
therapists training and experience o f providing and receiving therapy as a means to learning. 
The name given here for this kind o f therapeutic experience was therapeia. In the meeting o f 
the client and therapist, the outcome of the encounter cannot be known beforehand, or 
afterhand, for it can only be apprehended in the moment. In the recounting o f  the experience 
there will always be a remainder .that cannot be elucidated. If there is no remainder, then 
therapeia has not taken place.
Within the therapeutic relationship it is possible to determine a continuum o f relationships; 
the therapist may be ready for an ethical relation but is the client? Can the client enter into a 
relationship with the therapist? Or do they relate to self and others as objects? Perhaps there 
is a need for clients to first learn how they relate with self and others before the ethical 
relation is possible. Buber’s (1965) concept o f relating can be a helpful way o f  exploring 
how the client relates to the therapist and how they relate with others. The ‘ I-It’ relationship 
is premised on relating to the self and other as an object; the ‘ I-Thou’ relationship the self 
and other as subjects. The next stage would be a ‘subject to’ and the recognition o f  a 
multiplicity o f  meanings.
The therapeutic relationship can be identified as a learning milieu that may provide the 
potential for a change in how the client perceives their self and how they relate with and to 
others. In the early stages the transition from an ‘ I-It’ relationship to an ‘ I-Thou’ relationship 
it may be possible to identify aspects o f significant, transformative and emotional learning; to 
recognise a shift from non-reflective to reflective learning. The shift from reflective to pre- 
reflective learning is learning that cannot be named but apprehended in the moment. 
Therapeia provides a possibility for therapy to be a means to learning; a return to learning 
from experience.
The model developed as a way o f viewing therapy as a means to learning may generate 
further conversations with therapists, between therapists on the implications for their practice 
when positioning therapy as a means o f teaching and learning. When knowledge creation is 
recognised as being context specific, there is the potential for therapists to be acknowledged 
as creators o f situated knowledge (ICvale 1992); knowledge that could be made known to 
other practitioners so that it may inform their work (see Rowland and Goss 2000, Horvarth 
and Greenberg 1994) this may generate further conversations about the nature o f therapeutic 
knowledge.
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3. Facial difference
Within the field o f facial difference it is acknowledged that there is no correlation between 
the size or cause o f the disfigurement and the level o f psychological difficulties encountered 
(Robinson 1997a, Bull and Rumsey 1988, MacGregor 1984). Counselling/psychotherapy is 
recognised as being an approach that may enable people to cope (Turner et al 1998, 
McGrouther 1997, Edwards 1997, Partridge 1997, Bradbury 1996). However, information on 
the specific nature on what a person may bring to therapy, hence the specific nature o f their 
difficulties, or the experience o f therapy from people with a facial difference is lacking in the 
literature available. This study therefore provides new information and adds to the body o f 
knowledge on facial difference and the implications o f therapy as a means to learning.
The intention was to explicate the lived experience o f therapy for this client group, and from 
this to discern the learning experiences inherent to the process o f therapy. As the population 
size o f this group was an unknown entity, it was decided to include additional perspectives; 
from therapists working in the field o f facial difference, and people with a facial difference 
who have not had therapy but have an opinion on the place o f therapy, likewise people living 
with someone with a facial difference may also have experience or opinion o f the place for 
therapy. There were thus two broad areas o f focus, therapist and client experience o f therapy, 
and experiences that may precipitate the need for therapy.
The perspective gained from interviewing therapists (working in the field o f facial 
difference) and clients (people with a facial difference) provided hitherto unreported 
information on the presenting issues o f this client group. There was a correlation between the 
therapist and client’s perspectives on what a person with a facial difference may bring to 
therapy. Overall it was recognised that therapy was initiated following some event that 
brought into focus their difficulties in coping with their appearance and the reactions o f the 
general public to their facial difference.
The experience o f  therapy provided people with an opportunity to explore their thoughts and 
feelings surrounding their appearance and the responses from others. The therapist was 
identified as being interested in hearing their concerns, providing support and providing a 
place where they could talk. Through this process there was a change in perspective; previous 
distortions in perception emanating from previous learning experiences were challenged and 
worked through. Thoughts and feelings about their appearance were spoken about for the 
first time; there was evidence o f significant, transformative and emotional learning. The 
learning aspect o f therapy was not just restricted to the clients, the therapists also commented
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on how their perspective on ‘disfigurement’ had changed, being with the client had affected a 
change in previously held beliefs.
Experiences that may precipitate the need for therapy were sub-divided into two main areas, 
the parents and the person with a facial difference. From the parents perspective, there was 
evidence that giving birth to a child with a facial difference was a difficult emotional 
experience, one that was not anticipated, and generally generated negative feelings within the 
extended family and from strangers. The label o f  ‘difference’ appeared to define the child. 
The parents concerns were perceived to be ongoing and each developmental stage created a 
new set o f potential difficulties.
The people with a facial difference exhibited an inability to learn from experience, for it 
appeared on the whole that previous negative experiences became the anticipated norm for 
the next experience o f meeting a similar set o f circumstances. There was as such an inability 
to experience their experience. Reactions from others, informed their response to others and 
these had implications for the perceived effects o f the facial difference; effects that were 
unique, and premised on previous experiences. It was recognised that there was a potential 
for an intergenerational transmission o f trauma from mother/parent to child, this may be 
either unconscious or conscious, and the implications for the child is that facial difference 
becomes a defining label, and there is an interruption to learning from experience.
When this phrase was deconstructed in the second cycle o f interpretation, it was recognised 
how this term is conferred by people without a facial difference, the dominant voice. The 
term is located in language and has multiple meanings, it is an erroneous concept for it exists 
in the minds o f people, it is a label that may define the person. Through the process o f  
therapy it may be possible for the person to challenge the label and become more open to the 
experience o f difference; to challenge their distortions in meaning making perspectives. 
Distortions premised on previous experiences that may have perpetuated the myth that facial 
difference defines the person.
Overall there was a recognition o f the need for therapy as a means to learning, to uncover the 
distortions in meaning making perspectives, and to relearn to experience their own 
experience. The need for therapy extended to both those with a facial difference, and parents 
o f a child with a facial difference. Therapy may facilitate a transition in how a person 
perceives facial difference; it need not define the person. Therapy may enable a person to 
explore their sense o f marginalisation; the sense o f being different, and how early 
experiences can create a sense o f difference and how further experiences reinforce this view,
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there is as such an inability to learn from experience. Therapy as a process may assist with a 
return to learning from experience and thereby address marginalisation at an individual and 
possibly societal level. Through the process o f therapy and the telling o f one’ s story and the 
learning emanating from this process, there is also the potential for an increase in mental 
well-being; an increase in self-esteem (Keyes 1998, Zika and Chamberlain 1992).
The information on people’ s experience o f therapy and experiences o f what may precipitate 
the need for therapy may be beneficial to people with a facial difference, and for people 
working in the field o f facial difference. The information provided here may enable them to 
gain an insight o f the potential needs o f  this client group and their families.
4. Areas for further study
In the field o f facial difference, this study seems to be indicating that there may be an 
intergenerational transmission o f trauma, and this merits further study. Is there a difference if 
the parent has had therapy? What o f the fathers perspective? How important are early 
experiences in mediating the effects o f facial difference? Would a comparative study 
undertaken with people who acquired the difference in later life and those born with a 
congenital difference provide further knowledge on this phenomenon?
Therapy as a means to learning, was identified in relation to people with facial difference, 
what o f other client groups? Or is labelling the client group a misnomer? Would it be helpful 
to explore how these ‘groups’ construe and own the groups’ label? Could the findings 
presented here be replicated in another group? What o f therapy as a means to learning for 
couples in therapy? For therapeutic groups? The training implications for offering therapeia 
could be another area that merits further study, how can the neophyte practitioner be 
introduced to providing therapy as a means to learning?
Could these findings be a springboard for developing a more quantitative study, 
acknowledging that this study has temporarily privileged the minority research voice. A 
larger study may provide further evidence on therapy as a means to learning. Alternatively a 
similar study could be carried out with clients in therapy, like Granfanki and McLeod’s 
(1998) study. There are many potential opportunities for developing this study, the 
methodological framework could be applied to other studies, to other methods. When 
research is viewed as work in progress there is an opening up to the possibility o f meaning 
making being an infinite process.
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5. Personal learning
As the study progressed I began to reflect on experiences as a therapist, identifying within 
the therapeutic relationship changes in client’s perspectives, and began to see these as 
evidence o f learning. There were examples o f how people were feeling different, initially 
positioning themselves in a rigid framework o f ‘its always been that way' then a transition to 
*well it could be different'. This transition was dependent on the exploration o f barriers to 
learning from experience. There was a gradual uncovering o f how these barriers had been 
formed, followed by a working through o f the distortions in meaning making perspectives. 
Through this process, there was a making conscious o f previous unconscious material, 
material that exerted an influence on behaviour. There was a change in perspective, an 
increased ability to leam from experience. The trajectory o f this change was not linear, but 
‘all over the place’ , a trajectory that was unique to the client, and unique to each therapeutic 
relationship; it could not be anticipated in advance. For there is a need to remain open to the 
process, to be with an other in the relationship. To create a space for the generation o f new 
meaning.
The continuing experience o f being a client, enabled me to recognise my own learning 
through the process o f  therapy. As such there was a recognition of my distortions in previous 
learning. Through the therapeutic relationship I began to recognise my own role in 
maintaining this status quo; a status quo founded on facial difference defining me. There was 
also a realisation that the status quo was founded on misconceptions and misperceptions, and 
that during childhood, socialisation experiences had been contributory factors in creating 
distortions in my meaning making perspectives. The distortions became entrenched with 
further experiences that reinforced this early learning. Therapy provided an environment that 
was conducive to exploring the distortions, to recognise how they were created, and then to 
challenge the beliefs and attitudes behind them. There was a freeing, a letting go o f 
distortions, a return to experiencing experience; therapy was a means to learning.
The experience o f interviewing people with a facial difference was also thought provoking, 
there was a sense on the one hand o f belonging to the ‘ same club’ and this may have 
somehow influenced the sharing o f people’s experience (Bola 1996). Yet when speaking to 
parents there was a sense o f hearing it from the ‘other side’ , a side that as yet I have not 
encountered. But who knows what the future holds, with the potential o f  being either a 
grandmother or great aunt to children with a facial difference. Perhaps this concern has been 
an unconscious influence (Walsh 1996), behind the inclusion o f people in the study who live 
with someone with a facial difference.
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T h e r e  h a s  b e e n  a n  i n c r e a s e  in  m y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  p o s t m o d e r n i s m  f o r  
r e s e a r c h .  M y  s t y l e  o f  w r i t i n g  c h a n g e d  a s  t h e  s t u d y  p r o g r e s s e d ,  i t  b e c a m e  m o r e  q u e s t i o n i n g  in  
t h e  l a t t e r  c h a p t e r s  a s  I g a i n e d  c o n f i d e n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o n c e p t ,  a n d  t h e  m a k i n g  k n o w n  o f  t h e  
s t r u g g l e  to  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  o t h e r .  A  s t r u g g l e  t h a t  i s  o n g o i n g ,  f o r  t h e  s t u d y ’ s  c o n c l u s i o n  
r e p r e s e n t s  a n  e n d i n g ,  a n  in  t h e  m o m e n t  e n d i n g .  T h e  l e a r n i n g  e m a n a t i n g  f r o m  t h e  s t u d y  h a s  
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  b e  o n g o i n g ,  f o r  m e a n i n g  m a k i n g  is  a  l i f e l o n g  p r o c e s s .
Conclusion
A  k e y  a s p e c t  to  t h e  s t u d y  w a s  in  r e l a t i o n  t o  d e v e l o p i n g  a  m e t h o d o l o g y  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  p o s e d :  I s  c o u n s e l l i n g / p s y c h o t h e r a p y  a  f o r m  o f  l e a r n i n g  f o r  p e o p l e  w i t h  a  f a c i a l  
d i f f e r e n c e ?  E x p l o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  f a v o u r e d  o v e r  a n s w e r i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  w h e r e  t o  
q u e s t i o n  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a  d e f i n i t i v e  a n s w e r  w i l l  b e  r e a c h e d .  R a t h e r  t h e  in t e n t i o n  w a s  t o  o p e n  a  
c o n v e r s a t i o n  o n  t h e r a p y  a s  a  f o r m  o f  r e t u r n i n g  t o  l e a r n i n g  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e .  A n  e x p l o r a t i o n  
t h a t  w a s  p r e m i s e d  o n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  m e a n i n g s ,  a n d  t h e  n e e d  t o  r e m a i n  o p e n  
t o  e x p e r i e n c e ;  f o r  t h e r e  t o  b e  a n  e m b r a c i n g  o f  h u m a n n e s s  o v e r  s c i e n c e  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y .  
W h e r e  s c i e n c e  a n d  t e c h n o l o g y  w a s  s e e n  t o  b e  a b o u t  r e p e a t a b i l i t y ,  c e r t a i n t y  a n d  s a m e n e s s ;  
h u m a n n e s s  w a s  s e e n  t o  b e  a b o u t  u n c e r t a i n t y  a n d  d i f f e r e n c e .
T h e  r e s e a r c h  p a r a d i g m  ( r e l a t i v i s t  o n t o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  i n t e r a c t i o n a l  s u b j e c t i v e  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  a n d  a  r e f l e x i v e  d i a l e c t i c a l  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e )  i n f o r m e d  
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  f r a m e w o r k  t o  g u i d e  t h i s  s t u d y .  T h e  m e t h o d  s e l e c t e d  t o  
g u id e  t h e  s t u d y  w a s  h e u r i s t i c s ,  h o w e v e r  a s  t h e  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  f r a m e w o r k  in c o r p o r a t e d  a  
s e c o n d  c y c l e  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  p l u s  a  c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  p r o c e s s ,  c o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  
m e t h o d  c a n  b e  v i e w e d  a s  p o s t - h e u r i s t i c .
T h e  m e a n i n g  g e n e r a t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y  w a s  p r e m i s e d  o n  t h e r a p y  a s  a  f o r m  
o f  l e a r n i n g .  T h e  p r i m a r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  i t  w a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  
e l e m e n t s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  t r a n s f o r m a t i v e  a n d  e m o t i o n a l  l e a r n i n g ;  t h e r a p y  w a s  a  f o r m  o f  
l e a r n i n g .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  e n a b l e d  f u r t h e r  m e a n i n g  t o  e m e r g e ,  t o  
r e c o g n i s e  t h e  r o l e  o f  u n c o n s c i o u s  p r o c e s s e s  in  m e a n i n g  m a k i n g ,  t h e r a p y  is  a  m eans to  
learn in g . W h e r e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o u t c o m e  is  a  r e t u r n  t o  l e a r n i n g  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e ;  f o r  th e  p e r s o n  
t o  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e i r  o w n  e x p e r i e n c e .
I n  r e la t i o n  t o  p e o p l e  w i t h  a  f a c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e ,  t h e  f i n d i n g s  p r o v i d e d  e v i d e n c e  o f  h o w  p r e v i o u s  
l e a r n i n g  e x p e r i e n c e s  c a n  c r e a t e  d i s t o r t i o n s  in  m e a n i n g  m a k i n g  p e r s p e c t i v e s ;  d i s t o r t i o n s  t h a t  
a r e  b a r r i e r s  to  l e a r n i n g  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e ,  f o r  t h e y  p r o v i d e  a  t e m p l a t e  f o r  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  
e x p e r i e n c e .  T h e r a p y  p r o v i d e s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  t h e  u n c o v e r i n g  a n d  w o r k i n g  t h r o u g h  o f
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d i s t o r t i o n s  t o  e n a b l e  a  r e t u r n  t o  l e a r n i n g  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e .  F o r  t h e  p e r s o n  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  t h e i r  
e x p e r i e n c e .  F a c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  p r e - t h e r a p y  is  a  l a b e l  t h a t  m a y  d e f i n e  a  p e r s o n ,  p o s t - t h e r a p y  
t h e r e  is  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  h o w  t h e  l a b e l  d o e s  n o t  n e e d  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  p e r s o n ;  t h e r e  is  a  r e t u r n  to  
l e a r n i n g  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e .
A  m o d e l  w a s  d e v e l o p e d  t o  e n a b l e  f u r t h e r  c o n v e r s a t i o n s  t o  b e  o p e n e d  u p  o n  t h e r a p y  a s  a  
m e a n s  t o  l e a r n i n g .  T h e  m o d e l  w a s  p r e m i s e d  o n  L e v i n a s '  e t h i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  a n d  B u b e r ’ s  ‘ I -  
I t ’ a n d  ‘ I - T h o u ’ r e la t i o n s h i p .  T h e r a p y  a s  a  m e a n s  t o  l e a r n i n g  c a n  r e p r e s e n t  a  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  
a n  ‘ I - I t ’ ( n o n - r e f l e c t i v e ) .  T o  a n  ‘ I - T h o u ’ ( r e f l e c t i v e ) .  T o  a  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o t h e r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  ( p r e - r e f l e c t i v e ) ,  a n d  e a c h  t r a n s i t i o n  o f f e r s  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  t o  r e t u r n  t o  l e a r n i n g  f r o m  
e x p e r i e n c e ;  t o  b e  m o r e  o p e n  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  o t h e r .
T h e  t r a j e c t o r y  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  i n q u i r y ,  h a s  b e e n  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  in  a  l i n e a r  f o r m a t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  
s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e s s  in  a c t i o n  c a n  b e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  p l o t  f o r  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e r e  
w a s  a  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  t r a j e c t o r y  w a s  ‘ a l l  o v e r  t h e  p l a c e ’ a n d  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h a t  t h e  
t r a j e c t o r y  w a s  s e q u e n t i a l  e a c h  s t a g e  b u i l d i n g  o n  t h e  n e x t .  T h i s  p a r a d o x  is  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  
t h e  d i l e m m a  w h e n  t r a n s l a t i n g  t h e  s a y i n g  ( i n  t h i s  c a s e  d o i n g  t h e  r e s e a r c h )  in t o  t h e  s a i d  
( r e c o u n t i n g  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  t h e  m e a n i n g  g e n e r a t e d  in  t h e  m a n y  i n - b e t w e e n s  i d e n t i f i e d  in  t h e  
r e s e a r c h  p r o c e s s ) .  In  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  t h e r e  is  a n  i n e v i t a b l e  g a p ,  f o r  w e  k n o w  m o r e  t h a n  w e  c a n  
t e l l ,  in  a t t e m p t i n g  to  d e s c r i b e  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  t h a t  w h i c h  t o o k  p l a c e ,  o r  t h e  m e a n i n g  t h a t  
e m e r g e d ,  t h e r e  is  a n  i r r e d u c i b l e  e le m e n t .
W h e n  t h e r e  is  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h i s  i n e v i t a b l e  g a p ,  t h e r e  is  a n  o p e n i n g  u p  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
m u l t i p l e  m e a n i n g s ;  r e s e a r c h  b e c o m e s  w o r k  in  p r o g r e s s ,  a n d  t h e  r e s e a r c h e r  c o n c u r s  w i t h  
F i n e ’ s  ( 1 9 9 8 : 1 4 0 )  s e n t i m e n t :
‘ O u r  w o r k  w i l l  “ n e v e r ”  a r r i v e  b u t  a l w a y s  m u s t  s t r u g g l e  “ b e t w e e n ”  ’ .
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